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PRINT Abstract 
The  impact  of  European  policy  developments,  or  Europeanisation,  upon  sub- 
national  authorities  (SNAs)  across  the  European  Union  has  been  subject  to 
considerable  debate  in  recent  years,  principally  as  a  consequence  of  the 
establishment  of  a  Single  European  Market  and  as  a  result,  of  Structural  Funds 
to  reduce  regional  disparities  within  the  European  Union.  These  developments 
have  led  to  a  widespread  mobilisation  of  SNAs  into  the  European  policy  process 
as  European  legislation  began  to  increasingly  impact  upon  the  responsibilities  of 
SNAs  and  as  the  European  Commission  became  an  important  source  of  finance 
within  the  sphere  of  economic  development. 
This  thesis  considers  the  impact  of  Europeanisation  upon  local  government  in  the 
West  of  Scotland  through  analysing  firstly,  the  response  of  Strathclyde  Regional 
Council  to  Europeanising  influences  and  the  policies  which  SRC  subsequently 
pursued  to  respond  to  these  developments.  The  impact  of  European  policies  as 
a  form  of  multi-level  governance  is  also  evaluated  through  research  into  the  role 
of  local  government  within  two  institutions  established  in  Strathclyde  to  deal  with 
aspects  of  European  policy  :-  Strathclyde  European  Partnership  and  the 
Ouverture  programme.  Lastly,  the  impact  of  local  government  reorganisation 
upon  SRC's  successor  unitary  authorities  to  engage  with  European  policy  is 
considered. 
The  research  findings  illustrate  that  the  process  of  Europeanisation  has 
developed  through  a  number  of  cyclical  stages  which  has  resulted  in  the 
development  of  changing  and  varying  responses  from  SNAs  to  European  policy 
developments.  The  initial  engagement  of  SRC  with  European  Institutions 
occurred  at  an  early  stage  as  the  Council  attempted  to  discover  new  sources  of 
finance.  The  pro-active  stance  of  the  Council  resulted  in  financial  benefits  for 
Strathclyde  but  also  an  increasing  engagement  within  SRC  with  European  policy 
as  the  Council  responded  to  the  emerging  Single  European  Market.  This 
engagement  also  led  SRC  to  attempt  to  utilise  a  variety  of  means  to  influence 
European  policy.  The  research  suggests  that  while  local  government  was  able  to 
influence  the  European  policy  process  this  tended  to  occur  where  European 
Commission  and  /  or  member-state(s)  interests  overlapped  with  those  of  local 
government.  While  multi-level  governance  exists  in  Western  Scotland,  the  key 
partners  remain  the  European  Commission  and  the  member  state. 
The  subsequent  reorganisation  of  local  government  resulted  in  a  diminished 
ability,  on  the  part  of  local  government.  in-Western  Scotland,  to  conduct  a 
European  policy  at  the  same  scale  as  hfidr^  'e  4ously  been  conducted  by  SRC. 
However,  the  reorganisation  of  local  gove 
ii 
nt  also  demonstrated  that  the 
European  function  had  become  an  integral  component  of  the  local  government 
policy  portfolio  in  Western  Scotland  despite  the  small  size  and  limited  finances  of 
SRC's  successor  authorities. 
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X Chanter  One  -  Introduction. 
1.1  -  Globalisation,  European  Integration  and  Regions. 
The  impact  of  globalisation  upon  regions  and  localities,  or'glocalisation'  (Peck 
and  Tickell,  1994,  p.  317)  has  been  widely  theorised  upon  in  terms  of  the 
geographical,  economic,  social  and  cultural  outcomes  of  these  processes.  The 
differentiated  impacts  of  globalisation  upon  regions  and  localities  has  also 
received  empirical  attention  (Amin  and  Thrift,  1994;  Dunford  and  Kafkalis,  1992) 
with  attempts  to  categorise  regions  and  localities  according  to  their  location  (or 
likely  position)  within  global  hierarchies  (Hebbert  and  Hansen,  1990;  Sassen, 
1991).  At  the  European  scale,  the  creation  of  a'Single  European  Market'  has 
again  shifted  attention  onto  the  regional  implications  of  a  European  market,  and 
latterly  of  political  integration  (European  Commission,  1991;  Dunford,  1993). 
Analysis  of  this  kind  in  particular  has  attempted  to  map  economic  disparities 
between  regions  resulting  in  discussions  of  core  and  peripheral  regions  (Keeble 
et.  al,  1988),  regions  which  are  'winning  and  losing'  (Dunford,  1994)  and  of 
grouping  of  regions  at  the  EU  level  with  similar  economic  characteristics  resulting 
in  terms  such  as  "European  super  regions"  (Gripaios  and  Mangles,  1993; 
Masser,  1992). 
The  impact  of  globalisation  upon  political  structures  has  tended  to  focus  upon  the 
impact  of  such  trends  upon  the  `sovereignty'  of  the  state  (Camilleri  and  Falk, 
1992)  as  global  processes  result  in  a  `hollowing  out'  of  state  power  as  areas  of 
policy  competences  are  removed  away  from  the  state  to  international  or  supra- 
national  institutions,  sub-national  institutions  and  to  governance  arrangements 
drawing  the  private  sector  into  policy  fields  previously  reserved  to  the  state.  For 
example  Jessop  (1993)  comments  that  :  - 
"The  nation  state  is  subject  to  various  changes  leading  to  its'hollowing  out'.  This 
does  not  mean  that  the  national  state  has  lost  all  importance  but  its  capacities  to 
project  power  even  within  its  own  national  boundaries  are  becoming  ever  more 
limited  due  to  a  complex  displacement  of  powers  upward,  downward,  and  to 
some  extent,  outward....  For  the  national  state's  tendential  loss  of  autonomy creates  both  the  need  for  supranational  coordination  and  the  space  for 
subnational  resurgence"  (Jessop,  1993,  p.  10). 
The  increasing  pace  of  European  integration  post  1986,  is  frequently  alluded  to 
as  an  example  of  such  processes  at  the  European  scale  for  instance  Rosamond 
(1995)  comments  that  :- 
"The  observation  that  national  and  subnational  identities  are  reimagined  as 
awareness  of  external,  globalising  'threats'  takes  place  could  be  usefully  applied 
to  the  politics  of  nationalism  within  the  EU,  where  the  notion  of  'globalisation'  is 
replaced  by  ideas  of  'Europeanisation'  and  'Europeanising'  dynamics" 
(Rosamond,  1995,  p.  401). 
More  directly  the  impact  of  globalisation  and  European  integration  have  been 
considered  as  causal  factors  resulting  in  a  restructuring  of  territorial  structures 
within  states  where  "European  integration  has  further  enhanced  the  importance 
of  regions,  in  the  political  and  economic  domains,  and  produced  a  new  dynamic" 
(Keating  and  Hooghe,  1996,  p.  217).  Events  at  the  global  and  European  scale 
allied  to  a  resurgence  of  regionalism  and  nationalism  within  Western  European 
states  has  led  to  a  reassessment  of  the  importance  of  'place'  (Agnew,  1987)  and 
regions  as  significant  actors  with  a  new  European  polity.  Such  a  dynamic  has 
been  envisaged  and  conceptualised  in  many  ways  resulting  in  terms  such  as  a 
'Europe  of  the  Regions'  (Coombes,  1991),  'variable  geometry  state  order 
(Keating,  1992,  p.  60)  and  'multi-level  governance'  (Marks,  1992).  Such 
terminology  attempts  to  capture  changing  region-state  relations  as  a 
consequence  of  European  integration  and  globalisation.  For  instance  Keating 
(1996)  describes  :  - 
"a  complex  political  order  in  which  European  politics  are  regionalised;  regional 
politics  are  Europeanised;  and  national  politics  are  both  Europeanised  and 
regionalised"  (Keating,  1996,  p.  51). 
Underpinning  such  analyses  is  a  recognition  of  a  refocussing  of  attention  onto 
the  sub-national  scale  as  an  arena  which  may  shed  considerable  light  upon  the 
changing  territorial  relationships  occurring  within  nation-states.  As  Keating  and 
Loughlin  (1997,  p.  1)  put  it  :-  "The  regional  question  is  once  again  on  the  social 
science  and  political  agendas  in  Europe  and  North  America".  This  thesis 
2 considers  the  'place'  of  Strathclyde  Region  between  1975  and  1997  within  this 
emergent  polity  in  terms  of  the  impact  of  European  policies  upon  the  region  and 
as  an  institution  within  a  larger  region  /  nation  in  which  territorial  politics  (in  the 
UK  state)  became  re-emphasised.  Prior  to  discussing  the  position  of  Strathclyde 
Region  within  Scotland  and  the  UK,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  term  'region'  is 
itself  contested  and  subject  to  a  variety  of  interpretations  dependent  upon  the 
context  within  which  it  is  used.  BAs  Harvie  (1994)  observes,  "Region  implies  a 
division  of  government"  (Harvie,  1994,  p.  10)  and  it  is  this  administrative  definition 
of  a  region  which  I  adopt  in  this  thesis. 
1.2.1  -  Locating  Strathclyde  `Region'. 
Strathclyde  Regional  Council  (SRC)  emerged  out  of  the  Wheatley  Commission 
(1969)  becoming  operational  in  1975  as  the  largest  Scottish  local  authority, 
accounting  for  nearly  half  the  national  population.  The  1975  Reform  of  Local 
Government  devised  a  two-tier  structure  with  the  Regional  Councils  responsible 
for  a  wide  range  of  services  including  :-  strategic  planning,  industrial 
development,  highways,  transport,  water  and  sewerage,  education,  social  work, 
police  and  fire,  and  consumer  protection2.  The  size  and  strategic  competences 
of  SRC  made  it  one  of  the  largest  local  authorities  in  Europe  for  the  period  of  its 
existence.  From  1975  to  1996,  SRC  was  constantly  controlled  by  the  Labour 
party  which  held  a  massive  majority  of  the  councillors  on  the  council  with  the 
scope  for  effective  opposition  from  other  parties  minimal.  Figure  1.1  displays  the 
two-tier  structure  of  local  government  between  1975  and  1996. 
I  Keating  and  Loughlin  (1997)  provide  a  useful  typology  of  the  many  forms  in  which  regions  can 
be  defined. 
2  District  Councils  had  a  range  of  competences  which  were  non-strategic,  the  most  important  of 
which  both  politically  and  financially  was  the  responsibility  for  housing  policy. 
3 Figure  1.1  -  The  Structure  of  Local  Government  in  Scotland,  1975-96. 
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ý  ý(  )I  )If  ý,  1'ý  o  idlý()ý  ;/II  iý  ý  0,1)  1  Hl'  ý The  location  of  Strathclyde  (and  Scotland)  on  the  North  Western  periphery  of 
Europe  resulted  in  SRC  being  less  likely  to  benefit  from  the  creation  of  a  Single 
European  Market  whilst  the  deindustrialisation  of  the  region  gathered  pace  during 
the  1980s  ensuring  that  unemployment  in  Strathclyde  was  constantly  higher  than 
that  in  both  Scotland  and  Great  Britain  throughout  the  period  of  the  council's 
existence.  Figure  1.2  compares  unemployment  rates  between  Strathclyde, 
Scotland  and  Great  Britain  from  1977-95  whilst  Figure  1.3,  compares 
unemployment  rates  in  Strathclyde  with  those  from  other  'selected'  industrial 
regions  in  Europe  between  1983  and  1993.  A  further  sign  of  the  severe 
economic  dislocation  within  the  region  as  a  consequence  of  deindustrialisation  is 
apparent  from  the  fall  in  total  population  within  the  region  from  2.47  million  in 
1977  to  2.3  million  in  1991,  a  fall  of  6.9%  (Strathclyde  Economic  Trends,  1995, 
p.  25).  Furthermore,  GDP  per  head  was  consistently  below  the  EU  average. 
Figure  1.4  compares  GDP  per  head  in  Strathclyde  with  that  in  other'selected' 
industrial  regions  and  the  EU  average  in  1981  and  1991. 
5 Figure  1.2  -  Unemployment  in  Strathclyde  Region,  Scotland,  and  Great 
Britain,  1977-95.20 
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Figure  1.3  -  Unemployment  in  Strathclyde  and  `selected'  industrial  regions 
in  Europe,  1983-93. 
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Clearly  the  size  and  the  range  of  strategic  functions  which  SRC  possessed 
enabled  the  Council  to  be  a  significant  actor  within  the  Scottish  political 
environment.  The  extent  of  economic  dislocation  within  the  Region  ensured  that 
economic;  development  /  regeneration  was  a  constant  policy  priority  of  the 
Council  throughout  its  existence.  Local  government  in  Scotland  was  again 
reorganised  in  1996,  with  the  area  formerly  covered  by  SRC  being  divided 
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0  1081     1901 Europeanisation  of  a  large,  strategic  sub-national  authority  (SNA),  and  latterly  of 
smaller,  unitary  authorities  subject  to  both  global  and  European  economic 
change  provides  the  backcloth  to  this  research. 
1.2.2  -  Scotland,  the  Union  State  and  Europe. 
Despite  the  centralized  structure  of  government  in  the  UK  prior  to  1997,  a 
significant  degree  of  territorial  variation  existed  within  central  government  through 
the  existence  of  the  Northern  Ireland,  Scottish  and  Welsh  Departments  of  State 
resulting  in  the  use  of  the  term  'union  state'  (Rokkan  and  Urwin,  1982),  as 
opposed  to  unitary  state,  to  convey  this  variation.  The  Scottish  Office  has  been 
responsible  for  a  steadily  increasing  set  of  policy  responsibilities  since  1885,  with 
this  process  of  administrative  devolution  accelerating  considerably  post-1945. 
The  extent  of  this  variation  between  policy-making  and  primarily  implementation 
between  Scotland  and  the  rest  of  the  UK  has  been  the  subject  of  considerable 
debate  (Kellas,  1990;  Midwinter  et.  al.  1991).  Local  government  represents  a  key 
symbol  of  Scottish  political  differentiation  as  a  result  of  Scotland  having  a  system 
and  structure  of  local  government  distinct  from  that  in  the  rest  of  the  UK.  In 
terms  of  Europe,  the  UK  Government  position  placed  Scottish  interests  firmly 
within  the  context  of  the  'union  state'  as  :  - 
"The  Secretary  of  State's  membership  of  the  Government  of  one  of  the  most 
influential  EC  Member  States  ensures  Scotland  a  strong  voice  in  formulating 
Community  policy.  The  Scottish  Office  participates  fully  in  the  UK  governmental 
machinery  which  determines  the  UK  negotiating  stance  in  determining  EC 
discussions"  (Scottish  Office,  1993,  p.  21). 
Scotland  was  not  immune  from  the  rise  of  regionalism  /  nationalism  apparent  in 
the  rest  of  Western  Europe  from  the  1960s  onwards.  Demands  for  a  greater 
degree  of  Scottish  autonomy,  whether  within  or  outwith  the  UK,  became  a  central 
feature  of  Scottish  political  debate.  Between  1975  and  1997,  demands  for 
constitutional  change  peaked  in  1979  and  then  subsided  following  the  lack  of  a 
sufficient  majority  in  favour  of  devolution  in  the  Referendum  of  that  year  and  the 
election  of  a  Conservative  Government  resolutely  opposed  to  home  rule. 
Devolution  was  back  on  the  agenda  by  the  mid-1980s  and  remained  there 
8 throughout  the  period  of  this  study.  Europe  was  a  central  element  of  the 
constitutional  debate  following  the  SNP  in  1988  adopting  a  policy  of 
`Independence  in  Europe'  instead  of  outright  independence.  The  policy  change 
placed  Europe  at  the  centre  of  Scottish  constitutional  debate  and  enabled  the 
SNP  to  appear  as  "a  modern,  progressive  force..  [whilst  also]  providing  an  answer 
to  the  'separatist  jibe'"  (Mitchell,  1996,  p.  234).  The  new  policy  also  reflected 
changing  attitudes  in  Scotland  towards  'Europe'  probably  as  a  result  of 
widespread  opposition  to  the  Conservative  government  within  Scotland  by  the 
1980s.  For  instance  Keating  comments  that  :  - 
"Class,  sectoral,  partisan  and  territorial  oppositions  have  thus  moved  from 
hostility  to  the  Community  to  seeing  it  as  a  means  of  outflanking  a  centralising, 
right  wing  UK  government"  (Keating,  1996,  p.  185). 
Local  government  represented  a  key  arena  within  which  conflict  between  central 
government  and  Scottish  opposition  groups  emerged,  notably  with  regard  to  the 
poll  tax,  water  privatisation  and  indeed  local  government  reorganisation.  More 
generally  the  approach  of  central  government  towards  Scottish  local  government 
was  frequently  viewed  by  Government  critics  as  representing  an  attack  upon  the 
post-war  welfare  consensus  in  Scotland  via  the  imposition  of  'alien'  Thatcherite 
New  Right  polices  with  regard  to  local  government  (Brown,  et.  al.,  1998). 
However,  whilst  the  broad  direction  of  policy  with  regard  to  local  government 
pursued  by  the  Conservative  government  in  England  was  largely  followed  in 
Scotland,  such  as  council  house  sales  and  the  introduction  of  compulsory 
competitive  tendering,  the  extent  of  this'  process  was  mediated  and  limited  by  the 
Scottish  Office  in  areas  such  as  opting  out  and  water  privatisation  (Midwinter, 
1995).  Nevertheless,  central-local  relations  during  the  majority  of  the  period  on 
which  this  research  is  based  "have  been  uniquely  conflictual  and-the  standing 
and  status  of  elected  local  authorities  has  been  subject  to  a  more  aggressive 
attack  from  the  centre"  (Stoker,  1991,  p.  12)  as  compared  to  the  rest  of  Europe. 
The  United  Kingdom  has  frequently  been  viewed  as  anomalous  in  terms  of  the 
territorial  distribution  of  powers  within  the  state,  in  comparison  with  other 
9 European  states  which  have  tended  to  introduce  decentralised  structures  of 
government,  particularly  since  the  late  1960s.  Even  in  terms  of  local  government 
(as  opposed  to  federal  governments  such  as  the  German  Lander  and  Spanish 
Autonomous  Communities)  the  UK  was  portrayed  as  out  of  step  in  the  period 
pre-1997.  For  instance,  Blair  (1991)  comments  :  - 
"local  government  in  continental  Europe  and  in  Britain  is  moving  in  quite  different 
directions.  Where  in  the  one  case  there  are  numerous  instances  of 
decentralisation  of  powers  and  transfer  of  functions  from  state  administrations  to 
the  local  authorities,  in  the  other  there  is  a  reduction  of  local  responsibility 
through  privatisation  or  transfer  to  appointed  bodies"  (Blair,  1991,  p.  56). 
The  centralised  nature  of  the  UK  state  pre-1997,  led  to  an  apparent  paradox  for 
UK  analyses  of  Europeanisation,  namely  "the  Europeanisation  of  sub-national 
government  in  the  context  of  a  strengthened  and  centralising  national  state" 
(John,  1996,  p.  131).  The  position  of  sub-national  actors  in  Scotland,  and  to  a 
lesser  extent  Wales,  becomes  more  complex  given  the  territorial  identities  and 
demands  emerging  from  these  nations  during  the  period  in  which  the  research 
was  conducted.  This  thesis  considers  the  experience  of  local  government  in  the 
West  of  Scotland,  within  this  paradoxical  context,  as  a  significant  sub-national 
actor  within  a  centralised  state  and  a  nation  /  region  subject  to  global  and 
European  economic  change  from  the  top-down  and  demands  for  increased 
autonomy  from  the  bottom-up  between  1975  and  1997.  It  is  to  the  structure  of 
this  thesis  that  I  now  intend  to  turn. 
1.3  -  Thesis  Structure. 
Following  on  from  the  discussion  above,  Chapter  Two  considers  the  meaning  of 
'Europeanisation'  in  relation  to  local  government  prior  to  considering  a  number  of 
conceptualisations  of  the  role  of  sub-national  actors  within  the  European  Union. 
In  particular,  the  chapter  examines  'Multi-Level  Governance'  as  a  framework  of 
analysis  with  which  to  analyse  some  facets  of  SRC's  European  policy.  The 
process  of  Europeanisation  as  experienced  by  local  authorities  in  the  UK  is 
discussed  drawing  attention  to  the  different  form  which  this  process  took  post- 
1986  following  the  implementation  of  the  Single  European  Act  (1986)  and 
10 Maastricht  Treaty  (1992).  Finally  the  role  of  the  Scottish  Office  with  regard  to 
European  policy  is  considered,  prior  to  a  range  of  research  themes  being 
established  upon  which  the  subsequent  research  is  based. 
Chapter  Three  deals  primarily  with  the  methodological  approaches  utilised  in 
order  to  address  the  research  themes  established  in  Chapter  Two.  However  the 
chapter  initially  considers  these  research  themes  in  more  detail,  and  divides 
these  themes  into  two  categories  :-  issues  surrounding  Europeanisation  and 
questions  dealing  with  Multi-Level  Governance.  A  specific  set  of  research 
questions,  which  are  addressed  in  the  subsequent  chapters,  are  then  developed. 
Subsequently  the  rationale  for  the  selection  of  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  as  a 
suitable  case-study  of  the  twin  processes  of  Europeanisation  and  Multi-Level 
Governance  is  considered.  The  research  methods  adopted  in  this  study  are  then 
discussed  which  ranged  from  documentary  analysis  and  participant  observation 
to  the  use  of  elite  interviewing  and  questionnaires.  The  various  stages  of  the 
research  process  are  considered  with  particular  attention  being  paid  to  the 
selection  of  respondents  at  each  period  in  the  three  distinct  phases  of  the 
research. 
Chapter  Four  deals  with  the  internal  impact  of  Europeanisation  upon  Strathclyde 
Regional  Council.  Firstly,  the  influence  of  European  policy  upon  SRC  in  the 
period  prior  to  1986  is  considered  with  a  particular  focus  on  the  accessing  of 
EEC  finance  and  the  process  surrounding  the  establishment  of  a  European  Unit 
within  SRC  and  of  a  representative  office  in  Brussels.  Secondly,  the 
development  of  SRC's  European  policy  post-1986  is  evaluated,  focusing 
particularly  on  the  changing  role  of  SRC's  representative  office;  the  participation 
of  the  Council  within  trans-regional  networks;  and  finally,  the  changing  structures 
established  within  SRC  to  deal  with  European  policy  post-1986. 
Chapters  Five  and  Six  are  both  concerned  with  the  experience  of  Strathclyde 
Regional  Council  within  Multi-Level  Governance  institutions.  Chapter  Five  deals 
11 with  the  evolution  of  partnership  arrangements  in  Strathclyde  from  1985  to  1996. 
Three  principal  forms  of  partnership  developed  during  this  time-period,  and  the 
influence  of  SRC,  Scottish  Office  and  European  Commission  upon  the  evolution 
of  partnership  in  Strathclyde  is  considered  in  detail.  Chapter  Six  deals  with  the 
role  of  SRC  within  the  (Ecos-)  Ouverture  programme.  In  particular,  the  chapter 
deals  with  the  changing  power  relations  within  (Ecos-)  Ouverture  between  sub- 
national  authorities  (SNAs)  and  the  Commission  and  amongst  SNAs  involved 
within  the  programme  and  considers  these  experiences  against  the  framework  of 
Multi-Level  Governance. 
Chapter  Seven  deals  with  the  ability  of  SRC  to  influence  the  European  policy 
process  via  formal  and  informal  mechanisms.  Firstly,  SRC's  participation  Wthin 
trans-regional  networks  is  evaluated  focusing  primarily  upon  its  role  within  two 
networks  :-  the  Assembly  of  European  Regions  (AER)  and  the  Traditional 
Industrial  Regions  of  Europe  (RETI).  Secondly,  the  role  of  SRC's  representative 
office  as  a  means  of  influence  is  evaluated.  Finally,  the  role  of  informal  networks 
as  a  means  of  influence  is  considered,  concentrating  mainly  on  the  existence  of 
Strathclyde-wide  and  Scottish  networks  with  regard  to  European  policy. 
Chapter  Eight  analyses  the  impact  of  local  government  reorganisation  upon  the 
ability  of  local  government  in  the  West  of  Scotland  to  maintain  a  European  policy. 
The  chapter  begins  by  considering  the  broader  debate  surrounding  the  'need'  for 
reorganisation  and  the  consideration  given  to  European  policy  during  this  period. 
The  impact  of  reorganisation  is  considered  across  three  axes.  Firstly,  the  extent 
to  which  SRC's  twelve  successor  authorities  maintained  a  European  function  and 
the  form  this  took.  Secondly,  the  effect  of  reorganisation  upon  local  government 
participation  within  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership  and  Ecos-Ouverture 
programme.  Finally,  the  ability  of  local  government  of  Western  Scotland  to 
articulate  interests  vis-a-vis  European  Institutions  following  reorganisation. 
12 Chapter  Nine  then  provides  a  synthesis  of  the  conclusions  reached  in  the 
previous  chapters,  whilst  setting  the  research  findings  firmly  within  the  framework 
of  the  research  questions  established  in  Chapters  Two  and  Three.  This  final 
chapter  also  briefly  considers  the  role  of  local  government  in  Scotland  with 
regard  to  European  policy  following  devolution. 
13 Chapter  Two  -  The  Europeanisation  of  Local  Government. 
2.1  -  Introduction. 
'Europeanisation'  can  imply  a  number  of  meanings,  dependent  upon  the  context 
in  which  it  is  used.  For  instance,  in  relation  to  member-states,  'Europeanisation' 
refers  to:  - 
"an  incremental  process  reorienting  the  direction  and  shape  of  politics  to  the 
degree  that  EC  political  and  economic  dynamics  become  part  of  the 
organisational  logic  of  national  politics  and  policy-making".  (Ladrech,  1994,  p.  69). 
In  terms  of  sub-national  authorities  (SNAs),  the  'process'  of  Europeanisation,  in 
its  most  limited  sense  refers  to  "a  collection  of  processes"  (John,  1996,  p.  133), 
ranging  from  an  awareness  of  EU  legislation,  accessing  EU  funds,  networking 
with  other  SNAs,  through  to  the  establishment  of  regional  offices  in  Brussels, 
implying  the  lobbying  of  EU  institutions  and  thus  possibly  leading  to  the  by-pass 
of  national  governments  (see  Goldsmith,  1993).  It  is  not  necessary  for  a  SNA  to 
carry  out  all  of  these  functions  for  Europeanisation  to  be  occurring,  these  merely 
represent  a  broad  characterisation  of  the  activities  which  SNAs  have  become 
involved  in. 
Engagement  with  the  EU  amongst  SNAs,  has  increased  markedly  since  the 
introduction  of  the  Single  European  Act  (1986)  and  the  Maastricht  Treaty  (1993). 
As  Bongers  dramatically  noted  in  1990  :- 
"The  completion  of  the  Single  European  Market  will  bring  major  changes  in  the 
way  in  which  the  UK  is  governed.  These  changes  will  affect  every  sector  of 
society,  they  will  affect  every  service  provided  by  local  government  and, 
potentially  at  least,  they  will  affect  the  constitutional  position  of  local  government 
in  its  relationship  to  the  state".  (Bongers,  1990,  p.  1). 
Whilst  Bongers  may  have  over-emphasised  the  importance  of  these  two 
legislative  'events',  they  do  represent  the  key  moments  in  terms  of  transforming 
the  nature  of  SNA  -  EU  relations.  The  Single  European  Act  brought  home  clearly 
(to  those  not  already  aware)  to  local  authorities,  the  necessity  of  being'in  touch' 
with  potential  EU  legislation,  due  to  the  range  of  local  authority  competences 
over  which  Single  Market  legislation  took  'precedence'.  In  relation  to  this,  the 
14 need  for'regional  cohesion'  within  a  single  market,  and  the  accordingly  enlarged 
budget  of  the  Structural  Funds  from  1988  onwards,  ensured  that  UK  local 
authorities  would  look  to  Brussels  for'finance',  in  a  period  of  fiscal  retrenchment 
at  the  national  level.  In  addition,  the  reforms  included  the  adoption  of  the 
'partnership'  principle  concerning  the  requirement  that  sub-national  actors  be 
involved  in  the  implementation  of  the  Structural  Funds  (Armstrong,  1995, 
Keating,  1995;  Marks,  1993).  Equally,  the  Maastricht  Treaty  signalled  the 
emergence  of  SNAs  onto  the  European  scene  in  a  formal  sense,  through  the 
creation  of  the'Committee  of  the  Regions'  (CoR)4.  Also  included  within  the 
Maastricht  Treaty,  were  clauses  concerning  'subsidiarity'  (Scott  et.  al.,  1994). 
Traditionally,  analyses  of  the  EU  policy  process,  have  been  dominated  by  state- 
centric  conceptions  of  decision-making,  most  notably  between  functionalist  /  neo- 
functionalist  versus  liberal-intergovernmentalist  accounts  of  policy-making  (see 
Haas,  1968,  Moravcsik,  1993;  George,  1991).  However,  the  increasing 
mobilisation  of  SNAs,  particularly  in  the  late  1980s,  has  resulted  in  a  number  of 
conceptual  frameworks  being  developed  to  account  for  these  developments,  and 
to  attempt  to  assess  the  ability  of  SNAs  to  feed  their  interests  into  the  EU  policy 
process.  These  models  are  by  the  nature  of  the  subject  matter  exploratory,  and 
have  been  subject  to  a  process  of  continuous  reformulation  in  recent  years,  as 
the  literature  upon  SNA  activity  within  Europe  has  expanded.  I  intend  to  discuss 
the  literature  surrounding  some  of  the  models  which  have  been  utilised  to 
structure  research  upon  SNA  activity,  before  proceeding  to  focus  upon  the  most 
frequently  adopted  approach  of  'Multi-Level  Governance'.  Thereafter,  I  will 
outline  the  experience  of  UK  SNA's  in  this  area,  through  reference  to  existing 
research  upon  Europeanisation. 
2.2.1  -  Towards  a  Framework  of  Analysis  ? 
A  wide  variety  of  explanations  have  been  offered  as  to  the  extending  role  of 
SNAs,  within  the  EU  policy  process  however,  they  can  be'collapsed'  into  three 
main  categories.  Firstly,  'Third  Level'  accounts,  most  commonly  articulated 
through  the  term  :  'A  Europe  of  the  Regions'.  Secondly,  through  the  lens  of 
'para-diplomacy',  and  finally,  through  the  framework  of  'multi-level  governance'. 
4  The  Committee  of  the  Regions  (CoR)  is  not  an  EU  Institution  in  a  'formal'  sense,  rather  it  is  a 
consultative  body,  consisting  of  regional  and  local  representatives,  with  the  role  of  discussing  EU 
policies  that  have  a'regional  dimension'.  (see  Van  Der  Knaap,  1994;  McCarthy,  1996). 
15 2.2.2  -  The'Third  Level' 
Initial  attempts  to  conceptualise  the  increasing  involvement  of  SNA's  in  extra- 
territorial  activities  tended  to  rely  upon  a  'functionalist'  logic,  whereby  the 
'spillover'  (Haas,  1968)  of  functions  at  the  EU  scale,  also  involved  a  devolving  of 
powers  to  sub-national  levels,  in  order  to  maintain  legitimacy  and  fill  the 
'democratic  deficit'  (Martin,  1990).  The  most  prominent  example  of  such  thinking, 
coalesced  around  the  slogan:  -'a  Europe  of  the  Regions'.  Such  ideas  were  not 
entirely  new,  indeed  Rhodes  criticised  the  "considerable  ambiguity  in  the  notion 
of  a'Europe  of  the  Regions"'  in  1974  (Rhodes,  1974,  p.  105),  whilst  also  drawing 
attention  to  the  not  inconsiderable  difficulty  in  determining  what  constituted  a 
'region',  and  to  the  wide  variations  in  power  amongst  SNAs  across  Europe. 
These  depictions  of  the  role  of  SNAs  within  Europe  were  not  intended  to  describe 
current  reality,  but  rather  to  set  out  an  idealistic  vision  of  an  alternative'  Europe' 
to  that  being  constructed  by  EU  member-states.  As  such,  "the  vague  and 
overworked  slogan  of  a'Europe  of  the  Regions"'  (Jeffrey,  1996a,  p.  57)5  was  less 
an  attempt  to  conceptualise  SNA  -  EU  relations,  but  rather  a'call  to  arms'  for 
SNAs,  as  the  EU  began  to  increasingly  influence  their  activities  and  sub-national 
actors  mobilised  as  a  result.  Accordingly,  the  vision  of  a'Europe  of  the  Regions' 
was  operationalised  through  the  conception  of  the  'Third  Level'  by  a  wide  range 
of  SNAs  in  the  negotiations  leading  up  to  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  6  Sub-national 
lobbying  appeared  to  result  in  the  creation  of  the  'Committee  of  the  Regions'  and 
the  inclusion  of  subsidiarity  clauses  within  the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
However,  whilst  Third  Level  conceptions  do  not  provide  an  analytical  framework, 
they  did  connect  with  wider  debates,  notably  those  surrounding  globalisation,  and 
the  posited  interplay  between  the  global  and  the  local  (see  Chapter  One). 
Keating  (1995)  draws  upon  these  themes  when  he  attempts  to  steer  a  middle 
course  through  the  two  competing  hypotheses  that  European  integration  is  a 
5  Jeffrey  (1996b)  draws  a  distinction  between  the  usage  of  the  Third  Level'  in  the  form  of 
proclamations  concerning  proclamations  of  a  'Europe  of  the  Regions',  and  a  more  'neutral'  usage 
of  the  term  Third  Level'  which  is  intended  to  "describe  the  various  and  many  forms  of  European 
engagement  of  regional  and  other  sub-national  authorities"  (Jeffrey,  1996b,  p.  213).  However, 
this  neutral  usage  of  the  term,  merely  provides  a  descriptive  function,  rather  than  containing  any 
conceptual  underpinnings. 
6  The  term  'Third  Level'  refers  to  the  scenario  whereby  the  EU  would  develop  a  structure  where 
the  regions'  (Third  Level)  would  be  present  in  European  negotiations  along  with  the  European 
Institutions  (First  Level)  and  Member-States  (Second  Level).  Most  prominent  amongst  sub- 
national  actors  in  lobbying  for  such  an  outcome,  were  the  German  Lander  and  the  Belgian 
regions  and  communities.  For  a  fuller  account,  see  Jeffrey,  1996b. 
16 process  which  maintains  the  state  (and  perhaps  has  rescued  it,  Milward,  1992)  or 
that  European  integration  and  regionalism  will  result  in  the'end'  of  the  state,  as  it 
loses  authority  and  competences  to  political  regimes  from  above  and  below. 
Instead  he  argues  that  while  states  control  the  broad  thrust  of  policy  and  'events', 
nevertheless  such  control  is  not  absolute,  to  the  extent  that  some  concessions 
have  been  made  by  states,  which  may  not  have  been  desired.  This  may  be  due 
to  either  territorial  demands  or  by  external  economic  and  strategic  interests.  To 
this  extent  :- 
"the  processes  and  institutions  of  European  integration  and  regionalism  have 
brought  into  being  new  actors  and  new  networks  which  themselves  become  an 
element  in  the  political  game"  (Keating,  1995,  p.  11). 
However,  given  the  rather  grand  claims  of  'Third  Level'  proclamations,  it  was 
inevitable  that  a  rather  more  cautious  conceptualisation  of  the  role  of  SNAs  within 
Europe  would  be  necessary. 
2.2.3  -  Paradiplomacy. 
'Paradiplomacy  refers  to  policies  carried  out  by  SNAs  which  may  be  "parallel  to, 
often  co-ordinated  with,  complementary  to,  and  sometimes  in  conflict  with  centre- 
to-centre  macro-diplomacy"  (Duchacek,  1990,  p.  32).  The  concept  has  emerged 
through  the  study  of  the  external  activities  of  states  in  the  US  and  Canadian 
provinces,  with  a  concentration  upon  the  activities  of  the  external  trade  offices  of 
North  American  sub-national  authorities.  As  a  result,  studies  of  para-diplomacy 
tend  to  focus  upon  the  direct  interactions  between  SNAs  and  foreign  institutions, 
without  any  mediating  role  being  performed  by  the  nation-state.  Particular 
emphasis  is  placed  upon  the  impact  of  globalisation  upon  sub-national  actors,  as 
the  'complex  interdependence'  (Keohane  and  Nye,  1989,1991;  Soldatos,  1993) 
of  the  world  economy  motivates  states  and  provinces  to  follow  a  trade  policy 
more  closely  focused  upon  the  requirements  of  the  locality,  in  order  to  cope  with 
economic  restructuring.  As  Brown  and  Fry  comment  :- 
"regionalism  is  also  being  globalised  and  is  contributing  to  the  explosion  of 
'subgroupism".  (Brown  and  Fry,  1993,  p.  7). 
Whilst  globalisation  is  central  to  the  development  of  paradiplomatic  activities, 
other  factors  may  also  spur  such  action,  such  as,  the  existence  of  a  regional 
17 identity  which  enables  elites  to  perceive  that  their  interests  are  divergent  from 
national  policy;  the  existence  of  sub-national  elites  within  an  institutional 
structure,  may  encourage  the  desire  to  carry  out  new  functions,  such  as 
operating  within  the  international  sphere;  the  search  for  new  sources  of  finance  in 
order  to  fund  public  policies;  and  finally,  where  regional  interests  are  not  viewed 
as  being  represented  by  or  are  disadvantaged  by  national  policy  (see  Soldatos, 
1990).  Keating  (1999)  views  paradiplomacy  as  a  strategy  via  which  SNAs  can 
obtain  support  /  resources  to  support  economic,  cultural  /  linguistic  or  political 
agendas  or  strategies. 
The  concept  of  paradiplomacy  has  lent  itself  to  the  study  of  European  SNAs7,  in 
relation  to  the  role  and  function  of  sub-national  offices  based  in  Brussels  (John, 
1994;  Mitchell,  1994).  However,  paradiplomacy  has  been  developed  primarily 
within  a  North  American  context,  which  as  a  result  emphasises  direct  contacts 
between  sub-national  actors  and  foreign  institutions.  This  is  a  rather  uncommon 
scenario  within  the  EU,  where  sub-national  activities  tend  to  be  mediated,  to  at 
least  some  extent,  through  state  channels.  As  a  result,  "little  evidence  would 
seem  to  exist  for  a  North  American  style  paradiplomacy  within  the  EU"  (Jeffrey, 
1996b,  p.  214).  In  addition,  the  term  `paradiplomacy'  has  been  viewed  as  difficult 
to  define  (Aldecoa  and  Keating,  1999)  in  terms  of  the  area  of  activity  which 
paradiplomacy  refers  to  and  the  type  of  actors  /  organisations  which  engage  in 
paradiplomatic  activity.  For  instance  Keating  (1999)  comments  that  : 
"Paradiplomacy  is  part  of  a  broadening  of  the  universe  of  international  affairs,  in 
which  states  are  no  longer  the  sole  actors.  Regions  operate  alongside  firms, 
trade  unions,  social  movements  and  transnational  organisations  like  Greenpeace 
or  Oxfam.  This  universe  is  complex,  fragmented  and  unstructured"  (Keating 
1999,  p.  6). 
2.2.4  -  Multi-Level  Governance. 
The'rise'  of  regional  and  sub-regional  activity  within  the  EU,  has  been  the  subject 
of  considerable  attention,  in  particular  since  the  doubling  of  the  Structural  Funds 
budget  in  1988  (Harvie,  1994).  Indeed,  much  of  the  literature  upon  regions 
focused  upon  the  potential  'entry  point'  to  EU  Institutions  that  the  expansion  of 
the  Structural  Funds  contained  for  SNAs.  Initially,  analyses  of  the  role  of  SNAs 
7  For  a  wide  ranging  consideration  of  paradiplomacy  both  within  and  outwith  the  European  Union, 
see  Regional  and  Federal  Studies  (1999)  Vol.  9.  No.  1. 
18 within  Europe  focused  upon  individual  'events',  and  the  problems  such  examples 
held  for  neo-functionalist  or  liberal  intergovernmentalist  theorists.  For  instance, 
McAleavey  (1993)  in  a  discussion  of  the  role  of  SNAs  in  the  debates  surrounding 
'additionality,  concludes:  - 
"  Rejecting  both  state-centred  and  neo-functionalist  frameworks,  we  need 
explanations  of  European  Community  policy-making  in  the  field  of  regional 
development  that  encompass  all  levels  of  the  new  and  complex  inter- 
governmental  relationships  involved.......  The  specific  details  of  this  system 
remain  unclear,  but  the  role  of  sub-national  units  of  government  should  be 
incorporated  into  our  analysis  of  its  outline.  "  (McAleavey,  1993,  p.  104-5). 
The  first  attempt  to  provide  a  coherent  framework  within  which  to  view  the 
apparently  triangular  relationship  between  the  EU,  member-states  and  SNAs, 
was  provided  by  Marks  (1992,1993),  through  his  concept  of  'Multi-Level 
Governance'.  As  with  other  academics,  Marks  drew  his  initial  conception  of 
'multi-level  governance'  through  an  analysis  of  the  role  of  SNA's  within  the 
sphere  of  regional  policy.  In  particular,  he  drew  attention  to  the  1988  reform  of 
European  regional  policy  which  introduced  partnerships  into  the  management 
and  implementation  of  Structural  Fund  packages.  These  partnerships  he  viewed 
as  opening  up  "new  arenas  in  which  decision-making  will  take  place"  (Marks, 
1992,  p.  214-5),  through  the  involvement  of  SNAs8  in  negotiations  with  the 
Commission  and  member-states,  surrounding  the  implementation  of  the  funds. 
Marks  posited  that  these  arenas  were  enabling  policy  networks  to  emerge 
between  regional  actors  (from  both  the  public  and  the  private  sector)  and  that,  in 
particular,  SNAs  were  creating  direct  links  to  European  Institutions.  Thus,  within 
the  field  of  structural  policy,  Marks  was  able  to  envisage  :- 
"a  complex,  multi-layered,  decisionmaking  process  stretching  beneath  the  state 
as  well  as  above  it"  (Marks,  1992,  p.  221). 
Marks  expanded  this  initial  hypothesis  further,  in  later  accounts,  to  include  firstly, 
the  involvement  of  subnational  government  within  transnational  networks; 
secondly,  the  establishment  of  'regional'  representative  offices  in  Brussels;  and 
finally,  the  establishment  of  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  as  the  main  areas  of 
8  The  'partnerships'  also  introduced  outside  agencies,  from  the  private  sector  and  public  sector, 
for  example,  educational  establishments,  which  were  eligible  for  funding.  In  this  sense,  these 
new  decision-making  arenas,  also  raised  issues  surrounding  governance. 
19 sub-national  mobilisation  within  the  EU  (Marks,  1993,1996).  Marks  describes 
'multi-level  governance',  in  a  manner  which  diverges  from  the  traditional 
triangular  relationship  between  the'sub-national  -  national  and  the  EU,  as:  - 
"a  system  of  continuous  negotiation  amongst  nested  governments  at  several 
territorial  tiers  -  supranational,  national,  regional  and  local  -  as  the  result  of  a 
broad  process  of  institutional  creation  and  decisional  reallocation  that  has  pulled 
some  previously  centralised  functions  of  the  state  up  to  supranational  level  and 
some  down  to  the  local  /  regional  level  ".  (  Marks,  1993,  p.  392). 
Thus,  Marks  develops  a  framework  where  a  wide  range  of  actors  interact  across 
several  tiers  of  government,  often  within  newly  created  institutional  structures, 
such  as  the  Structural  Fund  'partnerships'.  Marks  contends  that  SNAs  are  drawn 
to  interacting  with  Brussels,  in  order  to  obtain  some  degree  of  control  over  their 
policy  environment.  Thus,  the  greater  the  amount  of  policy  competences  which  a 
SNA  commands,  the  more  likely  it  is  that  it  will  attempt  to  create  links  with  EU 
Institutions.  SNAs  require  information  concerning  forthcoming  legislation,  and 
concomitantly  they  wish  to  influence  the  drafting  of  legislation.  Equally  the 
Commission  and  the  European  Parliament  in  particular,  are  interested  in 
obtaining  information  from  as  many  sources  as  possible,  and  especially  from 
non-state  sources  in  order  to  obtain  information  which  a  member-state  may  not 
wish  to  disclose  or  which  could  undermine  a  member-state  policy  position  within 
European  negotiations.  For  instance,  McAleavey  considers  the  pressure  applied 
upon  member-states  when  information  is  passed  by  SNA's  to  the  European 
Commission  which  undermines  a  central  government  position  within  the  context 
of  the  additionality  regulations  for  EU  Structural  Funds  (McAleavey,  1993),  while 
John  (1999)  also  considers  the  potential  for  such  alliances  to  undermine 
member-states.  Additionally,  Marks  considers  regions  which  have  a  sense  of 
'distinctiveness',  identity  orassociational  culture'  (Marks  et.  at.,  1996a)  at  odds 
from  the  national  as  being  more  likely  to  mobilise  in  Brussels,  in  order  to  "foster 
autonomous  channels  of  informational  exchange  because  they  do  not  want  to 
rely  exclusively  on  national  channels"  (Marks  and  McAdam,  1996b,  p.  265)9. 
9  Marks  (1996b)  when  discussing  the  motivations  for  opening  'regional'  offices,  identifies  the 
degree  of  political  autonomy  devolved  to  SNAs  as  a  key  factor  in  opening  an  office.  As  Marks 
states  :-  "Strong  regional  identity  intensifies  demands  for  regional  governance;  strongly 
entrenched  regional  governments  intensify  regional  identity"  (Marks,  1996a,  p.  60).  However,  this 
appears  to  denote  a  slight  modification  of  his  earlier  position,  where  the  policy  autonomy  whilst 
being  viewed  as  important,  was  not  seen  as  a  key  factor  (see  Marks,  1993). 
20 Thus,  'multi-level  governance'  represents  less  of  a  transition  to  a  'Europe  of  the 
Regions',  and  rather  to  a  'Europe  with  the  Regions'  (Hooghe,  L,  cited  in  Marks, 
1996b),  where  SNAs  attempt  to  modify  the  state  dominance  of  the  EU,  through 
obtaining  access  to  the  decision-making  process,  either  through  institutional 
creation  (such  as  the  Committee  of  the  Regions)  or  by  obtaining  influence  within 
existing  structures  (for  instance,  through  the  opening  of  'regional'  offices  in 
Brussels).  Most  recently,  Marks  (1996c)  attempts  to  account  for  the  motivations 
of  state'actors'  in  dispersing  functions  to  the  supra-national  and  sub-national 
arenas,  through  tracing  out  situations  in  which  a  state  may  devolve  powers  in 
either  a  conscious  or  indeed  unconscious  manner. 
Multi-Level  Governance  (MLG)  has  been  applied  widely  to  the  activities  of  SNAs 
throughout  Europe,  most  frequently  in  terms  of  the  extent  of  mobilisation  of  SNAs 
within  member-states.  1  0  These  accounts  have  tended  to  emphasise  the 
differentiation  between  and  within  states  in  terms  of  SNA  mobilisation,  however 
this  is  not  in  itself  a  criticism  of  MLG,  as  the  concept  is  itself  a  loose  framework 
within  which  to  categorise  these  variations  which  "appear  to  be  about  as  great  a 
variation  as  along  any  other  political  dimension  in  Western  Europe"  (Marks, 
1996c,  p.  21).  Multi-level  governance  has  been  criticised11  due  to  the  top-down 
implications  of  its  initial  premises,  most  notably,  by  Jeffrey  (1996b)  who 
considered  MLG  as  being  overly  focused  upon  the  interactions  between 
member-states  and  the  EU,  with  regions  merely  responding  as  'passive  agents' 
to  the  opportunities  or  spin-offs  which  arise  out  of  these  interactions.  Instead, 
Jeffrey  considers  that  more  attention  be  paid  to  'bottom-up'  processes  where 
SNAs  :- 
"may  actively  seek  to,  and  succeed  in  changing  those  dynamics  in  ways  which 
facilitate  their  European  policy  engagement".  (Jeffrey,  1996b,  p.  214). 
10  For  instance,  'Regional  and  Federal  Studies',  Vol.  6,  No.  2,  special  issue  on  multi-level 
governance. 
11  Analyses  of  an  emergent  regional  dimension  have  also  been  scrutinised  from  rather  more 
'sceptical'  viewpoints,  notably  Anderson  (1990)  who  sought  to  re-assert  the  liberal- 
intergovernmentalist  paradigm  within  this  sphere  by  asserting  the  centrality  of  the  central  state  as 
a  'gatekeeper,  which  although  "the  ability  of  member  states  to  retain  their  roles  as  gatekeepers 
vanes,  this  capacity  remain  strong.  Moreover,  subnational  actors  often  view  the  EC  as  yet 
another  exogenous  institutional  constraint  on  action".  (Anderson,  1990,  p.  417). 
21 To  achieve  this,  Jeffrey  considers  that  MLG  should  concern  itself  more  fully  with 
the  domestic  arena,  as  :- 
"the  real  transformation  on  the  relative  roles  of  SNAs  and  the  central  state  in  EU 
policy-making  has  taken  place  in  the  intra-state  arena.....  SNAs  have  begun  to 
wrest  away  from  central  state  institutions  some  share  of  the  competence  to 
represent  their  member  state  in  the  process  of  EU  policy-making,  and  to  mobilise 
this  through  rather  than  beyond  the  established  structures  of  the  member  state. 
'Europe',  for  SNAs,  has  become  domesticised  rather  more  than  they  have 
become  genuinely  internationalised".  (Jeffrey,  1997,  p.  3). 
'European  Domestic  Policy  draws  upon  the  experience  of  regions  within  federal 
constitutions,  such  as  the  German  Lander  or  the  Belgian  regions  or  communities, 
where  there  has  been  a  constitutional  settlement  between  the  central  state  and 
the  regions  as  to  their  respective  rights  across  the  European  policy  agenda,  so 
that  there  is  now  considerable  involvement  of  SNAs  in  the  formulation  of  the 
member-state  position  through  institutionalised  structures.  12  Additionally,  Jeffrey 
contends  that  the  extent  of  mobilisation  of  SNAs  will  be  a  function  of  the  number 
of  competences  they  hold  which  are  affected  by  EU  legislation.  Thus,  Jeffrey 
concurs  with  Marks  (1996a)  that  access  to  funding  is  not  the  main  motivation  for 
SNA  mobilisation  within  the  EU.  Equally,  Jeffrey  recognises  the  diversity  which 
exists  between  and  within  member-states,  in  terms  of  SNA  mobilisation.  As 
such,  he  outlines  five  factors  which  determine  the  success  of  a  SNAs'European 
policy.  These  are  :  - 
A)  Constitutional  -  SNAs  with  extensive  constitutional  powers  are  more  likely  to 
exert  more  influence  over  European  policy  than  less  well  endowed  SNA5. 
B)  Intergovernmental  Relations  -  Formal  structures  of  state  -  SNA  relations  will 
create  a  relationship  of  'close  interdependence'  and  so  enable  SNAs  to  influence 
policy  more  effectively  than  through  informal  interactions. 
C)  Administrative  Adaptation  -  Early  and  extensive  adaptation  to  the 
Europeanisation  process  by  SNAs  will  improve  the  likelihood  of  influencing 
European  decision-making. 
12  For  a  discussion  on  the  procedures  developed  to  inGude  SNAs  in  the  formulation  of  a 
member-state's  position  within  the  EU,  see  Jeffrey  (1996)  on  the  German  Lander,  Morass  on  the 
Austrian  Lander  and  Kerremans  and  Beyers  (1996)  on  the  Belgian  regions  and  communities. 
Belgium,  Germany  and  Austria  represent  the  prime  examples  of  the  domesticisation  of  European 
policy. 
22 D)  Coalition  -  Building  -  The  establishment  of  coalitions  with  other  actors  with 
compatible  European  policy  interests  is  likely  to  improve  the  prospects  for 
successfully  influencing  European  decision-making. 
E)  Legitimacy  -  The  'credibility'  of  SNA  claims  to  an  influence  in  European  policy- 
making,  will  be  enhanced  by  the  legitimacy  that  institution  holds,  particularly 
when  underpinned  by  a  regional  identity  /  civil  society. 
(Jeffrey,  1997). 
'European  Domestic  Policy  does  not  represent  a  radical  split  away  from  MLG, 
but  rather  a  refinement  of  the  focus  of  academic  engagement,  back  onto  the 
SNAs  themselves  and  the  policy  environment  within  which  they  are  embedded. 
Whilst,  'European  Domestic  Policy'  may  represent  a  useful  approach,  in  terms  of 
analysing  the  rather  more  structured  relationships  which  exist  within  federal 
frameworks,  the  UK  requires  a  looser  framework  due  to  the  largely  informal 
structures  which  exist  between  local  government  and  central  government  within 
the  European  policy  sphere.  However,  'European  Domestic  Policy'  does  allow  a 
useful  refocussing  of  analysis  onto  the  domestic  political  sphere  and  in  particular, 
onto  the  scope  available  to  SNAs  in  attempting  to  influence  EU  decision-making. 
Analyses  of  the  role  of  SNAs  within  the  EU  are  evolving  constantly,  due  to  the 
relatively  recent  nature  of  these  processes.  However,  MLG  in  its  widest  sense 
(including  the  reformulation  inherent  within  'European  Domestic  Policy')  raises  a 
number  of  issues  for  this  study  including  :- 
1)  Where  sub-national  actors  enter  into  institutional  relationships  with  outside 
actors,  how  do  the  relationships  between  these  actors  (in  particular,  between 
SNAs,  central  government  and  the  European  Commission)  evolve  over  time?. 
2)  Which  actors  dominate  these  relationships?. 
3)  How  extensive  is  the  influence  of  SNAs  within  such  relationships?. 
In  terms  of  the  frame  of  reference  of  this  thesis,  institutional  developments 
resembling  multi-level  governance  arrangements  are  of  direct  relevance  to  two 
institutional  structures  established  within  Strathclyde  involving  a'partnership'  of 
actors  from  a  range  of  governmental  tiers,  namely,  the  'Strathclyde  European 
Partnership'  and  the'Ouverture'  programme.  Accordingly  these  institutions  will 
be  evaluated  using  a  multi-level  governance  framework. 
23 Finally,  as  Jeffrey  (1997)  notes,  the  key  emphasis  of  any  research  into  SNA 
activities  within  the  EU  should  be  what  difference  does  SNA  mobilisation  make  to 
policy  outcomes  within  the  EU  ?,  or  "is  there  really  a  multi-level  governance  in 
which  sub-national  mobilisation  has  led  to  a'real  shift  of  decision-making  power' 
to  the  advantage  of  SNAs  in  EU  policy  processes?  "  (Jeffrey,  1997,  p.  15). 
Perhaps  more  accurately,  this  question  can  be  rephrased  to'fit'  the  purposes  of 
this  thesis  to  read  :-  to  what  extent  do'local'  actors  believe  SNA  mobilisation  has 
'made  a  difference'  ?.  Accordingly,  what  policy  outcomes  were  changed  and 
what  were  the  strategies  used  ?. 
Given  this  re-assertion  of  the  domestic  environment,  I  now  intend  to  briefly 
summarise  the  literature  upon  the  role  of  UK  SNAs  within  the  EU,  both  in  terms 
of  'multi-level  governance'  and  in  the  wider  sense  of  the  overall  'Europeanisation' 
of  local  government  within  the  UK. 
2.3.1  -  Euroneanisation  within  UK  local  government. 
The  experience  of  UK  local  government  can  be  divided  into  two  distinct  time 
periods.  These  are  the  role  of  local  government  prior  to  1986,  and  accordingly 
the  impact  of  Europeanisation  post-1986,  when  the  impact  of  the  signing  of  the 
'Single  European  Act,  began  to  filter  through.  Given  the  focus  of  this  thesis  upon 
Strathclyde  and  thus  Scotland,  attention  will  be  drawn  to  'regional'  differences 
within  the  UK  discussed  within  the  literature,  and  in  particular,  to  the  process  of 
Europeanisation  within  Scotland. 
2.3.2  -  The  Europeanisation  of  Local  Government  within  the  pre-1986  EEC. 
Prior  to  the  1986  Single  European  Act,  the  extent  of  involvement  with  EEC 
institutions  amongst  local  government  actors  tended  to  be  limited  to  obtaining 
finance  from  Brussels,  through  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund 
(ERDF)  or  the  European  Social  Fund  (ESF).  The  primary  use  of  this  finance  for 
local  authorities  would  be:  - 
"to  reduce  the  amount  which  has  to  be  borrowed  to  finance  an  existing 
committed  project  and  hence  reduce  interest  charges  and  debt  service  costs 
which  they  would  otherwise  have  to  pay.  "  (Mawson  and  Gibney,  1985). 
24 However,  access  to  these  funds  tended  to  require  co-ordination  with  central 
government  rather  than  EEC  institutions,  as  nation-states  tended  to  exert  a  very 
strong  influence  over  "how  the  money  was  spent  and  who  received  the 
assistance"  (Armstrong,  1995,  p.  35-6).  One  area  where  local  authorities  could 
potentially  engage  in  fruitful  contact  with  the  European  Commission,  was  in 
attempting  to  access  'non-quota'  funds  under  the  ERDF,  where  the  Commission 
had  greater  discretion  in  determining  eligibility.  However,  the  comparatively 
small  amount  of  funds  available,  as  opposed  to  the  overall  ERDF  budget, 
ensured  that  only  the  more  pro-active  local  authorities  were  involved  in  such 
contacts.  Thus,  UK  central  government  can  be  viewed  in  the  period  up  until 
1986,  as  fulfilling  a'gatekeeper  role  (Anderson,  1990;  Keating,  1995),  between 
European  Institutions  and  UK  local  authorities. 
The  process  of  applying  for  ERDF  assistance  on  a  regular  basis  tended  to  be 
limited  to  larger  authorities,  as  Mawson  and  Gibney  (1985)  stated:  - 
"those  authorities  with  a  large  population  base  and  those  with  second  tier 
strategic  functions  are  more  likely  to  have  the  staff  resources  and  range  of 
activities  to  be  successful  in  securing  ERDF  support.  In  contrast,  smaller  local 
authorities  and  those  in  the  areas  of  lower  regional  priority  may  well  be  less 
familiar  with  the  workings  of  the  EC,  and  indeed,  consider  that  it  is  not  worth  the 
time  and  effort  of  putting  forward  applications".  (p.  154). 
In  UK  terms,  two  local  authorities  which  fulfilled  these  criteria  were  Strathclyde 
and  Birmingham,  which  both  opened  offices  in  Brussels  during  1984,  these  were 
the  first  sub-national  representative  offices  to  be  opened  by  UK  actors.  In  this 
sense,  these  two  local  authorities  can  be  considered  'pioneer'  authorities  onto  the 
European  scene  (John,  1994).  Scale  is  clearly  an  important  factor  determining 
whether  a  local  authority  was  able  to  engage  actively  with  EU  Institutions. 
Mawson  and  Gibney  (1985)  stress  the  importance  of  employing  staff  to  deal 
primarily  with  EU  affairs  and  in  particular  with  funding  applications.  The 
positioning  of  such  a  section  within  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  was  also 
regarded  as  important,  if  the  local  authority  was  to  liase  effectively  with 
government  ministries  and  individual  departments,  in  terms  of  assessing  the 
impact  of  EU  legislation.  Moreover,  the  development  of  close  contact  with 
Commission  officials  was  viewed  relevant  (particularly  with  regard  to  ERDF 
25 funding),  in  order  to  stay  aware  of  funding  possibilities  and  potential  changes  in 
regulations.  Clearly  such  activities  would  only  be  feasible  for  a  larger  local 
authority. 
Whilst  Mawson  and  Gibney  emphasise  the  dominance  of  the  Department  of  the 
Environment  and  the  Welsh  Office  over  English  and  Welsh  local  government, 
Scottish  local  government  experienced  a  more  co-operative  relationship  with  the 
Scottish  Office.  Keating  and  Waters  refer  to  the  Scottish  Office  as  providing  both 
"a  channel  of  influence  and,  given  the  close  links  between  the  Scottish  Office 
and  local  authorities,  a  source  of  support  in  dealing  with  EC  matters"  (Keating 
and  Waters,  1985,  p.  71).  Scottish  local  government  at  this  time,  appears  to  have 
worked  primarily  through  the  Scottish  Office,  although  direct  contact  would  be 
maintained  by  Scottish  actors  at  the  European  level  for  information  purposes. 
This  emphasis  upon  the  Scottish  Office  may  be  reflected  in  the  lack  of  a 
European  division  within  COSLA  (Convention  of  Scottish  Local  Authorities), 
although  Scottish  local  government  was  represented  through  the  LGIB  (Local 
Government  International  Bureau)  on  the  International  Union  of  Local  Authorites 
and  the  Council  of  European  Municipalities  and  Regions.  Scottish  local 
government  was  active  in  obtaining  funds  across  the  whole  spectrum  of  schemes 
from  the  European  Investment  Bank  to  ERDF.  However,  ongoing  concerns  over 
additionality  ensured  that  the  real  benefit  of  such  monies  was  in  terms  of 
reducing  borrowing,  and  therefore  avoiding  loan  charges.  Thus,  "  the  Funds, 
though  publicly  visible,  are  in  practice  a  relatively  less  important  aspect  of 
Scotland's  relationship  with  the  EC  "  (Keating  and  Waters,  1985,  p.  87).  In  terms 
of  lobbying  over  funding  regulations  or  EU  directives  which  impacted  upon 
Scottish  local  government,  there  was  little  activity,  although  Strathclyde  was 
notable  for  having  set  up  a  representative  office,  and  having  "seized  the  initiative 
in  developing  contacts  with  Brussels,  to  a  certain  extent  bypassing  the  formal 
channels  through  central  government"  (Keating  and  Waters,  1985,  p.  69-70). 
2 
. 
3.3  -  The  Single  European  Act  and  Maastricht. 
The  Single  European  Act  (1986)  and  the  Maastricht  Treaty  (1993)  completely 
transformed  both  the  scale  and  form  of  SNA  mobilisation  with  Brussels.  The 
major  impact  of  the  SEA  lay  primarily  with  the  requirements  placed  upon  UK  local 
authorities  from  Community  legislation.  Areas  of  local  authority  competence 
such  as  public  procurement,  environmental  policy,  social  issues,  education 
26 through  to  employment  practices  in  areas  such  as  health  and  safety  were  heavily 
influenced  by  EU  legislation.  As  a  result,  it  became  necessary  for  local 
authorities  to  be  aware  of  EU  legislation  and  to  stay  aware  of  potential  policy 
changes,  whilst  also  altering  internal  procedures  in  order  to  come  into  line  with 
existing  European  legislation  (Bongers,  1990;  Hart  and  Roberts,  1995;  Roberts 
et.  al.  1990).  The  Single  European  Act  also  influenced  the  policies  of  local 
authorities  within  the  field  of  economic  development,  where  they  were  becoming 
increasingly  important  'players',  whilst  the  Structural  Funds  and  policies  on  areas 
such  as  Research  and  Development,  offered  significant  financial  possibilities  for 
local  authorities.  Due  to  the  increasing  impact  of  Community  decisions  upon 
localities  and  local  authorities,  it  was  hardly  surprising  that  SNAs  should  attempt 
to  mobilise  to  influence  the  decision-making  process  in  Europe.  Hart  and 
Roberts  describe  the  rationale  for  SNA  strategies  in  response  to  '1992'  in  the 
following  terms:  - 
"Putting  support  behind  representative  bodies  for  regional  and  local  authorities, 
and  making  greater  efforts  to  forge  interregional  links,  may  be  a  means  by  which 
sub-national  government  bodies  can  help  overcome  the'democratic  deficit  in  the 
Community  -  not  this  time  that  between  elected  members  and  the  legislative 
process,  but  that  between  the  legislative  process  and  the  localities  affected  by  its 
consequences,  and  that  between  Community  programmes  and  those  responsible 
for  their  effective  implementation.  "  (Hart  and  Roberts,  1995,  p.  105-6). 
The  Maastricht  Treaty  whilst  not  having  as  direct  an  impact  upon  UK  local 
authorities  as  the  SEA,  did  however  have  a  rather  more  symbolic  effect13.  The 
creation  of  a  Committee  of  the  Regions  in  Article  198  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty 
ensured  that  sub-national  government  "was  for  the  first  time  officially 
acknowledged  as  part  of  the  European  Union"  (Stolz,  1994,  p.  13)14,  whilst  the 
inclusion  of  clauses  concerning  subsidiarity  (Scott  et.  al,  1994;  Van  Kersbergen 
and  Verbeerk,  1994)15,  provided  further  legitimacy  to  the  mobilisation  of  SNAs 
within  Europe. 
13  Martin  (1992)  provides  an  example  of  a  European  Parliamentarian's  view  of  the  Maastricht 
Treaty,  and  in  particular  of  the  impact  it  was  expected  to  have  upon  the  'regional  dimension'  of 
EU  affairs  and  correspondingly  upon  EU'goveming  structures'. 
14  Van  der  Knapp  (1994)  also  gives  an  informative  overview  into  the  origins  of  the  Committee  of 
the  Regions. 
15  These  two  articles  provide  interesting  insights  into  the  origins  (historically  and  politically)  of 
subsidianty,  and  the  contested  nature  of  its  meaning  and  indeed  its  application,  or  perhaps  more 
accurately  lack  of  application,  given  the  debates  surrounding  its  meaning. 
27 2.3.4  -  The  Europeanisation  of  UK  Local  Government.  Post-1986. 
The  United  Kingdom  was  frequently  perceived  as  being  out  of  step  with  the  rest 
of  Europe,  in  terms  of  its  structure  of  sub-national  government  in  the  period 
between  1986-97.  Whilst,  the  majority  of  Western  European  countries 
decentralised  powers  away  from  the  central  state,  the  UK  was  viewed  as  moving 
towards  a  more  centralised  structure  of  governance  (Batley  and  Stoker,  1991). 
Additionally,  sub-national  government  in  the  UK  tends  to  be  rather  transitory  in 
nature  due  to  the  history  of  British  local  government  which  consists  of  :- 
"  repeated  revisions  of  boundaries  and  structures,  carried  out  for  reasons  which 
have  often  paid  scant  regard  to  historical  community  identities  or  communities  of 
sentiment  and  interest......  The  only  European  parallels  with  this  orgy  of 
reorganisation  are  to  be  found  in  the  new  democracies  in  Eastern  Europe,  where 
the  structures  of  local  and  regional  government  have  been  repeatedly  changed  to 
meet  the  demands  of  ideologies  and  occupying  Powers.  "  (Elcock,  1997,  p.  1). 
Nevertheless  the  period  post-1986  saw  UK  local  government  mobilise  onto  the 
European  arena  on  a  scale  comparable  with  the  most  active  SNAs  from  other 
member-states.  For  instance,  the  opening  of  a  regional  office  in  Brussels  can  be 
taken  as  a  measure  of  the  extent  of  SNA  mobilisation  within  member-states. 
John  (1994)  shows  that  the  UK  had  18  SNA  offices  located  in  Brussels  in  1994, 
with  only  France  establishing  a  higher  number  of  'regional  offices'.  Whilst  in  part 
this  is  symptomatic  of  the  comparatively  fragmented  nature  of  UK  local 
government,  it  is  also  a  product  of  the  process  of  Europeanisation  going  on 
within  local  government  in  the  post-1986  period.  Thus,  the  UK  appears  to 
present  a  paradox  as  a  state  which  is  experiencing  "the  Europeanisation  of  sub- 
national  government  in  the  context  of  a  strengthened  and  centralising  national 
state"  (John,  1996,  p.  131). 
The  extent  of  Europeanisation  within  UK  local  authorities  became  increasingly 
apparent  during  the  late  1980s,  perhaps  culminating  in  two  key  events.  Firstly, 
the  dispute  between  DGXVI  (Commission  Directorate-General  for  Regional 
Policy)  and  the  UK  government  concerning  the  application  of  'additional  ity"6, 
16  Additionality  has  been  defined  as  a  principle  of  the  Structural  Funds  which  'aims  to  ensure  that 
financing  from  Community  funds  is  not  used  to  replace  national  structural  aid.  More  specifically, 
each  Member  State  has  to  maintain,  in  the  whole  of  the  territory  concerned,  its  public  structural  or 
comparable  expenditure  at  least  at  the  same  level  as  in  the  previous  programming  period,  taking 
28 which  culminated  in  an  "alliance  between  the  European  Commission  and  British 
local  authorities  over  the  Rechar  initiative  [and]  produced  a  climbdown  by  the  UK 
government"  (McAleavey,  1993,  p.  105).  British  local  authorities  had  been 
prominent  in  this  dispute,  through  the  'Coalfield  Communities  Campaign',  which 
consisted  almost  entirely  of  Labour-controlled  local  authorities  which  represented 
(ex-)  coal  mining  areas.  Secondly,  the  lobby  by  a  grouping  of  'industrial  regions' 
under  the  auspices  of  RETI  (Association  of  European  Regions  of  Industrial 
Technology),  and  notably  under  the  leadership  of  Strathclyde  Regional  Council, 
appeared17  to  lobby  successfully  for  the  retention  of  Objective  2  funding  within 
the  enlarged  Structural  Funds  budget,  arising  out  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty 
(McAleavey  and  Mitchell,  1994).  These  events  perhaps  signified  the  'high-water 
mark'  of  UK  local  authority  activity  in  Europe,  as  most  commentators  tend  to 
temper  the  influence  of  UK  local  government  action,  with  considerations  of  the 
dominant  role  of  central  government  across  the  more  routine  aspects  of 
European  policy,  or whether  the  "sound  and  fury"  (Jeffery,  1997,  p.  15)  of  British 
local  authority  engagement  with  Europe  is  as  significant  as  such  individual 
events  portray.  A  number  of  commentators  note  the  continued  dominance  of 
central  government  over  European  policy  even  within  policy  areas  such  as  the 
Structural  Funds  (  Burch  and  Holliday,  1993;  John,  1996).  However,  significant 
variations  exist  within  the  UK,  with  particular  emphasis  being  placed  upon  areas 
which  can  form'regional  coalitions'  of  public  and  private  actors  around  a 
development  consensus,  thus  enabling  a  region  to  project  itself  onto  outside 
actors  as  a  coherent  voice  for  a  locality  (Burch  and  Holliday,  1993).  The  most 
significant  examples  within  the  UK  of  such  a'regional  coalition',  exist  in  Scotland 
and  Wales.  The  'territorial  offices'  of  the  central  state  provide  a  focal  point  for 
channelling  'regional'  interests  into  the  national  decision-making  process,  thus 
producing  a'territorial  network',  distinct  from  other  areas  of  the  UK (Keating  and 
Jones,  1995;  McAteer  and  Mitchell,  1996;  Rhodes,  1988).  18  Given  the  distinct 
into  account,  however,  the  macroeconomic  circumstances  in  which  the  funding  takes  place,  as 
well  as  a  number  of  specific  economic  circumstances,  namely  privatisations,  an  unusual  level  of 
public  structural  expenditure  undertaken  in  the  previous  programming  period  and  business  cycles 
in  the  national  economy.  Member  States  must  provide  the  financial  information  needed  to  verify 
additionality  when  submitting  plans  and  regularly  thereafter  during  the  implementation  of  the 
programmed  assistance'  (European  Commission,  1996,  p.  20). 
17  The  lobby  can  only  be  said  to  have  'appeared'  to  be  successful,  due  to  the  impenetrable 
nature  of  Council  of  Ministers  meetings,  alongside  the  bargaining  which  accompanies  such 
negotiations. 
18  Interestingly,  Garmise  (1996)  provides  evidence  that  the  Welsh  Office  was  rather  hostile  to 
attempts  by  the  Welsh  'territorial  network'  to  extend  their  influence  within  the  sphere  of  European 
29 nature  of  Scottish  local  government  as  a  result  of  the  'Treaty  of  Union'  (1707) 
(Kellas,  1989),  and  the  increasingly'Scottish'  dimension  to  European  policy 
amongst  Scottish  local  government  in  the  post-1986  period,  I  intend  to  briefly  to 
discuss  some  of  the  major  developments  within  European  policy  in  Scotland,  and 
in  particular  within  the  Scottish  Office  (as  well as  related  theoretical  analyses)  as 
the  Department  represented  the  prime  political  actor  in  Scotland.  Accordingly, 
the  relationship  of  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  and  indeed  Scottish  local 
government  with  Europe,  was  influenced  heavily  by  Scottish  Office  responses  to 
European  policies. 
2.4  -  The  Scottish  Dimension. 
The  importance  of  the  Scottish  Office  as  a'territorial  manager  is  well 
documented  (for  instance,  Keating  and  Midwinter,  1981;  Kellas,  1991),  and  this 
extends  into  the  European  policy  arena,  where  a  plethora  of  organisations  with 
European  interests  orbit  the  Scottish  Office,  including  local  authorities.  Mazey 
and  Mitchell  (1993)  note  the  increase  in  sub-national  activity  within  Europe  post- 
1986,  and  the'regional  impact'  of  a  large  proportion  of  European  legislation,  in 
particular,  the  Single  European  Act.  Correspondingly,  they  observed  an  increase 
in  the  scale  of  the  Scottish  Office's  involvement  with  European  affairs  across  a 
range  of  policy,  notably  in  terms  of  European  funding.  This  process  they  viewed 
as  a  form  of  Europeanisation,  to  the  extent  that  :- 
"The  intention  within  the  Scottish  Office  has  been  to  raise  the  number  of  civil 
servants  working  on  secondment  in  Brussels  each  year,  to  increase  the 
European  dimension  of  training  and  encourage  trainee  EC  officials  to  spend  time 
working  with  the  Scottish  Office.  Training  sessions  for  staff  to  increase 
awareness  of  the  European  Community  has  become  a  standard  part  of  the 
development  of  the  Euro-profile  of  the  Scottish  Office.  "  (Mazey  and  Mitchell, 
1993,  p.  110). 
Perhaps  the  most  noticeable  development  within  the  Scottish  Office,  concerning 
its  profile  with  Europe  was  the  creation  of  Scotland  Europa19  as  an  umbrella 
organisation  to  bring  together  the  disparate  range  of  Scottish  interest  groups, 
including  local  authorities,  based  in  Brussels  under  the  one  roof.  At  the  same 
policy.  Notably,  the  Welsh  Office  was  hostile  to  the  creation  of  a'Welsh'  European  office  in 
Brussels,  and  to  the  inclusion  of  non-central  state  actors  in  funding  partnerships. 
19  The  origins,  function  and  development  of  Scotland  Europa,  including  the  role  of  SRC  within  it, 
is  discussed  fully  in  Chapter  Seven,  Section  3.2. 
30 time,  this  enabled  the  Scottish  Office  to  gain  a  foothold  in  Brussels  through 
Scottish  Enterprise  which  formally  owned  the  controlling  stake  in  Scotland 
Europa  (Mitchell,  1994).  However,  the  creation  of  Scotland  Europa  symbolised 
the  constraints  upon  Scottish  Office  activities  in  Europe,  as  the  Department  had 
to  ensure  that  it  remained  in  step  with  Whitehall's  European  policy.  Such 
concerns  were  clearly  expressed  in  the  Weeple  papers,  which  recommended 
that  the  office  in  Brussels  should  :- 
"  articulate  the  Scottish  Office  view  of  Scotland's  interests  but  it  could  not  be  too 
closely  associated  with  the  Scottish  Office  as  it  was  feared  that  the  Treasury  and 
FCO  [  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Office]  would  oppose  any  prospect  of  the 
Scottish  Office  being  able  to  articulate  a  view  they  did  not  share.  "  (Mitchell,  1994, 
p.  11). 
It  is  this  tension  which  runs  through  all  the  Scottish  Office's  activity  with  European 
policy,  and  in  particular  with  the  Scottish'territorial  network',  as  the  Scottish 
Office  attempts  to  reconcile  the  demands  of  Scottish  interests  groups  with 
Whitehall  policy.  Keating  and  Jones  (1995)  acknowledge  this  mediating  role  of 
the  Scottish  Office  within  European  policy,  and  consider  ultimately,  that  the 
'territorial  ministries'  must  at  best  "content  themselves  with  minor  modifications  of 
the  overall  UK  line"  (p.  101).  However,  Keating  and  Jones  consider  that  even 
here  the  influence  of  the  Scottish  Office  is  limited  as  the  power  of  the  Department 
declined  during  the  1980s,  due  to  "an  English  backlash  to  the  devolution  episode 
of  the  late  1970s  and  the  weakness  of  the  Secretaries  of  State  who,  lacking 
majority  support  at  home,  could  no  longer  credibly  claim  to  speak  for  their 
respective  territories"  (p.  101).  McAteer  and  Mitchell  (1996)  whilst  recognising 
that  the  Scottish  'territorial  network'  is  constrained  in  its  dealings  with  the  Scottish 
Office,  consider  "the  relationship  between  Scottish  sub-central  government  and 
the  Scottish  Office  [  to  be  ],  in  practice,  a  mutually  productive  one"  (p.  14). 
Alternatively,  Bomberg  (1994)  views  British  'territorial  networks'  to  be  rather 
uninfluential  in  terms  of  European  decision-making,  due  to  "significant  structural 
or  constitutional  constraints"  (p.  59).  Constitutional  constraints  refer  to  the 
position  of  the  Scottish  Office  within  the  UK,  and  its  inability  to  take  a  policy  line 
'at  odds'  with  Whitehall.  Structural  constraints,  that  limit  the  effectiveness  of  the 
Scottish  'territorial  community'  according  to  Bomberg,  are  the  small  size  of  the 
network,  and  accordingly  the  relatively  small  amount  of  policy  expertise, 
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specific  networks. 
This  ongoing  process  of  Europeanisation  both  within  the  UK  and  at  a  Scottish 
level,  raise  a  wide  range  of  questions  within  the  context  of  this  thesis,  namely:  - 
1)  How  extensive  was  the  process  of  Europeanisation  within  Strathclyde 
Regional  Council,  and  how  did  the  process  change  over  time  ?.  In  other 
words,  which  departments  were  drawn  into  developing  a  European  remit,  and 
equally,  which  departments  did  not  require  or  failed  to  develop  such  a 
function  ?.  Additionally,  how  important  were  trans-regional  networks  and  a 
representative  office  in  Brussels,  as  Europeanising  influences  ?. 
2)  In  terms  of  external  relationships,  how  did  Strathclyde  actors  perceive  their 
relationships  with  central  state  (primarily  Scottish  Office)  officials  and  with 
Commission  officials  ?.  Did  these  relationships  change  over  time?.  Did 
Strathclyde  actors  form  alliances  with  the  Commission  'against  the  state',  or 
work  with  member-state  officials,  in  a'mutually  productive  relationship'?. 
3)  How  important  was  the'territorial  network'  as  a  lobbying  device,  and  what 
were  its  strength  and  weaknesses  ?.  What  was  the  role  of  local  authorities, 
and  in  particular  Strathclyde  within  this  'territorial  community'?. 
4)  Were  Scottish  local  authorities  and  /  or  the  Scottish  'territorial  network',  able 
to  modify  UK  policy  positions  within  Scotland  ?. 
2  .5- 
Summary  and  Conclusions. 
Studies  of  sub-national  activity  vis-ä-vis  Europe  have  tended  to  split  into  two 
categories.  Firstly,  analyses  of  the  impact  of  sub-national  mobilisation  upon  the 
European  decision-making  process  have  attempted  to  re-formulate  the  traditional 
debate  surrounding  neo-functionalist  and  liberal  intergovemmentalist  approaches 
to  EU  decision-making.  The  most  prominent  attempt  to  achieve  such  an 
outcome  has  been  developed  within  the  broad  conceptual  framework  of  'multi- 
level  governance'.  Whilst,  'European  domestic  policy'  denotes  a  shift  to  a  greater 
focus  upon  the  interactions  within  the  nation-state,  a  significant  amount  of 
research  already  exists  concerning  the  'embedded  ness'  of  sub-national 
institutions  within  the  nation-state,  and  the  interactions  which  take  place  between 
actors  and  institutions  (from  both  the  public  and  private  sector)  at  regional  and 
national  scales,  within  the  context  of  'Europeanisation'.  In  addition,  research 
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conditions  for  sub-national  mobilisation  within  local  authorities  themselves. 
This  thesis  will  draw  upon  both  approaches,  as  it  attempts  to  provide  an  account 
of  Europeanisation  upon  an  SNA  with  significant  'resources'  and  strategic 
competences,  whilst  also  considering  the  approaches  used  by  Strathclyde 
Regional  Council,  to  mobilise  the  institution  as  a  significant  European  actor  on 
both  the  Scottish  and  European  stages.  As  McAteer  and  Mitchell  observe  :  - 
"few  have  as  yet  investigated  exactly  how  sub-central  government  lobbying 
strategies  have  been  affected  by  changes  within  the  European  polity.  "  (McAteer 
and  Mitchell,  1996,  p.  2). 
Martin  and  Pearce  (1999)  emphasise  the  need  for  'bottom-up'  analyses  of 
Europeanisation  upon  SNAs  through  commenting: 
"The  differentiated  pattern  of  local  responses  revealed  by  the  survey  findings  has 
implications  for  methodology,  theory  and  future  policy  development.  In  terms  of 
research  methodology,  it  highlights  the  importance  of  detailed,  'bottom  up' 
analyses  of  local  responses  in  addition  to  broader  brush  studies  of  developments 
at  national  and  supranational  levels"  (Martin  and  Pearce,  1999,  p.  46). 
The  longitudinal  nature  of  this  thesis  will  enable  an  exploration  of  the  changes 
which  occurred  within  SRC  as  the  nature  of  European  integration  changed  during 
the  1980s  and  into  the  1990s.  Additionally,  the  re-organisation  of  Scottish  local 
government  in  1996,  will  allow  an  assessment  to  be  made  of  the  extent  to  which 
'Europeanisation'  has  taken  place  within  Scottish  local  government,  through 
analysing  to  what  extent  European  functions  continued  to  be  undertaken  by  the 
reorganised  councils.  This  will  also  allow  a  useful  comparison  to  be  made,  as  to 
the  extent  to  which  smaller'unitary'  councils  with  less  strategic  competences, 
have  the  capacity  to  develop  a  European  policy.  However,  further  consideration 
will  be  given  to  the  'methodological  approaches'  adopted  in  the  research  design 
of  the  thesis  in  Chapter  Three. 
33 Chapter  Three.  Methodoloaical  Anoroaches. 
3.1  -  Introduction. 
The  previous  chapter  outlined  the  range  of  processes  which  come  under  the 
term:  -'the  Europeanisation  of  local  government'  (Goldsmith,  1993),  whilst  also 
discussing  a  variety  of  conceptual  frameworks  which  have  been  advanced  to 
account  for  the  increasing  activity  of  sub-national  authorities  (SNAs)  within 
structures  and  networks  which  extend  beyond  the  state.  This  study  will  assess 
the  extent  to  which  the  trends  identified  in  the  literature  (as  outlined  in  Chapter 
Two)  were  evident  within  one  SNA,  namely  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  (SRC). 
In  a  broad  sense,  there  are  two  central  aims  underpinning  this  research. 
Firstly,  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  a  process  of  'Europeanisation'  had  been 
taking  place  within  SRC  over  the  period  from  1975  to  1996,  and  correspondingly, 
the  depth  of  such  a  process,  when  dealing  with  institutional  change  through  the 
replacement  of  one  Regional  authority  by  twelve  unitary  authorities  (Paddison, 
1996).  As  a  result,  the  study  aims  to  assess  the  extent  of  Europeanisation  which 
has  taken  place  within  local  government  in  the  West  of  Scotland  as  a  whole 
during  the  previous  two  decades  and  the  form  such  a  process  has  taken. 
Secondly,  where  SRC  (or  its  successor  unitary  authorities)  have  created  or 
entered  into  structures  which  involve  actors  from  sub-national,  national  and 
supra-national  arenas,  I  intend  to  analyse  the  development  of  such  institutions 
through  the  framework  of  'multi-level  governance'. 
This  chapter  will  elaborate  upon  the  research  questions  initially  sketched  out  in 
Chapter  Two,  in  order  to  refine  the  precise  research  questions  this  thesis  will 
address.  Having  framed  the  research  questions,  the  chapter  proceeds  onto  an 
explanation  as  to  the  reasons  for  the  selection  of  Strathclyde  Regional  Council, 
as  the  case-study  adopted  to  analyse  the  process  of  Europeanisation.  The 
methodologies  adopted  to  address  the  study  area  are  then  discussed,  with 
34 regard  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  research  methodologies  selected,  in  answering 
the  research  questions.  This  is  followed  by  an  exposition  of  the  various  stages 
the  field-research  progressed  through,  and  the  rationale  behind  adopting  such  a 
research  structure.  In  essence,  this  chapter  is  a  recognition  of  the  need  to  clarify 
the  research  process  adopted  prior  to  discussing  the  case-study  findings 
premised  upon  the  methodological  approaches  used,  or  as  Newcomb  succinctly 
states:  - 
"It  is  a  truism  that  no  research  results  are  any  better  than  the  methods  by  which 
they  are  obtained"  (Newcomb,  1965,  p.  1). 
Chapter  Two  set  out  a  number  of  issues  with  which  this  study  engages,  under 
the  broad  categorisations  of  'Europeanisation'  and'Multi-Level  governance'. 
Accordingly,  discussion  of  the  research  questions  maintains  this  two-pronged 
approach. 
3.2.1  -  Europeanisation. 
As  noted  in  Chapter  Two,  the  process  of  Europeanisation  within  SNAs  refers  to  a 
wide  range  of  activities  with  which  SNAs  could  become  involved,  ranging  from:  - 
1.  an  awareness  of  European  legislation, 
2.  willingness  to  search  for  European  finance, 
3.  networking  with  other  European  SNAs, 
4.  engaging  in  contacts  with  European  Institutions  (in  particular  the 
Commission),  in  order  to  obtain  information  concerning  EU  legislation  or 
potential  future  legislation, 
5.  the  direct  lobbying  of  European  Institutions,  in  particular  the  Commission, 
and, 
6.  the  establishment  of  a  representative  offices  in  Brussels. 
This  list  of  actions  which  represents  the  scale  of  Europeanising  influences  upon 
UK  local  government  (John,  1994a;  See  also  Chapter  Seven,  Table  7.1),  raises  a 
number  of  questions  which  can  be  sub-divided  into  three  categories  :- 
35 1)  What  was  the  impact  of  Europeanisation  upon  the  internal  structures  of  SRC? 
2)  To  what  extent  was  SRC  able  to  develop  direct  links  to  European  Institutions? 
3)  What  role  did  'formal'  and  'informal'  networks  fulfil  in  terms  of  SRC's  European 
policy? 
1)  What  impact  did  Europeanisation  have  upon  the  internal  structure  of 
Strathclvde  Regional  Council  ? 
The  research  conducted  within  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  set  out  to  establish 
the  extent  to  which  the  local  authority  had  engaged  with  European  policy 
developments  and  correspondingly  of  the  impact  of  such  processes  upon  SRC. 
At  an  internal  level,  the  questions  to  be  addressed  include  the  manner  in  which 
the'European  function'  was  incorporated  into  SRC's  organisation;  which 
departments  were  involved  with  European  affairs;  and  more  generally,  to 
ascertain  the  awareness  and  opinions  of  councillors  and  officers  concerning  the 
extent  to  which  European  issues  impinged  upon  the  affairs  of  the  council.  Such 
considerations  would  enable  an  assessment  to  be  made  of  the  extent  to  which 
SRC  was  able  to  stay  aware  of  EU  legislation  and  the  efforts  made  to  obtain 
funding  from  EU  sources,  in  relation  to  the  structures  put  in  place  to  facilitate 
such  activities. 
2)  To  what  extent  was  SRC  able  to  develop  direct  links  with  EU  Institutions 
The  extent  to  which  SRC  was  able  to  gain  access  directly  to  EU  Institutions,  and 
therefore  unmediated  by  national  structures,  would  provide  a  yardstick  against 
which  to  test  the  extent  to  which  SRC  was  able  to'bypass  the  nation-state'.  The 
literature  tends  to  suggest  that  such  direct  contacts  are  sought  by  SNAs  in  order 
to  enable  the  sharing  of  information  between  themselves  and  EU  Institutions, 
perhaps  leading  to  an  improved  process  of  policy  implementation  (Goldsmith, 
1993).  The  undertaking  of  para-diplomatic  activities  raises  further  questions,  as 
to  the  role  of  the  representative  office  in  Brussels  in  developing  contacts  with  EU 
Institutions;  on  which  issues  would  representations  be  made;  and  which 
institutions  would  be  lobbied.  Most  importantly,  the  extent  to  which  direct 
36 contacts  were  perceived  by  sub-national  representatives  to  be  an  effective 
device  with  which  to  influence  EU  decisions  will  be  considered. 
3)  What  role  did  'formal'  and  'informal'  networks  fulfil  in  terms  of  SRC's  European 
1201icy  ? 
'Formal  networks'  refers  to'Inter-Regional  Associations'  (Weyand,  1996)  such  as 
AER  and  RETI,  which  bring  together  SNAs  from  across  the  EU  (and  frequently 
from  outside  the  EU)  usually  with  the  aims  of  attempting  to  engender  co- 
operation  between  regions  or  to  act  as  organisations  which  can  provide  a  'single 
voice'  for  SNAs  upon  particular  issues  when  lobbying  EU  Institutions.  This  study 
aimed  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  SRC  became  involved  in  such  structures  of 
'horizontal  integration',  and  the  purpose  of  membership  for  the  Council  within 
such  bodies.  As  before,  the  attitudes  of  SRC  councillors  and  officials  regarding 
the  effectiveness  of  'formal  networks'  will  be  assessed. 
In  terms  of  'informal  networks',  the  research  set  out  to  assess  whether  SRC 
developed  contacts  with  other  regions  based  in  Brussels  or  EU  officials  and 
politicians  in  order  to  advance  the  Region's  European  policy.  Of  particular 
concern  to  the  research  (as  noted  in  Chapter  Two),  was  whether  a  Scottish 
'territorial  community'  existed  in  Brussels,  which  attempted  to  express  a  distinctly 
Scottish  'line'  to  EU  Institutions,  and  the  role  which  SRC  (and  Scottish  local 
government  in  general)  pursued  within  such  a  network.  At  the  Scottish  level,  the 
study  set  out  to  assess  the  extent  of  contacts  and  co-operation  amongst  Scottish 
actors  concerned  with  European  issues,  for  instance,  the  extent  of  interaction 
between  the  Scottish  Office  and  SRC  over  European  issues. 
3.2.2  -  Multi-Level  Governance. 
As  noted  earlier  (see  Chapter  Two),  there  were  two  institutions  created  with  the 
active  involvement  of  Strathclyde  Regional  Council,  which  brought  together 
actors  from  the  sub-national,  national  and  supra-national  arenas.  These  were 
the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership  and  the  Ouverture  programme.  These 
37 institutions  provide  the  opportunity  to  analyse  the  relationships  which  developed 
between  the  various  partners  over  a  period  of  time,  whilst  assessing  how  the 
power  relationships  between  the  various  'partners'  evolved  over  time.  In 
essence,  did  such  institutions  allow  SRC  the  opportunity  to  enter  into  the 
decision-making  arena  alongside  the  European  Commission  and  the  UK 
government  within  these  policy  arenas  ? 
Previous  studies  of  the  European  dimension  of  UK  sub-central  government  have 
tended  to  focus  upon  individual  'events'  rather  than  upon  the  impact  of 
Europeanisation  upon  SNAs  in  a  holistic  sense.  This  study  intends  to  outline  the 
response  of  Scotland's  largest  local  authority  to  changes  within  the  European 
polity  across  a  broad  time-period,  in  order  to  evaluate  the  extent  to  which  a 
process  of  Europeanisation  has  been  taking  place  within  Scottish  local 
government  over  the  previous  two  decades.  This  longtitudinal  approach  also 
covers  a  period  of  institutional  change  following  the  reorganisation  of  Scottish 
local  government  in  1996,  in  order  to  evaluate  the  extent  to  which  the'European 
function'  continued  to  be  developed  amongst  unitary  authorities  which 
represented  smaller  populations  and  possessed  fewer  resources  than 
Strathclyde  Regional  Council.  It  is  to  the  selection  of  SRC  as  the  chosen  case- 
study,  which  I  now  intend  to  turn. 
3.3  -  The  Selection  of  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  as  a  Case-Study. 
In  order  to  test  the  extent  to  which  a  process  of  Europeanisation  was  ongoing 
within  Scottish  local  government,  I  set  out  to  select  an  institution  which  would 
appear  to  fulfil  the  criteria,  outlined  in  Chapter  Two,  of  an  SNA  most  likely  to 
mobilise  onto  the  European  policy  arena.  As  Mawson  and  Gibney  (1985)  noted, 
local  authorities  containing  a  large  population  allied  to  responsibility  for  a  number 
of  strategic  services  would  be  likely  to  have  been  successful  in  obtaining  ERDF 
from  the  European  Commission  and  presumably,  in  developing  contacts  with 
actors  from  European  Institutions.  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  certainly  fulfilled 
these  criteria,  as  the  authority  covered  roughly  half  the  population  of  Scotland. 
38 For  example  in  1981,  SRC  contained  2,400,000  people  out  of  a  Scottish 
population  of  5,135,634  or  46.7%  of  the  Scottish  population  (Keilas,  1989).  The 
population  of  Strathclyde  remained  at  roughly  this  proportion  of  the  total  Scottish 
population  throughout  the  period  of  study.  For  instance,  in  1991  the  population 
for  Scotland  fell  to  4,962,152  (Office  of  Population,  Censuses  and  Surveys, 
1991),  whilst  the  population  of  Strathclyde  Region  stood  at  2.3  million  (SRC, 
1995)  or  46.3%  of  the  Scottish  total.  In  comparison  with  other  Regional  Council's 
in  Scotland,  Strathclyde  is  again  significant  in  terms  of  its  population  base,  with 
the  second  largest  Regional  Council  in  Scotland,  Lothian,  containing  a  population 
of  only  735,892  in  1981  (Kellas,  1989). 
The  two-tier  structure  of  local  government  in  Scotland  post-1975  left  the  Regional 
Councils  with  the  major  strategic  and  planning  functions  delegated  to  local 
government,  including  industrial  development,  transportation,  roads,  water  and 
sewerage,  education,  social  work,  and  the  police  and  fire  services  (Midwinter 
et.  al,  1991).  Thus,  the  range  of  competences  which  SRC  managed  covered 
many  areas  which  would  subsequently  be  influenced  by  Single  European  Market 
legislation.  In  addition,  the  Region's  location  within  an  area  of  marked  de- 
industrialisation  (Keating,  1988)  and  its  subsequent  designation  as  an  Objective 
2  Region20  (a  declining  industrial  area)  in  1989  under  the  Structural  Funds 
ensured  that  SRC  was  likely  to  have  engaged  with  the  EU  in  terms  of  obtaining 
finance.  The  likelihood  of  SRC  engaging  with  European  funding  was  also 
enhanced  due  to  the  complimentarity  of  SRC's  policy  aims  and  the  funding  aims 
of  ERDF  and  ESF  finance.  The  Council's  principal  policy  priorities  of  addressing 
economic  and  social  cohesion  within  Strathclyde  were  clearly  outlined,  as  early 
as  1983,  through  SRC's'economic  and  social  strategies'21.  Thus  SRC's 
extensive  engagement  with  European  funding,  in  particular  following  the  creation 
20  Whilst  the  majority  of  SRC  was  eligible  for  Objective  2  funding,  it  is  worth  noting  that  some  of 
the  regions  outlying  areas  were  eligible  for  Objective  1  funding.  This  will  be  considered  further  in 
the  following  chapters. 
21  See  Chapter  Four  for  a  fuller  discussion  of  the  impact  of  SRC's  economic  and  social 
strategies  upon  the  Council's  engagement  with  European  funding  in  the  early  1980's  and  SRC 
(1983  and  1993)  for  detail  of  the  social  strategy  and  SRC  (1994)  for  the  economic  strategy. 
39 of  an  Integrated  Development  Operation  in  Strathclyde  in  1988  (See  Chapter 
Five),  enabled  the  Council  to  utilise  European  funding  as  a  financial  mechanism 
via  which  to  pursue  SRC's  economic  and  social  strategies. 
As  noted  in  Chapter  Two,  John  (1994)  terms  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  a 
'pioneer  authority',  due  to  the  establishment  of  a  representative  office  in  Brussels 
during  1984,  whilst  Goldsmith  (1993)  notes  the  creation  of  an  Integrated 
Development  Operation  (IDO)  in  1988  covering  Strathclyde,  and  Redmond  and 
Barrett  (1988)  refer  to  the  success  of  the  region  in  obtaining  finance  through  the 
ERDF.  To  this  extent,  it  was  possible  to  assume  that  SRC  had  been  involved  to 
some  extent  in  European  issues.  On  a  more  anecdotal  basis,  it  was  possible  to 
find  considerable  evidence  of  Strathclyde's  engagement  with  European  issues  (in 
particular  with  the  Structural  Funds)  in  the  Scottish  Press.  Typically,  such 
articles  warned  of  possible  cuts  in  European  funding  to  Scotland,  however 
Strathclyde  frequently  drew  media  attention  to  its  European  operations,  for 
instance,  The  Herald  commented  in  October  1991  :  - 
"Few  regional  authorities  in  Scotland,  with  the  exception  of  Strathclyde  however, 
have  the  population  and  financial  resources  to  compete  with  their  continental 
equivalents"  (Herald,  30/10/91). 
The  engagement  of  local  authorities  with  European  finance  would  also  obtain 
significant  comment  amongst  the  Scottish  media.  For  example,  the  agreement  to 
a  package  of  funds  for  the  Strathclyde  IDO  elicited  the  following  response  from 
the  Herald  in  1989  :- 
'Whoops  of  delight  throughout  Strathclyde  yesterday  greeted  the  announcement 
of  £56m  worth  of  infrastructure  projects  funded  from  the  European  Regional 
Development  Fund.....  The  four-year  programme,  known  as  the  Strathclyde 
Industrial  Development  Operation,  was  agreed  just  in  time,  according  to  Charles 
Gray,  leader  of  the  council  (SRC).  (Herald,  24/11/89). 
Equally,  the  location  of  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  within  the  wider  Scottish 
political  environment,  and  in  particular  as  an  institution  which  formed  part  of  the 
Scottish  policy  network  surrounding  the  Scottish  Office  (Keating  and 
Midwinter,  1981;  Kellas,  1991),  and  the  actions  of  SRC  within  this  territorial  arena 
40 would  provide  a  useful  case-study  of  the  extent  to  which  sub-national  actors 
would  be  able  to  draw  upon  'regional  coalitions'  (  Burch  and  Holliday,  1993)  in 
any  efforts  to  influence  European  policy-making.  In  relation  to  this  point,  the  role 
of  regional  identity  or  regional  civil  society  is  frequently  posited  as  a  catalyst  in 
enabling  the  mobilisation  of  SNAs  onto  the  European  policy-making  arena22 
(Jeffrey,  1997;  Keating,  1996,  ).  Scotland  is frequently  considered  as  a  society 
which  has  a  distinct  regional  identity  and  civil  society,  to  the  extent  that  it  has 
been  perceived  as  a  'stateless  nation'  (McCrone,  1992).  This  study  therefore 
attempted  to  ascertain  whether  SRC  attempted  to  accentuate  the  distinct  nature 
of  Scottish  politics  and  accordingly  of  Scottish  interests,  in  its  efforts  to  obtain 
'legitimacy'  within  European  policy-making  circles,  or  in  order  to  form  coalitions 
with  others  actors  from  Scotland  when  attempting  to  influence  the  EU. 
Therefore,  the  selection  of  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  as  the  case-study  with 
which  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  a  process  of  Europeanisation  had  been 
taking  place  within  local  government  in  the  West  of  Scotland  over  the  period 
1975-97,  was  due  to  a  number  of  factors.  The  size  of  the  authority  itself  and  the 
range  of  competences  for  which  it  was  responsible  lent  credence  to  the 
impression  that  SRC  was  likely  to  be  the  major  sub-national  authority  within 
Scotland  to  be  active  in  European  terms.  While  other  local  authorities  did 
engage  to  a  considerable  degree  with  European  developments,  notably  in  the 
cases  of  Highland  and  Lothian  Regional  Councils,  the  size  of  SRC  in  population 
terms  and  correspondingly  of  its  budget  in  comparison  to  other  Scottish  councils 
ensured  that  SRC  was  clearly  likely  to  be  able  to  suggest  the  extent  to  which  a 
process  of  Europeanisation  was  taking  place  within  Scottish  local  government. 
While  such  trends  may  not  prove  to  have  been  evident  to  the  same  extent  in 
other  Scottish  local  authorities,  if  SRC  was  found  to  have  been  largely 
unengaged  with  a  process  of  Europeanisation  this  would  also  tend  to  suggest 
that  other  Scottish  councils  were  largely  unaffected  by  Europeanisation.  Thus 
the  choice  of  SRC  as  the  focus  for  this  thesis  results  from  the  extent  to  which 
22  See  Chapter  Two  for  a  broader  discussion  of  this  premise. 
41 SRC  dominated  the  pre-1996  structure  of  Scottish  local  government  and  was 
thus  clearly  as  likely  (if  not  more  so)  to  be  subject  to  a  process  of 
Europeanisation  than  any  other  Scottish  local  authority.  Furthermore,  SRC  also 
fulfilled  many  of  the  'conditions',  outlined  in  the  literature,  as  being  likely  to  induce 
mobilisation  onto  the  European  arena  such  as  eligibility  for  Structural  Funding, 
being  located  within  a'region'  with  a  distinct  regional  identity  and  a  polity  which  is 
to  some  extent  differentiated  from  that  of  the  rest  of  the  UK.  These  factors  allied 
to  the  preliminary  literature  review  (in  which  SRC  was  frequently  referred  to  as  an 
active  SNA  in  European  terms  and  more  particularly,  in  terms  of  local  authorities 
within  the  UK),  provided  the  basis  upon  which  SRC  was  selected  as  the  case- 
study  for  this  research. 
3.4  -  Initial  Exploratory  Fieldwork. 
Prior  to'entering  the  field',  I  set  out  to  obtain  background  information  on  the 
European  affairs  of  SRC  through  a  wide  variety  of  methods.  This  was  necessary 
as  the  primary  method  I  intended  to  utilise,  in  order  to  answer  the  research 
questions  outlined  above,  were  elite  interviews.  Therefore,  a  thorough 
awareness  of  the  issues  surrounding  the  case-study  would  ensure  that  upon 
conducting  field-work  a  considerable  amount  of  evidence  could  be  obtained 
within  a  short  time-period  without  the  need  for  basic  areas  of  knowledge  to  be 
covered  by  the  respondent  for  my  benefit.  Indeed  many  respondents  would 
enquire  as  to  your  knowledge  of  a  subject  area  prior  to  an  interview, 
Consequently,  carrying  out  the  initial  exploratory  stages  of  the  research  ensured 
that  the  maximum  benefit  was  obtained  during  the  later  research  stages.  The 
advice  of  Wagstaffe  and  Moyser  on  the  value  of  background  research  prior  to 
entering  the  field  proved  invaluable  in  this  regard  :- 
"Interviewers  need  to  arm  themselves  with  as  much  background  information  as 
possible  before  venturing  to  begin  the  survey.  The  importance  of  full  use  of 
secondary  sources,  documentation  and  archival  material  cannot  be  over- 
emphasised"  (Wagstaffe  and  Moyser,  1987,  p.  196). 
42 Following  the  initial  literature  review,  I  undertook  an  archival  search  of  the 
minutes  of  Strathclyde  Region,  focusing  primarily  upon  the  European  and 
International  Affairs  sub-committee  of  the  council  which  was  established  in  1992. 
These  minutes23  which  were  prepared  by  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  of 
SRC  (which  fulfilled  a  co-ordinating  role  concerning  European  policy)  provided 
information  demonstrating  the  wide  scope  of  SRC's  European  policy  over  the 
period  1992-94.  In  addition,  the  minutes  included  a  substantial  amount  of 
background  reports  for  the  period  prior  to  this,  which  were  issued  upon  the 
establishment  of  the  Committee  to  enable  Councillors  to  have  an  awareness  of 
the  manner  in  which  European  policy  had  developed  within  the  Council,  and  the 
'motivations'  for  SRC's  involvement  in  particular  projects.  Additional  information 
for  the  period  prior  to  1992,  was  also  obtained  from  the  Policy  and  Resources 
Committee  which  dealt  with  European  affairs  prior  to  the  setting  up  of  the 
aforementioned  Committee. 
Whilst  the  minutes  of  the  Committee  meetings  tended  to  be  rather  formal 
documents,  nevertheless,  they  provided  vital  information  regarding  the 
composition  of  the  Committee,  the  extent  to  which  members  attended  the 
Committee  as  well  as  enabling  the  identification  of  politicians  who  were  involved 
in  trans-regional  networks  and  other  European  policy  related  organisations.  Of 
particular  importance  were  the  background  reports  given  upon  the  establishment 
of  the  Committee,  to  brief  the  Councillors  on  the  development  of  SRC's  European 
policy,  and  of  the  role  of  the  various  organisations  with  which  SRC  was  a 
member  or  involved.  Most  Committee  meetings  received  reports  from  officials 
concerning  the  development  of  policy  within  their  own  sphere  of  responsibility. 
These  again  gave  invaluable  information  concerning  the  development  of  policy, 
as  well  as  allowing  me  to  identify  the  officials  who  were  concerned  with  particular 
23  Prior  to  the  full  Committee  meetings  comprising  politicians  from  all  the  political  parties,  the 
Labour  group  would  hold  a  meeting  at  which  they  would  agree  a  common  position  on  policies. 
Unfortunately,  the  ruling  Labour  group  papers  have  all  been  destroyed,  and  thus  a  large  array  of 
documented  material,  which  would  have  been  of  huge  interest  has  been  lost.  Occasionally, 
individual  members  would  provide  me  with  such  papers  which  they  had  kept,  however,  this 
tended  to  only  reinforce  my  sense  of  loss  at  the  lack  of  an  archive  containing  such  documents. 
43 policies.  The  Committee  meetings  covered  a  wide  range  of  issues,  which 
extended  my  awareness  of  the  extent  to  which  SRC  was  involved  in  European 
affairs,  aside  from  issues  surrounding  European  funding  which  were  fairly  well 
documented  amongst  the  academic  literature.  For  instance,  to  give  a  flavour  of 
the  range  of  issues  which  would  be  covered  at  the  European  and  International 
Affairs  Committee,  the  meeting  of  the  6th  September  1994  provides  a  fairly 
representative  example  (See  Table  3.1). 
Whilst  undertaking  the  archival  search,  I  also  began  a  process  of  participant 
observation24,  through  attendance  at  the  European  and  International  Affairs 
Committee  meetings  of  SRC.  These  meetings  tended  to  take  place  once  a 
month,  although  the  workload  of  the  Committee  reduced  as  the  re-organisation  of 
local  government  drew  closer.  In  total  I  attended  seven  Committee  meetings 
which  provided  me  with  information  regarding  current  debates  within  the  Council 
regarding  the  European  function  within  the  new  unitary  authorities,  in  the  build-up 
to  re-organisation,  and  of  the  structures  which  would  be  put  in  place  to  conduct 
European  affairs  in  the  West  of  Scotland  following  reorganisation.  Attendance  at 
the  Committee  meetings  also  enabled  me  to  make  first  contact  with  key  actors, 
thus  gaining  me  an  entry  mechanism  when  the  interviews  within  the  Council 
began25. 
24  For  a  discussion  on  the  issues  surrounding  undertaking  participant  observation,  and  the 
'ethics'  involved,  see  Spradley  (1980);  Jorgenson  (1989);  and,  Punch  (1994). 
2'  The  process  of  attending  Committee  meetings  continued  throughout  the  first  series  of 
interviews,  until  the  abolition  of  Strathclyde  in  April  1996. 
44 Table  3.1  -  European  and  International  Affairs  Committee  of  Strathclyde 
Regional  Council.  Meeting  of  the  6th  September  1994. 
Agenda  Items.  Contents. 
Agenda  Item  No.  1  :  -  The  presentation  outlined  the 
Presentation  on  the  Ouverture  development  of  the  programme  in 
project,  by  the  Director  of  the  recent  months,  and  of  the  creation  of 
Programme.  a  number  of  new  projects. 
Agenda  Item  No.  2  :  -  A  report  was  forwarded  by  the 
Current  European  Issues.  Brussels-based  officer  and 
presented  by  the  Assistant  Chief 
Executive  which  dealt  with  :-  the 
newly  agreed  Community  Initiatives 
package;  the  chairs  of  the  new 
Committees  of  the  European 
Parliament;  the  commissions 
established  within  the  Committee  of 
the  Regions;  comment  on  the  Delor 
White  Paper  on  'Growth, 
Competitiveness  and  Employment'; 
and  the  conclusions  of  the  Greek 
Presidency  of  the  EU  at  a  recent 
conference. 
Agenda  Item  No.  3  :  -  A  report  by  the  Chief  Executive's 
Community  Initiatives.  Department  on  the  preparations 
being  made  to  apply  for  Community 
Initiatives. 
Agenda  Item  No.  4  :  -  A  report  by  the  Chief  Executives 
Growth,  Competitiveness  and  Department  on  the  Delor's  White 
Employment.  Paper. 
Agenda  Item  No.  5  :  -  Potential  submissions  for  ESF 
European  Social  Fund  (Objective  support  by  SRC  under  the  Objective 
One).  1  partnership,  to  be  approved  by  the 
Committee. 
Agenda  Item  No.  6  :  -  Potential  submissions  for  ESF 
European  Social  Fund  (Voluntary  support  in  partnership  with  the 
Sector  Organisations).  voluntary  sector,  to  be  approved  by 
the  Committee. 
45 Agenda  Item  No.  7  :  -  Update  the  members  on  the 
Objective  Two  Lobby.  progress  SRC  was  making  with  an 
Objective  2  lobby  it  was  organising 
with  other  Objective  2  regions, 
concerning  the  distribution  of 
Structural  Funds  for  the  period  1997- 
9. 
Agenda  Item  No.  8  :  -  A  report  outlining  the  European 
European  Dimension  in  Education.  policy  of  the  Education  department 
for  the  year  1993-4. 
Agenda  Item  No-9:  -  A  report  by  the  Chief  Executive's 
European  Social  Policy.  Department  on  the  European 
Commission's  Green  Paper  on 
European  Social  Policy,  and  how  it 
would  influence  the  Commission's 
work  programme  . 
Agenda  Item  No.  10  -  A  report  by  the  Chief  Executive's 
Progress  Report  on  the  Ouverture  Department  on  the  financial 
Programme.  contributions  of  SRC  to  the 
programme  over  the  next  year,  and 
to  ask  permission  for  the  Chief 
Exec's  Dept.  to  negotiate  a  contract 
for  further  funding  with  the  PHARE 
Programme. 
Agenda  Item  No.  11  :  -  A  report  from  the  Physical  Planning 
Villes  et  Ports.  Department  of  the  role  of  SRC's 
involvement  in  the  Villes  et  Ports 
exchange  of  experience  programme, 
and  to  propose  holding  a  conference 
of  the  network  in  Glasgow. 
Agenda  Item  No-12:  -  Report  by  the  Director  of  Transport 
Trans-European  road  network.  of  a  revised  European  Commission 
view  on  a  network  of  'Euro-routes' 
for  the  UK. 
Agenda  Item  No-13:  -  Applications  by  members  to  attend 
Conferences.  conferences  dealing  with  European 
issues.  Total  of  seven  applications 
at  this  meeting. 
Source:  -  SRC  (September  1994),  European  and  International  Affairs  Committee 
Papers. 
Observation  of  the  Committee  meetings  enabled  me  to  'pick  out'  the  more  active 
members  of  the  Committee,  in  terms  of  the  contribution  made  by  individual 
Councillors  to  the  meetings.  As  a  result,  I  tended  to  leave  the  more  fully  involved 
46 actors  to  the  end  of  my  first  series  of  interviews  amongst  SRC  actors,  in  order  to 
be  armed  with  as  much  information  as  possible  before  approaching  these 
individuals.  The  Committee  meetings  also  yielded  valuable  insights  into  the 
various  factions  within  the  Council,  in  particular  within  the  ruling  Labour  party 
group.  As  the  Labour  party  dominated  the  Council  in  terms  of  political 
representation  throughout  the  existence  of  the  authority,  divisions  within  the 
ruling  Labour  party  tended  to  be  of  greater  importance  than  the  role  of  opposition 
party  groupings26.  This  awareness  proved  particularly  useful  when  it  came  to 
interviewing  individual  Councillors,  as  it  enabled  a  sensitivity  with  regard  to  the 
phrasing  of  questions  relating  to  internal  politicking  and  its  impact  upon  European 
policy27. 
In  addition  to  the  analysis  of  official  documents,  a  search  of  newspaper  articles 
dealing  with  SRC's  involvement  with  Europe,  was  also  carried  out.  These 
articles  dealt  primarily  with  the  allocations  of  Structural  Funds  to  SRC  and  proved 
an  interesting  source  of  documentation,  regarding  the  public  statements  made  by 
leading  SRC  figures  at  this  time,  as  well  as  the  perception  which  the  Council  was 
attempting  to  convey  regarding  its  European  policy  to  the  general  public,  as  well 
as  the  media's  treatment  of  such  activities  (as  referred  to  above).  More 
generally,  newspaper  articles  dealing  with  European  issues  within  a  wider 
Scottish  context  were  also  studied.  These  articles  covered  a  wide  range  of 
issues,  such  as,  the  debates  surrounding  additionality  and  the  setting-up  of 
Scotland  Europa,  although  they  tended  to  focus  once  more  on  the  lobbying 
process  surrounding  the  re-negotiation  of  Structural  Fund  packages.  Thus,  these 
articles  helped  to  provide  a  voider  contextualisation  of  the  Scottish  political 
debates  surrounding  Europe,  as  SRC  developed  a  European  policy. 
26  To  illustrate  the  dominance  of  the  Labour  party  in  terms  of  political  representation  within  the 
Council,  following  the  Scottish  Regional  Council  elections  of  May  1982,  of  the  103  Councillors 
elected  to  Strathclyde  Regional  Council,  79  (77%  of  Councillors)  represented  the  Labour  party 
with  the  remaining  Councillors  being  split  between  the  Conservatives  (15),  Liberal  (4),  SNP  (3), 
and  Independents  (2)  (McCrone,  D  ed.,  1982,  p.  268). 
47 Finally,  a  series  of  preliminary  interviews  were  carried  out  with  actors  involved  in 
European  affairs  across  Scotland  (see  Table  3.2).  These  individuals  were 
primarily  involved  with  the  development  of  European  policy  within  the  Central 
Belt  of  Scotland,  and  the  respondents  came  from  a  diverse  range  of  institutions. 
The  vast  majority  of  respondents  were  not  directly  involved  with  the  operation  of 
European  policy  within  SRC,  although  most  had  at  some  point  come  into  contact 
with  SRC  in  relation  to  European  policy.  An  exception,  was  the  interview  carried 
out  with  an  official  from  SRC's  Chief  Executives  Department,  who  was 
interviewed  to  provide  clarification  on  informational  points  regarding  the 
organisation  of  the  European  function  within  Strathclyde28.  The  preliminary 
interviews  were  undertaken,  in  order  to  further  contextualise  my  understanding  of 
the  role  of  Scottish  local  government  vis-ä-vis  the  EU,  and  also  to  ascertain 
insights  into  areas  where  I  required  further  knowledge  concerning  my 
understanding  of  the  role  of  various  actors  within  Scotland  and  their  European 
activities.  However,  the  primary  aim  in  carrying  out  exploratory  interviews,  was 
to  'pilot-test'  my  elite  interviewing  technique,  in  order  to  develop  my  experience  of 
this  form  of  research,  prior  to  entering  into  the  field.  The  material  obtained  from 
these  interviews  has  not  been  included  in  the  research  presented  here,  rather 
these  exploratory  interviews  acted  as  a  'scene-setting'  exercise,  and  whilst  the 
information  obtained  guided  my  later  questioning,  the  interviews  were  carried  out 
in  order  to  obtain  information  not  available  from  other  sources,  rather  than  to  test 
the  research  questions  outlined  earlier.  Table  3.2  illustrates  this  point,  as  these 
preliminary  interviews  were  conducted  with  respondents  from  a  diverse  range  of 
institutional  backgrounds.  The  interviews  conducted  with  the  European 
Commission  representative  and  at  European  Information  Centre  were  clearly 
intended  to  provide  further  information  regarding  linkages  between  SNAs  and  the 
EU  whilst  the  remaining  interviewees  considered  the  practical  experience  of  a 
27  See  Chapter  Four,  Section  Four  with  regard  to  the  issue  of  the  impact  of  internal  Labour  group 
conflict  upon  the  management  of  European  policy. 
28  Two  other  individuals  were  also  interviewed  from  institutions,  which  although  not  directly  from 
SRC,  were  closely  linked  to  the  authority.  These  were  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership  and 
the  Ouverture  programme.  Again,  this  was  done  for  informational  purposes. 
48 variety  of  respondents  concering  the  extent  of  SNA  -  EU  relations  within  both 
Strathclyde  and  Scotland. 
Table  3.2  -  List  of  Preliminary  Interviewees. 
European  Officer,  Industry  Department,  Scottish  Office,  Edinburgh,  June 
1995. 
European  Commission  Representative,  European  Commission  Office  in 
Scotland,  Edinburgh,  June  1995. 
Representative  from  the  European  Information  Centre,  Glasgow,  June 
1995. 
Representative  from  the  Scottish  Trade  Union  Congress,  Glasgow,  July 
1995. 
Official  from  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership,  Glasgow,  July  1995. 
Official  from  the  Ouverture  Programme,  Glasgow,  July  1995. 
Official  from  the  Chief  Executive's  Department,  Strathclyde  Regional 
Council,  July  1995. 
Scottish  Labour  MEP,  Glasgow,  August  1995. 
Scottish  Labour  MEP,  Edinburgh,  August  1995. 
This  process  of  exploratory  fieldwork  enabled  me  to  enter  the  field,  armed  with  a 
wealth  of  background  information  concerning  the  development  of  SRC's 
European  policy  and  the  wider  context  of  European  policy  throughout  Scotland. 
Additionally  carrying  out  elite  interviews  enabled  me  to  gain  experience  in 
conducting  semi-structured  interviews.  The  research  'proper  undertaken  in  the 
'field',  was  based  upon  elite  interviews.  However  prior  to  elaborating  upon  the 
research  structure  employed  in  'the  field',  I  will  discuss  the  rationale  surrounding 
the  selection  of  elite  interviewing  as  the  most  suitable  technique  with  which  to 
realise  the  research  aims  of  this  thesis,  and  the  manner  of  their 
operationalisation. 
49 3.5.1  -  Methodological  Approach. 
In  order  to  ascertain  the  extent  of  SRC's  engagement  with  European  policy,  this 
study  intended  not  to  focus  purely  upon  institutional  structures  as  tends  to  be  the 
case  in  accounts  of  multi-level  governance,  which  has  an  implicit  emphasis 
towards  new'decision-making  arenas'  (Marks,  1992).  The  research  was  also 
concerned  with  the  broader  process  of  Europeanisation  and  thus  intended  to 
take  into  account  the  role  of  formal  and  informal  networks.  This  was  in  part  a 
recognition  of  the  complexity  and  fluidity  of  the  EC  policy  process,  with  extensive 
lobbying  and  political  activity  occurring  outside  institutional  arenas  (Mazey  and 
Richardson,  1993).  Thus,  in  order  to  comprehend  the  European  policy  of  SRC,  it 
would  be  necessary  to  analyse  informal  lobbying  strategies  pursued  by  the 
Council  vis-a-vis  EU  Institutions.  Equally  the  conception  of  informal  networks  at 
the  domestic  level,  such  as'territorial  communities'  (Rhodes,  1988,  p.  78),  implied 
a  focus  upon  non-formalised  political  interactions.  This  is  not  to  state  that  the 
research  does  not  analyse  institutional  arenas,  on  the  contrary,  where  this  is 
applicable  documentary  materials  are  utilised  to  analyse  institutions,  such  as  the 
Strathclyde  European  Partnership.  However,  this  study  focuses  upon  the 
motivations  of  actors  in  pursuing  particular  strategies,  and  the  perceptions  they 
hold  as  to  their  utility,  in  order  to  understand  the  development  of  European  policy 
within  SRC. 
In  order  to  achieve  these  aims,  I  decided  to  utilise  semi-structured  elite 
interviews.  Elite  interviewing  has  the  advantage  of  enabling  the  researcher,  to  go 
into  detail  with  key  actors  over  the  research  area.  Given  the  research  aims  of 
this  study,  and  the  relatively  small  nature  of  the  sample  population,  the 
undertaking  of  elite  interviews  appeared  the  most  effective  way  to  achieve  these 
aims.  In  addition,  elite  interviewing  had  previously  been  widely  used  in  order  to 
ascertain  the  attitudes  of  sub-national  elites  (for  example,  Putnam,  1993). 
However,  elite  interviewing  has  been  criticised  for  its  inability  to  be  readily 
systematised  or  made  comparable.  In  part,  this  is  a  problem  for  in-depth 
research  amongst  elites  within  any  policy  sphere.  As  a  result,  the  research 
50 design  I  employed  attempted  to  mitigate  against  these  criticisms  in  two  ways. 
Firstly,  the  interviews  were  semi-structured,  with  a  pre-arranged  'interview  guide' 
designed  for  each  series  of  interviews  where  a  number  of  subject  areas  were 
identified  as  having  to  be  discussed  in  the  interview.  Thus,  each  interview 
covered  certain  subject  areas,  whilst  allowing  the  respondent  to  elaborate  upon 
issues  they  wished  to  discuss  further.  Secondly,  the  earlier  stages  of  the 
research  process  enabled  a  cross-checking  to  occur  between  accounts  given  in 
interviews  and  evidence  obtained  from  documentary  analysis. 
3.5.2  -  Elite  Interviewin 
"If  the  focal  data  for  a  research  project  are  the  attitudes  and  perceptions  of 
individuals,  the  most  direct  and  often  the  most  fruitful  approach  is  to  ask  the 
individuals  themselves"  (Cannell  and  Kahn,  1965,  p.  330). 
The  process  of  defining  or  categorising  any  particular  group  as  being  an  'elite'  is 
widely  contested2g,  however  for  the  purpose  of  the  research  conducted  in  this 
study  I  adopted  Laswell's  general  definition  of  an  'elite'  as  "the  influential" 
(Lasswell,  1950,  p.  3).  Clearly  in  terms  of  the  frame  of  reference  of  this  study  the 
elite  constituted  those  who  exerted  influence  over  the  development  of  SRC's 
European  policy,  with  these  individuals  being  identified  via  the  'positional'  and 
'reputational'  approaches. 
Prior  to  setting-out  to  conduct  a  series  of  interviews,  I  developed  a  sampling 
strategy,  which  in  all  three  series  of  interviews  followed  the  pattern  of  initially 
identifying  individuals  via  their  position  (  the'positional'  approach)  within  a 
particular  institution.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  the  first  series,  I  identified  potential 
interviewees,  either  through  their  position  upon  the  European  and  International 
Affairs  Committee,  or  in  the  case  of  officials,  by  contacting  the  appropriate 
department.  Once  the  process  of  interviewing  had  begun,  I  would  frequently  ask 
interviewees  to  recommend  individuals  they  considered  relevant  to  the  research, 
29  For  a  discussion  of  theories  concerning  elites  and  elitism  see  Evans,  M,  in,  Marsh,  D  and 
Stoker.  G  (1995),  p.  228-247. 
51 although  additional  contacts  would  frequently  be  offered  spontaneously 
throughout  the  course  of  an  interview.  This  'reputational'  approach  not  only 
improved  my  knowledge  of  the  area  concerned,  but  also  gave  me  an  insight  into 
the'network'  of  the  interviewee30.  From  this  process  of  'snowballing',  further 
interviews  could  then  be  obtained  (Arber,  1993).  Thus,  the'reputational' 
approach  enabled  me  to  uncover  the  'network'  of  the  respondent,  whilst  the  initial 
'positional'  approach  ensured  that  I  did  not  merely  interview  those  who  were 
connected  to  a  particular  network,  and  who  shared  common  interests.  In  the 
majority  of  cases,  contact  was  made  with  the  respondent  via  a  letter,  outlining  my 
research  area  and  my  reasons  for  wanting  to  interview  the  potential  interviewee. 
However,  on  some  occasions,  contact  was  initially  made  by  telephone, 
particularly  where  a  respondent  had  been  interviewed  previously3l. 
This  combination  of  the  `positional'  and  `reputational'  approaches  to  data 
sampling  for  elite  interviews  represented  an  attempt  to  minimise  the  problems  of 
each  single  sampling  method.  The  problems  associated  with  these  approaches 
are,  in  the  case  of  the  positional  approach  that  individuals  may  be  interviewed 
who  hold  positions  of  authority  but  in  reality  do  not  exert  influence,  while  a 
reputational  approach  may  lead  the  researcher  into  a  network  of  individuals  who 
share  similar  interests  /  views  but  who  do  not  represent  the  whole  spectrum  of 
individuals  who  exert  influence  within  a  particular  policy  field  (See  Moyser  and 
Wagstaffe,  1987).  The  utilisation  of  these  two  approaches  to  sampling,  was 
viewed  as  a  means  of  overcoming  the  difficulties  associated  with  adopting  a 
purely  reputational  or  positional  approach.  "Intra-method  triangulation" 
(Sarantakos,  1993,  p.  155)  is  a  common  means  of  attempting  to  overcome  the 
deficiencies  of  a  single  technique  while  also  providing  a  means  from  which  to 
30  Moyser,  G  and  Wagstaffe,  M  (1987)  include  a  number  of  essays  containing  discussions  of  the 
various  benefits  of  the  'positional'  and  'reputational'  approaches  to  sampling  in  the  context  of  elite 
interviews.  In  essence,  the  'positional'  approach  is  seen  as  useful  in  the  initial  stages  of  gaining 
'access',  whilst  the  'reputational'approach  is  often  viewed  as  worthwhile  at  a  later  stage.  Moyser 
and  Wagstaffe  also  consider  the  problems  associated  with  these  sampling  approaches  as  a 
means  of  obtaining  a  sample  for  elite  interviews. 
52 obtain  as  diverse,  and  representative,  a  sample  of  respondents  as  possible 
within  the  confines  of  a  qualitative  methodology. 
In  order  to  assess  the  perceptions  of  interviewees  to  past  events,  and  to  obtain 
their  judgement  concerning  the  research  questions,  the  elite  interviews  carried 
out  during  this  research  project,  were  'semi-structured'  interviews  with  the 
questions  asked  being  'open-ended'.  This  approach  was  adopted,  in  order  to 
allow  the  respondent  to  focus  upon  areas  of  particular  interest  of  concern  to 
themselves,  whilst  staying  within  the  frame  of  reference  of  the  research  question. 
In  order  to  encourage  the  interviewee  to  talk  freely,  I  always  emphasised  the 
confidentiality  of  all  interviews  at  the  outset.  Whilst,  the  interviews  were  tape- 
recorded,  it  was  again  emphasised  that  the  tape  could  be  switched  off  at  any 
time32.  I  viewed  my  role  as  interviewer,  as  being  that  of  an  'outsider,  attempting 
to  develop  'trust'  with  the  interviewee,  in  order  to  facilitate  a'frank  discussion' 
with  the  respondent  (see  Fielding,  1993  and  Arthur,  1987).  Particularly  in 
situations  where  a  respondent  had  been  interviewed  previously  it  was  frequently 
apparent  that  they  would  become  more  'open'  and  display  a  greater  interest  in 
the  research  project.  The  objective  of  the  interview  was  not  to  uncover'truth',  but 
rather  to  ascertain  the  interviewees  perceptions  and  beliefs  regarding  particular 
events  and  actions.  As  Dexter  states:  - 
"The  informant's  statement  represents  merely  the  perception  of  the  informant, 
filtered  and  modified  by  his  cognitive  and  emotional  reactions  and  reported 
through  his  personal  verbal  usage's"  (Dexter,  1970,  p.  120). 
During  the  period  in  which  the  interviews  were  being  undertaken,  local 
government  throughout  Scotland  was  experiencing  a  period  of  considerable 
'turmoil'  as  respondents  sought  employment  in  the  new  councils,  and 
31  The  exception  to  this,  were  the  series  of  interviews  conducted  in  Brussels,  where  all  the 
respondents  were  contacted  by  telephone. 
32  This  was  a  frequent  occurrence,  with  a  majority  of  respondents  wishing  that  either  the  tape  be 
switched  off  at  some  point,  or  that'on-tape'  comments  be  considered  as  'off  the  record'.  I  would 
attempt  to  verify'off  the  record'  comments  (as  I  would  with  other  statements  on  tape)  with  other 
respondents,  in  order  to  try  and  verify  accounts,  although  in  every  case  the  name  of  the  initial 
informant  was  never  mentioned.  Occasionally,  respondents  would  prefer  not  to  be  recorded  at 
all,  in  which  case  I  kept  hand-written  notes. 
53 subsequently,  settled  into  their  new  positions.  Thus,  it  is  worth  mentioning  the 
'time-bound'  nature  of  elite  interviewing  as  respondents  could  possibly  begin  to 
see  the  previous  era  of  relative  stability  with  Strathclyde  as  a  'golden  era'.  This 
combined  with  the  'memory  bias'  of  respondents  when  recalling  the  development 
of  European  policy,  particularly  during  the  first  series  of  interviews,  may  again 
have  led  respondents  to  add  a'gloss'  onto  past  events  Thus,  a  constant  effort 
was  made  throughout  the  interviewing  process  to'cross-check'  accounts  of  past 
events  with  various  interviewees. 
Qualitative  methods  and  the  analysis  of  the  results  generated  are  frequently 
critiqued  for  their  lack  of  verifiability  and  resulting  reliability  (See  Devine,  1995). 
The  sampling  strategies  and  the  approach  taken  within  interviews  outlined 
above,  were  intended  to  ensure  that  the  research  was  undertaken  in  a 
systematic  manner  which  would  minimise  any  distortion  in  results  caused  by  the 
methods  utilised  or  the  effects  of  the  researcher  upon  the  individuals  researched. 
Equally,  the  interpretation  of  transcripts  required  that  they  were  organised  in  a 
systematic  manner  in  order  to  be  analysed.  This  process  involved  a  number  of 
stages.  Initially,  the  transcripts  from  a  particular  series  would  be  read,  in  order  to 
develop  categories  out  of  the  data.  Filing  cards  were  used  to  list  these  various 
categories  according  to  the  section  of  a  particular  interview  from  which  they  were 
drawn,  thus  enabling  me  to  access  all  comments  on  a  particular  subject.  These 
passages  were  then  re-read,  in  order  to  draw  conclusions  upon  these  particular 
topics,  with  particular  attention  being  made  to  ensure  that  both  majority  and 
minority  views  were  accounted  for33.  In  addition,  where  transcript  material  is 
utilised  within  the  research,  the  viewpoint  expressed  was  triangulated  against 
other  respondents  to  assess  whether  at  least  two  other  respondents  from  other 
positions  (such  as,  a  politician  view  being  corroborated  by  an  official  and  an 
individual  from  another  institution)  corroborated  the  perception  expressed.  If 
such  an  opinion  is  also  expressed  by  a  minimum  of  two  other  respondents  then 
54 the  perception  would  be  considered  valid.  Interviewees  would  be  asked  to 
comment  on  a  particular  persepective  of  a  previous  respondent  in  order  to 
facilitate  this  process  without  being  told  that  a  previous  respondent  had  elicited 
such  an  opinion.  This  approach  of  ensuring  that  at  least  three  individuals 
expressed  similar  views  regarding  a  particular  issue,  independently  of  each 
other,  was  intended  to  ensure  that  a  consistent  approach  was  advanced  in 
determining  how  excerpts  from  the  interview  transcripts  would  be  used  within  the 
research  presented.  The  views  expressed  by  respondents  were  also  checked 
against  other  sources  of  information,  such  as,  minutes  of  Council  meetings,  to 
ensure  that  the  accounts  given  by  respondents  were  consistent  with  other 
sources  of  documentation. 
Transcript  material  has  been  integrated  into  the  thesis  in  a  number  of  ways,  from 
direct  quoting  of  particularly  relevant  accounts  to  assimilated  references  to  the 
perceptions  of  actors  upon  a  particular  issue.  However,  such  a  process  does 
raise  concern  that  the'voice'  of  the  respondent(s)  could  be  conflated  or  confused 
with  that  of  the  researcher.  As  a  result,  close  attention  was  paid  throughout  the 
writing-up  of  results  that  the  opinions  of  respondents  are  clearly  differentiated 
from  that  of  the  researcher  and  are  clearly  referenced  as  being  the  opinion  of  an 
interviewee.  At  all  times,  individuals  are  not  named  due  to  the  assurances  of 
confidentiality  given  to  all  respondents.  However,  all  quotes  are  preceded  by  a 
positionality  statement,  as  to  the  role  which  the  particular  respondent  held,  for 
example,  'a  prominent  Labour  SRC  politician  commented'  etc.  Following  all 
quotes,  a  case  number  is  given  which  relates  to  the  interviewee  list,  where  all 
respondents  are  listed  according  to  their  case  number  (see  Tables  3.3  to  3.5). 
33  It  was  decided  not  to  use  the  Nu-dist  package,  despite  the  many  advantages  this  could  have 
provided  in  terms  of  analysing  transcripts,  due  to  a  lack  of  memory  space  in  terms  of  the 
computing  facilities  available,  thus  rendering  the  package  'unmanageable'. 
34  See  Raab,  C,  in  Moyser  and  Wagstaffe  (1987)  on  this  approach  to  analysing  interview 
transcripts. 
55 3.5.3  -  The  Local  Government  Reorganisation  Questionnaire. 
The  questionnaire  dealing  with  the  impact  of  reorganisation  upon  the  European 
policy  of  local  government  in  Western  Scotland  was  clearly  limited  in  scope,  as  it 
dealt  with  respondents  following  the  reorganisation  of  local  government,  and  thus 
was  only  completed  by  respondents  during  the  final  series  of  interviews  (see 
Appendix  Two).  The  decision  to  use  a  questionnaire  for  this  final  stage  of  the 
research  process  was  taken  in  recognition  of  the  increased  number  of  local 
government  officials  and  politicians  dealing  with  European  policy  in  the  twelve 
successor  authorities  to  SRC.  An  initial  assessment  of  the  number  of  officials 
dealing  with  European  policy  in  Western  Scotland  following  reorganisation  had 
been  ascertained  from  a  COSLA  document  which  listed  the  officials  appointed  as 
'European  policy  officers'  within  unitary  authorities  in  Scotland.  Twenty-one 
European  policy  officers  had  been  appointed  to  SRC's  successor  authorities 
according  to  this  document  (COSLA,  1996).  Clearly  to  conduct  a  sampling 
strategy  as  applied  to  SRC  would  have  been  a  costly  and  time-consuming 
exercise  as  a  substantial  proportion  of  Councillors  on  each  Council  European 
Affairs  Committee  and  officials  in  a  wide  range  of  department  beyond  those  titled 
as  being  European  policy  officers  would  have  to  be  interviewed.  Accordingly, 
four  unitary  authorities  were  selected  as  case-study  authorities5  whilst  a 
questionnaire  was  sent  to  each  Chair  of  a  European  Committee  and  European 
Policy  Officer  within  SRC's  twelve  successor  authorities36.  In  total  17 
questionnaires  were  completed  from  the  target  sample  of  24  (a  councillor  and  an 
official  from  each  of  SRC  successor  authorities)  however  one  of  these 
questionnaires  was  completed  by  a  WOSEC37  representative  who  was  not 
directly  employed  by  a  unitary  authority.  The  response  rate  from  the  unitary 
authorities  was  therefore  66.6%.  Of  the  remainingl6  questionnaires,  seven  were 
35  Section  3.6,  outlines  the  rationale  for  the  selection  of  these  four  authorities  as  case  studies. 
36  As  the  reorganisation  of  local  government  occurred  in  the  middle  of  the  research  process,  the 
questionnaire  was  not  pilot-tested  amongst  'practitioners',  but  rather  amongst  academics  and 
researchers  in  the  Departments  of  Politics  and  Geography,  at  Glasgow  University. 
37  WOSEC  (West  of  Scotland  European  Consortium)  is  an  organisation  formed  by  the  twelve 
successor  authorities  to  SRC  and  Dumfires  and  Galloway  Council  to  represent  the  West  of 
Scotland  in  the  EU  post  reorganisation. 
56 completed  by  politicians  and  nine  by  officials,  a  58%  response  rate  amongst 
councillors  and  75%  response  from  officials.  In  the  case  of  North  Lanarkshire 
two  officials  were  interviewed  and  thus  two  questionnaires  completed.  Table  3.3 
provides  a  breakdown  of  completed  questionnaires  by  unitary  authority. 
Table  3.3  -  Completed  Reorganisation  Questionnaires  by  Unitary  Authority. 
Unitary  Authority.  Number  of  completed 
questionnaires  from 
politicians. 
Number  of  completed 
questionnaires  from 
officials. 
Argyll  and  Bute  1  1 
Dumbarton  and 
Clydebank 
0  0 
East  Ayrshire  1  1 
East  Dunbartonshire  0  1 
East  Renfrewshire  1  1 
Glasgow  City  0  0 
Inverclyde  0  0 
North  Ayrshire  0  1 
North  Lanarkshire  1  2 
Renfrewshire  1  0 
South  Ayrshire  1  1 
South  Lanarkshire  1  1 
Total  7  9 
The  questionnaire  was  divided  into  three  elements  (See  Appendix  Two).  The 
first  section  dealt  with  the  internal  operation  of  European  policy  within  individual 
councils,  such  as  the  number  of  staff  dealing  with  European  affairs  and  the 
councils  structure  of  departments  and  Committee's  which  had  been  established 
to  deal  with  the  management  of  European  affairs,  in  order  to  gauge  the  extent  to 
which  the  unitary  authorities  had  adopted  common  structures  or  developed  their 
57 own  systems  to  deal  with  such  a  corporate  function  (Questions  1-4).  This  section 
also  asked  respondents  to  identify  the  key  priorities  of  the  council  in  terms  of 
European  policy  and  attempted  to  ascertain  the  extent  of  awareness  of  European 
issues  through  questions  concerning  the  councils  involvement  in  trans-regional 
networks  and  whether  applications  were  being  prepared  for  Community 
Initiatives  (Questions  5-7).  The  second  section  concerned  the  extent  of  contacts 
between  councils  and  external  actors  with  an  involvement  with  European  issues, 
in  order  to  gain  an  impression  of  the  networks  which  the  unitary  authorities  were 
likely  to  be  involved  in  (Questions  9-15).  The  final  section  of  the  questionnaire 
contained  questions  concerning  the  impact  of  reorganisation  upon  local 
government  in  the  West  of  Scotland  as  whole,  whilst  also  attempting  to  assess 
the  extent  of  European  experience  amongst  those  in  European  positions  within 
the  new  councils  (Questions  16-19). 
The  reorganisation  questionnaire  required  respondents  to  provide  factual 
answers  concerning  the  new  structures  put  in  place  following  reorganisation,  as 
well  as  attitudinal  questions  concerning  the  impact  of  reorganisation.  This  was 
due  to  the  nature  of  the  research  process  amongst  the  reorganised  councils, 
where  four  unitary  councils  were  selected  as  case-studies,  whilst  the  remaining 
councils  were  only  contacted  via  the  questionnaire38. 
Accordingly,  interviews  were  undertaken  in  the  case-study  unitary  authorities, 
and  the  questionnaires  were  given  to  respondents  at  the  end  of  the  interview  and 
returned  by  post.  The  remaining  councils  received  the  questionnaires  by  post, 
with  the  chief  European  officer  within  each  council  being  identified  from  COSLA 
document  listing  all  the  main  European  officers  within  the  reorganised  councils 
throughout  Scotland39.  Upon  receipt  of  the  questionnaires  from  officers,  the 
questionnaire  would  then  be  sent  to  the  politician  who  was  Chair  of  the 
Committee  within  each  council,  as  identified  by  the  corresponding  officer  in  the 
38  The  research  process,  including  the  study  of  the  reorganised  councils  (including  the  selection 
of  the  four  case-study  councils)  is  discussed  later  in  this  chapter  (Section  3.6). 
39  This  document  was  received  upon  request  from  COSLA,  which  due  to  its  internal  status,  has 
not  been  published. 
58 opening  section  of  the  questionnaire  (Questions  1a  and  1  b).  Where 
questionnaires  were  not  returned,  the  individuals  concerned  would  then  be 
contacted  by  telephone.  Thus,  the  third  series  research  identified  individuals  via 
a  'positional'  approach,  however  given  that  all  twelve  successor  authorities  were 
contacted  and  a  high  response  rate  was  achieved,  it  is  considered  unlikely  that 
such  an  approach  led  to  a  skewed  sample,  as  the  experiences  of  officials  and 
politicians  from  the  vast  majority  of  authorities  was  ascertained  by  questionnaire 
thus  a  considerable  amount  of  data  was  obtained  ensuring  that  results  were 
representative  of  experience  across  authorities  in  Western  Scotland. 
3.6  -  The  Research  Process. 
As  has  been  stated  previously,  the  design  of  the  research  process  divided  into 
three  distinct  stages,  each  dealing  with  a  group  of  actors  who  held  differing 
positions  in  relation  to  the  research  topic.  Thus,  those  analysed  fell  into  three 
categories  :-  firstly,  individuals  within  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  who  were 
involved  in  the  development  of  European  policy;  secondly,  respondents  external 
to  SRC  who  were  based  in  Brussels  or  Scotland,  who  had  an  involvement  with 
SRC's  European  policy  activities;  and  finally,  actors  who  were  involved  in  the 
development  of  European  policy  amongst  the  new  unitary  authorities. 
Accordingly,  each  stage  of  the  research  varied  according  to  the  sample 
population  being  approached  whilst  the  methods  applied  remained  uniform,  with 
the  exception  of  the  reorganisation  questionnaire. 
Stage  One  -  Individuals  within  SRC  who  were  involved  in  the  development  of 
European  policy. 
The  first  research  stage  targeted  officials  and  politicians  from  SRC  with  an 
involvement  in  European  policy.  The  politicians  selected  for  research  were  all 
drawn  from  the  European  and  International  Affairs  Committee.  A  target  sample 
of  ten  politicians  was  established  prior  to  the  research  proceeding,  with  the 
politicians  being  selected  due  to  the  extent  of  their  involvement  in  European 
affairs  (for  example,  through  representing  the  Council  on  trans-regional 
59 networks)  and  also  to  provide  a  balance  across  party  political  representation.  As 
mentioned  above,  my  attendance  at  the  Committee  made  it  relatively  straight- 
forward  to  gain  access  to  elected  members,  and  indeed  this  was  borne  out  in  my 
response  rate  which  stood  at  70%,  with  7  politicians  interviewed,  including  a 
representative  of  each  party  which  had  a  member  on  the  Committee40  (See 
Table  3.4).  Thus  roughly  54%  of  the  Councillors  who  were  members  of  the 
European  Committee  were  interviewed. 
The  response  rate  amongst  officials  was  also  high,  with  eight  departments 
initially  being  targeted,  and  an  official  being  interviewed  from  five  separate 
departments.  Departments  which  had  made  representations  to  the  European 
Comittee  were  chosen  as  targets  for  interview  due  to  their  involvement  in 
European  affairs.  Departmental  involvement  with  the  European  Committee  was 
ascertained  from  the  minutes  of  the  Council.  However,  a  degree  of  'snowballing' 
took  place  amongst  this  sample,  as  I  was  referred  onto  other  contacts  and  as  it 
became  increasingly  clear  that  certain  departments,  such  as  Chief  Executive's 
and  Strathclyde  Business  Development,  occupied  a  central  position  with  regard 
to  the  research  topic.  As  a  result,  three  interviews  were  carried  out  amongst 
officials  from  the  Chief  Executive's  Department4l  and  two  with  officials  from 
Strathclyde  Business  Development  (See  Table  Three).  Thus,  eight  interviews 
were  conducted  with  officials  from  SRC  representing  five  departments  out  of  the 
eight  departments  initially  targeted.  42 
40  Throughout  the  lifetime  of  the  European  and  International  Affairs  Committee,  it  had  22 
members,  usually  with  around  13  members  at  any  one  time.  When  the  interviews  were  carried 
out,  I  selected  10  members  for  interviews,  of  whom  7  were  interviewed.  In  addition,  one  further 
SRC  Councillor  was  interviewed,  regarding  the  overall  policy  of  the  labour  party  within  SRC,  who 
had  a  limited  involvement  in  European  affairs,  whilst  the  respondent  was  pursuing  a  fellowship  at 
the  University  of  Glasgow,  thus  accounting  for  the  later  interview  date  of  Case  Eight  in 
comparison  to  other  first  series  interviews. 
41  In  one  case,  an  official  from  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  was  interviewed  on  three 
separate  occasions,  as  I  required  further  information,  although  this  is  counted  as  one  interview. 
42  The  majority  of  these  interviews  were  conducted  with  the  use  of  a  tape  recorder  and 
transcribed  later,  however  three  officials  requested  that  their  interviews  were  not  taped  and  thus 
hand-written  notes  were  taken  and  written-up  following  the  interview. 
60 Prior  to  each  research  stage,  an  interview  schedule  was  developed  which 
identified  the  key  issues  1  intended  to  address  with  every  respondent.  In  the 
case  of  the  first  research  stage,  the  interviews  dealt  with  the  motivations  amongst 
politicians  and  within  individual  departments  in  developing  a  European  agenda 
within  a  particular  sphere  of  responsibility.  Questions  also  centred  on  the 
relations  between  departments  in  terms  of  co-ordinating  a  European  policy,  and 
in  particular  upon  the  role  of  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  in  such  a  process. 
The  interview  then  moved  on  to  the  respondent's  involvement  in  particular 
networks,  and  the  informal  channels  of  information  and  influence  which  a 
respondent  would  utilise  in  order  to  draw  attention  to  a  particular  issue.  Contact 
with  external  agencies  was  then  discussed,  with  an  emphasis  upon  relations  with 
the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership,  Scottish  Office  and  the  European 
Commission.  The  interview  would  conclude  on  the  topic  of  the  respondent's 
perception  of  the  impact  of  reorganisation  upon  European  policy  in  the  West  of 
Scotland,  which  was  particularly  pertinent  given  that  the  changeover  was 
approaching  rapidly  when  the  interviews  were  carried  out. 
61 Table  3.4  -  Respondents  from  the  First  Series  of  Interviews.  43 
Case  Number  Position  of  the  Respondent  Date  of 
Interview 
Case  One  Senior  Labour  Councillor  within  SRC.  January  1996. 
Case  Two  Labour  Councillor  within  SRC.  January  1996. 
Case  Three  Senior  Labour  Councillor  within  SRC  January  1996. 
(and  CoR  representative). 
Reinterviewed  in  third  series. 
Case  Four  Liberal  Democrat  Councillor  within  SRC.  January  1996. 
Case  Five  Conservative  Councillor  within  SRC.  January  1996. 
Case  Six  Scottish  National  Party  Councillor  within  April  1996. 
SRC  and  CoR  representative). 
Case  Seven  Liberal  Democrat  Councillor  within  SRC.  January  1996. 
Case  Eight  Former  Labour  Party  Secretary  within  February  1997. 
SRC. 
Case  Nine  Official  from  the  Department  of  Physicat  February  1996. 
Planning. 
Case  Ten  Official  from  the  Roads  Department.  February  1996. 
Case  Eleven  Official  from  the  Education  Department.  February  1996. 
Interviewed  on  three  occasions. 
Case  Twelve  Official  from  the  Chief  Executive's  March  1996. 
Department.  Interviewed  on  three 
occasions  (once  as  a  Third  Series 
respondent). 
Case  Thirteen  Official  from  the  Chief  Executive's  April  1996. 
Department. 
Case  Fourteen  Senior  Official  from  the  Chief  April  1996. 
Executive's  Department. 
Case  Fifteen  Senior  Official  from  Strathclyde  March  1996. 
Business  Development. 
Case  Sixteen  Official  from  Strathclyde  Business  April  1996. 
Development. 
Stage  Two  -  Non-SRC  respondents,  located  in  Scotland  or  Brussels. 
The  second-series  of  interviews  covered  a  wide  range  of  actors,  ranging  from 
Strathclyde-based  MEPs,  Scottish  lobbyists  resident  in  Brussels  through  to 
European  Commission  officials  and  non-Scottish  lobbyists  in  Brussels  who  had  a 
frequent  contact  with  SRC.  The  majority  of  these  interviews  were  conducted 
43  As  stated  above,  all  respondents  were  assured  of  their  anonymity  and  to  the  confidential 
nature  of  the  interview,  as  a  result,  I  do  not  identify  the  respondent's  by  name  but  rather  by  their 
62 during  a  one  month  period  in  Brussels.  Additionally,  individuals  throughout 
Scotland  were  interviewed  from  a  range  of  organisations  which  were  closely 
involved  with  SRC  in  various  aspects  of  European  policy  (See  Table  3.5).  The 
field-work  in  Brussels  was  conducted  within  tight  time-limits,  as  a  result  of 
financial  constraints  resulting  in  the  field-work  in  Brussels  being  conducted  in  one 
month  (October  1996),  with  respondents  being  targeted  for  interview  according  to 
their  position  within  institutions.  A  range  of  institutions  were  initially  identified 
with  a  target  list  of  11  individuals  /  institutions  being  drawn-up  prior  to  arriving  in 
Brussels.  The  targets  were  :  - 
-  the  Strathclyde-based  MEPs  (five). 
-  Commission  officials  who  had  come  into  contact  with  SRC  or  Scottish  SNA 
representatives.  For  instance,  the  DGV  and  DGXVI  officials  interviewed  both 
had  a  responsibility  in  dealing  with  a  Structural  Fund  partnership  in  Scotland. 
-  Scottish  lobbyists  from  Scotland  Europa  and  a  local  government  lobbyist  (two). 
-  Non-Scottish  lobbyists  such  as  the  Council  of  European  Municipalities  and 
Regions  (CEMR),  the  Local  Government  Information  Bureau  (LGIB)  and  an 
Ouverture  partner-region  representative. 
All  these  targets  were  met,  although  I  was  unable  to  obtain  an  interview  with  the 
DGXVI  official  with  responsibility  for  the  Ouverture  programme  or  with  the  DGV 
representative  for  the  West  of  Scotland.  In  compensation,  a  DGV  official  with  a 
similar  responsibility  for  another  area  of  Scotland  was  interviewed  as  were  a 
number  of  individuals  with  an  involvement  in  the  Ouverture  programme.  In 
addition  to  these  early  targets,  further  interviews  were  carried  out  as  a  result  of 
recommendations  given  by  the  initial  interviewees  and  through  the  Scotland 
Europa  publication,  'Jock  Tamson's  Bairns-44.  This  publication  listed'Scots' 
positional  status.  Each  respondent  is  given  a  case  number  which  will  be  referred  to  whenever  a 
quote  is  used  from  a  respondent  in  the  following  chapters. 
44  'Jock  Tamson's  Baims'  provides  a  listing  of  Scots  (or  people  with  Scottish  connections),  living 
and  working  in  Brussels  and  Luxembourg.  The  listing  is  used  fairly  extensively  by  Scots  in 
Brussels,  for  example,  one  Scottish  DGXI  official  commented  :  - 
"you're  probably  aware  of  'Jock  Tamson's  Baims'.  We  use  that,  I  think  its  used  quite 
heavily.  Any  issue  that  somebody  is  finding  difficult  or  strained,  they  can  resort  to  phoning  up  the 
63 resident  in  Brussels  and  provided  me  with  a  range  of  further  contacts  amongst 
areas  not  previously  identified  such  as  Scottish  journalists.  In  total  25  interviews 
were  carried  out  in  Brussels  thus  providing  a  wealth  of  data  on  the  activities  of  a 
wide  range  of  actors  and  the  form  their  interaction  with  the  West  of  Scotland 
took. 
In  Scotland  four  interviews  were  conducted  with  Scottish  based  actors,  from  the 
five  institutions  initially  targeted,  as  no  representative  from  Scottish  Enterprise 
was  available  for  interview  (See  Table  3.5).  Two  of  the  institutions  were  closely 
related  to  SRC,  however  they  were  left  for  analysis  until  the  second  series  of 
interviews  as  they  were  largely  unaffected  by  the  reorganisation  of  local 
government.  On  only  three  occasions  did  interviewees  decline  to  be  tape- 
recorded,  whereupon  hand-written  notes  were  taken  and  written  up  after  the 
interview. 
The  second  series  of  interviews  dealt  primarily  with  the  respondent's  involvement 
with  SRC  and  their  perceptions  of  the  manner  and  effectiveness  with  which  SRC 
conducted  their  European  affairs,  particularly  with  regard  to  lobbying  techniques 
and  the  channels  of  communication  which  SRC  used  to  attempt  to  influence  EU 
institutions.  In  addition,  questions  were  asked  concerning  the  links  between  sub- 
national  actors  and  the  areas  where  co-operation  would  regularly  occur. 
Attempts  were  also  made  to  ascertain  the  existence  of  networks  amongst  actors 
and  in  particular  between  institutions  at  different  tiers  of  government,  for 
example,  between  SNAs  and  the  European  Commission. 
nearest  member  of  the  Scottish  Mafia  and  sorting  out  the  issue  or  at  least  getting  a  way  round  it" 
(Case  32). 
Or  on  another  occasion,  a  Scottish  lobbyist  stated 
"Scotland  Europa  produces  a  booklet  of  all  the  Scots  in  Brussels,  and  if  you  are  really 
stuck,  you  go  into  that  booklet.  If  you  find  that  you  really  don't  have  any  contact  in  DGVI  for 
instance,  if  you  find  somebody  in  there  who  is  Scottish,  then  its  a  lot  easier"  (Case  25). 
The  high  response  rate  is  also  due  to  the  ease  of  access  to  institutions  and  individuals  within 
Brussels,  as  well  as  the  assistance  of  the  Scotland  Europa  centre  in  Brussels.  In  addition,  prior 
to  conducting  interviews  in  Brussels,  I  attended  a  Joint  Conference  of  the  EP  and  CoR  entitled 
Towards  a  Europe  Based  on  Democracy  and  Solidarity'  (1-3/10/96),  which  enabled  a  number  of 
contacts  to  be  made.  I  also  attended  a  seminar  held  in  Scotland  Europa,  which  again  enabled 
me  to  make  contact  with  representatives  from  a  wide  range  of  organisations. 
64 Table  3.5  -  Respondents  from  the  Second  Series  of  Interviews. 
Case  Number  Position  of  the  Respondent  Date  of  Interview 
Case  Assistant  to  West  of  Scotland  Labour  October  1996. 
Seventeen  MEP. 
Case  Eighteen  West  of  Scotland  Labour  MEP.  October  1996. 
Case  Nineteen  Scottish  National  Party  October  1996. 
Case  Twenty  West  of  Scotland  Labour  MEP.  October  1996. 
Case  Twenty  West  of  Scotland  Labour  MEP.  October  1996. 
One 
Case  Twenty  West  of  Scotland  Labour  MEP.  October  1996. 
Two 
Case  Twenty  Scotland  Europa  Official.  October  1996. 
Three 
Case  Twenty  Scotland  Europa  Official.  October  1996. 
Four 
Case  Twenty  Scottish  Local  Government  lobbyist.  October  1996. 
Five 
Case  Twenty  Scottish  Local  Government  lobbyist  October  1996. 
Six  and  former  Ecos-Ouverture 
official  . 
45 
Case  Twenty  Senior  Scotland  Europa  official.  October  1996. 
Seven 
Case  Twenty  Scottish  Journalist.  October  1996. 
Ei  ht 
Case  Twenty  Scottish  Journalist.  October  1996. 
Nine 
Case  Thirty  Scottish  Journalist.  October  1996. 
Case  Thirty  DGXVI  official  October  1996. 
One 
Case  Thirty  Commission  official  and  formerly  a  October  1996. 
TWO  member  of  Millan's'Cabinet'. 
Case  Thirty  DGXI  official.  October  1996. 
Three 
Case  Thirty  DGV  official.  October  1996. 
Four 
Case  Thirty  DGXVI  official.  October  1996. 
Five 
Case  Thirt  Six  CEMR  official.  October  1996. 
Case  Thirty  Wales  European  Centre  lobbyist.  October  1996. 
Seven 
45  This  respondent  was  interviewed  twice.  The  first  interview  concerned  her  role  as  a  lobbyist  for 
a  Scottish  local  government  organisation,  whilst  the  second  dealt  with  her  previous  employment 
with  Ecos-Ouverture. 
65 Case  Number  Position  of  the  Respondent  Date  of  Interview 
Case  Thirty  LGIB  lobbyist.  October  1996. 
Eight 
Case  Thirty  Merseyside  partners  lobbyist.  October  1996. 
Nine 
Case  Forty  Lancashire  Enterprises  lobbyist.  October  1996. 
Case  Forty  One  Saschen-Anhalt  lobbyist.  Partner  October  1996. 
re  ion  in  Ecos  Ouverture. 
Case  Forty  Two  Senior  Official,  Industry  Department,  January  1997. 
Scottish  Office. 
Case  Forty  Senior  Official,  Strathclyde  European  July  1996. 
Three  Partnership.  46 
Case  Forty  Senior  Official,  Ecos-Ouverture.  47  February  1996. 
Four 
Case  Forty  Five  Former  European  Commissioner  and  July  1996. 
Scottish  Labour  politician. 
Stage  Three  -  Individuals  dealing  with  European  affairs  in  the  new  unitary 
authorities. 
The  final  series  of  interviews  were  carried  out  in  order  to  assess  the  impact  of 
reorganisation  upon  the  overall  development  of  the  West  of  Scotland's  European 
policy,  and  in  particular  to  what  extent  the  new  authorities  would  be  able  to 
continue  pursuing  the  policies  previously  undertaken  by  SRC.  Whilst  all  the  new 
unitary  authorities  were  sent  questionnaires,  four  unitary  authorities  were 
targeted  for  interviews:  -  Glasgow  City,  North  Lanarkshire,  South  Lanarkshire  and 
Renfrewshire.  Glasgow  City  Council  was  selected  due  to  the  size  of  the  Council, 
as  it  covered  a  population  of  623,850  residents  (SLGIU,  1995),  thus  making  it  the 
largest  local  authority  in  Scotland  post-April  1996.  In  addition,  as  the  council 
represented  Glasgow  which  is  the  metropolitan  centre  of  the  region,  it  was  likely 
that  Glasgow  would  continue  to  be  involved  in  European  affairs,  at  least  partly  in 
order  to  maintain  the  profile  of  the  city  and  to  obtain  funding  in  order  to  address 
the  economic  and  social  priorities  of  the  Council.  North  and  South  Lanarkshire 
46  This  respondent  was  re  interviewed  in  April  1997,  in  order  to  stay  aware  of  developments 
following  the  first  interview. 
47  This  respondent  was  re  interviewed  in  March  1997,  in  order  to  obtain  information  on 
developments  within  Ouverture  post-February  1996. 
66 both  represented  areas48  experiencing  de  industrialisation,  and  as  a 
consequence  were  expected  to  receive  substantial  amounts  of  Objective  2 
funding.  The  proximity  of  the  councils  to  each  other,  and  the  similar  problems 
they  were  likely  to  face,  presented  the  opportunity  to  assess  whether  similar 
structures  were  put  in  place  to  deal  with  European  issues  and  whether  the 
degree  of  engagement  with  European  issues  varied  between  the  two  authorities. 
North  Lanarkshire  was  also  of  interest  as  it  provided  the  base  for  the  West  of 
Scotland  European  Consortium  (WOSEC)49,  whilst  the  Chair  of  North 
Lanarkshire's  European  Committee  was  also  the  Chair  of  WOSEC.  Finally, 
Renfrewshire  Council  was  also  selected  due  to  the  legacy  of  de-industrialisation 
within  this  council  area,  whilst  the  smaller  size  of  the  authority  (population  of 
176,970)  offered  the  possibility  to  analyse  the  degree  of  Europeanisation  within  a 
smaller  local  authority. 
Prior  to  conducting  the  third  stage  of  research,  the  target  group  of  respondents 
was  drawn-up,  with  an  official  and  a  politician  being  contacted  from  each  case- 
study  authority.  This  was  carried  out  in  the  same  manner  as  the  distribution  of 
the  reorganisation  questionnaires,  with  the  main  European  officer  within  each 
council  being  contacted  from  the  COSLA  document,  and  the  Chair  of  the 
Council's  European  Committee  being  approached  after  being  identified  by  the 
officer.  Thus,  the  sample  was  selected  purely  according  to  the  position  of  the 
respondent.  From  the  initial  sample  of  eight  respondents,  seven  were 
interviewed50  as  the  Chair  of  North  Lanarkshire's  European  Committee  was  not 
available  for  interview  (see  Table  3.5).  Thus,  two  extra  interviews  were 
conducted  in  North  Lanarkshire  Council,  firstly,  with  a  Councillor  who  had 
previously  been  heavily  involved  in  the  development  of  SRC's  European  policy 
48  North  Lanarkshire  covered  a  population  of  326,750,  whilst  South  Lanarkshire  contained  a 
population  of  307,100  (SLGIU,  1995).  Again  this  highlights  the  similar  size  of  the  two  authorities. 
49  WOSEC  is  the  umbrella  organisation  established  by  the  twelve  successor  authorities  to  SRC, 
and  Dumfries  and  Galloway  (initially),  which  coordinates  the  policy  positions  of  these  councils  on 
European  issues  (see  chapter  eight). 
50  The  interview  with  European  officers  conducted  at  Glasgow  City  Council,  was  a  joint  interview 
with  two  European  officers  from  the  Council. 
67 and  was  acting  as  an  advisor  to  the  Chair  of  the  European  Committee. 
Secondly,  aside  from  the  Council's  European  officer,  a  senior  official  from  North 
Lanarkshire  was  interviewed,  as  the  official  attended  all  European  meetings  with 
the  Chair  of  the  European  Committee.  Three  further  interviews  were  conducted 
with  individuals  not  drawn  from  the  case-study  councils.  An  official  representing 
WOSEC  was  interviewed,  in  order  to  outline  the  operations  of  the  umbrella 
organisation,  as  were  two  COSLA  officials  in  a  joint  interview,  as  COSLA  had 
significantly  extended  and  enhanced  its  European  organisation  post- 
reorganisation.  Finally,  an  interview  was  conducted  with  a  representative  of 
Argyll  and  Bute  Council,  due  to  the  authority's  peripherality  and  rural  setting, 
combined  with  its  location  within  the  Objective  One  funding  area  for  the 
Highlands  and  Islands  and  Objective  Two  area  in  Strathclyde.  Despite  not  being 
a  case-study  council,  it  was  considered  worthwhile  obtaining  further  information 
on  the  impact  of  reorganisation  upon  this  area,  and  its  ability  to  participate  within 
the  Highlands  and  Islands  European  Partnership  and  the  Strathclyde  European 
Partnership  (See  Table  3.6).  All  the  interviews  conducted  in  the  third  series  were 
tape-recorded. 
The  third  series  interviews  addressed  the  internal  structures  dealing  with 
European  affairs  within  the  new  unitary  authorities,  the  role  which  the 
respondents  viewed  WOSEC  as  fulfilling  and  its  relationship  with  COSLA 
following  their  reorganisation  of  the  European  function.  Relations  with  external 
agencies  following  reorganisation  were  discussed,  with  a  particular  emphasis 
upon  the  interactions  with  the  European  Commission  and  the  Scottish  Office. 
The  extent  of  participation  within  decision-making  arenas  such  as  Ecos- 
Ouverture  and  the  SEP  was  also  a  key  issue  in  the  reorganisation  interviews. 
Perceptions  of  the  role  of  local  government  in  the  West  of  Scotland  in  terms  of 
European  policy  following  reorganisation  was  also  discussed,  as  was  the  overall 
impact  of  reorganisation  upon  the  operation  of  European  policy  within  both  the 
West  of  Scotland  and  Scotland  itself. 
68 Table  3.6  -  Respondents  from  the  Third  Series  of  Interviews. 
Case  Number  Position  of  Respondent  Date  of  Interview 
Case  Forty  Six  Labour  Councillor  (and  CoR  January  1997. 
member),  North  Lanarkshire  Council. 
Also  interviewed  in  First  series. 
Case  Forty  European  Officer,  North  Lanarkshire  February  1997. 
Seven  Council. 
Case  Forty  Senior  Officer,  North  Lanarkshire  May  1997. 
Eight  Council. 
Case  Forty  European  Officer,  WOSEC.  Also  February  1997. 
Nine  interviewed  in  First  series. 
Case  Fifty  European  Officer,  Renfrewshire  May  1997. 
Council. 
Case  Fifty  One  Labour  Councillor  (Chair  of  COSLA's  May  1997. 
European  Committee),  Renfrewshire 
Council.. 
Case  Fifty  Two  European  Officer,  South  Lanarkshire  March  1997. 
Council. 
Case  Fifty  Labour  Councillor,  South  Lanarkshire  May  1997. 
Three  Council. 
Case  Fifty  Four  Labour  Councillor,  Glasgow  City  February  1997. 
Council. 
Case  Fifty  Five  European  Officers,  Glasgow  City  March  1997. 
Council. 
Case  Fifty  Six  European  Officers,  COSLA.  March  1997. 
Case  Fifty  European  Officer,  Argyll  and  Bute  March  1997. 
Seven  Council. 
In  total,  fifty-seven  individuals  were  interviewed  on  at  least  one  occasion,  across 
the  research  period  as  a  whole.  The  process  of  undertaking  field-work,  and  in 
particular  elite  interviews,  involves  extensive  human  interaction,  which  no  matter 
how  many  safeguards  are  put  in  place  may  result  in  the  skewing  of  results.  I  now 
intend  to  consider  some  of  the  problems  surrounding  the  research  process  in 
order  to  acknowledge  such  problems,  whilst  also  recognising  that  the  re-creation 
of  laboratory  conditions  within  social  science  research,  and  in  particular  research 
utilising  qualitative  methodologies,  is  an  impossible  task.  As  a  result,  it  is 
inevitable  that  the  results  will  have  been  affected  to  some  extent  by  such 
considerations,  although  the  methodology  outlined  above,  was  designed  to 
mitigate  such  effects  as  far  as  is  possible. 
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The  process  of  carrying  out  social  research,  is  always  imbued  with  power 
relationships,  however,  elite  interviewing  is  relatively  unusual  in  terms  of  social 
science  research,  in  that  the  researcher  is  relatively  powerless  due  to  a  reliance 
upon  the  interviewee  being  forthcoming  and  willing  to  engage  with  the  subject 
matter.  Thus,  it  is  necessary  to  reassert  the  importance  of  ensuring  all 
interviewees  of  confidentiality,  and  to  structure  the  interview  as  an  informal 
conversation,  in  which  the  respondent's  would  be  asked  for  clarification  of  an 
opinion,  but  where  the  opinion  would  not  be  challenged  outright.  Equally, 
adequate  preparation  before  entering  the  'field'  is  essential  in  such  forms  of 
research.  This  situation  is  amplified  where  the  researcher  is  studying  actors 
within  a  specialised  policy  field,  in  a  society  that  is  relatively  small  to  start  with. 
MacLeod  (1996)  considers  the  Scottish  elite  to  resemble  a'village  community', 
due  to  their  small  numbers  and  close  interaction,  and  this  was  especially  true 
amongst  my  respondents,  due  to  the  limited  number  of  individuals  concerned 
with  European  affairs  in  Scotland.  Thus,  I  was  always  aware  of  the  importance 
of  respecting  my  interviewee's  wishes,  as  knowledge  of  broken  confidences, 
would  presumably  have  closed  many  'avenues'  for  further  research,  especially 
when  proceeding  via  a  'reputational'  approach.  In  part,  this  issue  is  a  result  of 
researching  a  policy  community  /  elite  which  is  relatively  small  in  terms  of  both 
the  size  of  the  society  itself  and  the  number  of  individuals  engaged  with 
European  issues  in  the  West  of  Scotland  and  indeed,  Scotland.  To  an  extent  this 
concern  was  minimised  through  research  being  conducted  with  non-Scottish 
actors  in  Brussels  but  nevertheless  the  interconnectedness  of  individuals  within 
this  policy  sphere  was  apparent  when  conducting  the  research.  For  instance,  on 
an  anecdotal  basis,  on  one  occasion  a  respondent  in  one  interview  was  aware  of 
an  interview  I  had  conducted  at  an  entirely  different  institution  less  than  twenty- 
four  hours  earlier.  Raab  (1987)  refers  to  the  close  contacts  between  individuals 
within  the  Scottish  educational  policy  elite  in  the  following  terms: 
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his  career  progressed  through  its  stages,  move  across  to  occupy  positions  in 
different  but  interrelated  institutional  or  geographical  parts  of  the  educational 
system"  (Raab,  C,  1987,  p.  118). 
The  impact  of  the  environment  in  which  the  research  was  conducted 
necessitated  that  interviewees  confidentiality  was  ensured  and  that  a  variety  of 
sampling  structures  were  adopted  and  the  research  design  minimised  any 
potential  bias  or  drawbacks  inherent  in  the  methods  adopted.  Alternatively,  a 
Scottish  background  was  a  considerable  advantage,  especially  in  Brussels, 
where  respondents  would  go  out  of  their  way  to  give  an  interview,  often  outside 
of  working  hours.  Equally,  due  to  the  substantial  changes  taking  place  within 
local  government  during  the  research  period,  this  heightened  the  insecurities  of 
many  respondents,  as  they  were  often  involved  in  searching  for  future 
employment.  Thus,  interviews  carried  out  around  the  time  of  reorganisation  had 
to  be  handled  with  particular  sensitivity.  The  third  series  of  interviews  dealing 
with  the  impact  of  reorganisation,  was  postponed  not  only  until  a  new  set  of 
European  structures  were  established,  but  also  to  enable  respondents  to  have,  to 
some  extent,  settled  in  to  their  new  environment. 
Elite  interviewing  is  a  dynamic  method,  in  which  the  researcher  is  constantly  re- 
evaluating  his  own  performance,  whilst  also  re-assessing  the  priorities  of  the 
research  program  as  new  information  emerges.  Undoubtedly,  I  would  have 
changed  some  of  my  initial  lines  of  questioning,  given  the  awareness  of  the 
issues  I  have  now,  although  in  some  cases  this  was  rectified  by  re-interviewing. 
It  is  also  worth  commenting  that  this  research  dealt  with  individuals  who  were 
heavily  involved  with  European  affairs  and  predominantly  drawn  from  sub- 
national  government  who  may  over-exaggerate  the  importance  of  the  policy  area. 
In  the  following  chapters,  efforts  are  continuously  made  to  ensure  that  the  impact 
of  Europeanisation  upon  Scottish  local  government  is  not  over-emphasised  via 
reference  to  corroborative  evidence,  primarily  drawn  from  the  literature  on  the 
European  policy  of  SNAs  and  documentary  evidence,  in  order  to  mitigate  against 
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this  research  would  have  been  to  randomly  sample  local  government  politicians 
and  officials,  in  order  to  obtain  their  views  as  to  the  possibility  of  local 
government  having  experienced  a  process  of  Europeanisation.  However,  the 
research  design  is  biased  in  that  it  focuses  upon  those  involved  with  European 
affairs,  in  order  to  assess  the  degree  of  Europeanisation,  whilst  the 
contextualisation  of  the  research  results  attempts  to  ensure  that  the 
role  of  SNAs  and  the  impact  of  Europeanisation  is  not  overemphasised. 
When  conducting  the  primarily  qualitative  research  for  this  thesis  every  effort  was 
made  to  minimise  the  impact  of  the  researcher  upon  those  interviewed,  to  ensure 
that  the  format  in  which  the  research  was  undertaken  minimised  any  potential 
bias  and  attempted  to  obtain  as  representative  a  sample  of  respondents  as 
possible.  Furthermore  throughout  the  research  process,  there  was  a  concerted 
effort  to  ensure  that  there  was  not  an  over  reliance  on  any  one  particular 
approach  (for  instance,  utilising  a  reputational  and  positional  approach  to  sample 
selection)  and  checking  the  responses  of  interviewees  against  other  respondents 
and  external  sources  of  documentation.  The  use  of  two  sampling  strategies  was 
also  a  means  of  ensuring  that  an  adequate  number  of  individuals  were 
interviewed  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  research  process  would  be  able  to  gain  a 
representative  cross-section  of  respondents  engaged  with  European  issues. 
Equally  the  triangulation  of  interviewee  responses  and  the  checking  of  transripts 
against  documentary  evidence,  where  possible,  was  also  a  means  of  checking 
that  the  quotes  presented  within  this  thesis  were  reliable  and  had  been  verified 
against  the  perceptions  of  other  respondents  and  external  sources. 
In  this  way,  the  manner  in  which  the  research  was  designed,  implemented  and 
subsequently  analysed  was  intended  to  be  systematic,  rigorous  and  consistent 
throughout  the  entire  research  process.  Nevertheless,  the  selection  of  any 
particular  methodology  involves  the  recognition  that  there  are  disadvantages,  as 
well  as  advantages,  inherent  within  the  approaches  and  methodological 
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has  attempted  to  clearly  outline  the  methods  utilised  in  the  research  presented 
here  and  recognise  the  disadvantages  of  these  methods.  The  impact  of  these 
disadvantages  upon  the  research  process  cannot  be  entirely  removed,  however 
the  research  design  made  every  possible  effort  to  minimise  the  impact  of  the 
weaknesses  of  the  methods  adopted  whilst  also  recognising  the  shortcomings  of 
the  approach  adopted. 
3.8  -  Summary. 
This  chapter  has  set  out  the  structure  which  underpinned  the  field  research.  In 
particular,  the  methodological  approaches  used  concentrated  on  the  need  to 
ensure  reliability  and  verifiability  to  as  great  an  extent  as  possible.  The  research 
design  employed  both  qualitative  and  quantitative  methods,  following  an 
extensive  process  of  background  research.  A  particular  emphasis  has  been 
placed  upon  elite  interviewing,  due  to  the  central  position  this  occupies  in  the 
following  chapters.  Whilst,  elite  interviews  cannot  be  carried  out  without  some 
degree  of  interviewer  -  interviewee  reactivity,  extensive  measures  were  taken  to 
reassure  the  respondents  as  to  the  aims,  scope,  function  and  confidentiality  of 
the  research.  Despite,  the  problems  identified  with  the  methodology  adopted,  the 
combination  of  the  methods  adopted  and  safeguards  used  in  operationalising  the 
field-work,  were  designed  to  limit  as  far  as  possible  the  limitations  which  pervade 
any  methodological  approach. 
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1975-96. 
4.1  -  Introduction. 
This  chapter  addresses  the  impact  of  European  policies  on  the  internal 
organisation  of  Strathclyde  Regional  Council,  and  the  affect  this  had  upon  the 
perceptions  of  actors  within  SRC  as  to  the  role  which  the  Region  could  pursue 
within  the  European  context.  In  other  words,  the  chapter  is  concerned  with  the 
process  of  Europeanisation  within  SRC  across  the  period  of  study,  in  terms  of  the 
changing  nature  of  European  activity  within  the  Council  during  this  time-period, 
and  the  perceptions  of  individuals  as  to  the  policy  which  the  Region  developed 
with  regard  to  the  European  function  of  SRC.  The  role  of  SRC  within  external 
structures  and  networks  is  considered  in  terms  of  the  impact  of  such  activities 
upon  the  internal  organisation  of  European  policy  within  the  Council. 
There  are  two  main  time-periods  which  distinguish  the  impact  of  European  policy 
on  SRC  (and  indeed,  SNAs  across  Europe).  This  distinction  arises  due  to  the 
impact  of  Single  European  Market  legislation  in  transforming  the  relationship 
between  European  Institutions  and  SNAs  (see  Chapter  Two)51.  As  a  result,  I 
intend  firstly  to  consider  the  European  policy  of  SRC  from  the  period  1975  to 
1985,  in  isolation  from  the  period  1986-96,  in  order  to  assess  the  extent  to  which 
SRC's  relations  with  the  EU  differed  between  the  two  periods,  and 
correspondingly  the  effect  this  had  upon  SRC's  European  policy.  In  addition, 
this  chapter  will  examine  the  tensions  created  at  a  political  and  officer  level 
during  the  period  of  study  as  SRC's  involvement  in  European  affairs  expanded. 
4 
.2- 
The  Emergence  of  a  European  Policy  within  SRC  :-  1975-85. 
The  initial  contacts  which  developed  between  SRC  and  the  Institutions  of  the 
European  Community  were  a  result  of  the  Council  attempting  to  tap  into  the 
funding  possibilities  available  at  the  European  level.  The  main  sources  of 
finance  available  to  SRC  over  the  period  1975  to  1986  were  the  European 
Regional  Development  Fund  (ERDF),  European  Social  Fund  (ESF)  and  loans 
51  Chapter  Two,  identified  the  Single  European  Act  (1986)  as  a  watershed  in  terms  of  the 
relationship  between  the  EU  and  SNAS.  This  was  a  process  which  continued  in  later  'legislative 
events',  such  as  the  Reform  of  the  Structural  Funds  and  the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
74 from  the  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB).  Whilst  the  EIB  had  been  in  operation 
since  1958,  the  ERDF  and  ESF  schemes  were  created  in  1975  as  a  result  of  UK 
entry  into  the  EEC,  largely  in  order  to  re-reimburse  the  UK  Exchequer  for  the 
minimal  benefit  it  obtained  from  other  schemes  such  as  the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy,  as  compared  to  other  member  states  (Dinan,  1994).  The  engagement  of 
UK  local  authorities  as  a  whole  with  these  schemes  was  initially  rather  limited 
during  the  1970's  (Keating  and  Waters,  1985).  Nevertheless,  by  the  early 
1980's,  SRC  was  beginning  to  draw  significant  degrees  of  funding  from  both  the 
ERDF  and  ESF  (See  Table  4.1). 
Table  4.1  -  SRC  ERDF  Receipts,  1975-84.  (  Quota  Section.  £). 
Year  SRC  ERDF  Receipts.  SRC  Receipts  as  a%  of  Total  Scottish 
ERDF  Receipts. 
1975  888,634  14.7% 
1976  1,601,919  15.5% 
1977  784,825  12.6% 
1978 
1979 
4,779,548 
11  730440 
26% 
33.2% 
1980  3,670,777  23.7% 
1981  12,693  358  23.7% 
1982  3,235  020  5.4% 
1983  13,722,421  21.9% 
1984  10  564,350  17.8% 
Total  63,761,292  19.5% 
Source:  -  Keating  and  Waters  (1985). 
Table  4.1  illustrates  that  whilst  SRC  obtained  roughly  around  20%  of  total 
Scottish  ERDF  receipts  over  the  period  1975-1984,  the  actual  sums  involved 
began  to  increase  markedly  in  the  early  1980s.  However,  funding  obtained 
through  the  ERDF  was  not  genuinely  additional,  as  central  government  would 
tend  to  cut  back  capital  allowances  according  to  the  funding  obtained. 
Nevertheless,  ERDF  finance  did  represent  a  financial  benefit  to  SRC,  as  the 
Council  did  not  have  to  pay  loan  charges  on  the  finance.  Strathclyde  also 
obtained  finance  through  the  Non-Quota  Section  of  ERDF  (See  Chapter  Two), 
75 which  was  additional  to  SRC's  capital  allowance.  However,  the  sums  of  money 
involved  were  smaller,  as  the  Non-Quota  section  of  ERDF  represented  only  5% 
of  the  total  ERDF  budget.  As  a  result  SRC  obtained  only  £645,877  through  this 
fund,  to  deal  with  the  decline  of  the  steel  and  shipbuilding  industries  over  the 
period  1980-84  (Keating  and  Waters,  1985).  In  total,  SRC  received  £83  million  in 
ERDF  grants  between  1975  and  1986,  which  were  directed  towards 
infrastructure  programmes,  which  in  terms  of  SRC's  competences  were  primarily 
utilised  by  the  Roads,  Water  and  Transport  departments  of  the  Council.  A  similar 
increase  in  funding  from  the  ESF  during  the  early  1980s  can  also  be  detected  in 
SRC's  dealing  with  the  fund  (See  Table  4.2). 
Table  4.2  -  SRC  ESF  Receipts  (1978-83)  (£). 
Year  SRC  ESF  Receipts  SRC  ESF  Receipts  as  a%  of  Total 
Scottish  ESF  Receipts. 
1978  0  0% 
1979 
1980 
0 
0 
0% 
0% 
1981  0  0% 
1982  1,014,000  29.8% 
1983  2,933,400  44.1% 
Total  3,947,400  39.3% 
Source:  -  Keating  and  Waters  (1985). 
The  uptake  of  ESF  funding  amongst  Scottish  local  authorities,  was  virtually  nil  in 
Scotland  until  1980.  However,  the  scale  of  SRC's  engagement  with  ESF  funding 
signified  not  only  the  emergence  of  the  Social  Fund  as  an  important  source  of 
funding  for  Scottish  local  authorities,  but  also  of  an  increasing  awareness  within 
SRC  of  the  role  which  European  finance  could  provide  in  the  attempt  to  meet  the 
Council's  policy  priorities.  The  major  challenge  for  SRC  from  its  inception  was  to 
attempt  to  minimise,  if  not  alleviate,  the  impact  of  deindustrialisation  within  the 
region.  In  this  respect,  ERDF  and  ESF  support  provided  a  financial  instrument 
with  which  to  address  the  problems  of  high  unemployment,  social  dislocation  and 
population  loss  which  were  endemic  within  the  Region  during  the  early  1980s. 
The  extent  of  the  task  facing  Strathclyde  in  the  early  1980s  cannot  be 
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36%  above  the  UK  average  in  1984  (SRC,  Annual  Report,  1984,  p.  3)  whilst 
severe  pockets  of  unemployment  and  multiple  deprivation  existed  within 
boundaries  of  SRC. 
The  approach  of  SRC  towards  these  issues  became  increasingly  apparent  in  the 
period  1982-3,  with  the  publication  of  the'Economic  Strategy'  in  1982  and  the 
'Social  Strategy'  in  1983.  These  critical  initiatives  guided  overall  policy 
development  within  SRC  throughout  the  1980s,  and  the  increased  funding 
obtained  by  the  Region  from  1982  onwards  was  channelled  towards  their 
objectives.  These  two  strategies  were  both  broadly  concerned  with  addressing 
the  problems  facing  the  region  resulting  from  deindustrialisation.  Thus  the'Social 
Strategy'  identified  five  issues  which  the  Council  intended  to  target  :-  poverty, 
health,  housing,  employment  and  community  development  (SRC,  'Social 
Strategy  for  the'80s,  1983;  SRC  Annual  Report,  1984).  The  dramatic  increase  in 
ESF  funding  reflected  these  priorities,  with  the  Council  attempting  to  obtain  funds 
from  the  European  Social  Fund,  in  order  to  lend  financial  support  to  the  Council's 
'Social  Strategy.  In  particular,  funding  secured  from  the  ESF,  was  being 
channelled  into  the'Employment  Grant  Scheme'  (EGS),  which  the  Council  had 
created  in  an  attempt  to  address  long-term  unemployment.  The  scheme 
provided  a  wage  subsidy  to  employers,  if  the  firm  employed  an  individual  who 
had  been  unemployed  for  6  months  or  more.  Between  1982  to  1986,  this 
scheme  provided  support  to  over  14,000  individuals  categorised  as  being  long- 
term  unemployed  (SRC,  1986/7).  The  success  of  EGS,  both  in  terms  of 
obtaining  European  finance  and  in  inducing  employers  to  recruit  the  long-term 
unemployed,  appeared  to  make  a  significant  impression  upon  both  officials  and 
Councillors.  For  instance  one  Councillor  commenting  upon  the  success  of  the 
scheme,  claimed  :  - 
"I  would  be  boasting  now,  but  I  think  you'll  discover  that  probably  more  than  90% 
of  the  people  taken  on  under  that  scheme,  over  a  full  decade  later  were  kept  on. 
Absolutely  remarkable.  .... 
And  had  we  not  done  that,  it  [the  unemployment  rate 
in  Strathclyde]  would  have  been  the  highest  in  Europe,  as  well  as  the  UK'.  (Case 
Three). 
Whilst  the  EGS  may  have  made  the  largest  impact  upon  SRC's  institutional 
consciousness,  with  regard  to  the  benefit  which  could  be  obtained  from 
European  funding,  ESF  monies  were  also  used  to  initiate  schemes  which 
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Training  Scheme,  and  the  'New  Start'  programme.  Thus  the  practical  impact  of 
European  monies,  in  providing  a  mechanism  with  which  to  finance  the  Council's 
policy  priorities  within  the  employment  and  social  spheres  was  central  to  a  re- 
evaluation  of  the  role  which  European  Institutions  could  fulfil.  However  the 
response  which  the  Council  received  when  approaching  'Brussels'  was  also  a 
significant  influence  upon  SRC's  engagement  with  European  policy.  Whilst  the 
prevailing  neo-liberal  ideology  within  central  government  was  perceived  as  being 
antithetical  to  the  stated  aims  of  SRC,  it  was  clear  to  SRC  politicians  and  officials 
that  the  Commission,  in  the  form  of  DGV(Social  Policy)  and  DGXVI(Regional 
Policy),  were  keen  to  encourage  SRC  to  develop  new  programmes  of  assistance 
through  European  finance.  Thus  to  Labour  politicians  within  SRC  during  the 
early  1980's,  the  situation  resembled  :  - 
"  the  usual  story  of  finding  the  open  doors  in  Brussels,  and  realising  that  we  had 
some  soulmates  there,  which  we  didn't  have  in  London".  (Case  8). 
The  increasing  awareness  amongst  senior  officials  and  politicians52  of  the  value 
of  European  funding  with  regard  to  SRC's  policy  priorities,  and  of  the  openness 
of  the  Commission  to  approaches  from  sub-national  government,  led  to  the 
formal  incorporation  of  a'European  function'  within  SRC  through  two  institutional 
innovations.  Firstly,  in  1980  a  policy  division  was  transferred  from  the 
Department  of  Physical  Planning,  into  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  which  as 
well  as  having  responsibilities  for  aspects  of  economic  and  social  policy,  was 
given  control  over  European  affairs.  The  principal  functions  of  the  unit  were  to 
co-ordinate  the  Council's  overall  policy  position  vis-a-vis  the  EEC  and  act  as  an 
administrator  for  the  application  of  funds53.  This  group  of  five  officials,  reported 
directly  to  the  Chief  Executive  of  the  Council,  whilst  liaising  with  individual 
departments  concerning  their  applications  for  funds  and  co-ordinating  the  policy 
position  taken  when  approaching  'Brussels'  upon  a  particular  issue.  The 
positioning  of  such  a  unit  at  the  centre  of  the  Regional  Council's  administration 
clearly  illustrated  how  seriously  SRC  was  taking  the  possibilities  offered  through 
engagement  with  European  Institutions,  or  more  precisely  the  financial 
52  The  centrality  of  senior  politicians  and  officials  to  the  development  of  European  policy  within 
SRC  is  discussed  later  in  this  chapter. 
53  European  Affairs  also  started  to  be  brought  to  the  attention  of  politicians  in  Committees,  as 
European  issues  began  to  be  channelled  through  the  Economic  and  Industrial  Development 
Committee,  which  was  a  sub-committee  of  the  Policy  and  Resources  Committee. 
78 possibilities  available.  The  Chief  Executive's  Department  determined  overall 
policy  for  the  Council  and  was  central  to  any  process  of  policy  innovation  within 
SRC,  for  example  the  department  had  developed  SRCs  economic  and  social 
strategies.  As  an  official  within  this  policy  group  from  its  inception  stated  :  - 
"The  policy  role  initially  was  to  simply  see  the  extent  to  which  we  could  tap  into 
European  resources  available  for  regional  development,  in  order  to  help  the 
economic  and  social  policy  of  the  Regional  Council.  Basically,  we  were  initially 
looking  at  it  as,  are  there  any  schemes  we  can  tap  into,  and  the  very  first  thing 
we  did  was  to  tap  into  the  ERDF,  and  the  Council  had  been  using  the  ERDF  in  a 
small  way  since  1976.  So,  in  that  sense,  there  was  an  appreciation  of  the  use  of 
the  Regional  Fund,  what  was  different  was  the  identification  of  the  Social  Fund 
as  having  the  potential  to  help  the  Regional  Council".  (Case  14). 
The  second  institutional  development,  which  signified  the  Regional  Council's 
engagement  with  European  issues,  was  the  creation  of  a  representative  in 
Brussels,  in  1984.  In  many  respects,  the  establishment  of  the  office  was  a 
symbolic  gesture,  in  terms  of  signifying  the  importance  which  SRC  attached  to 
European  issues  whilst  also  raising  the  awareness  of  SRC  amongst  European 
Institutions,  and  in  particular  the  European  Commission.  The  innovative  nature 
of  such  an  action  on  the  part  of  the  Regional  Council  is  apparent  when  it  is 
considered  that  the  office  was  only  the  second  to  be  opened  by  a  UK  local 
authority54,  whilst  sub-national  representative  offices  from  any  area  of  the  EEC, 
were  relatively  unknown  even  amongst  more  powerful  'regions',  such  as  the 
German  Lander.  On  a  practical  level,  the  office  was  intended  primarily  to 
maximise  the  funding  which  SRC  obtained  from  the  European  Commission. 
Thus,  the  role  of  the  office  was  to  maintain  close  contacts  with  Commission 
officials  regarding  ongoing  projects  within  Strathclyde,  whilst  also  being  aware  of 
new  funding  opportunities  for  the  Council  emerging  from  within  the  Commission. 
However,  with  the  approach  of  the  Single  European  Market  legislation,  the  office 
also  took  on  an  a  role  as  a'listening-post',  from  which  the  Council  would  be  kept 
abreast  of  policy  developments  emerging  from  Brussels.  Strathclyde  did  not 
however,  at  this  stage,  have  a  policy  on  how  to  attempt  to  influence  legislation 
emerging  from  Brussels,  rather  that:  - 
'We  were  quite  simply  aware  of  the  fact  and  we  were  aware  of  it  ahead  of  most 
other  Councils,  that  legislation  from  Brussels  was  becoming  increasingly 
54  Birmingham  City  Council  opened  a  representative  office  two  months  prior  to  the  opening  of  the 
SRC  office. 
79 important  in  relation  to  the  activities  of  the  Council  as  a  whole".  (Case  14  - 
Senior  Official  within  the  Chief  Executives  Department). 
The  lobbying  function  of  the  office  in  Brussels  was  also  taking  on  a  critical  role  in 
the  period  between  1984  and  1986,  as  SRC  was  beginning  to  make  progress  in 
the  Council's  long-term  strategy  to  obtain  an  Integrated  Development  Operation 
(IDO)  for  the  West  of  Scotland.  The  European  Commission  had  created  funding 
packages  combining  ERDF  and  ESF  support  for  the  cities  of  Belfast  and  Naples 
in  1982,  which  provided  for  a  sum  of  money  agreed  between  the  European 
Commission,  member  state  and  local  organisations,  which  were  termed 
'Integrated  Development  Operations'.  SRC  was  aware  of  the  designation  given 
to  these  two  cities,  and  was  keen  to  obtain  a  similar  scheme  for  the  West  of 
Scotland.  The  attraction  to  SRC  in  obtaining  an  IDO,  lay  in  the  removal  of 
uncertainty  from  the  process  of  bidding  for  individual  projects  and  the  securing  of 
funds  directly  allocated  to  the  West  of  Scotland  over  a  set  time-scale,  drawing 
upon  all  the  Regional  Funds.  In  addition,  the  potential  existed  for  obtaining 
superior  funding  through  negotiations  with  the  member-state  and  European 
Commission,  rather  than  being  subject  to  individual  project  approvals.  In  1982, 
the  Economic  and  Industrial  Development  sub-committee  agreed  to  the  Council 
approaching  the  Commission  regarding  the  possibility  of  obtaining  an'Integrated 
Development  Operation'55.  After  a  series  of  meetings,  DGXVI  agreed  to  setting- 
up  a  pilot-study  to  assess  the  potential  of  Strathclyde  Region  to  cope  with  such  a 
scheme,  in  terms  of  the  capabilities  of  development  agencies  within  the  region. 
The  costs  of  this  preparatory  study  came  to  £90,000,  \Mth  the  European 
Commission  covering  75%  of  the  expense  incurred. 
The  report  judged  the  potential  of  Strathclyde  favourably  to  cope  with  an  IDO, 
however  the  Commission  took  the  view  that  the  concept  of  IDOs  required  further 
work,  and  offered  SRC  an  interim  'National  Programme  of  Community  Interest 
(NPCI)  covering  the  City  of  Glasgow.  In  particular,  the  Commission  was  unsure 
as  to  whether  local  institutions  in  Strathclyde  had  the  leverage  to  provide  the 
match  funding  for  the  significant  funds  which  would  be  provided  via  an  IDO 
covering  the  whole  of  the  region.  Thus  the  NPCI  can  be  viewed  as  a  pilot 
55  The  negotiations  leading  up  to  the  designation  of  an  Integrated  Development  Operation  (IDO) 
in  Strathclyde  and  the  role,  functions  and  organisational  structure  of  the  IDO  is  discussed  in 
Chapter  Five. 
80 scheme  to  assess  the  potential  of  the  region  to  cope  with  an  IDO.  The  NPCI 
provided  £68.2m  of  ERDF  support  for  the  City  of  Glasgow  over  the  period  June 
1984  to  December  198756.  The  funds  being  managed  by  a'Co-ordinating 
Committee',  bringing  together  the  Scottish  Office  Industry  Department, 
Strathclyde  Regional  Council,  the  Scottish  Development  Agency,  the  South  of 
Scotland  Electricity  Board,  the  Scottish  Gas  Board,  British  Railways,  the 
Strathclyde  Passenger  Transport  Executive,  and  a  representative  from  DGXVI. 
To  officials  within  SRC,  whilst  this  designation  of  the  NPCI  did  possess  the 
potential  of  developing  into  an  IDO,  it  did  not  fulfil  ambitions  within  the  Council:  - 
"  it  was  very  much  an  ERDF  programme,  it  wasn't  all  embracing,  an  IDO  was  of 
course  meant  to  involve  all  of  the  European  funding  brought  to  bear  in  a  coherent 
and  integrated  programme  for  the  economic  development  of  a  particular  Region, 
with  all  the  local  bodies  involved".  (Case  14). 
As  a  result,  SRC  continued  to  lobby  the  European  Commission  and  the  Scottish 
Office  as  to  the  possibility  of  Strathclyde  being  designated  an  IDO.  It  was 
against  this  background  of  negotiations  between  the  European  Commission, 
SRC  and  the  Scottish  Office,  that  SRC  opened  a  representative  office  in 
Brussels,  as  the  representative  in  Brussels  would  prove  pivotal  in  maintaining 
contact  with  DGXVI  concerning  the  NPCI  and  later  regarding  the  possibility  of 
obtaining  an  IDO.  Thus,  the  timing  of  opening  an  office  in  Brussels  can  be 
viewed  as  not  entirely  coincidental,  given  that  the  Commission  was  receiving  the 
study  into  the  NPCI  around  the  same  time  as  the  office  opened.  In  this  sense,  an 
office  in  Brussels  offered  the  potential  to  lobby  increasingly  directly  with  the 
Commission,  whilst  the  cost  of  maintaining  a  presence  in  Brussels57  would  seem 
minimal  as  compared  to  the  benefits  to  Strathclyde,  should  the  Region  be 
granted  an  IDO. 
The  creation  of  a  National  Programme  of  Community  Interest  irrevocably 
changed  SRC's  engagement  with  European  funding.  The  initial  contacts  which 
Strathclyde  developed  with  DGV  and  DGXVI  were  carried  out  unilaterally,  with 
the  European  Commission  becoming  aware  of  SRC  :- 
56  The  decision  to  approve  the  NCPI  was  not  taken  by  the  European  Commission  until 
December  1985,  however  the  funds  were  back-dated  to  June  1984. 
57  The  full  cost  to  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  of  maintaining  an  office  in  Brussels  in  1991  stood 
at  £87,190. 
81 "because  we  had  taken  the  trouble  to  visit  Brussels  on  a  number  of  occasions 
and  over  the  course  of  this  time,  and  during  the  course  of  this  dialogue  we  got  to 
know  the  people  in  DGXVI  and  DGV  very  well".  (Case  14). 
Whilst  SRC  was  applying  for  funding  on  a  project-by-project  basis,  it  was  able  to 
develop  proposals  on  its  own  initiative  whilst  keeping  the  Scottish  Office  informed 
of  its  activities.  This  situation  changed  as  the  negotiations  concerning  the  NCPI 
progressed,  with  the  Scottish  Office  becoming  gradually  more  involved  as  the 
proposals  took  on  a  more  concrete  form.  As  has  been  noted  above,  the  structure 
of  the  NCPI  'Co-ordinating  Committee',  introduced  a  number  of  institutions  into  a 
new  decision-making  arena,  which  would  make  executive  decisions  concerning 
the  eligibility  of  individual  project  applications,  with  the  Scottish  Office  chairing 
the  Committee.  Thus,  SRC's  control  over  the  funding  process  lessened  through 
the  creation  of  the  NCPI,  although  this  was  compensated  for  by  the  existence  of 
an  improved  funding  package.  58 
Strathclyde  had  also  begun  to  become  involved  with  other  actors  involved  within 
the  European  arena  during  the  early  1980s,  through  beginning  to  participate  in 
trans-regional  networks.  In  the  period  leading  up  to  1986,  SRC  was  most  active 
within  the  network  of  'Traditional  Industrial  Regions  of  Europe'  (RETI).  The 
Regional  Council  became  interested  in  the  role  of  the  network,  as  it  was  primarily 
concerned  with  the  economic  development  strategies  being  pursued  within 
different  regions  across  Europe,  which  were  attempting  to  cope  with  de- 
industrialisation.  The  Council  had  also  sent  representatives  to  conferences 
organised  by  the  Council  of  European  Municipalities  and  Regions  (CEMR)  which 
dealt  with  economic  development  and  urban  regeneration.  However,  the 
Regional  Council's  participation  within  these  networks  was  mainly  limited  to 
observing  proceedings,  rather  than  subscribing  to  membership  of  them.  The 
Regional  Council  was  also  a  member  of  the  International  Union  of  Local 
Authorities  (IULA),  and  was  represented  on  COSLA  working  groups  dealing  with 
European  issues,  although  again  the  Council's  involvement  was  related  primarily 
to  issues  dealing  with  economic  development. 
58  The  role  of  'partners'  within  funding  partnerships,  is  considered  in  detail  in  the  following 
chapter,  with  a  particular  emphasis  upon  the  changing  nature  of  SRC's  role  within  these  funding 
partnerships. 
82 Summary. 
The  early  engagement  by  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  with  European 
Institutions  was  motivated  by  a  desire  to  obtain  finance  with  which  to  further  the 
policies  the  Council  was  developing  within  the  economic  and  social  spheres. 
Whilst  the  size,  range  of  functions  and  correspondingly  budget  of  SRC,  maybe 
viewed  as  necessary  conditions  for  mobilisation  onto  the  European  arena,  they 
were  not  sufficient.  Equally  important  catalysts  in  the  emergence  of  a  European 
policy  were  the  impact  of  de-industrialisation  upon  the  Region,  and  the 
increasingly  tight  fiscal  environment  which  central  government  was  setting  for 
local  authorities  across  the  UK.  Additionally,  the  desire  of  key  individuals  within 
SRC,  and  in  particular  within  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  that  SRC  should 
be  an  innovative  authority  and  that  it  should  be  seen  to'make  a  difference',  given 
the  widespread  misgivings  upon  its  creation,  stimulated  policy  developments 
such  as  the  creation  of  a  representative  office  in  Brussels  to  occur. 
Thus  by  the  end  of  1985  the  internal  structure  which  would  guide  the  expansion 
of  SRC's  European  policy  through  the  period  1986-97  was  in  place.  Policy  was 
directed  and  co-ordinated  from  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  in  liaison  with 
the  representative  in  Brussels,  with  other  departments  being  drawn  into  the 
process  when  applying  for  or  implementing  European  funding.  The  Council's 
involvement  within  trans-regional  networks,  whilst  at  this  stage  rather  limited  and 
exploratory  in  nature,  would  become  increasingly  significant  in  the  following 
years,  as  a  platform  for  engaging  with  European  policies.  Finally,  the  creation  of 
the  NCPI  for  the  City  of  Glasgow,  established  a  new  institutional  arena  in  which 
bargaining  over  funding  applications  would  take  place  between  'local'  actors,  the 
Scottish  Office  and  DGXVI.  This  intermediary  institution  removed  the  direct 
nature  of  the  funding  process  between  SRC  and  the  Commission59,  whilst 
drawing  in  a  wide  range  of  interests  which  would  guide  the  overall  development 
strategy  underpinning  the  eligibility  for  regional  funding  within  Strathclyde 
Region. 
'a  Initially,  this  was  only  true  for  the  City  of  Glasgow,  however  the  NCPI  would  later  transform 
into  an  institution  covering  the  whole  of  Strathclyde. 
83 4.3  -  The  Europeanisation  of  Strathclyde  Regional  Council.  1986-96. 
4.3.1  -  Introduction. 
Whilst  the  early  years  of  SRC's  engagement  with  European  policy  was 
underpinned  by  the  desire  to  maximise  the  amount  of  funding  available  to  the 
authority,  the  period  from  1986  to  1997  witnessed  a  widening  of  the  Council's 
European  activities.  Funding  remained  central  to  the  role  of  Strathclyde  in 
Europe,  however,  as  noted  above,  by  the  end  of  1985  the  autonomy  of  SRC 
within  this  sphere  was  somewhat  weakened  through  the  creation  of  the  NCPI  for 
the  City  of  Glasgow.  This  was  a  process  which  would  intensify  in  the  following 
four  years  to  the  extent  that  by  December  1988  the  European  Commission  had 
designated  the  whole  of  Strathclyde  (with  the  exception  of  Argyll  and  Bute)  as  an 
'Integrated  Development  Operation',  thus  ensuring  that  applications  for  the  vast 
majority  of  European  funding  would  be  assessed  within  the  various  Committee's 
of  the  IDO.  Thus  the  necessity  for  direct  contact  with  DGXVI  and  DGV  over 
funding  bids  was  limited  to  contact  with  individual  'desk  officers'  who  represented 
the  European  Commission  within  the  IDO.  The  only  exception  to  this  rule,  was 
when  the  Structural  Fund  budget  (as  it  became,  post-1988)  was  under  review, 
where  direct  representations  would  be  made  in  Brussels.  However,  the  nature  of 
these  approaches  were  significantly  different  from  the  pre-1986  era,  in  that  such 
representations  were  increasingly  undertaken  in  alliance  with  other  sub-national 
actors  either  through  trans-regional  networks,  or  distinctly  'Scottish'  or  UK 
networks,  dependent  upon  the  issue  or  tier  of  government  being  lobbied.  Apart 
from  changes  within  the  European  funding  regime,  the  primary  areas  of 
European  integration  impacting  upon  SNAs  cited  in  the  literature  over  the  period 
1986-97  were:  - 
1)  The  impact  of  Single  European  Market  legislation  upon  the  competences  of 
SNAs. 
2)  The  increasing  activity  of  SNAs  with  regard  to  lobbying  European  Institutions, 
primarily  through  the  establishment  of  SNA  representative  offices  in  Brussels, 
the  increasing  prominence  of  trans-regional  networks  and  the  creation  of  the 
Committee  of  the  Regions  (CoR). 
It  is  to  these  developments  and  the  form  in  which  they  impacted  upon  SRC, 
which  I  now  intend  to  turn. 
84 4.3.2  -  The  Intemalisation  of  Europeanisation  within  SRC. 
The  Single  European  Act  (1986)  altered  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between 
SNAs  and  European  Institutions,  as  the  EC  was  now  an  arena  which  could 
confer  legal  obligations  upon  SNAs  through  regulations,  as  well  as  being  a 
means  of  obtaining  finance.  Within  Strathclyde  Regional  Council,  Single 
European  Market  legislation  was  expected  to  impact  upon  the  authority  in  three 
principal  ways.  Firstly,  an'organisational'  impact  was  expected  to  be  a  result  of 
the  SEM,  through  the  Council  having  to  restructure  the  manner  in  which  it  dealt 
with  issues  such  as  the  tendering  of  public  contracts,  and  ensuring  that  Council 
services  met  European  technical  standards  in  areas  including  consumer 
protection  and  the  health  and  safety  of  Council  employees.  Secondly,  the 
expansion  of  EC  competences  under  SEM  legislation  was  likely  to  have  an 
impact  upon  Council  departments  which  whilst  not  being  directly  affected  by  EC 
regulations,  could  nevertheless  expect  to  be  influenced  by  the  increasing  pace  of 
European  integration  as  a  result  of  the  SEM.  For  instance,  the  European 
Commission  had  made  clear  its  intention  to  foster  the  exchange  of  experience 
between  practitioners  in  fields  such  as  education  and  social  services.  Finally  the 
economic  impact  of  the  Single  European  Market  required  that  the  economic 
development  arm  of  SRC  (Strathclyde  Business  Development)  consider  the 
consequences  for  their  development  strategies  against  the  backdrop  of  how  the 
Strathclyde  economy  was  likely  to  respond  to  the  Single  Market,  given  that  the 
Region  was'peripheral'  in  European  terms,  and  still  coping  with  the  deepening 
processes  of  deindustrialisation. 
The  main  responsibility  for  ensuring  that  SRC  was  prepared  for  the  SEM,  lay  with 
the  Chief  Executive's  Department,  in  co-ordination  with  the'European  Liaison 
Officer  based  in  Brussels.  In  essence,  the  Council's  response  to  the  SEA,  was 
directed  towards  ensuring  that  the  various  departments  of  the  Council  were  fully 
informed  as  to  the  likely  consequences  of  the  Single  European  Market  legislation 
as  well  as  fulfilling  the  strictures  of  European  regulations,  as  the  deadline  of  the 
31st  December  1992  grew  closer.  For  instance,  the  Chief  Executive's 
Department  organised  :  - 
"a  corporate  group  of  all  departments  of  the  Council,  to  whom  it  [the  SEM]  was 
relevant  to  look  at  the  implications  of  the  SEM  to  the  Regional  Council  as  a 
whole.  And  Norman  [the  European  Liaison  Officer]  came  over  regularly  and 
85 reported  to  that  group  on  the  latest  policy  developments  in  Brussels,  and  how 
they  might  influence  the  Regional  Council"  (Case  14). 
Experience  within  the  Council  as  to  the  European  role  of  SNAs  remained  largely 
concentrated  within  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  and  the  Brussels 
representative,  with  the  dissemination  of  information  being  directed  through 
these  channels.  Direct  responses  by  individual  departments  to  the  prospect  of 
the  SEM,  such  as  participation  within  specialised  trans-regional  networks  dealing 
with  specific  subject  areas,  did  not  occur  between  1986  to  1992.  However,  the 
response  to  the  SEM  in  terms  of  the  internal  organisation  of  departments  did  vary 
according  to  the  extent  to  which  the  department  had  been  involved  with 
European  policy  in  the  period  leading  up  to  1986.  Thus  departments,  which  had 
previously  been  involved  in  the  process  of  drawing  up  applications  for  European 
funding,  would  tend  to  delegate  the  responsibility  of  remaining  aware  of  the 
departmental  implications  of  SEM  to  the  officer  previously  responsible  for  this 
task.  Other  departments  with  no  previous  European  experience  would  tend  to 
form  internal  Committees  to  discuss  the  implications  of  the  SEM  for  the 
department,  usually  chaired  by  the  head  of  the  Department.  By  1996  the 
majority  of  departments  within  the  Council  had  at  least  one  officer  designated  as 
having  responsibility  for  European  issues  concerning  the  department.  60  This 
process  of  Europeanisation  and  'institutional  learning'  within  departments  was 
due  to  the  increasing  involvement  of  departments  which  did  not  expect  to  be 
heavily  affected  by  the  SEM  becoming  engaged  in  trans-regional  networks  which 
dealt  with  'technical'  and  policy  issues  relating  to  the  role  of  the  department.  61 
The  changing  nature  of  SRC's  engagement  with  European  issues,  was  most 
clearly  evident  within  the  Chief  Executive's  Department.  Whilst  the  Department 
still  contained  two  officers  dealing  solely  with  European  funding  (one  with  ERDF 
and  the  other  with  ESF),  the  Council  found  that  it  was  becoming  increasingly 
involved  in  an'advocacy  role  vis-a-vis  European  issues,  through  the  gathering 
and  dissemination  of  information  concerning  European  developments  both  to 
departments  within  the  Council  and  to  outside  actors,  in  addition  to  attempting  to 
60  The  departments  outside  of  the  Chief  Executive's  Department,  which  became  most  heavily 
involved  with  European  policy  were  the  :-  Department  of  Consumer  and  Trading  Standards; 
Department  of  Education;  Department  of  Physical  Planning;  Department  of  Roads;  Department  of 
Social  Work;  and,  Strathclyde  Business  Development. 
61  The  role  of  SRC  in  trans-regional  networks  is  considered  in  detail,  later  on  in  this  chapter. 
86 find  mechanisms  with  which  the  Council  might  be  able  to  obtain  a'voice'  within 
the  European  decision-making  process.  Two  areas  were  central  to  this 
development,  firstly,  the  changing  role  of  the  European  Liaison  Officer  in 
Brussels  and  the  Council's  involvement  within  trans-regional  networks. 
4.3.3.  The  Changing  Remit  of  SRC's  Representative  Office  in  Brussels. 
By  1988,  it  had  become  clear  within  SRC  that  the  role  which  the  representative 
office  in  Brussels  fulfilled  had  altered  since  its  establishment.  As  noted  above, 
the  office  was  created  primarily  so  that  SRC  could  pursue  the  funding 
opportunities  it  could  see  emerging  from  European  sources  in  the  early  1980's. 
However,  the  vast  majority  of  European  funds  were  now  disbursed  from  the 
'Strathclyde  Integrated  Development  Operation'  with  any  direct  lobbying  over 
funding  issues  with  Brussels  being  largely  limited  to  the  periodic  reviews  of  the 
Structural  Funds  every  five  years.  Thus,  the  future  impact  of  a  representative 
office  in  Brussels  in  terms  of  generating  finance,  was  at  best  likely  to  be  minimal. 
As  a  result,  the  office  increasingly  became  concerned  with  the  impact  of  SEM 
regulations  upon  the  Council  and  facilitating  SRC's  activities  within  'formal'  trans- 
regional  networks  as  well  as  developing  'informal'  networks  amongst  SNAs 
based  in  Brussels.  Thus  the  remit  of  the  Brussels  office  post-1986  had  become:  - 
"providing  a  link  between  the  various  departments  and  the  Chief  Executive's 
Department  with  the  Commission,  the  European  Parliament,  the  CoR  etc.  The 
work  ranges  from  looking  for  opportunities  for  smaller  projects,  to  organising 
meetings  for  politicians  or  officers  and  generally  providing  an  information  service. 
Working  with  politicians  on  inter-regional  associations  or  networks  that  we  are 
part  of  and  general  lobbying  work  if  that's  required.  And  obviously,  regular  visits 
to  Glasgow,  to  report  back".  (  Case  13). 
Whilst  the  evolving  function  of  the  representation  in  Brussels  was  partly  due  to 
the  'decentralisation'  of  the  European  funding  regime  and  the  impact  of  the 
'Single  European  Act',  which  had  resulted  in  the  office  taking  on  the  role  of  a 
'listening  post'  from  which  events  within  European  Institutions  could  be  relayed  to 
the  Council,  the  transformation  also  reflected  the  widespread  mobilisation  of 
SNAs  across  Europe.  The  period  from  1986  to  1996  witnessed  a  widespread 
mobilisation  of  SNAs  onto  the  supra-national  arena  either  through  the 
establishments  of  'representative  offices'  in  Brussels  or  through  participation  in 
networks.  Jeffrey  (1996)  notes  that  15  offices  representing  sub-national  actors 
had  opened  in  Brussels  by  1988,  with  this  figure  having  increased  to  143  offices 
87 by  1996  (Scottish  Enterprise,  1996).  As  a  result,  the  Strathclyde  office  became 
increasingly  involved  in  developing  contacts  with  these  actors  for  a  number  of 
purposes.  Firstly,  to  share  information  obtained  from  European  actors  as  each 
representation  would  often  have  access  to  different  'informal'  networks.  For 
example,  SRC  would  be  likely  to  have  better  access  to  Scottish  or  UK  officials 
within  a  particular  DG  than  a  German  office.  Secondly,  some  sources  of  funding 
required  that  a  'project'  contain  partners  from  a  number  of  member-states,  thus 
contacts  with  other  offices  would  often  lead  to  the  offer  of  participation  in  projects 
such  as  Community  Initiatives  which  would  contain  a  financial  benefit  for  the 
Region.  In  addition,  with  the  creation  of  the  Scotland  Europa  Centre  in  1992, 
followed  by  SRC's  participation  within  the  Centre,  the  office  increasingly  became 
involved  in  co-operating  with  other  Scottish  actors  through  the  sharing  of 
information  and  workloads,  thus  adding  a  new  dimension  to  the  office's 
activities.  62  Finally,  SRC's  increasing  activity  within  the  more  formal  channels  of 
'trans-regional  networks',  also  required  an  increasing  amount  of  liaison  between 
the  SRC  office  in  Brussels  and  other  SNA  offices  (see  below). 
In  essence,  the  changing  priorities  of  SRC's  representative  office,  reflected  the 
process  of  Europeanisation  occurring  within  the  Council.  Whilst  funding 
remained  central  to  the  Region's  involvement  with  European  Institutions,  the 
process  of  obtaining  funding  was  now  mediated  by  an  intermediate  institution, 
the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership.  As  a  result,  the  requirement  for  direct 
lobbying  of  European  Institutions  was  replaced  by  bargaining  within  the 
Committee  structure  of  the  SEP.  The  requirements  of  the  Single  European  Act, 
shifted  SRC's  focus  onto  the  requirements  of  remaining  aware  of  the  EU  policy 
process  and  of  issues  which  could  influence  the  competences  of  the  Council. 
Increasingly,  the  concern  within  the  Council  was  to  provide  information  between 
departments  as  to  the  impact  of  European  developments,  whilst  also  attempting 
to  have  some  influence  upon  the  policy  process  within  the  EU.  One  of  the 
principal  mechanisms  with  which  SRC  became  involved,  in  order  to  articulate  the 
Council's  interests  into  the  EU  policy  process,  was  through  participation  in  'trans- 
regional  networks'. 
62  The  issues  surrounding  the  role  of  the  SRC  office  in  Brussels,  how  lobbying  was  conducted, 
relations  with  other  actors  and  institutions  and  of  the  nature  of  the  Scotland  Europa  Centre,  is 
discussed  in  Chapter  Seven. 
88 4.3.4  SRC  and  Trans-regional  Networks. 
Prior  to  1986,  Strathclyde  had  become  involved  with  two  'trans-regional  networks' 
to  a  limited  extent,  broadly  due  to  the  Council's  widespread  involvement  with 
economic  development  issues.  The  period  1986  to  1996  is  marked  not  only  by 
the  increasing  number  of  networks  of  which  SRC  became  a  member,  but  also  by 
the  extent  of  SRC's  involvement  within  a  number  of  networks.  The  functions  of 
these  networks,  of  which  SRC  was  a  member  ranged  from  trans-regional 
networks  which  addressed  extremely  broad  and  political  issues  such  as,  the  role 
of  regions  within  the  EU  to  narrow  and  technical  networks  concerned  with  policy 
areas  such  as  traffic  systems  in  urban  conurbations.  Accordingly,  the 
involvement  of  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  within'trans-regional  networks',  can 
be  separated  into  two  categories  according  to  the  form  of  activity  which  the 
network  performed  or  set  out  to  undertake.  These  are  firstly,  networks  with  a 
broad  membership  often  following  a  directly  political  agenda  regarding  the  role  of 
SNAs  within  the  EU  policy  process.  Participation  within  these  networks  and  the 
policy  which  SRC  would  pursue  was  the  responsibility  of  the  Chief  Executive's 
Department  of  the  Council.  Secondly,  networks  dealing  with  issues  of  a  more 
technical  or'practical'  nature  being  devolved  to  departments  relevant  to  the 
network. 
Generalist  Networks. 
SRC  was  a  member  of  three  networks  which  come  under  this  categorisation. 
These  were  the'Assembly  of  European  Regions'  (AER);  the'Council  of 
European  Municipalities  and  Regions'  (CEMR);  and  the  network  of  'Traditional 
Industrial  Regions  of  Europe'  (RETI).  Of  these  three  networks,  SRCs 
involvement  was  most  limited  within  CEMR,  where  the  Council  maintained  an 
'observer  status'  through  sending  a  representative  (usually  an  official)  to 
meetings  of  the  network63.  The  limited  involvement  of  SRC  within  this  network, 
was  due  to  CEMR  tending  to  consist  largely  of  municipalities  or  smaller  SNAs.  In 
contrast  SRC  considered  itself  to  be  a  'Region',  due  to  factors  such  as  the  range 
of  competences  it  commanded  and  the  size  of  population  contained  within  the 
authorities  boundaries.  As  a  consequence,  SRC  viewed  AER  and  RETI  as 
arenas  where  the  Council  should  operate  given  its  range  of  responsibilities, 
whilst  the  scale  of  SRC's  involvement  within  AER  and  RETI  was  symptomatic  of 
63  SRC  did  co-host  CEMR's  17th  Assembly,  with  Glasgow  District  Council,  in  June  1988. 
89 the  authorities  extended  European  agenda.  Thus,  one  senior  Labour  politician 
within  SRC  commented  when  discussing  the  relative  values  of  AER  and  CEMR, 
that  .  - 
"  AER  is  much  more  important,  because  it  is  specifically  regional,  it's  led  by 
Pujol64,  most  of  the  big  German  regions  are  there,  including  some  from  the 
East.  "  (Case  3). 
The'Assembly  of  European  Regions'  (AER). 
The'Assembly  of  European  Regions'  was  established  in  1985  with  a  broad 
political  remit  concerning  the  role  of  regions  within  the  EU  policy  process.  These 
can  be  broadly  summarised  as:  - 
"  to  develop  and  organise  co-operation  between  European  regions,  and  to 
strengthen  regional  participation  at  European  institutional  level  and  regional 
participation  in  the  construction  of  Europe"  (SRC  Minutes,  April  1993). 
SRC  joined  AER  in  1986,  as  a  direct  result  of  membership  of  RETI,  as  members 
of  RETI  were  automatically  entitled  to  membership  of  AER.  By  1992,  the 
network  contained  150  Western  European  regions  as  well  as  a  further  20 
Eastern  European  regions.  The  network  was  organised  into  six  Committees 
which  prepared  reports  on  a  number  of  issues  relevant  to  regions,  which  would 
then  be  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  European  Commission  in  future  lobbying 
efforts  (See  Table  4.3). 
64'Pujol'  refers  to  Jordi  Pujol,  the  President  of  Catalonia. 
90 Table  4.3  -  AER's  Committee  Structure,  1995. 
Committee  Number.  Subject  Area. 
Committee  One.  Institutional  Questions,  Relations  with  the  Council  of 
Europe,  the  European  Union,  the  European 
Constitution,  the  Revision  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
Committee  Two.  East  -  West  Co-operation. 
Committee  Three.  North  -  South  Co-operation  and  Relations  with  regions 
outwith  the  European  area. 
Committee  Four.  Social  Cohesion,  Social  Services,  Public  Health. 
Committee  Five.  Regional  Policy,  Planning,  Infrastructure,  Environment 
and  Tourism. 
Committee  Six.  Culture,  Education,  Training  and  Youth. 
Source:  -  SRC  Minutes,  March  1995. 
In  addition  to  these  Committees,  AER's  overall  strategy  was  determined  by  'the 
Bureau',  which  consisted  of  a  region  from  each  EU  member-state.  SRC  was  a 
member  of  AER's  Bureau  from  1989-92,  whilst  the  Council  held  membership  of 
Committee  One  from  1993-96  and  the  Chairmanship  of  Committee  Two  for  the 
same  period.  Whilst  AER's  remit  was  wide,  essentially  the  aim  of  the  network 
was  to  see  the'Consultatiye  Council  of  Local  Authorities  and  Regions'  upgraded 
into  a  European  Institution.  Thus,  the  major  success  of  the  network  was  to 
achieve  the  creation  of  the'Committee  of  the  Regions'  (CoR)65.  Whilst  the 
largely  political  role  of  the  network  did  alienate  some  SRC  officials  (See  Table 
4.4)  as  to  the  worth  of  the  structure,  nevertheless  AER  was  viewed  as  a  useful 
mechanism  through  v  hich  to  access  European  Commission  officials  as  to  the 
views  of  SNAs.  For  instance,  following  the  creation  of  the  CoR,  SRC  minutes 
note  that  SRC  had  been  approached  by  the  AER  Bureau,  as  a  possible  member 
of  Committee  One,  and  that  the  Council  should  seek  membership  of  this 
Committee  on  the  grounds  that  :  - 
"  This  Committee  is  potentially  important  for  SRC's  future  participation  in  EC 
policy  development......  Many  of  the  key  representatives  in  the  AER,  will  become 
Clearly,  the  creation  of  the  CoR  cannot  be  attributed  solely  to  the  activities  of  AER  given  the 
nature  of  the  EU  policy  process  and  inter-governmental  bargaining,  nevertheless  as  the 
establishment  of  such  an  'institution'  (although  not  a  formal  European  Institution)  was  the 
principal  goal  of  the  network,  the  creation  of  the  CoR  was  viewed  within  AER  as  a  success  for  the 
network. 
91 key  members  of  CoR  and  will  have  a  central  influence  on  the  agenda  of  issues 
which  it  addresses.  This  is  an  area  of  work  to  which  Committee  One  of  AER  will 
be  turning.  SRC  involvement  in  this  work,  could  have  a  long-term  value  in 
helping  to  place  issues  of  significance  for  Strathclyde  on  CoR's  agenda".  (SRC 
Minutes,  March  1993). 
It  is  significant  that  given  SRC's  instrumentalist  approach  to  European  policy  in 
the  pre-1986  era,  that  it  should  seek  to  become  actively  involved  in  such  an 
overtly  'political'  network  as  AER  post=  86.  This  shift  reflects  a  recognition  within 
SRC  that  European  issues  were  becoming  increasingly  central  to  the  working  of 
the  Council,  whilst  SRC  itself  was  keen  to  place  itself  amongst  the  major 
'regional'  players  operating  at  the  European  level  in  order  to  advance  the 
Council's  interest  into  the  EU  policy  process.  The  extent  of  this  shift  is  apparent 
when  it  is  considered  that  in  1989,  the  "stronger  SNA's"  within  AER  organised  a 
number  of  Conferences,  upon  the  initiative  of  the  'stronger  German  Lander  (for 
example,  Bavaria),  dealing  with  the  topic  of  a'Europe  of  the  Regions',  and  later 
formed  a  "special  grouping  with  AER"  (Bullman,  1996,  p.  4).  It  is  a  sign  of  SRC's 
extensive  involvement  with  European  issues  by  this  time,  that  SRC  was  a 
member  of  this'special  grouping'.  Table  4.4,  provides  the  opinion  of  a  senior 
SRC  official  within  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  who  was  heavily  involved 
with  AER  from  1986-94,  as  to  his  views  upon  the  value  of  SRC's  involvement 
within  AER,  and  how  these  changed  as  the  potential  'political'  benefits  of 
involvement  within  AER  became  apparent. 
92 Table  4.4  -  Official  within  the  Chief  Executives  Department  view  of  AER. 
(Case  14). 
"I  personally  took  the  view  that  RETI  as  a  focused  network  of  industrial 
regions,  had  more  to  offer  Strathclyde  than  AER,  which  was  a  very  large  and 
amorphous  and  from  an  officials  point  of  view,  a  frustratingly  slow  body.  Now, 
it  took  me  a  while  to  appreciate  AER,  because  I  have  to  say  from  a  practical 
perspective,  they  didn't  get  involved  with  anything  to  do  with  finance.  Instead, 
they  were  playing  a  long-term  political  game,  but  that  meant  from  an  officials 
point  of  view  going  along  to  these  meetings,  it  drove  you  mad.  They  waffled  on 
endlessly  about  federalism  and  the  role  of  the  regions  and  they  all  said  the 
same  thing  in  different  words  and  at  great  length.  So,  it  was  not  a  very 
satisfactory  organisation  to  be  involved  in  from  an  officials  level.  It  was  also  a 
bit  of  an  insider's  club. 
Strathclyde  became  an  insider,  but  from  the  outside.  When  you  first  joined  as 
ordinary  members,  it  just  seemed  a  lot  of  people  meeting  in  nice  places, 
seeming  to  have  quite  a  nice  time  and  not  doing  very  much.  You're  asking  for 
my  opinion  of  AER,  and  it  was  in  my  opinion,  a  bit  of  a  waste  of  time.  I 
suppose  my  perspective  has  changed  because  I  now  look  at  it  from  a  historical 
perspective  and  they  were  trying  to  play  the  long  game  of  arguing  the  case  for 
regions,  and  the  necessity,  the  symbolism  of  getting  together  once  a  year  for  a 
jamboree,  irrespective  of  what  was  said.  I  mean  we  could  have  played 
tiddlywinks  for  two  days.  I'm  exaggerating  to  make  the  point,  but  not  entirely. 
Basically,  there  were  not  a  series  a  short-term  objectives.  They  were  all  talking 
a  long-term  political  game  about  the  importance  of  regions.  So  that  was  the 
nature  of  the  organisation,  and  until  you  were  on  the  Bureau,  it  was  then  that 
we  became  aware  that  they  were  actually  a  quite  serious  organisation  with 
serious  objectives.  So  in  my  opinion,  the  organisation  was  very  badly  at  fault 
for  not  involving  all  its  members  in  its  thinking  and  objectives,  and  I  have  to  say 
that  the  Secretary  General  at  the  time,  was  not  effective  in  my  opinion,  in 
involving  the  broad  network.  He  looked  after  his  little  Bureau,  and  the  rest  of 
the  members  could  go  to  hang  as  far  as  he  was  concerned.  Once  we  were  on 
the  Bureau,  we  had  a  greater  understanding  of  what  the  political  moves  were, 
and  they  were  still  very  long-term  and  they  were  still  very  slow  and 
bureaucratic. 
So,  I  was  very  critical  of  aspects  of  the  organisation,  but  looking  at  it  from  a 
longer-term  perspective,  I  realise  that  they  had  that  long-term  political  objective 
and  they  weren't  interested  in  getting  involved  in  dirty  games  like  Objective  One 
versus  Objective  Two". 
93 The'Traditional  Industrial  Regions  of  Europe'  (RETI). 
RETI  differed  from  AER  in  that  as  well  as  pursuing  a  political  agenda,  in  terms  of 
lobbying  the  European  Commission,  in  particular  DGXVI,  over  issues  pertaining 
to'regions',  the  network  also  fulfilled  a  more  'practical'  function.  AER  dealt 
primarily  with  economic  development  issues  relating  to  the  impact  of  de- 
industrialisation  upon  regions  and  the  varying  policy  responses  being  pursued  by 
SNAs  as  a  consequence.  The  network  was  formed  in  1984,  largely  at  the 
instigation  of  Nord-Pas  de  Calais,  although  RETI  also  had  the  backing  of  the 
European  Commission  who  appeared  intent  that  a  trans-national  structure 
representing  industrial  regions  should  be  established  (McAleavey  and  Mitchell, 
1994).  66  SRC  joined  RETI  in  1986,  as  the  network  offered  the  potential  of  being 
able  to:  - 
"lobby  the  European  Commission  on  behalf  of  industrial  regions,  whilst  the 
organisation  also  undertakes  inter-regional  joint  programmes  and  offers  a  good 
means  of  exchanging  experience  in  the  fields  of  economic  development,  training 
and  planning"  (SRC  Minutes,  July  1993). 
RETI  certainly  fulfilled  the  last  two  functions,  but  was  somewhat  lacking  in  terms 
of  lobbying  the  European  Commission,  in  the  period  up  to  1992.  In  part,  this  was 
due  to  a  failure  on  the  part  of  RETI  to  recruit  members  from  across  the  whole  of 
the  EC,  which  led  to  the  network  being  viewed  as  unrepresentative  by  DGXVI. 
Additionally,  RETI  often  appeared  unwilling  to  become  involved  with  issues  upon 
which  DGXVI  would  expect  it  to  be  a  natural  ally.  This  problem  came  to  a  head 
in  the  lead  up  to  a  decision  being  made  concerning  the  renegotiation  of  the 
Structural  Funds  budget  in  1992.  At  the  time,  it  appeared  to  be  a  distinct 
possibility  that  Objective  Two  funding  (which  deals  with'declining  industrial 
areas'),  would  have  its  budget  reduced  or  that  the  fund  may  entirely  disappear. 
The  reluctance  of  RETI  to'take  a  stand'  on  this  issue  led  to  a  separate'  Objective 
Two  Lobby'  being  formed,  which  brought  together  the  vast  majority  of  Objective 
Two  regions,  and  was  led  by  SRC.  67  This  lobby  effectively  ousted  the 
incumbent  leadership  of  RETI  at  the  network  annual  general  meeting  in  April 
66  McAleavey  and  Mitchell  (1994),  provide  an  interesting  account  of  some  of  the  tensions  which 
existed  within  RETI  (which  are  referred  to  in  this  section),  and  somewhat  limited  the  influence  of 
the  network.  In  particular,  fora  variety  of  reasons,  RETI  was  unable  to  attract  members  from  the 
Netherlands,  Denmark  and  Germany,  which  as  a  result,  somewhat  diminished  the  effectiveness 
of  the  network,  in  the  view  of  the  European  Commission,  and  in  particular  DGXVI. 
67  The  issues  surrounding  SRC's  role  with  the  Objective  Two  Lobby,  are  considered  in  detail  in 
Chapter  Seven. 
94 1992,  electing  Cllr.  Charles  Gray,  as  Leader  of  SRC,  to  be  President  of  RETI, 
whilst  at  the  same  changing  the  name  of  the  network  to  the  more  dynamic  and 
forward  sounding:  -'Association  of  European  Regions  of  Industrial  Technology' 
(RETI). 
With  the  Presidency  of  RETI  under  the  control  of  SRC,  the  network  became 
actively  involved  in  lobbying  for  the  retention  of  Objective  Two  funding,  with 
representations  being  made  directly  to  the  Commissioner  for  Regional  Policy, 
Bruce  Millan,  and  the  President  of  the  Commission,  Jacques  Delors.  The 
network  also  organised  a  conference  on  the  role  of  Objective  Two  funding  in 
conjunction  with  the  Objective  Two  lobby  in  Edinburgh,  shortly  before  the  EU 
member-states  met  in  the  city  to  decide  upon  the  fate  of  the  Structural  Funds. 
Within  SRC,  it  was  felt  that  holding  the  Presidency  of  RETI  enabled  the  Council 
to  gain  direct  access  to  the  European  Commission,  to  the  extent  that  :-  "if  the 
President  of  RETI  goes  to  the  Commission,  speaking  for  RETI,  I  think  he  would 
have  a  fair  bit  of  influence".  (Case,  13). 
Membership  of  RETI  enabled  improved  access  to  the  Commission,  not  only 
through  SRC  holding  the  Presidency  but  also  through  the  use  of  other  'regions' 
national  contacts,  for  instance  the  President  of  Nord-Pas  de  Calais  "knew  Delors 
personally,  and  he  knew  a  lot  of  the  French  connections.  He  used  me  or  the 
Milian  thing  and  he  also  used  any  French  people  that  were  there"  (Case  Three). 
In  addition  to  the  directly  political  benefits  of  involvement  with  RETI,  participation 
within  the  network  also  produced  'spin-offs'  in  terms  of  exchange  of  information 
between  regions  and  "access  to  a  reasonably  intimate  grouping  of  a  number  of 
regions,  in  RETI's  case,  so  that  if  you're  planning  other  projects,  such  as,  a 
Leonardo  project  or  whatever  kind  of  other  project,  you  know  that  within  that 
network,  you  have  regions  that  have  similar  interests  or  similar  problems  to  your 
own"  (Case  Thirteen). 
The  role  of  networks  in  providing  an  entry  mechanism  into  projects  with  SNAs 
that  have  similar  priorities  to  SRC,  was  a  common  feature  of  SRC's  involvement 
with  networks,  often  through  the  use  of  Community  Initiatives  (CIs).  Despite 
RETI's  more  active  lobbying  role  from  1992  onwards,  the  network  still  failed  to 
attract  members  from  across  the  whole  spectrum  of  EU  member-states,  thus 
perhaps  blunting  RETI's  effectiveness  in  terms  of  lobbying  the  European 
95 Commission.  Nevertheless  the  scale  of  SRC's  involvement  with  RETI,  to  the 
extent  that  the  Council  was  able  to  garner  the  support  of  enough  SNAs  to  form  a 
separate  Objective  Two  lobby  (see  Chapter  Seven),  and  mount  a  virtual  coup  de 
etat  within  RETI  in  1992,  signified  the  extent  to  which  SRC  had  become  a 
'serious  player  amongst  SNAs  active  in  European  policy  and  the  degree  to  which 
the  priorities  of  SRC  in  terms  of  European  policy  had  shifted  from  the  pre-1986 
era. 
Issue  -  Based  Networks. 
By  1992,  SRC  had  become  a  participant  in  nine  networks  which  can  be  termed 
as  dealing  specifically  with  issues  which  lay  under  the  competences  of  the 
Regional  Council.  Table  Five  outlines  the  functions  of  these  networks,  and  the 
department  of  SRC  which  was  involved  with  each  organisation.  The  principal 
benefits  for  departments  of  the  Council  participating  within  issue-specific 
networks,  tended  to  be  two-fold.  Firstly,  contact  with  other  SNAs  operating  within 
similar  policy-fields  enabled  the  Council  to  assess  the  approaches  followed  in 
other  member-states,  whilst  also  allowing  the  possibility  for  collaboration  with 
other  SNAs.  Secondly,  membership  of  networks  enabled  Council  departments  to 
obtain  funding  for  projects  related  to  the  network,  through  obtaining  the  backing 
of  the  'network'  for  funding  applications  being  proposed  to  the  European 
Commission  such  as  Community  Initiatives  (Cls)68,  or  as  a  senior  SRC  politician 
commented:  - 
"the  thing  about  being  involved  within  a  network  with  a  group  of  other  regions,  is 
that  the  Commission  is  always  more  willing  to  listen  if  they're  coming  with  a  point 
together.  There's  a  very  good  example  in  'Les  Esturiales'  where  they're  putting 
68  Over  the  period  1994-96,  Cis  accounted  for  9%  of  the  EU's  Structural  Fund  budget,  with 
funding  designed  to  'support  the  development  of  trans-national,  cross-border  and  inter-regional 
co-operation'  (European  Commission,  'Guide  to  the  Community  Initiatives',  1994,  p.  7).  SRC 
obtained  Community  Initiative  funding  from  six  Cis.  These  were  :  - 
-  Employment  and  Human  Resource  Initiatives  (NOW,  HORIZON,  YOUTHSTART)  :  The  'NOW 
programme  aims  to  improve  employment  opportunities  for  women;  'HORIZON'  is  intended  to 
improve  the  integration  of  'excluded'  groups  (such  as,  the  handicapped,  homeless  etc.  )  into  the 
labour  market;  YOUTHSTART'  is  targeted  at  improving  the  employment  opportunities  of  those 
aged  under  20. 
-  RECHAR  -  provides  assistance  to  areas  affected  by  unemployment  due  to  the  decline  of  the 
coal-mining  industry. 
-  RESIDER  -  provides  assistance  to  areas  affected  by  unemployment  due  to  the  decline  of  the 
steel-making  industry. 
-  URBAN  -a  programme  aimed  at  funding  schemes  targeted  at  urban  localities  experiencing 
severe  socio-economic  problems. 
96 together  a  'LIFE'69  project  under  the  'LIFE'  programme.  If  Strathclyde  was  to  put 
that  forward  with  say  a  couple  of  other  regions  they  wouldn't  have  nearly  so 
much  of  a  chance  of  getting  the  money,  as  they  have  when  its  going  under  the 
umbrella  of  'Les  Esturiales',  which  is  a  body  recognised  by  the  European 
Commission"  (Case  One). 
Table  4.5  -  SRC  participation  within  issue-based  networks. 
Name  of  Function  of  Network  SRC  Department 
Network.  represented  upon 
the  Network. 
Les  Esturiales  A  network  for  research  and  discussion  Department  of 
amongst  SNAs  situated  next  to  Physical  Planning. 
'estuaries'.  Concerned  with  issues  such 
as  maritime  trade  and  the  relationship 
between  development  and  environmental 
concerns  within  estuaries. 
Atlantic  Arc  Network  of  SNAs  with  a  coastline  Department  of 
bordering  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  Acts  as  a  Physical  Planning. 
lobby  for  interests  common  to  these 
SNAs,  such  as  sea  transport  links. 
ISOCARP  Network  of  SNAs  concerned  with  planning  Department  of 
(International  issues  at  both  the  urban  and  regional  Physical  Planning. 
Society  of  City  scales. 
and  Regional 
Planners) 
POLIS  Network  of  SNAs  concerned  with  traffic  Department  of 
(Promoting  systems  in  urban  environments,  and  with  Roads. 
Operational  obtaining  EU  grants  for  research  and 
Links  with  development  work  in  this  field.  The 
Operational  network  is  closely  aligned  to  DGXIII. 
Services) 
Eurocities  A  network  of  SNAs  concerned  with  traffic  Department  of 
and  transportation  problems  within  urban  Roads. 
areas. 
Villes  et  Ports  A  network  of  SNAs  dealing  with  the  Department  of 
integration  of  urban  policies  with  port  Physical  Planning. 
development  strategies. 
69  The  LIFE  programme  is  funded  under  Article  10  of  the  ERDF,  which  provides  funding  for  inter- 
regional  co-operation  schemes  and  projects  which  foster  exchange  of  experience  between  SNAs. 
97 The'Alliance  of  A  network  of  SNAs  with  coastal  and  /  or  Department  of 
Maritime  maritime  interests,  to  enable  the  Physical  Planning. 
Regions  in  articulation  of  common  interests  to  EC 
Europe'  Institutions.  AMRE  also  aimed  to  promote 
(AMRE).  research  and  exchange  of  experience 
within  this  field. 
Quartier  en  A  network  of  SNAs  concerned  with  Chief  Executive's 
Crise  development  strategies  in  'seriously  Department. 
deprived  neighbourhoods'  and  to  develop 
an  'integrated  approach  to  urban 
regeneration'. 
Source  :-  SRC  Minutes,  1994-95. 
The  participation  of  departments  outwith  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  of  the 
Council  within  'trans-regional  networks'  is  symptomatic  of  the  extent  to  which 
European  policy  increasingly  'widened-out'  across  the  Council  between  1986  to 
1996.  However  the  `commanding  heights'  of  European  policy  continued  to  be 
dominated  by  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  and  a  small  group  of  senior 
politicians.  This  emphasis  upon  collective  action  in  concert  with  other  SNAs, 
signifies  the  increasingly  complex  nature  of  EU  structures  and  the  depth  of 
SRC's  engagement  with  European  policies.  In  addition,  the  extensive 
mobilisation  of  SNAs  from  across  the  EU  and  the  European  Commission's 
emphasis  upon  encouraging  trans-regional  co-operation,  ensured  that  SRC  could 
no  longer  expect  to  operate  as  a  single  actor,  as  the  Council  had  occasionally 
done  pre-1986,  for  example,  through  initiating  the  process  which  resulted  in  the 
creation  of  the  NCPI  for  the  City  of  Glasgow. 
43.5  -  SRC's  response  to  the  economic  effects  of  European  integration. 
The  peripherality  of  SRC  within  the  European  economy,  as  well  as  its  legacy  of 
de-industrialisation  in  large  areas  of  the  Council,  leads  to  the  expectancy  that 
SRC  would  have  formulated  a  response  to  these  issues  within  the  European 
context.  As  noted  above,  SRC's  initial  engagement  with  European  funds  were  a 
response  to  these  problems.  The  Council  continued  to  address  these  issues 
through  involvement  within  the  'Strathclyde  European  Partnership's  and  through 
accessing  smaller  European  funds  targeted  at  particular  issues  through 
70  The  Strathclyde  European  Partnership  (SEP),  which  came  into  existence  in  1994,  is  the 
successor  organisation  within  the  West  of  Scotland  to  the  NPCI  and  Strathclyde  IDO. 
98 participation  within  `trans-regional  networks'.  The  Regional  Council  noted  the 
importance  of  European  funding  and  of  the  European  level  when  outlining  the 
`Economic  Strategy'  of  the  authority  for  the  1990s,  with  SRC  perceiving  its  role  as 
being  to:  - 
"act  as  a  `broker'  between  the  local  communities  of  Strathclyde,  with  their  specific 
needs  and  opportunities,  and  the  policy  makers  at  national  and  European  levels" 
(SRC,  1994,  p.  1). 
The'Economic  Strategy'  of  the  Council  placed  a  significant  emphasis  upon  the 
role  of  European  finance  as  a  means  of  obtaining  additional  funding  for  the 
Council:  - 
"The  European  Community's  Structural  Funds,  particularly  the  European 
Regional  Development  Fund  (ERDF)  and  the  European  Social  Fund  (ESF), 
provide  an  important  means  of  increasing  the  resources  available  for 
implementing  the  Strategy.  Most  of  the  £500m  of  European  funds  attracted  to 
the  region  to  date  has  been  in  support  of  economic  development  objectives.  To 
continue  to  maximise  this  source  of  additional  resources  the  Council  will  :  - 
-  with  partner  regions,  continue  to  lobby  the  Community  on  the  particular  needs 
of  declining  industrial  regions; 
-  take  a  substantial  role  in  the  development  of  a  robust  successor  to  the 
Strathclyde  Integrated  Development  Operation  and  maintain  a  close  interest 
in  ensuring  its  success; 
-  monitor  all  EC  documentation  to  identify  new  funding  sources; 
-  and,  maintain  a  presence  in  Brussels  through  a  European  Liaison  Officer. 
(SRC,  1994,  p.  26-27). 
In  this  sense,  the  development  of  European  policy  outlined  above,  was  viewed 
within  the  Council  as  central  to  sustaining  the  economic  policies  of  the  Council. 
The  centrality  of  European  funding  to  the  Council's  'Economic  Strategy'  was 
nowhere  more  apparent  than  in  the  economic  development  arm  of  SRC, 
'Strathclyde  Business  Development',  which  "took  35-40%  of  our  budget  (i.  e. 
Strathclyde  Business  Development's  budget)  every  year  through  European 
funding"  (Case  Sixteen). 
Thus,  the  expansion  of  the  EU  Structural  Funds  post-1988  also  acted  to  ensure 
that  SRC  continued  to  depend  upon  EU  funding,  in  order  to  pursue  SRC's  policy 
priorities.  The  Council's  engagement  within  a  widening  range  of  European 
structures  also  has  to  be  viewed  in  this  context,  despite  the  increasing 
importance  of  European  regulations  and  the  overtly  political  nature  of  some  of 
99 SRCs  activities  within  European  structures,  finance  continued  to  underpin  SRC's 
European  policy. 
Summary. 
The  impact  of  the  Single  European  Act  and  latterly,  the  Maastricht  Treaty, 
resulted  in  a  widening  of  the  scope  and  scale  of  SRC's  European  policy  in  two 
key  respects.  Firstly,  the  range  of  departments  within  the  Council  which  had  an 
involvement  with  European  policy  extended  to  varying  degrees,  from  purely 
submitting  applications  for  European  funding  to  remaining  aware  of  European 
regulations  and  'proposals'  and  participating  with  'trans-regional  networks'. 
Whilst  overall  strategic  European  policies,  such  as  the  role  of  the  Council  within 
AER,  continued  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  Chief  Executive's  Department,  other 
departments  began  to  develop  a  more  autonomous  European  policy  through 
issue-specific  networks  and  exchange  of  experience  programmes.  In  part  this 
was  due  to  the  second  major  change  in  SRC's  European  policy  as  the  Council 
found  that  European  policy  was  no  longer  purely  concerned  with  levering  money 
from  European  funds,  but  was  increasingly  taking  on  a  'advocacy'  function.  This 
was  reflected  in  the  changing  role  of  the  SRC  representative  office  in  Brussels 
towards  liaison  with  other  SNAs  and  European  Institutions,  as  well  as  providing 
an  information  service  to  Council  departments.  SRC's  involvement  within  'trans- 
regional  networks'  (particularly  AER  and  RETI)  signified  that  SRC  had  come  to 
view  itself  as  a  major  player'  amongst  European  SNAs.  Nevertheless,  the 
financial  benefits  to  the  Council  through  accessing  European  funds  remained 
central  to  SRC's  policy.  However  the  period  from  1986  to  1997  added  a  new 
dimension  to  this  policy  as  an  overtly  'political'  role  for  the  authority  emerged. 
The  debates  which  took  place  within  SRC  as  the  extent  of  the  Council's 
involvement  developed  and  the  tensions  which  resulted  between  Councillors  and 
individual  departments  are  the  subject  of  the  following  section. 
4 
.4  -The  Management  of  European  Policy  within  SRC. 
European  policy  within  SRC  (as  has  been  noted  above)  tended  to  be  dominated 
in  bureaucratic  terms,  by  the  Chief  Executive's  Department,  and  in  political 
terms,  by  senior  politicians.  Alliances  between  senior  politicians  and  officials  is 
100 not  uncommon  within  local  government,  with  such  a  situation  being  termed  as  a 
'joint-elite'.  Stoker  (1991)  suggests  that  a  `joint-elite'71  consists  of:  - 
"a  small  group  of  leading  councillors  and  officers.  The  composition  of  this 
leading  group  will  vary  from  authority  to  authority  but  is  likely  to  be  drawn  from 
committee  chairs  and  vice-chairs  together  with  chief  officers  and  their  deputies" 
(Stoker,  1991,  p.  92). 
The  control  which  this  'joint-elite'  exercised  over  European  policy  within  SRC  was 
a  constant  feature  of  the  Council's  European  policy,  which  was  evident  even 
during  the  initial  emergence  of  a  European  policy  within  the  Council.  The  early 
recognition  by  SRC  of  the  possibilities  for  the  Council  within  the  European  arena 
was  unusual  in  UK  local  government  terms.  Additionally,  the  Labour  party 
campaigned  during  the  1983  Election  on  the  basis  that  a  future  Labour 
government  would  withdraw  from  the  EEC,  whilst  the  mid  1980s  were 
characterised  by  an  ambivalent  attitude  within  the  Labour  party  towards  the  EEC. 
The  emergence  of  a  European  policy  within  SRC's  Labour  group  which  viewed 
'Brussels'  as  an  ally,  was  met  with  surprisingly  little  debate,  as  a  senior  Labour 
Councillor  at  the  time  commented:  - 
"  at  no  time  did  we  go  to  the  Labour  group  and  say'Let's  vote  pro-Europe'.  What 
we  did  was,  agree  that  what  we  were  doing  was  right  at  the  time.....  We  became 
pro-European  in  an  almost  tacit  way,  the  Labour  group  on  the  Council  became 
pro-Europe  and  in  fairness  the  Chief  Executive  and  Assistant  Chief  Executive  in 
a  sense  helped  with  that,  because  they  were  putting  'feelers'  out  to  other 
departments,  saying  look  there's  an  interest  in  this  for  you......  So,  without  ever 
formally  taking  a  pro-European  vote  in  Council,  or  in  the  Labour  group,  we 
became  probably  the  leading  pro-European  local  authority  in  the  whole  of  the 
United  Kingdom.  "  (  Case  Three)72. 
In  part,  this  'tacit'  drift  towards  a  pro-European  policy  stance  within  SRC  was  also 
attributable  to  factors  other  than  purely  the  manoeuvrings  of  a  'joint  elite' 
71  For  a  discussion  and  critique  of  the  joint  elite  model  of  power  relationships  within  local 
government,  see  Wilson,  D  and  Game,  C  (1994).  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  'joint  elite'  persepctive 
of  local  government  decision-making  has  been  critiqued  for  lacking  a  recognition  of  a  hierarchy  of 
actors  within  an  elite  and,  for  failing  to  recognise  the  role  of  organisations  external  to  the  local 
authority.  Given  this  chapter,  deals  solely  with  internal  decision-making  within  SRC  the  role  of 
external  organisations  are  not  considered  here.  Equally,  given  the  relatively  small  number  of 
individuals  viewed  as  forming  a  joint-elite  in  Strathclyde  with  regard  to  European  policy  it  would 
prove  somewhat  problematic  to  attempt  to  develop  a  hierarchy  with  regard  to  this  elite. 
72  Indeed  so  widespread  had  'pro-Europeanism'  become  within  the  SRC  Labour  group,  that  one 
Senior  Labour  Councillor  (Case  One)  refused  to  accept  that  the  Labour  party  had  ever  held  a 
policy  position  which  was  anti-European  during  the  1983  election,  or  at  any  time  prior  to  or 
following  this. 
101 consisting  of  senior  figures  within  the  Council,  such  as  the  need  within  the 
Council  to  obtain  finance  to  pursue  its  policy  priorities.  Nevertheless,  the 
prominence  of  an  elite  group  of  politicians  and  officials  directing  the  development 
of  policy,  was  a  constant  feature  throughout  SRC's  involvement  with  European 
affairs.  Indeed,  it  was  noticeable  when  interviewing  members  of  SRC's 
'European  and  International  Affairs  Committee',  who  were  not  within  this  'elite' 
grouping,  that  their  knowledge  of  SRC's  involvement  with  European  affairs  was 
extremely  limited.  For  instance,  several  Councillors  interviewed73  had  either 
never  heard  of,  or  had  no  knowledge  as  to  the  role  of,  the  'Strathclyde  European 
Partnership'.  This  is  despite  the  vast  majority  of  Committee  meetings  either 
containing  items  relating  to  applications  for  ERDF  or  ESF  funding,  and  frequently 
dealing  with  agenda  items  concerning  the  changing  structure  of  the  SEP. 
However,  these  members  on  the  'outside'  would  tend  to  justify  virtually  every 
aspect  of  SRC's  European  policy  in  terms  of  the  finance  generated,  even  where 
certain  policies  were  not  concerned  primarily  with  finance  generation,  or  where 
'additionality'  considerations  limited  the  financial  benefits.  There  was  a 
recognition  amongst  some  Labour  Councillors  that  claims  of  millions  of  pounds 
were  being  obtained  from  the  EU,  without  considering  the  implications  of  issues 
such  as  additionality,  merely  amounted  to  "a  legitimation  exercise  for  the  overall 
policy"  (Case  Eight). 
This  is  not  to  imply  that  SRC's  European  policy  was  misguided.  However,  the 
unquestioning  assumption  that  finance  generation  was  the  sole  rationale  behind 
all  aspects  of  European  policy  enabled  a  'policy  elite'  of  senior  Councillors  and 
officials  to  develop  European  policy  in  a  relatively  autonomous  manner  due  to  the 
lack  of  scrutiny  at  Committee  level.  It  was  noticeable  how  frequently 
respondents  outside  of  this  policy  elite  would  consider  European  affairs  as  being 
essentially  "non-political  or  apolitical,  in  that  the  present  administration  see  it  as  a 
valuable  source  of  funding"  (Case  Four).  The  extent  of  this  acceptance  of  the 
financial  benefits  and  apolitical  nature  of  European  policy,  led  to  an  almost 
complacent  acceptance  of  all  policy  decisions,  as  the  following  comments  from  a 
Labour  Councillor  exemplify:  - 
"I  think  most  of  European  and  International  Affairs  is  really  just  a  reporting  back 
thing,  because  the  policies  will  take  place  in  the  European  organisations  we're 
involved  in.  So,  that's  where  policies  are  debated  and  made.  Obviously,  the 
73  These  were  Cases  Two,  Four,  Five  and  Six. 
102 Chair  [of  the  European  and  International  Affairs  Committee]  will  sit  down  with  his 
officers  from  time  to  time,  but  there's  never  a  lot  of  debate  in  the  European  and 
International  Affairs  Committee,  because  things  are  usually  agreed  by  then.  But 
debating  policies,  usually  takes  place  in  the  Labour  group  meetings.  "  (Case 
Two). 
The  lack  of  a  vote  concerning  the  Labour  group's  attitude  towards  the  EEC  and 
the  general  paucity  of  knowledge  amongst  'outsider  members,  makes  it 
extremely  questionable  as  to  how  much  debate  took  place  within  Labour  group 
meetings  concerning  European  policies.  However,  debate  did  take  place  within 
the  'joint-elite'  concerning  the  extent  to  which  SRC  should  become  involved 
within  certain  structures  and  as  to  the  overall  direction  of  European  policy. 
Conflict  also  occurred  within  SRC  over  the  control  of  European  policy.  This  is 
hardly  surprising,  as  European  policy  as  a  function  of  local  government  is  clearly 
a  recent  development,  and  as  such  required  that  both  officials  and  councillors 
adjusted  to  operating  within  a  new  policy  environment.  In  addition,  the  European 
function  is  qualitatively  different  from  other  functions  of  local  government  in  that  it 
contained  significant  attractions  for  both  officials  and  politicians.  To  officials, 
European  policy  offered  the  opportunity  to  be  involved  in  a  policy  environment:  - 
"that  was  really  exciting,  and  therefore  lots  of  people  wanted  to  get  a  stake  in  it, 
because  it  was  interesting  and  new  and  there  was  money  coming  from  it,  when 
there  wasn't  money  coming  from  anywhere  else.  "  (Case  Forty-Three). 
For  politicians,  European  affairs  also  offered  the  opportunity  to  be  'seen'  to  be 
attracting  finance  to  the  region,  as  well  as  the  possibility  of  foreign  travel  and  to 
be  associated  with  new  projects  being  opened  as  a  consequence  of  European 
finance.  As  a  result,  of  the  attractiveness  of  involvement  with  European  affairs, 
conflict  over  the  control  of  policy  tended  to  occur  along  two  axes,  firstly,  between 
departments  of  the  Council,  and  secondly,  between  rival  factions  or  individual 
Councillors  within  SRC's  Labour  group. 
Inter-departmental  conflict  within  SRC. 
The  principal  area  of  conflict  between  departments  within  SRC,  in  terms  of  the 
management  of  European  policy,  lay  between  the  Chief  Executive's  Department 
and  the  other  departments  with  an  involvement  in  European  affairs.  Due  to  the 
pivotal  role  of  the  `European  Unit'  within  the  Chief  Executives  Department,  in 
terms  of  access  to  information,  the  processing  of  funding  applications,  and 
103 directing  policy,  resulted  in  tensions  arising  between  the  Chief  Executive's  and 
other  departments,  which  felt  isolated  from  European  policy.  The  centralisation 
of  the  European  function  within  CE's  was  recognised  by  officials  from  within  the 
European  Unit,  who  were  also  aware  of  the  resentments  this  could  create,  for 
instance,  one  official  commented:  - 
"You  had  a  situation  where  the  Chief  Exec's  had  a  responsibility  for  European 
policy,  and  it  was  centralised  and  corporate  in  that  sense,  and  the  region  had  a 
strong  sense  of  identity,  so  much  so  that  there  wasn't  really  any  parallel  to  it. 
And  that  certainly  existed  and  there  was  at  the  same  time  a  desire  from  other 
sections  or  departments  to  do  things...  . 
What  tended  to  happen  was  that  the  sort 
of  big  money,  the  Objective  Two  and  ESF,  was  handled  centrally,  and  there  was 
liaison  with  individual  departments  as  to  who  was  getting  money  eventually.  But 
I  think  that  was  a  good  thing,  because  there's  a  central  intelligence  side  to  things, 
where  you  need  to  know  what  the  Commission  thinks  about  things,  what's  going 
to  get  money,  what  isn't.....  generally  those  relationships  were  alright  because  we 
were  successful  in  getting  money  through  during  the  `80s,  so  that  everyone  won. 
What  tended  to  happen  was  that  over  time,  other  departments  got  involved  in 
initiatives,  in  other  Article  10  sort  of  programmes.  There  was  a  mushrooming  of 
programmes  during  the  '80s,  and  they  tended  to  be  handled  by  particular 
departments,  so  Social  Work  did  a  thing  about  Aids  for  the  European 
Commission,  that  kind  of  thing.  Which  was  fine  for  them  to  handle  that,  because 
it  was  more  kind  of  specialist.  I  think  that's  OK.  But  there  certainly  were 
jealousies  for  the  Chief  Exec's,  as  in  who's  going  to  have  overall  responsibility  for 
Europe,  because  its  so  attractive  really,  that  certainly  existed  but  overall  I  think  it 
worked  alright"  (Case  Forty  Three). 
Jealousies  certainly  did  exist  between  the  Chief  Executive's  and  other 
departments,  which  frequently  complained  of  being  'press-ganged'  into  applying 
for  funding,  despite  the  fund  not  perhaps  being  adequately  suited  to  a 
department's  overall  policy  line.  As  a  result,  departments  had  an  impression  of 
being,  at  best  patronised  by  Chief  Executives  and  at  worst,  dominated  by  the 
Department's  demands.  These  tensions  did  lessen  post-1986,  as  the  increasing 
workload  of  the  European  Unit  within  the  Chief  Executive's  department  ensured 
that  some  decentralisation  of  responsibilities  occurred,  whilst  individual 
departments  also  developed  their  own  programmes  and  became  involved  within 
arenas,  such  as  trans-regional  networks.  An  example  of  the  form  these  tensions 
took,  arises  from  the  relations  between  the  Chief  Executive's  and  Strathclyde 
104 Business  Development  (SBD)74.  The  relationship  between  CE's  and  SBD  was 
summed  up  by  one  SBD  official  as  follows:  - 
"In  the  early  days,  there  was  a  tendency  for  the  'thinkers'  [  referring  to  CE's]  to 
devise  the  schemes  and  to  look  at  the  European  regulations  and  say  if  you  follow 
this  construction,  you  will  get  European  funding.  And  there  was  a  tendency  for 
them  to  conceptually  create  the  parcel  and  then  say  here  over  to  you,  you  run  it. 
That  wasn't  very  satisfactory,  and  there  was  a  tendency  for  them  to  come  up  with 
programmes  which  they  hadn't  even  discussed  with  us.  And  then  say  to  us,  this 
meets  European  requirements,  and  off  you  go.  Now  two  things  resulted  in  a 
change  of  our  understanding.  One  was  the  fundamental  principle,  that  if  you  are 
going  to  devise  a  scheme,  you  should  involve  the  people  who  are  going  to  run  it. 
The  other  was  that  as  time  went  on,  the  Economic  Strategy  people  [within  CE's] 
became  more  and  more  involved  in  the  bureaucratic  dimension  to  Europe  and 
they  didn't  have  time  devising  schemes  and  so  a  lot  of  the  schemes  that  have 
been  developed  since  those  very  early  days,  have  been  developed  and  run  'in 
house'  (i.  e.  within  SBD)".  (Case  Fifteen). 
The  perception  that  European  policy  was  'managed'  within  Chief  Executives  and 
that  the  department  was  protective  of  its  European  role,  was  not  a  perception 
confined  only  within  SRC,  for  instance  an  official  from  an  institution  outwith  the 
Council  commented  :  - 
"The  economic  development  staff  and  the  Chief  Executives  staff  were  a  bit 
protective,  we've  got  all  the  knowledge  of  Europe.  And  knowledge  was  power  in 
the  early  days  and  still  is  to  some  extent,  because  Europe  is  complicated,  people 
think,  if  you  have  the  wrong  approach  about  knowledge  of  Europe,  and  say  I'm 
the  only  person  who  knows  about  how  to  speak  to  the  Commissioner  about 
Europe,  I  can't  tell  you  to  go".  (Case  Forty  Two). 
Nevertheless,  conflicts  between  departments  of  SRC  remained  limited  to  'turf 
wars'  over  the  control  of  aspects  of  European  policy,  and  resentment  at  what 
could  be  viewed  as  'interference'  from  CE's  in  the  internal  workings  of  other 
departments.  In  contrast,  tensions  within  the  ruling  Labour  group  of  the  Council 
could  be  far  more  acrimonious,  and  indeed  personal,  and  it  is  to  these  that  I  now 
intend  to  turn. 
74  Strathclyde  Business  Development  was  the  economic  development  arm  (department)  of 
Strathclyde  Regional  Council. 
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Given  that  any  conflict  amongst  Councillors  over  the  control  of  European  policy 
within  SRC  could  only  take  place  within  the  Labour  group  rather  than  between 
party  groupings,  such  conflict  tended  to  revolve  around  what  could  be  loosely 
termed  'factions'.  These  factions  were  frequently  based  upon  'personal'  political 
struggles  between  individual  Councillors  within  SRC  The  key  event  which 
highlighted  the  jealousies  and  rivalries  which  the  introduction  of  a  European 
function  for  local  government  could  produce  amongst  Councillors,  was  the 
removal  of  Cllr.  Charles  Graym  as  Leader  of  the  Council  in  1992.  Cllr.  Gray's 
extensive  involvement  with  European  affairs  had  resulted  in  an  impression  that 
there  was  a  certain  degree  of  'junketing'  taking  place,  or  as  an  interviewee 
outwith  SRC  observed:  - 
"that  was  part  of  what  was  the  downfall  of  Charlie  Gray,  he  didn't  bring  in  enough 
people.  Now,  he  was  seen  as  being  going  off  to  Brussels  and  off  to  Europe  too 
often  and  he  didn't  spread  that  amongst  people  (i.  e.  other  councillors)"  (Case 
Forty  Two). 
The  rival  political  faction  which  ultimately  gained  control  of  the  Council,  certainly 
benefited  from  such  impressions  amongst  Councillors,  and  upon  taking  office 
established  the'European  and  International  Affairs  Committee',  apparently  to 
establish  clear  lines  of  democratic  accountability  over  the  expanding  European 
function.  Alternatively,  some  Councillors  considered  that  the  establishment  of  a 
European  Committee  was  a  mechanism  to  "pull  Charlie  into  line,  so  that  the 
powers  that  be  in  Strathclyde,  got  to  know  what  he  was  getting  up  to"  (Case  Six). 
The  concern  that  the  attraction  of  the  European  function  of  local  government, 
may  lead  to  some  'dubious'  practices  amongst  Councillors  was  a  frequent 
concern  amongst  Councillors  and  officials  within  SRC.  Whatever  the  reality  of 
the  situation,  the  control  of  European  policy  amongst  a  small  elite  group  of 
politicians  and  officials  had  clearly  facilitated  political  infighting  and  created 
jealousies  within  SRC. 
Summary. 
The  dominance  of  a  `joint-elite'  of  Councillors  and  officials  over  the  development 
of  European  policy,  certainly  aroused  conflict  within  SRC.  In  part  this  was 
75  Cllr.  Gray  held  positions  within  AER  and  RETI,  and  would  subsequently  become  Leader  of  the 
UK  delegation  to  the  Committee  of  the  Regions. 
106 inevitable,  as  the  incorporation  of  a  new  function  into  an  institution  would  lead  to 
disputes  over  divisions  of  responsibility  and  control  for  the  policy  field.  This 
situation  is  further  exacerbated  when,  as  with  European  policy,  the  competence 
is  of  a  corporate  nature.  The  extent  of  control  exercised  by  this  elite  over 
European  policy  certainly  accounts,  to  some  extent,  for  the  'success'  which  SRC 
achieved  within  the  European  arena,  whether  this  is  measured  in  terms  of 
attracting  European  funding  or  obtaining  influential  positions  within  European 
structures.  Clearly,  this  elite  had  a  clear  vision  as  to  the  role  which  European 
policy  could  fulfil  for  SRC,  in  terms  of  the  Council's  economic  and  social 
priorities,  whilst  the  presence  of  key  figures  within  SRC  on  all  the  major 
European  structures  with  which  SRC  was  involved  certainly  made  the  Council 
`recognisable'  upon  the  broader  European  scene.  However,  the  rivalries 
resulting  as  a  consequence  of  having  so  much  control  of  European  policy  vested 
within  a  small  elite,  perhaps  reinforces  the  need  to  decentralise  (wherever 
possible)  aspects  of  European  policy  between  departments,  whilst  also  ensuring 
that  clear  lines  of  democratic  accountability  exist  at  the  political  level. 
4.5  -  Concluding  Remarks. 
The  development  of  European  policy  within  SRC  has  been  viewed  as  having 
taken  place  within  two  distinct  time  periods.  The  initial  establishment  of  a 
European  policy  between  1975  to  1985,  was  based  upon  the  need  to  obtain 
finance  from  European  Institutions,  in  order  to  supplement  funding  for  the 
Council's  policy  priorities.  As  awareness  within  the  Council  increased  as  to  the 
potential  financial  benefits  available  to  SRC  from  European  sources,  decisions 
were  taken  at  a  senior  level  to  entrench  the  emergent  European  function  through 
two  institutional  developments.  These  were  the  creation  of  a  section  within  the 
Chief  Executives  Department  which  dealt  solely  with  European  issues  and  the 
establishment  of  a  representative  office  in  Brussels.  These  were  major  initiatives 
for  any  SNA  within  Europe  to  undertake,  and  thus  reflected  the  extent  that  SRC 
was  refocusing  upon  the  EEC  as  a  potential  ally  in  its  attempts  to  pursue 
regeneration  policies.  As  a  consequence  of  these  developments,  European 
policy  was  centralised  bureaucratically  within  the  Chief  Executives  Department, 
with  key  decisions  being  taken  by  senior  officials  and  politicians.  The 
management  of  European  policy  by  a  `joint-elite'  within  SRC  would  remain  a 
significant  feature  of  the  Council's  European  policy  until  the  abolition  of  SRC  in 
April  1996. 
107 Whilst  the  early  engagement  of  SRC  with  European  Institutions  was  marked  by  a 
desire  to  maximise  funding  and  to  a  limited  extent  draw  upon  the  development 
policies  of  other  European  SNAs,  the  period  from  1986-96  witnessed  a  more 
complex  process  of  Europeanisation,  as  the  Council's  European  policy  expanded 
and  diversified.  Whilst  obtaining  finance  remained  central  to  SRC's  involvement 
within  European  structures,  there  was  also  a  recognition  that  the  Council  would 
have  to  engage  with  European  political  'debates'  (primarily  through  participation 
within  trans-regional  networks),  in  order  to  ensure  not  only  continuing  funding, 
but  also  to  influence  the  form  of  European  regulations  which  could  impact  upon 
the  SRC's  policy  competences.  In  addition,  the  increasing  scale  of  European 
policy,  required  that  some  aspects  of  European  affairs  be  devolved  to  other 
departments  within  SRC,  although  the  'commanding  heights'  of  European  policy 
remained  centralised  within  CE's  and  under  the  control  of  senior  politicians, 
resulting  in  various  tensions  within  SRC  at  political  and  bureaucratic  levels. 
The  extension  of  SRC's  European  policy  post-1986,  can  in  part  be  viewed  as  a 
natural  response  to  the  Europeanising  influences  of  the  Single  European  Act, 
however  the  extent  of  SRC's  involvement  within  trans-regional  networks  with  a 
broad,  political  agenda,  demonstrated  the  desire  of  key  actors  within  the  Council 
that  SRC  should  be  able  to  compete  with  the  other  major  'regional'  players  from 
across  Europe.  The  following  chapters  deal  with  SRC's  expanding  involvement 
with  European  policy,  principally  during  the  period  from  1986-96,  in  terms  of  the 
Council's  involvement  within  the  newly  created  'institutional  arenas'  of  the 
'Strathclyde  European  Partnership'  and  the  'Ouverture'  programme.  In  addition, 
the  role  of  SRC  within  'formal'  and  'informal'  networks  is  also  considered  in  order 
to  assess  the  extent  to  which  SRC  was  able  to  engage  with  a  new  process  of 
governance  which  stretched  across  tiers  of  government  and  between  public  and 
private  actors. 
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1985-96. 
"Partnership  conceives  the  relationship  between  levels  of  government  as  being 
one  of  interaction  rather  than  autonomy.  Instead  of  giving  independence  to  sub- 
national  governments  within  a  defined  framework  of  powers  and  duties  in  which 
certain  issues  are  deemed  to  be  exclusively  handled  at  the  sub-national  level, 
partnership  involves  governments  at  local,  regional,  national  and  supra-national 
levels  in  complex  patterns  of  mutual  influence"  (Marks,  1993,  p.  406). 
"The  1989  reforms  of  the  structural  funds  took  away  their  administration  from 
Brussels  and  placed  them  mainly  in  the  hands  of  nation-states.  Ironically,  Marks 
seizes  on  this  institutional  reform  as  heralding  greater  influence  of  the 
Commission  on  local  policy-making.  He  shows  the  Commission  has  been  active 
in  promoting  partnerships  by  direct  contacts  with  sub-national  bodies.  Though 
the  new  administrative  arrangements  were  designed  to  show  partnership, 
particularly  through  the  involvement  of  public  bodies  in  the  preparation  of 
Community  Support  Frameworks  and  in  the  evaluation  of  programmes,  UK  civil 
servants  dominate  the  monitoring  committees  by  appointing  the  participants, 
chairing  the  meetings  and  setting  the  agendas.  The  committees  meet 
infrequently,  usually  once  every  six  months,  which  indicates  partnership  is  largely 
superficial.....  Central  government  draws  up  and  submits  the  single  programming 
documents,  often  vetoing  the  sub-national  view.  Though  Marks  makes  much  of 
direct  contact  with  Commission  officials,  the  latter  are  observers  rather  than 
shapers  of  policy.  Because  of  the  financial  and  legal  power  of  central 
government,  programmes  are  as  centrally  run  as  before"  (John,  1996,  p.  137-8). 
5.1  -  Introduction. 
The  Reform  of  the  Structural  Funds  in  198876,  not  only  doubled  the  size  of  the 
fund  to  a  total  budget  of  60.4bn  ECU  (Dinan,  1994,  p.  409),  but  also  established 
four  principles  which  would  govern  the  implementation  of  the  Funds.  These 
principles  were  :-  additionality,  concentration,  partnership  and  programming. 
`Additionality'  refers  to  the  'principle'  that  European  funds  should  be  additional  to 
existing  central  government  (or  sub-national  authorities)  funding,  as  opposed  to 
merely  replacing  funding  already  committed  at  the  national  (or  sub-national) 
level.  `Concentration'  concerns  the  role  of  the  Structural  Funds  as  a  mechanism 
designed  to  concentrate  resources  in  the  favour  of  the  most  disadvantaged 
76The  Reforms  of  the  Structural  Funds  did  not  come  into  force  until  the  1st  January  1989. 
109 regions  or  groups  within  the  EU,  as  determined  through  the  creation  of  five 
`Objectives'.  Programming  refers  to  the  replacement  of  the  previous  project-by- 
project  approach  to  funding  with  a  programmatic  structure,  intended  to  provide  a 
coherent  strategy,  in  terms  of  the  development  of  the  region  concerned.  Finally, 
partnership  deals  with  the  process  through  which  this  local  development 
`strategy'  is  to  be  developed.  The  process  of  partnership  arises  as  the  European 
Commission,  member-states  and  regional  /  local  bodies  negotiate  over  the  plan 
which  will  determine  the  manner  in  which  the  funds  will  be  spent  within  the 
region.  Or  as  the  European  Commission  terms  it,  partnership  requires  :  - 
"the  close  involvement  of  regional  and  local  bodies  with  the  Commission  and 
national  authorities  in  planning  and  implementing  development  measures  in  their 
areas.  On  the  basis  of  the  CSF,  all  the  parties  in  the  partnership  will  develop 
programmes  and  projects  which  will  turn  the  priorities  identified  in  the  CSF  into 
actions  on  the  ground"  (European  Commission,  1991,  p.  6). 
It  is  with  the  implementation  of  the  'partnership'  principles  within  Strathclyde 
Region78,  that  this  chapter  is  concerned.  The  inclusion  of  partnership  as  a  key 
principle  informing  the  Reform  of  the  Structural  Funds  in  1989  and  its  subsequent 
implementation  was  the  principle  development  which  subsequently  informed 
conceptualisations  of  multi-level  governance  (Marks,  1993).  This  chapter 
considers  the  form  in  which  partnership  developed  within  Strathclyde  in  order  to 
not  only  understand  the  impact  of  this  process  upon  SRC  but  also  to  evaluate  the 
various  partnership  structures  which  developed  in  Western  Scotland  within  the 
context  of  multi-level  governance.  As  the  opening  quotes  to  this  chapter 
77  This  chapter  deals  with  four  different  institutional  structures  which  implemented  'partnership' 
arrangements  in  Strathclyde.  These  are  :  the  'National  Programme  of  Community  Interest' 
(NPCI)  1985-87;  the  'Strathclyde  Integrated  Development  Operation'  (IDO)  1988-92;  the  West  of 
Scotland  Operational  Programme'  (WSOP)  1993;  and,  the  'Strathclyde  European  Partnership' 
(SEP)  1994-99,  although  this  chapter  only  considers  the  SEP  until  April  1996  while  Chapter  Eight 
deals  with  the  role  of  the  new  unitary  authorities  within  SEP  until  May  1997. 
78When  referring  to  Strathclyde  Region  in  this  chapter,  I  am  not  referring  to  the  area  covered  by 
the  SRC  boundaries,  but  only  to  the  areas  covered  by  the  Strathclyde  Integrated  Development 
Operation  and  latterly,  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership.  Thus,  I  am  not  referring  to  the 
areas  that  came  under  Highlands  and  Islands  Objective  5b  status  from  1990-93,  or  Highlands 
and  Islands  Objective  I  status  from  1994-9,  namely  Argyll  and  Bute,  Arran  and  the  Cumbrae 
Islands.  Whilst  SRC  was  a  partner  in  the  Highlands  and  Islands  partnership,  in  local  government 
terms,  Highland  Council  was  the  primary  representative  of  local  government  on  the  Partnership, 
due  to  the  scale  of  the  funding  it  was  receiving. 
110 illustrate,  the  development  of  partnership  arrangements  around  the  Structural 
Funds  has  led  to  a  considerable  debate  as  to  whether  such  institutions  represent 
a  development  where  the  role  of  central  government  is  diminished  and  the 
Commission  is  able  to  influence  local  policy  agendas  and  policy-making  while 
local  organisations  (including  local  government)  can  form  alliances  with  each 
other  and  with  the  European  Commission  which  would  enable  the  by-passing  of 
central  government  policy.  The  extent  to  which  central  government  authority  has 
been  eroded  by  the  implementation  of  partnership  is  widely  contested  and  the 
purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  ascertain  the  extent  to  which  central  government 
exercised  authority  over  the  partnership  arrangements  that  developed  in 
Strathclyde. 
The  development  of  partnership  institutions,  principally  at  the  local  level,  has 
been  a  noticeable  development  since  the  early  1980's.  A  number  of  theoretical 
perspectives  provide  varying  perspectives  for  the  considerable  expansion  of 
partnership  arrangments79.  Within  the  United  Kingdom,  the  development  of 
partnerships  is  frequently  viewed  as  deriving  from  Conservative  Government 
policy  post-1979  which  emphasised  the  role  of  the  private  sector  and  a  market 
ethos  to  delivering  public  services  combined  with  budgetary  cut-backs  resulting 
in  local  authorities  collaborating  with  other  external  agencies  in  order  to  be  able 
to  provide  services  or  meet  new  policy  aims  (Harding,  1998).  However,  the 
influences  upon  establishment  of  partnerships  vary  considerably.  Harding  (1998) 
terms  Structural  Fund  partnerships  as  being  'shotgun  partnerships'.  Harding 
suggests  that  partnerships  are  the  result  of  one  institutions  dominance  over  a 
policy  agenda  with  such  an  outcome  being  a  result  of  a  "superordinate  authority 
taking  the  view  that  a  partnership  solution  to  the  issue  or  problem  at  hand  is 
preferable  to  a  non-partnership  and  perhaps  more  traditional  one"  (Harding, 
1998,  p.  74).  In  this  case,  the  European  Commission  would  represent  a 
'superordinate  authority'.  More  generally,  the  role  of  the  European  Commission 
79  See  Stoker,  G  (1998)  for  an  outline  of  a  number  of  theoretical  perspectives  on  the  growth  of 
partnerships  institutions. 
111 in  encoraging  the  development  of  partnerships  is  widely  recognised,  for  instance 
Stoker  comments  that: 
"The  role  of  the  European  Union  in  promoting  partnership  should  not  be 
underestimated  as  it  has  sought  to  forge  new  coalitions  with  local  and  regional 
governments  and  voluntary  organisations"  (Stoker,  1998,  p.  40). 
The  West  of  Scotland  was  distinctive  in  its  approach  to  implementing  the 
Structural  Funds,  as  it  had  obtained  experience  in  the  practice  of  'partnership' 
prior  to  the  1988  Reforms,  through  the  'National  Programme  of  Community 
Interest'  (NCPI  )  from  1985-87,  whilst  the  establishment  of  the  Integrated 
Development  Operation  (IDO)  in  198880  ensured  that  a  partnership  was  in  place 
a  year  or  two  in  advance  of  the  vast  majority  of  other  EU  regions.  As  a 
consequence  of  this  comparatively  lengthy  period  of  programming  in  the  West  of 
Scotland,  this  chapter  deals  firstly  with  the  evolution  of  the  'partnership'  principle 
in  the  region  via  a  consideration  of  the  changing  institutional  structures  applied  to 
implement  the  Structural  Funds.  Allied  to  this  is  a  preoccupation  with  the 
influence  of  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  within  these  structures,  as  measured  in 
terms  of  the  proportion  of  funding  obtained  and  via  the  perceptions  of  local 
actors.  Following  on  from  this  exploration  of  the  development  of  programming  in 
Strathclyde,  the  chapter  will  turn  to  analyse  the  'benefits'  of  programming  to  the 
major  institutions  within  the  partnership.  Finally,  I  intend  to  consider  the 
experience  of  the  region  with  regard  to  the  extent  to  which  'partnership' 
represents  an  emergent  system  of  'multi-level  governance'  within  the  policy 
environment  of  the  Structural  Funds,  in  the  case  of  Western  Scotland. 
5  .2 
The  National  Programme  of  Community  Interest,  1985-87. 
The  previous  chapter  referred  to  a  pilot  study  commissioned  by  DGXVI,  to 
assess  the  possibility  of  an  'Integrated  Development  Operation'  being  set  up  in 
Strathclyde.  Although  DGXVI  ultimately  decided  to  proceed  with  a  'National 
Programme  of  Community  Interest'  (NPCI)  covering  roughly  the  boundaries  of 
The  Integrated  Development  Operation  was  approved  in  December  1988,  a  matter  of  days 
before  the  Structural  Funds  Reforms  came  into  force. 
112 Glasgow  District  Council  and  limited  to  ERDF  funding  alone81,  the  preparatory 
study  is  of  significance  in  terms  of  the  structure  it  recommended  for  the 
implementation  of  European  funds  in  the  West  of  Scotland.  The  report 
recommended  that  the  IDO  should  consist  of  three  main  components.  Firstly,  an 
'IDO  Servicing  Group'  consisting  of  two  officials  based  with  SRC,  to  oversee  the 
administration  of  the  fund.  Secondly,  an  'IDO  Working  Group'  with  the  role  of 
ensuring  that  the  programme  was  co-ordinated  and  met  its  objectives.  This  body 
would  consist  of  representatives  from  the  European  Commission,  the  Scottish 
Office,  the  Scottish  Development  Agency  (SDA),  Glasgow  District  Council,  the 
Manpower  Services  Commission  and  other  agencies  could  attend  on  an  'ad  hoc' 
basis.  The  Working  Group  would  be  chaired  by  SRC.  Lastly,  the  IDO  would  be 
governed  by  a  'Directing  Committee'  containing  representatives,  including 
political  representatives,  from  each  of  the  institutions  that  were  members  of  the 
IDO  Working  Group82.  Once  again,  SRC  was  to  chair  the  meetings  of  this 
Committee.  The  role  of  this  Committee,  would  be  to  :  - 
"set  general  guidelines  for  the  future  development  of  the  IDO;  to  draw  together 
budgets;  to  monitor  progress  of  IDO  projects;  to  sort  out  conflicts  of  interest 
between  parties  involved  in  joint  working;  and  to  make  reports  to  the  EC  of  major 
emerging  trends  that  need  to  be  included  in  the  programme,  and  major  difficulties 
that  are  arising  from  the  priorities  of  the  EEC  or  interpretation  of  its  guidelines" 
(Roger  Tyms,  1984,  In,  MacAleavey,  P,  1995,  p.  272). 
The  NPCI  covered  a  more  limited  geographical  area  than  envisaged  by  the 
preparatory  study  and  consisted  of  ERDF  funding  only  (i.  e.  did  not  include  ESF 
finance).  As  result  the  institution  had  a  more  limited  number  of  constituent 
members  and  consequently  a  simpler  structure  than  envisaged  in  the  preparatory 
study.  The  NPCI  consisted  of  one  body,  the  `Co-ordinating  Committee'  which 
brought  together  (non-political)  representatives  from  SRC,  the  European 
Commission  (DGXVI),  Glasgow  District  Council,  SDA,  the  South  of  Scotland 
Electricity  Board,  Scottish  Gas,  British  Railways  and  the  Strathclyde  Passenger 
Transport  Executive.  The  Committee  was  chaired  by  the  Scottish  Office 
81As  opposed  to  an  IDO  covering  the  whole  of  Strathclyde  and  containing  ERDF  and  ESF 
funding. 
113 (Industry  Department).  The  role  of  this  body  which  met  twice  a  year  was 
essentially  to  oversee  the  running  of  the  NCPI,  with  administration  being  carried 
out  by  the  Scottish  Office.  However,  the  management  role  of  the  'Co-ordinating 
committee'  was  itself  rather  limited,  for  reasons  which  will  be  discussed  below. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  worth  noting  at  this  stage  that  the  Scottish  Office  was  clearly 
determined  to  have  a  dominant  role  upon  the  committee  through  holding  the 
chair,  whilst  also  being  unwilling  to  countenance  political  representation  upon  the 
NPCI.  This  increasing  activism  on  the  part  of  the  Scottish  Office  would  become 
increasingly  prominent  in  the  negotiations  surrounding  the  role  and  structure  of 
the  IDO  and  its  subsequent  implementation.  The  general  Scottish  Office  view  as 
to  the  possibility  of  political  representation  upon  the  NCPI,  was  summed  up  by  a 
senior  SRC  politician  as  follows  :  - 
"I  think  that  he  [a  senior  SRC  official]  had  doubts  that  if  I  insisted  on  politicians  on 
the  Committee,  the  Scottish  Office  would  veto  it....  The  Scottish  Office  had  made 
it  clear  to  [a  senior  SRC  official]  that  they  did  not  want  political  involvement,  but  I 
think  they  required  me  to  agree  to  that  before  they  could  get  away  with  it,  and  I 
saw  they  had  serious  problems  with  political  involvement"  (Case  46). 
The  aims  which  were  set  out  for  the  NPCI,  were  fairly  wide-ranging  and  rather 
vague,  these  were  to:  - 
"contribute  to  economic  development  :  by  adding  to,  or  improving  on,  strategic 
city-wide  infrastructure  systems  such  as  major  regional  roads  and  motorways 
linking  with  the  trunk  networks,  suburban  rail  networks,  the  network  of  vocational 
training  centres;  and  by  adding  to,  or  improving,  infrastructure  in  particular 
localities,  specifically  industrial  and  commercial  areas"  (MacAleavey,  1995, 
p.  236). 
The  NPCI  for  the  City  of  Glasgow  allocated  £68.2m  of  ERDF  support,  with  the 
'partners'  providing  50%  of  the  expenditure  for  each  scheme.  Written  into  the 
NPCI  agreement  was  a  percentage  breakdown  of  the  expected  funding  which 
each  partner  could  expect  to  receive,  which  went  as  follows  :-  SRC  53%; 
ScotRail  21  %;  Glasgow  District  Council  9%;  South  of  Scotland  Electricity  Board 
8%;  SDA  7%;  and  British  Gas  2%  (MacAleavey,  1995,  p.  236).  Thus  the 
vagueness  of  the  NPCI's  aims,  may  reflect  the  fact  that  the  programme  merely 
82There  would  be  no  ad-hoc  membership  of  the  IDO  Directing  Committee. 
114 ensured  that  a  sum  of  money  was  available  for  the  various  partners,  thus 
removing  the  uncertainty  of  applying  on  a  project  by  project  basis  and  enabling  a 
degree  of  forward  planning.  Clearly  Strathclyde  was  expected  to  obtain  the 
majority  of  the  funding  from  the  programme,  a  result  which  can  be  attributed  to 
two  main  factors.  Firstly,  the  NPCI  contained  ERDF  monies  only,  and  as  a 
consequence  dealt  only  with  applications  for  infrastructure.  As  the  Regional 
Council  was  the  main  provider  of  infrastructure  within  Strathclyde,  it  would  have 
been  surprising  had  the  Council  not  been  expected  to  obtain  a  substantial 
tranche  of  the  funds  available.  Secondly,  a  common  feature  of  all  the 
negotiations  resulting  in  'partnership'  agreements,  was  that  SRC  was  closely 
involved  in  the  negotiations  leading  up  to  an  agreement,  to  a  far  greater  extent 
than  the  other  participants,  with  the  exception  of  the  European  Commission  and 
the  Scottish  Office.  This  was  particularly  pertinent  in  the  case  of  the  NPCI, 
where  (as  outlined  in  the  previous  chapter)  SRC  had  been  lobbying  the 
European  Commission  for  an  integrated  funding  package  for  the  West  of 
Scotland,  and  was  heavily  involved  in  the  negotiations  surrounding  the  form  it 
should  take.  Thus,  the  NPCI  was  always  going  to  reflect  to  a  reasonable  extent 
the  spending  priorities  of  SRC.  As  a  SRC  official  commented  with  regard  to  the 
Strathclyde  European  Partnership  (SEP)  :  - 
"Not  surprisingly,  some  of  the  people  who  wrote  the  Single  Programming 
Document,  came  from  the  Regional  Council  and  so  their  priorities  weren't  a 
hundred  miles  away  from  those  of  Economic  Strategy,  when  we  came  to  apply 
for  funds"  (Case  16). 
There  is  no  reason  to  suspect  that  SRC  did  not  also  exert  a  similar  (if  not  greater) 
degree  of  influence  over  the  aims  of  the  NPCI  (and  subsequently  IDO).  In 
practice,  SRC  only  applied  for  funding  worth  38.1  %  of  the  NPCI's  fund,  although 
if  funding  levered  from  the  fund  by  the  Strathclyde  Passenger  Transport 
Executive  (SPTE)  is  included  in  this  total,  then  SRC's  uptake  of  the  £68.2m  rises 
to  40.5%.  In  terms  of  the  individual  departments  within  SRC,  the  major 
beneficiary  from  the  NPCI  was  the  Department  of  Roads  which  took  up  26.7  %  of 
the  programme's  funds,  due  to  ERDF  monies  being  limited  to  infrastructure 
115 projects.  The  dominance  of  the  Department  of  Roads  within  SRC  in  terms  of 
ERDF  applications  was  apparent  via  individual  project  applications,  as  between 
1975  and  1988  the  department  accounted  for  56.4%  of  all  ERDF  funding  SRC 
received  (SRC,  1994,  p.  46).  Thus,  the  extent  to  which  the  department  benefited 
from  the  NPCI  was  not  unexpected,  given  the  aims  of  the  programme  and  the 
departmental  history  of  applying  for  ERDF  grants.  However  with  reference  to 
comments  in  the  previous  chapter  regarding  the  dominance  of  the  Chief 
Executive's  Department  in  dealing  with  European  issues,  it  is  worth  noting  that 
despite  the  extent  to  which  the  Roads  Department  could  be  expected  to  benefit, 
all  the  negotiations  concerning  the  NPCI  were  carried  out  by  officials  from  Chief 
Executive's,  although  they  would  liaise  with  other  Council  departments.  Table 
5.1  displays  the  funding  SRC  received  between  1985  to  198783  through  the 
NPCI,  whilst  also  giving  a  breakdown  by  the  individual  departments  of  the 
Council. 
The  NPCI  for  the  City  of  Glasgow  was  an  experimental  scheme  for  the  European 
Commission,  which  had  at  the  same  time  approved  two  other  NPCI's  within  the 
UK84.  These  schemes  were  among  the  first  of  their  kind  across  Europe, 
although  similar  schemes  had  been  approved  previously  for  the  Cities  of  Naples 
in  1979  and  Belfast  in  1981,  which  had  initially  drawn  SRC  into  lobbying  the 
European  Commission  for  an  integrated  funding  package.  Given  the  innovative 
nature  of  the  programmes,  it  was  hardly  surprising  that  the  NPCIs  did  little  more 
than  bring  together  an  aggregated  sum  of  ERDF  funding  within  a  fixed  time 
period,  with  the  aims  of  the  programme  being  vaguely  sketched  out.  Thus 
contemporary  analyses  of  the 
value  of  the  NPCI  reached  largely  negative  conclusions  as  to  the  extent  to  which 
the  programme  represented  a  dramatic  improvement  upon  the  previous  project- 
by-project  approach.  The  initial  preparatory  study  into  the  potential 
831t  is  worth  reiterating  that  although  the  NPCI  was  in  operation  from  1985  to  1987,  the  European 
Commission  allowed  applications  for  funding  dating  back  to  mid-1984. 
84The  other  two  NPCI's  in  the  UK  were  both  located  in  England,  at  Shildon  /  Newton-Aycliffe  / 
Bishop  Auckland,  and  the  Mersey  Basin  respectively. 
116 for  an  IDO  in  Glasgow  had  commented  that  the  benefits  of  such  a  scheme  lay  in 
"increasing  the  effectiveness  of  existing  funds,  in  increased  priority  accorded  to 
applications  to  existing  funds  and  higher  rates  of  grant,  and  in  the  unquantifiable 
gains  following  from  a  closer  relationship  to  the  Community"  (Roger  Tyms,  1984, 
In,  Keating,  M  and  Boyle,  R,  1986,  p.  67). 
Table  5.1  -  Funding  Received  by  SRC  through  the  NPCI.  1985-87. 
Applicant  for  NPCI  funding. 
(Department  of  SRC). 
Funding  obtained  (£m).  %  of  total  NPCI  fund 
(Figures  are  rounded  up). 
Roads.  18.2  26.7% 
Sewerage.  3.6  5.3% 
Water.  2.7  4% 
Physical  Planning.  0.4  0.6% 
Other85.  1.0  1.5% 
SRC  (minus  SPTE).  26.0  38.1% 
Strathclyde  Passenger 
Transport  Executive  (SPTE). 
1.6  2.3% 
SRC  (including  SPTE).  27.6  40.5% 
Source  :-  Strathclyde  Regional  Council,  1994,  p.  46. 
However,  the  NPCI  was  criticised  by  outside  observers,  due  to  the  lack  of 
`additionality'86  whilst  the  NPCI  was  considered  as  consisting  of  no  more  than  "a 
shopping  list  of  projects  eligible  for  funding  from  EC  sources"  (Keating  and  Boyle, 
1986,  p.  68),  given  the  manner  in  which  funding  shares  between  partners  was 
largely  predetermined.  Thus  Keating  and  Boyle  took  the  view  that  :  - 
"There  is  a  great  deal  less  to  the  Glasgow  IDO87  than  meets  the  eye.  It  may 
have  a  certain  promotional  significance  both  for  the  local  authorities  and  for  the 
Community,  which  is  anxious  to  publicise  the  disbursement  of  its  funds.  The 
85'Other'  refers  to  funding  obtained  jointly  by  the  Education  and  the  Estates  Department. 
86The  previous  chapter  outlined  the  position  whereby  funding  local  authorities  received  from  the 
ERDF  resulted  only  in  a  benefit  to  the  authority  in  terms  of  loan  savings,  as  the  money  would  be 
taken  out  of  the  Council's  capital  budget  by  central  government  which  viewed  the  funds  as  a 
means  of  re-imbursement  for  the  cost  of  EEC  membership.  This  resulted  in  a  situation  whereby 
EEC  funding  was  not  genuinely  additional  to  existing  local  government  expenditure  plans,  thus 
resulting  in  the  term  'additionality'. 
87Keating  and  Boyle  are  referring  here  to  the  NPCI  and  not  to  the  post-I  988  IDO. 
117 existence  of  the  IDO  may  give  the  authorities  some  leverage  in  pursuing 
applications  for  funding  for  projects  from  the  ESF  and  the  quota  and  the  non- 
quota  sections  of  the  ERDF,  though  this  must  be  speculative.  It  does  not, 
however  amount  to  a  development  plan  nor,  indeed,  to  the  sort  of  strategic 
intervention  in  selected  projects  which  would  have  allowed  the  Community  to 
target  its  resources  on  items  central  to  its  own  policy  objectives  and  to  gain  the 
maximum  leverage  over  these.  Instead,  the  funds  will  continue  to  be  spread  over 
a  wide  range  of  items  as  before,  with  local  government  seeking  the  maximum  EC 
support  for  whatever  projects  it  is  pursuing  and  central  government  seeking  to 
maximise  the  UK  take  from  the  various  funds,  without  increasing  overall  public 
spending"  (Keating  and  Boyle,  1986,  p.  68). 
These  criticisms  of  the  NPCI  are  certainly  valid,  however  with  hindsight  the  NPCI 
is  significant  in  that  it  was  the  first  attempt  at  'partnership'  in  Strathclyde,  and  as 
such  did  have  a  legacy  upon  the  form  of  subsequent  structures.  Equally,  the 
NPCI  did  bring  a  range  of  benefits  to  the  principal  partners  in  the  NPCI  (i.  e.  the 
European  Commission,  the  Scottish  Office  and  Strathclyde  Regional  Council). 
To  SRC  the  NPCI  was  all  that  the  Council  required  from  programming,  in  that  the 
NPCI  enabled  a  degree  of  certainty  to  come  into  the  funding  process  whilst  also 
establishing  a  formal  line  of  contact  with  DGXVI  through  the'Co-ordinating 
Committee',  although  clearly  SRC  desired  a  Strathclyde-wide  programme 
integrating  ERDF  and  ESF  monies. 
Nevertheless,  the  form  of  the  programme  left  the  Council  relatively  free  to  pursue 
its  own  policy  priorities  with  European  finance.  The  main  objective  of  SRC  with 
regard  to  European  funding  was  to  obtain  the  maximum  amount  possible,  in 
order  to  pursue  the  Council's  economic  and  social  strategies.  Thus  the  rather 
minimalist  nature  of  'partnership'  in  the  NPCI,  was  not  a  concern  for  SRC  as  it 
had  no  vested  interest  in  pushing  the  concept. 
In  contrast,  the  European  Commission  did  have  an  interest  in  extending  the 
'partnership'  process,  and  for  the  Commission  the  NPCI  was  a  'pilot'  scheme 
which  offered  the  opportunity  to  gain  further  experience  of  the  process  of 
attempting  to  implement  the  concept  of  partnership,  as  well  as  obtaining  closer 
contact  with  local  institutions  and  their  policies.  In  general  terms  the  European 
118 Commission  desires  contact  with  sub-national  actors  and  interest  groups,  in 
order  to  attempt  to  minimise  the  Commission's  dependence  upon  member-states 
for  the  information  upon  which  the  formation  of  policy  and  its  implementation 
depends,  or  as  Marks  and  McAdam  (1996)  put  it  :  - 
"regional  governments  and  their  representatives  in  Brussels  provide  a  source  of 
information  to  the  Commission  outside  regular  state  executive  channels.  As  a 
small  organisation  with  vast  responsibilities,  the  Commission  has  to  rely  on 
externally  generated  information,  and  it  seeks  as  diverse  an  informational  base 
as  possible"  (Marks  and  McAdam,  1996,  p.  267). 
Thus  contact  with  institutions  from  the  West  of  Scotland,  offered  the  opportunity 
to  obtain  information  from  non  member-state  organisations  in  order  to  improve 
the  implementation  of  the  funds  and  'partnership'.  Finally  the  Scottish  Office  did 
not  experience  any  difficulty  in  supporting  SRC's  initial  lobbies  for  an  IDO  and 
then  in  participating  within  the  NPCI,  as  the  NPCI  approach  was  not  inconsistent 
with  UK  government  policy,  given  that  two  NCPI's  were  created  in  England  at  the 
same  time  as  Glasgow's  designation  as  an  NPCI.  Indeed  the  Scottish  Office  was 
keen  to  support  SRC  in  its  approaches  to  DGXVI,  an  attitude  which  a  senior  SRC 
politician  summarised  as  follows  :  - 
"There  was  a  kind  of  comradely  relationship  with  the  Scottish  Office,  who  were 
really  quite  pleased  with  what  Strathclyde  was  doing,  because  it  didn't  appear  to 
be  of  anti-government  significance,  it  wasn't  a  Labour  versus  Tory  thing,  it  was 
something  that  was  bringing  something  to  Scotland,  and  behind  their  hand  they 
were  agreeing  that  it  was  high  time  Scotland  got  its  share  of  what  the  UK  was 
putting  in  as  a  net  provider"  (Case  46). 
This  perception  of  a  'Scottish'  interest  and  of  an  alliance  between  the  Scottish 
Office  and  SRC  would  be  a  common  theme  in  the  development  of  `partnership' 
within  the  West  of  Scotland.  However  as  the  NPCI  exemplified,  the  Scottish 
Office  even  at  this  early  stage  were  ensuring  that  they  remained  in  a  position  to 
guide  the  implementation  of  partnership  through  chairing  the  'Co-ordinating 
Committee'  and  excluding  political  representation.  Symptomatic  of  this  co- 
operation  was  that  by  the  middle  of  1986,  SRC  and  the  Scottish  Office  were 
negotiating  with  DGXVI  regarding  the  possibility  of  an  'Integrated  Development 
119 Operation'  in  Strathclyde,  and  it  is  to  these  negotiations  and  the  role  of  the  IDO 
which  I  now  intend  to  turn. 
5.3.1  -  The  Strathclvde  `Integrated  Development  Operation'  (IDO).  1988-92. 
As  with  the  early  negotiations  concerning  the  NPCI  for  Glasgow,  the  initial 
contacts  with  DGXVI  concerning  an  IDO  were  led  by  SRC.  However  during  the 
creation  of  the  NPCI,  the  Scottish  Office  had  begun  to  display  signs  of  increasing 
interest  in  the  European  funds,  through  vetoing  political  representation  upon  the 
NPCI's'Co-ordinating  Committee'  and  through  chairing  this  committee.  In  the 
negotiations  with  the  European  Commission  regarding  the  IDO,  the  Scottish 
Office  became  increasingly  prominent  in  part  because  SRC  required  the  support 
of  the  Scottish  Office  in  these  negotiations  as  a  representative  of  the  member- 
state.  However  SRC  continued  to  have  a  prominent  position  in  these 
discussions  to  the  extent  that  :  - 
"The  Regional  Council  took  the  lead  in  all  of  this,  but  once  we  got  into  the  hard 
financial  negotiation  with  the  Commission,  it  became  absolutely  obvious  that  we 
needed  the  backing  of  the  UK  government,  and  the  Scottish  Office  came  in 
behind  us  very  well,  and  the  Assistant  Secretary  who  was  in  charge  of  European 
Affairs..  came  alongside  me  in  the  detailed  technical  negotiations.  The  political 
discussions  at  a  Commissioner  level  were  with  Cllr.  Gray,  but  obviously  the 
technicalities  of  what  was  eligible  and  what  wasn't...  had  to  be  sorted  out  at 
official  level,  and  [names  a  Scottish  Office  official]  and  myself  led  the  negotiations 
for  the  Strathclyde  IDO"  (Case  14). 
The  co-operation  between  the  Scottish  Office  and  SRC  in  pursuing  an  IDO, 
certainly  resulted  in  a  deal  which  represented  a  significant  advance  upon  the 
NPCI.  The  Strathclyde  `Integrated  Development  Operation'  (IDO)  covered  a 
geographical  area  consisting  of  the  vast  majority  of  Strathclyde  Regional 
Council's  boundaries  and  small  parts  of  Central  Region  and  Dumfries  and 
Galloway88.  The  funding  for  the  IDO  totalled  £377m  of  European  finance 
88The  boundaries  of  the  Strathclyde  IDO  were  based  upon  the  nine  travel-to-work  areas  (TTWAs) 
of  Glasgow,  Lanarkshire,  Dunbartonshire,  Greenock,  Irvine,  Ayr,  Girvan,  Kilmarnock,  and 
Cumnock  and  Sanquhar.  These  boundaries  remained  the  same  for  the  WSOP  and  SEP. 
120 between  198889  to  1992,  split  across  four  sources,  as  follows:  -  ERDF  -  £231  m; 
ESF  -  £41  m;  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB)  loans  -  £80m;  and  European  Coal 
and  Steel  Community  loans  -  £24m.  90  This  was  perceived  as  a  significant 
success  within  SRC,  partly  due  to  the  scale  of  the  funding  involved  and  as  the 
IDO  represented  the  first  scheme  of  its  kind  (which  combined  funding  over  a 
range  of  mechanisms  across  a  fixed  time-scale).  Thus  the  IDO  was  viewed 
within  SRC  as  a  vindication  of  the  policies,  the  Council  had  been  pursuing  with 
regard  to  'Europe',  as  a  senior  SRC  official  commented  :  - 
"We  eventually  got  £380m  which  is  less  than  we  asked  for,  but  it  was  still  the 
largest  IDO  in  the  whole  of  the  Obj.  2  regions  and  gave  more  per  capita  to 
Strathclyde  than  any  other  Obj.  2  region,  so  we  were  very  pleased  with  that" 
(Case  14). 
That  SRC  had  gained  an  advantage  as  a  consequence  of  the  active  nature  of  the 
European  polices  it  had  developed,  certainly  appeared  to  be  a  view  that  had 
some  credence,  as  the  views  of  a  former  Commissioner  of  DGXVI  in  Table  5.2 
exemplify.  Whilst  the  Strathclyde  IDO  was  significant  in  terms  of  the  scale  of  the 
funding  it  secured,  perhaps  the  most  important  influence  of  this  programme  lay  in 
the  institutional  structure,  notably  the  establishment  of  an  independent 
programme  management  executive  adopted  by  the  partnership,  which  would 
subsequently  act  as  a  blueprint  for  other  Structural  Fund  partnerships  in 
Scotland. 
The  IDO  was  agreed  in  December  1988,  however  funding  was  back-dated  to  include 
applications  from  January  1988  onwards. 
90AIi  the  figures  have  been  rounded  up. 
121 Table  5.2  -  The  Views  of  a  European  Commissioner  with  regard  to  SRC's 
role  in  the  designation  of  the  Strathclyde  IDO. 
The  importance  of  Strathclyde  in  all  of  this  has  to  be  emphasised  because 
Strathclyde  was  probably  the  foremost  region  or  local  authority  to  develop 
European  contacts.  Strathclyde  recognised  the  importance  of  Europe,  much 
earlier  than  lots  of  other  people,  so  that  for  example,  they  had  a  huge 
Integrated  Development  Operation  which  was  agreed  just  before  I  got  there, 
which  they  had  been  working  on  for  sometime  with  Commission  officials  and 
so  on.  A  number  of  local  authorities  had  been  trying  the  same  thing  a  bit  later, 
but  theirs  were  not  as  well  advanced  as  Strathclyde's,  so  their  programmes 
fell  under  the  new  regimes  starting  in  1989.  They  didn't  at  that  time  do  nearly 
so  well  as  Strathclyde,  so  Strathclyde  were  in  on  the  whole  business  of 
regional  policy  /  Structural  Funds  at  a  point  where  it  did  make  a  difference  to 
the  amount  of  money  you  got,  if  you  were  active. 
There  was  a  background  of  Strathclyde  interests  in  the  Community,  they  were 
well  known  in  Brussels  among  officials  not  just  from  DGXVI.  They  had  a  man 
there  of  course,  it  was  a  one  man  operation,  that  was  at  a  time  when  other 
people  had  been  very,  very  slow,  now  there  are  dozens  of  British  offices  of 
one  sort  or  another.  So  that  was  very  good,  from  their  point  of  view.  The 
thing  about  the  IDO  was  that  it  involved  a  lot  of  money,  much  more  than 
Strathclyde  were  really  entitled  to  on  an  objective  basis,  and  this  gave  me 
some  problems  because,  when  we  were  looking  at  the  allocations  for 
Objective  2  areas  in  the  UK,  for  the  first  period  from  1989  to  1991,  the  first 
three  year  period,  the  whole  thing  was  completely  skewed,  because  a  number 
of  authorities  specifically  Strathclyde  had  got  in  on  the  act,  and  obligations 
that  had  been  taken  onto  them,  had  to  be  met.  That  was  the  first  chunk  of 
money  and  that  meant  that  other  Objective  2  areas  were  actually  paying  a  bit 
for  the  Strathclyde  IDO.  When  it  came  to  the  second  period...  the 
geographical  areas  weren't  changed,  but  in  calculating  the  financial 
allocations,  some  adjustments  were  made  to  try  and  get  a  better  balance  over 
the  five-year  period.  So  Strathclyde  having  been  in  on  the  thing  earlier, 
undoubtedly  benefited  financially. 
Source  :  Case  Forty-I-ive. 
5.3.2  -  The  Institutional  Structure  of  the  Strathclyde  IDO.  1988-92. 
The  Strathclyde  IDO  was  approved  at  the  end  of  December  1988,  a  matter  of 
days  before  the  Reform  of  the  Structural  Funds  came  into  force.  Thus  DGXVI 
would  certainly  have  been  keen  to  push  for  a  more  extensive  form  of 
'partnership'  than  that  of  the  NPCI.  The  1989  Reforms  described  the  'principle  of 
partnership'  as  involving  :- 
122 "close  consultations  between  the  Commission,  the  Member  State  concerned  and 
the  competent  authorities  designated  by  the  latter  at  national,  regional,  local  or 
other  level,  with  each  party  acting  as  a  partner  in  pursuit  of  a  common  goal. 
These  consultations  are  hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  "partnership".  The 
partnership  shall  cover  the  preparation,  financing,  monitoring  and  assessment  of 
operations"  (European  Commission,  1988,  In,  Laffan,  B,  1989,  p.  47). 
The  structure  which  was  put  in  place  to  administer  the  IDO,  certainly  went  further 
than  ensuring  `close  consultation'  between  the  partners  involved,  as  the  IDO 
comprised  three  committees  (the  'Strathclyde  IDO  Co-ordinating  Committee;  the 
`ERDF  Working  Group;  and,  a'ESF  Working  Group')  to  oversee  the  applications 
for  funding,  and  a  programme  executive  to  administer  the  programme. 
The  `IDO  Co-ordinating  Committee'  fulfilled  a  similar  role  to  the  NPCI  Committee 
of  the  same  name  in  that,  the  Committee  was  expected  to  provide  a  strategic 
overview  of  the  programme,  and  was  responsible  for 
"monitoring  and  evaluation  against  targets,  for  considering  revisions  to  the 
programme,  and  for  future  direction  and  policy"  (Strathclyde  European 
Partnership,  1996,  p.  6).  The  Co-ordinating  Committee  brought  together 
representatives  of  15  organisations.  These  were  :  - 
"  The  Scottish  Office  Industry  Department  (chair); 
"  Strathclyde  Regional  Council; 
"  Dumfries  and  Galloway  Regional  Council; 
"  Glasgow,  Inverclyde  and  Motherwell  District  Councils; 
"  Training  Agency; 
"  Scottish  Development  Agency; 
"  Irvine  Development  Corporation; 
"  Department  of  Employment  ESF  Unit; 
"  Scottish  Business  in  the  Community; 
"  European  Commission  :-  DGV  (Employment  and  Social  Affairs);  DGXVI 
(Regional  Policy)  and  DGXXII  (Co-ordination), 
"  The  Wise  Group. 
123 As  with  the  NPCI  'Co-ordinating  Committee',  the  Scottish  Office  held  the  chair 
whilst  all  the  representatives  were  non-political.  The  Committee  consisted  of  a 
greater  number  of  'partners'  than  the  NPCI  Committee  due  to  the  larger  scale 
and  scope  of  the  programme.  The  Committee  met  four  times  a  year  between 
1989  and  1992,  with  the  exception  of  1989,  when  it  met  three  times.  Whilst  this 
is  more  frequent  than  the  twice  yearly  number  of  meetings  suggested, 
nevertheless  this  may  be  considered  as  a  'superficial'  level  of  meetings  with 
which  to  undertake  the  strategic  management  of  the  programme.  However  the 
programme  was  also  supported  by  the  ERDF  and  ESF  Working  groups,  as  well 
as  the  programme  executive,  leaving  the  committee  to  take  largely  'strategic' 
decisions,  for  instance,  concerning  the  'virement'  of  funds  between  'action 
programmes'  (areas  of  policy  into  which  funding  was  allocated).  This  therefore 
accounts  for  the  relatively  low  number  of  IDO  Co-ordinating  committee  meetings 
held.  These  structures  were  unique  to  Scotland,  as  other  Scottish  'partnerships' 
in  the  period  1994-99  would  be  organised  along  similar  lines,  whereas  all  other 
partnerships  in  the  UK  would  consist  only  of  a  'Programme  Management 
Committee'  analogous  to  the  IDO  Co-ordinating  Committee. 
The  ERDF  and  ESF  Working  Groups'  dealt  with  assessing  the  eligibility  of 
applications  for  funding  and  with  ensuring  that  the  projects  met  the  required 
regulations.  These  committees  would  then  recommend  to  the  'Co-ordinating 
Committee'  whether  the  applications  should  receive  funding.  However,  the'Co- 
ordinating  Committee'  dealt  exclusively  with  applications  worth  more  than  £2m 
and  £7m  in  the  case  of  transport  projects.  The'ERDF  Working  Group'  contained 
members  from  every  organisation  eligible  for  ERDF  funding  and  thus  by  1992,  as 
new  partners  became  eligible  for  funding  the  Working  Group  had  expanded  to 
consist  of  45  members,  therefore  resulting  in  a  rather  large  and  unwieldy 
committee91.  In  comparison,  the'ESF  Working  Group'  divided  partners  into 
91The  ERDF  Working  Group  in  1992,  contained  members  from  :  Scottish  Office  Industry 
Department;  DGXVI;  SRC;  Dumfries  and  Galloway  Regional  Council;  Scottish  Enterprise;  5 
LEC's;  18  District  Councils;  3  New  Town  Development  Corporations;  Scotrail;  British  Waterways 
124 constituencies  of  interest92,  such  as  local  government,  the  voluntary  sector  and 
so  on,  thus  resulting  in  a  membership  of  12  in  order  that  the  Committee  could  be 
"more  cohesive  since  members  could  play  a  much  more  active  part  in  the 
deliberations  of  the  Group"  (Strathclyde  European  Partnership,  1996,  p.  7).  This 
approach  would  later  be  adopted  in  the  post-1994  'Strathclyde  European 
Partnership',  and  emphasises  the  extent  to  which  the  partnership  was  an 
experiment  with  the  various  partners  attempting  to  'make  policy  in  the  dark'  as 
there  was  no  model  elsewhere  to  look  to.  As  a  consequence  'partnership'  in  the 
West  of  Scotland  was  different  in  that  as  a  Scottish  Office  official  commented, 
"the  Executive  [reference  to  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership]  here  almost 
came  about  by  a  process  of  osmosis,  it  evolved"  (Case  42). 
Once  again,  the  Scottish  Office  chaired  the  Working  Groups,  however,  the 
'Programme  Executive'  had  attempted  to  foster  a  situation  whereby  decisions 
would  be  reached  via  a  process  of  discussion  and  consensus,  as  opposed  to 
taking  a  formal  vote.  All  the  interviewee  respondents  who  had  participated  in 
Committee  meetings  during  the  IDO  or  SEP,  stated  that  this  was  the  normal 
procedure  and  were  unable  to  recall  any  instances  where  a  vote  had  been  taken 
in  the  committees93.  The  ERDF  Working  Group  met  on  three  occasions  in  1989 
and  1990,  four  times  in  1991  and  on  5  occasions  in  1992.  The  meetings  of  the 
ESF  Working  Group  over  the  four  year  period  were  as  follows  :  -1989  -  4;  1990  - 
7;  1991  -  5;  1992  -  4.  SRC  had  representatives  on  all  these  committees,  with 
these  officials  being  drawn  solely  from  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  of  the 
Council.  The  Working  Groups  certainly  had  a  significant  role  within  the  IDO  in 
terms  of  vetting  the  applications  for  funding,  as  the  ERDF  rejected  32.8%  of 
applications  for  funding  whilst  the  ESF  group  rejected  21.4%  of  applications. 
Board;  Clyde  Port  Authority;  Central  Scotland  Water  Development  Board;  Civil  Aviation  Authority; 
Voluntary  Sector  Bodies;  Local  Economic  Development  Bodies. 
92The  ESF  Working  Group  drew  its  membership  from  :-  DGV;  Scottish  Office  Industry 
Department;  Department  of  Employment;  SRC;  Inverclyde  Training  Trust;  University  of 
Strathclyde;  The  Wise  Group;  Scottish  Enterprise  National;  1  Local  Enterprise  Council;  Dumfries 
and  Galloway  RC;  and,  2  Enterprise  Trusts. 
93The  negotiations  that  took  place  within  the  Committees  of  the  SEP  will  be  considered  later  in 
this  chapter. 
125 Tables  5.3  and  5.4  illustrate  the  rate  of  applications  and  projects  approvals  for 
ERDF  and  ESF  funding  over  the  period  1988-92.  Table  Three  also  displays  the 
increasing  number  of  applicants  for  ERDF  funding  over  the  period,  once  again 
emphasising  that  once  the  IDO  deal  was  secured  the  IDO  continued  to  evolve. 
The  impact  of  the  increasing  number  of  partners,  will  be  considered  at  length  with 
regard  to  the  'Strathclyde  European  Partnership'. 
Table  5.3  -  Project  submissions,  approvals  and  number  of  applicants  for 
Strathclyde  IDO,  ERDF  funding,  1988-92. 
YEAR  1988/89  1990  1991  1992 
Number  of  applications.  87  112  128  219 
Number  of  approvals.  56  73  77  161 
%  of  projects  approved.  64.9  65.1  60.1  73.5 
Number  of  applicants.  33  36  44  55 
Source  :-  Strathclyde  IDO,  1994,  p.  7. 
Table  5.4  -  Project  submissions  and  approvals  for  Strathclyde  IDO.  ESF 
funding,  1989-92. 
YEAR  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Number  of  applications.  85  124  148  189 
Number  of  approvals.  85  91  110  143 
of  projects  approved.  %  100  73.4  74.3  75.7 
Source  :-  Strathclyde  IDO,  1994,  p.  30. 
The  final  component  of  the  IDO  was  the'Programme  Executive',  which  acted  as 
a  secretariat  to  the  aforementioned  committees,  whilst  also  administering  the 
application  process  and  monitoring  the  performance  of  projects  (both  in  terms  of 
financial  probity  and  the  economic  development  outcomes  from  the  project)  once 
funding  had  been  secured.  In  addition,  the  Programme  Executive  increasingly 
became  a  source  of  information  and  informal  advice  to  agencies  intending  to 
apply  for  funding.  Officials  from  within  SRC  would  regularly  contact  the  IDO  to 
126 discuss  the  suitability  of  project  applications  they  were  putting  together,  as  an 
official  from  Strathclyde  Business  Development  commented  :- 
"A  lot  of  these  things  come  down  to  personal  relationships,  I  mean  I  know  most  of 
the  people  on  the  Executive  of  the  SEP,  and  at  my  level  it  tends  to  be  the 
individual  officers  who  you  phone  up  and  say,  can  you  give  us  some  clarification 
on  this  or  information  on  this 
.... 
My  first  port  of  call  would  be  the  SEP"  (Case  16). 
The  close  relationship  between  SRC  and  IDO  (and  subsequently  SEP)  officials, 
was  in  part  due  to  the  close  proximity  of  the  IDO  office's  to  SRC.  In  addition, 
SRC  was  covering  the  costs  of  establishing  the  IDO  and  remunerating  its  staff, 
as  a  consequence  of  which  SRC  obtained  the  title  'lead  partner.  Finally,  the 
majority  of  the  staff  within  the  IDO  were  originally  SRC  officials.  The  Programme 
Executive  initially  consisted  of  two  officials,  the  Programme  Director  who  was 
seconded  by  SRC  and  a  `Financial  Controller',  who  was  seconded  from  the 
Industry  Department  of  the  Scottish  Office  on  a  part-time  basis.  By  the  time  the 
IDO  ended  in  1992,  the  Programme  Executive  consisted  of  five  full-time 
members  of  staff.  The  four  additions  were  two  Programme  Managers,  dealing 
with  the  ERDF  and  ESF  programmes,  an  Administrative  Officer  and  a  Clerical 
Assistant.  These  four  additional  members  of  the  Executive  were  all  seconded  to 
the  IDO  from  SRC.  This  increase  in  staffing  was  attributed  to  :  - 
"the  increasing  number  of  partners,  the  increasing  numbers  of  applications  made 
for  ERDF  and  ESF  support,  and  the  increasing  appraisal  and  monitoring 
requirements.  It  also  reflected  the  additional  guidance  partners  required  before 
submitting  applications.  This  applied  to  both  inexperienced  partners  and  to 
partners  seeking  to  develop  new  types  of  projects"  (Strathclyde  European 
Partnership,  1996,  p.  8). 
The  final  major  difference  between  the  NPCI  and  the  IDO,  was  that  the 
application  for  the  IDO  had  undertaken  a  socio-economic  evaluation  of  the  region 
and  had  subsequently  become  much  more  focused  in  terms  of  outlining  the  aims 
and  objectives  of  the  programme.  This  reflected  the  much  more  integrated 
nature  of  the  programme  as  opposed  to  the  NPCI,  but  also  the  fact  that  as 
outlined  earlier,  the  European  Commission  was  keen  to  obtain  as  much 
information  as  possible  about  the  designated  area,  in  order  to  improve  the 
127 effectiveness  of  its  funds.  The  IDO  had  the  overall  aim  of  "building  a  sound  base 
for  long-term  self-sustaining  growth"  (Strathclyde  European  Partnership,  1996, 
p.  4).  However  these  general  statements  were  backed  up  by  a  series  of  more 
specific  objectives  which  the  IDO  aimed  to  address.  These  were  to  :  - 
"  focus  development  programmes  and  initiatives  on  growth  industries; 
"  encourage  the  development  of  local  enterprise,  especially  small  and  medium- 
sized  enterprises  (SMEs); 
"  assist  the  adoption  of  new  technology  by  local  industry; 
"  attract  inward  investment; 
"  expand  tourism,  especially  in  rural  areas; 
"  improve  external  communications; 
"  create  a  modern  metropolitan  heart  in  Glasgow, 
"  and,  enhance  the  region's  external  image. 
(Source:  -  Strathclyde  European  Partnership,  1996,  p.  4) 
In  order  to  achieve  these  objectives,  applications  for  funding  had  to  fall  into  one 
of  seven  designated  'action  programmes'.  The  action  programmes  dealt  with  :  - 
Enterprise,  Innovation  and  Investment;  Industrial  Sites  and  Premises;  Tourism; 
Transport  and  Communications;  Underground  Services  and  Waste  Disposal, 
Environmental  Improvement,  and  Employment  and  Vocational  Training. 
Thus  the  Strathclyde  IDO  was  a  significant  progression  in  terms  of  the 
`partnership  principle'  from  the  NPCI,  due  to  the  integration  of  the  funding 
process  via  the  creation  of  an  independent  programme  executive  and  a 
committee  structure  which  evaluated  applications  for  funding  according  to  their 
eligibility  to  the  IDOs  stated  objectives  and  removed  pre-arranged  funding  splits 
between  partners.  For  the  European  Commission  the  Strathclyde  IDO  was  a 
significant  development  in  terms  of  partnership,  given  that  the  scheme  "was  the 
largest  economic  development  programme  in  Europe"  (Strathclyde  European 
Partnership,  1996,  p.  9)  at  that  time.  SRC  had  been  a  prime  mover  behind  the 
IDO,  through  its  initial  lobbying  for  an  integrated  package  of  funds,  participating 
128 in  the  debates  over  the  form  the  IDO  should  take,  and  subsequently  through 
financing  the  staffing  and  facilities  for  the  IDO.  However  the  Council's  motivation 
for  doing  so,  was  in  order  to  obtain  an  increased  amount  of  funding.  The  aims  of 
the  IDO  "were  to  be  met  primarily  by  significantly  improving  the  region's 
infrastructure,  in  order  to  create  the  conditions  within  which  a  more  modern 
economy  could  develop.  Although  the  emphasis  was  very  much  on  large  capital 
projects,  resources  were  also  made  available  for  a  wide  range  of  business 
development  and  training  measures"  (Strathclyde  European  Partnership,  1996, 
p.  5).  The  IDO's  emphasis  upon  large-scale  infrastructure  projects  was  largely 
because  ERDF  was  aimed  at  schemes  of  this  kind.  Therefore  as  with  the  NPCI, 
SRC  could  be  expected  to  obtain  a  large  share  of  the  funds  available  due  to 
being  the  main  provider  of  infrastructure  in  Strathclyde,  as  well  as  through  having 
had  a  significant  role  in  the  negotiations  surrounding  the  establishment  of  the 
IDO,  and  therefore  having  had  SRC  officials  aiming  the  scheme  towards  project 
areas  from  which  the  Council  would  be  able  to  lever  funds.  Table  5.5  displays 
the  funding  received  across  each  'Action  Programme'  from  the  IDO  by  SRC 
whilst  Table  5.6  displays  the  ERDF  and  ESF  funding  obtained  by  individual  SRC 
departments  from  the  IDO. 
Table  5.5  clearly  demonstrates  that  the  major  sums  of  money  coming  to  SRC 
through  the  IDO,  were  from  the  Action  Programmes  dealing  with  infrastructure, 
namely  the  'Transport  and  Communications'  and  'Underground  Services  and 
Waste  Disposal'  programmes,  which  brought  over  a  £100m  of  funding  to  SRC. 
The  Council  also  took  a  significant  proportion  of  the  funding  available  for 
`Employment  and  Vocational  Training',  which  is  reflected  in  Table  5.6,  in  terms  of 
the  funding  levered  by  Strathclyde  Business  Development  and  the  Education 
Department,  as  this  action  programme  was  less  geared  towards  infrastructure 
than  any  other  and  was  financed  primarily  through  the  ESF.  The  dominance  of 
infrastructure  based  projects  is  again  reflected  in  the  large  sums  of  money 
obtained  by  departments  with  significant  responsibilities  in  terms  of  infrastructure 
129 namely,  the  Departments  of  Roads,  Sewerage,  Water  and  the  Strathclyde 
Passenger  Transport  Executive. 
Table  5.5  -  ERDF  funding  obtained  by  SRC  through  the  IDO.  by  `action 
proaramme'. 
ACTION  PROGRAMME.  TOTAL  SRC'S  %  OF  THE  NUMBER 
FUNDING  SRC  TOTAL  ACTION  OF 
RECEIVED.  PROGRAMME  PROJECTS 
BUDGET.  INVOLVED. 
Environmental  Improvements.  £1,355,000  9.5%  5 
Enterprise,  Innovation  and  1,457,000  8.7%  16 
Investment. 
Industrial  Sites  and  Premises.  £831,000  3.7%  10 
Employment  and  Vocational  £3,347,000  79.7%  3 
Training. 
Transport  and  Communications.  £58,949,000  64.1%  32 
Tourism  Development.  £1,156,000  4.7%  8 
Underground  Services  and  Waste  £54,267,000  91.8%  26 
Disposal. 
Source:  -  Strathclyde  IDO  1994. 
130 Table  5.6  -  ERDF  and  ESF  Funding  from  the  IDO  by  SRC  Department.  1988- 
92  (£  millions). 
SRC  DEPARTMENT  ERDF 
FINANCE 
OBTAINED. 
ESF  FINANCE 
OBTAINED 
TOTAL 
FINANCE 
OBTAINED. 
Roads  59.1  0  59.1 
Sewerage  37.9  0  37.9 
Water  16.3  0  16.3 
Physical  Planning  1.1  0  1.1 
Strathclyde  Business  Development.  2.2  9.0  11.2 
Chief  Executive's  0.4  0.4 
Education  0  14.9  14.9 
Other94  4.4  0  4.4 
Strathclyde  Passenger  Transport 
Executive 
11.8  0  11.8 
Total  132.8  24.3  157.1 
Source:  -  Strathclyde  Regional  Council,  1994,  p.  46. 
In  retrospect  it  can  be  argued  that  the  establishment  of  the  IDO  came  to 
represent  SRC's  most  successful  period  of  engagement  with  European  funding, 
due  to  the  prominent  role  of  the  Council  in  lobbying  for  and  negotiating  the  IDO 
package.  As  has  been  mentioned  above,  the  implementation  of  the  rather  vague 
principle  of  'partnership'  was  a  new  experience  to  all  the  'partners'  involved,  with 
the  structures  put  in  place  continually  evolving95  as  'new  partners'  became 
involved  in  the  programmes  and  as  existing  'partners'  attempted  to  channel  their 
changing  policy  priorities  into  the  'plan'  of  the  IDO.  The  increase  in  the  number 
of  partners  eligible  to  access  European  funding  established  in  the  West  of 
94'Other'  refers  to  projects  undertaken  jointly  by  the  Education  and  Estates  Departments,  and  to 
funding  secured  to  support  the  '1990  City  of  Culture'  initiative. 
"As  well  as  the  IDO  evolving  in  terms  of  changing  policy  priorities  and  an  increasing  number  of 
partners,  the  IDO  also  increased  the  range  of  funds  it  was  responsible  for,  through  administering 
two  Community  Initatives  (Cl's)(see  Chapter  4,  for  a  discussion  of  Ci's  and  the  aims  of  the 
RECHAR  and  RENAVAL  Ci's).  SRC  obtained  funding  from  both  these  intiatives.  Through 
RECHAR,  the  Council  funded  five  projects  resulting  in  funding  worth  £149,070  or  5%  of 
RECHAR's  budget  and  via  RENAVAL,  SRC  funded  15  projects  totalling  £1,214,000  of  European 
money  or  7.4%  of  the  RENAVAL  budget.  (Source  :-  Strathclyde  IDO,  1994). 
131 Scotland  was  a  constant  feature  of  the  IDO  and  its  successors  (Table  5.3 
displays  the  increase  in  the  number  of  applicants  for  funding  during  the  life-time 
of  the  IDO).  The  increase  in  the  number  of  partners  eligible  for  funding  through 
the  IDO  and  subsequently  during  the  West  of  Scotland  Operational  Programme 
(WSOP)  and  then  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership  (SEP),  was  due  to 
organisations  which  were  not  previously  eligible  being  accepted  by  the  European 
Commission  as'partners',  most  notably  in  the  case  of  Scottish  Enterprise  and  the 
Local  Enterprise  Companies  network  (LECs)96.  By  1994  and  the  establishment 
of  the  SEP,  the  partnership  would  contain  around  180  organisations  of  various 
descriptions,  as  a  senior  SEP  official  commented  :  - 
"I  started  this  job  seven  years  ago  to  manage  the  IDO,  at  that  time  I  think  there 
was  about  30  to  35  partners  and  it  was  quite  tight  about  who  should  be  eligible, 
and  it  always  had  to  be  mainstream  public  sector  agencies.  And  over  time, 
we've  opened  the  door  to  a  whole  range  of  other  people  from  voluntary  agencies, 
local  economic  initiatives,  LEC's,  Govan  Initiative,  companies  limited  by 
guarantee,  area  tourist  boards,  the  20  colleges  in  the  region  that  have  come  out 
of  Strathclyde's  control  and  are  now  independent  and  so  on"  (Case  43). 
Thus  SRC  would  increasingly  be  competing  against  a  wider  range  of 
organisations  than  before  for  European  money.  Additionally  the  type  of  project 
which  SRC  benefited  most  from  i.  e.  large-scale  infrastructure  projects,  were  not 
favoured  by  DGXVI.  This  was  reflected  in  the  IDO  where  "there  was  a  change  of 
emphasis  in  terms  of  size  and  type  of  projects  approved.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
IDO,  the  focus  was  on  large  physical  projects  aimed  at  improving  strategic 
infrastructure  such  as  transport,  water  and  sewerage....  By  the  end  of  the 
programme  period  the  emphasis  had  changed  to  infrastructure  with  more  direct 
and  identifiable  benefits,  and  to  a  wider  range  of  tourism  and  business 
development  projects"  (Strathclyde  European  Partnership,  1996,  p.  8).  This  shift 
in  emphasis  from  'hardware'  schemes  to  'software'  schemes  was  pushed  by 
DGXVI  which  was  keen  to  pursue  such  measures,  as  the  1989  Reforms  of  the 
Structural  Funds  had  attempted  to  address  the  problem  of  ERDF  giving  "too 
much  aid  for  infrastructure  projects  and  not  enough  to  productive  industrial 
96Scottish  Enterprise  and  the  LECs  were  accepted  by  DGXVI  as  being  eligible  for  European 
132 projects"  (Armstrong,  1995,  p.  46).  This  pressure  would  increase  during  the 
WSOP  and  SEP,  and  as  a  consequence  SRC  would  experience  a  decline  in 
funding. 
The  evolution  of  the  IDO  not  only  marked  a  decline  in  European  funding  for  SRC, 
but  also  a  decline  in  the  Region's  influence  within  the  partnership.  SRC  now  had 
to  compete  with  other  organisations,  in  particular  the  Scottish  Enterprise  /  LEC 
network  which  had  a  significant  degree  of  experience  and  information  regarding 
economic  development,  as  MacAleavey  (1995)  comments  :- 
"The  eligibility  of  the  Network  has  been  the  single  most  significant  change  in  the 
composition  and  nature  of  the  partnership  since  the  introduction  of  programming 
in  1985.  LECs  attract  an  increasing  share  of  ERDF  resources  in  Scotland  for 
environmental  improvement  projects  and  training  measures  as  well  as  business 
support  schemes....  LECs  also  play  a  greater  role  in  the  institutional  structures 
through  which  the  programmes  are  delivered.  To  this  extent,  the  asset  specificity 
of  the  resources  brought  to  the  programming  relationship  (and  in  particular  the 
local  authorities)  is  reduced.  The  enhanced  ability  of  the  European  Commission 
to  turn  to  other  qualified  partners  for  local  expertise,  economic  data,  programme 
preparation  and  most  importantly  for  the  supply  of  eligible  projects  which  the 
Commission  can  co-finance,  reduces  it  dependence  on  traditional  partners" 
(MacAleavey,  1995,  p.  247). 
In  addition  to  the  extension  of  the  IDO  to  organisations  which  were  previously 
excluded,  SRC  had  also  noticed  an  increasing  activism  on  the  part  of  the 
Scottish  Office  with  regard  to  the  Structural  Funds.  As  noted  above,  the  first 
signs  of  this  trend  were  apparent  during  the  negotiations  with  the  European 
Commission  over  the  IDO,  whilst  the  creation  of  the  IDO  appeared  to  coincide 
with  an  increasingly  pro-active  stance  towards  this  policy  field,  most  notably 
through  the  creation  of  "a  European  Funds  Division  (EFD)  [which]  came  into 
existence  in  1988  as  a  separate  division  having  formerly  been  part  of  the  same 
division  dealing  with  urban  funding.  The  EFD  has  responsibility  for  the  Scottish 
Office's  side  regarding  the  European  Development  Fund  (ERDF)"  (Mazey  and 
Mitchell,  1993,  p.  110). 
funding  in  January  of  1992. 
133 In  part  such  a  reorganisation  and  corresponding  increase  in  staffing  dealing  with 
European  funding,  was  a  response  to  the  increasing  workload  associated  with 
the  policy  field.  However  this  can  only  partly  account  for  the  'Europeanisation'  of 
the  Scottish  Office  taking  place  at  this  time,  as  the  IDO  incorporated  a  separate 
programme  executive  to  deal  with  the  administration  of  the  funds  in  Strathclyde. 
These  changes  also  appear  to  be  part  of  a  recognition  on  the  part  of  the  Scottish 
Office  to  engage  with  European  policy  developments  (See  Chapter  Two). 
This  engagement  on  the  part  of  the  Scottish  Office  was  certainly  noted  by  SRC 
officials  and  politicians,  with  a  senior  SRC  politician  commenting  on  the  impact  of 
this  changing  approach  in  the  following  manner:  - 
"When  we  were  talking  to  them  from  1981  to  1985  to  86,  we  got  the  impression 
we  were  talking  to  a  man,  a  boy  and  a  girl.  Certainly  before  the  late  `80s,  there 
was  a  significant  increase  in  staffing  and  a  creation  if  you  like  of  a  European 
section  in  the  Scottish  Office.  On  occasions  such  as  around  1986-87,  when 
there  was  a  poverty  action  programme,  that  we  recommended  as  it  was  only 
going  to  be  worth  a  couple  of  million  pounds,  that  we  should  go  in  for  a  million  of 
this,  and  we  put  in  a  case  for  this,  and  the  Secretary  of  State  at  the  time,  said  it 
was  not  worth  our  time,  forget  it.  He  actually  interfered  then,  and  that  was  when 
we  began  to  feel  that  there  was  clear  political  interference  at  the  top,  and  that 
therefore  these  guys  in  Edinburgh  were  going  to  have  to  sort  themselves  out  in 
handling  us,  given  that  they  were  now  aware  that  the  Secretary  of  State  and  /  or 
his  ministers  were  interested  in  what  we  were  doing"  (Case  46). 
The  perception  that  the  Scottish  Office  became  increasingly  attuned  to  European 
policy  developments  and  in  particular  the  Structural  Funds  during  the  late  1980s 
was  also  widespread  amongst  Scottish  MEPs,  with  a  Labour  MEP  commenting  :- 
"Strathclyde  did  come  over  here,  they  didn't  need  the  Scottish  Office's 
permission  to  come  over  here,  and  they  still  don't  to  do  some  things.  But  there's 
no  doubt  at  all,  that  once  you  got  into  the  IDO  proper,  because  of  the  amount  of 
money  involved,  then  the  Scottish  Office  began  to  say  `hang  on  a  minute  here, 
you  can't  do  this  without  us"(Case  18). 
By  1994  and  the  establishment  of  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership,  the 
Scottish  Office  had  spread  the  practice  of  `partnership'  as  developed  in 
Strathclyde  to  three  other  areas  :-  the  Highlands  and  Islands  (Objective  1), 
Eastern  Scotland  (Objective  2)  and  Dumfries  and  Galloway  (Objective  5b).  The 
134 'partnership'  process  as  a  consequence,  existed  in  a  distinctly  different  form  from 
that  in  England,  leaving  the  Scottish  Office  as  the  primary  actor  not  only  holding 
the  ring  between  the  partners,  but  also  between  the  various  partnerships  in 
Scotland,  as  well  as  exerting  influence  in  ensuring  that  the  'partnership'  process 
remains  more  participative  than  that  in  England.  97  This  shift  is  recognised  within 
the  Scottish  Office,  as  a  senior  civil  servant  observed  :  - 
"I  would  have  to  acknowledge  the  role  that  Strathclyde  [RC]  played  in  the  '80s, 
increasingly  as  the  '90s  progressed  the  Scottish  Office  are  seen  to  be  in  the  lead, 
the  lead  player  of  a  complex  of  partnerships  in  Scotland.  In  the  '80s  it  was  very 
Western  dominated  by  Strathclyde  [RC]...  certainly  at  an  official  level  there  is  a 
growing  recognition,  that  the  Scottish  Office  mainly  because  we  have  separate 
programme  areas  plus  Objective  Three,  that  we  are  the  pivot  around  which  all 
the  rest  goes.  I  wouldn't  say  we  that  we  are  driving  the  agenda,  but  I  would  say 
equally  that  we  are  not  being  led  anymore"  (Case  42). 
Summary. 
The  ability  of  SRC  to  'lead'  the  Scottish  Office  in  the  development  of  partnership 
arrangements  in  the  1980s,  was  a  consequence  of  the  early  contacts  between 
SRC  and  primarily  DGXVI,  ranging  back  to  policy  developments  such  as,  the 
Employment  Grant  Scheme  (see  Chapter  Four)  and  subsequently  the  NPCI  and 
IDO.  The  high  priority  that  SRC  attached  to  European  policy  at  this  time  was  in 
marked  contrast  to  the  rather  low-key  approach  of  the  Scottish  Office. 
Nevertheless,  by  the  1990s,  as  a  result  of  policy  developments  at  the  European 
level,  primarily  the  shift  away  from  hardware  to  software  schemes  and  the 
extension  of  `partnerships'  to  an  increasing  array  of  organisations  (in  particular 
the  LEC's  which  also  benefit  substantially  from  software  schemes),  the  influence 
of  SRC  had  diminished.  In  addition,  the  Scottish  Office  had  reacted  to  the 
increasing  importance  of  the  Structural  Funds  and  due  to  the  central  position  of 
the  member-state  representative  within  the  partnership  process  was  in  a  position 
whereby  it  could  significantly  influence  the  development  of  the  process  within 
Scotland.  It  is  to  the  two  partnerships  structures  following  on  from  the  IDO,  the 
97The  variation  in  the  implementation  of  the  partnership  principle  between  Scotland  and  England 
will  be  discussed  later  in  this  chapter. 
135 West  of  Scotland  Operational  Programme  (WSOP)  and  the  Strathclyde 
European  Partnership  (SEP),  which  I  now  intend  to  turn. 
5.4.1.  -  The  West  of  Scotland  Operational  Programme  (WSOP).  1993. 
The  West  of  Scotland  Operational  Programme  (WSOP)  was  a  one  year 
programme  intended  to  bring  the  partnership  process  in  Strathclyde  into  line  with 
the  rest  of  Europe,  where  new  programmes  were  due  to  commence  at  the 
beginning  of  1994.  Funding  from  the  ESF  was  already  secured  for  1993,  as 
£55.5m  of  ESF  support  was  available  for  the  programme  between  1989-93. 
Thus  the  WSOP  consisted  of  an  extension  of  ERDF  support  for  1993  amounting 
to  £58.7m.  The  WSOP  was  significant  on  two  counts.  Firstly,  the  programme 
continued  the  shift  desired  by  the  European  Commission  away  from  `hardware' 
infrastructure  oriented  and  capital  account  funded  projects,  towards  'software' 
business  development  and  revenue  account  funded  schemes.  Secondly,  the 
WSOP  introduced  a  new  feature  into  the  institutional  structure  of  partnership96  in 
Strathclyde  termed  'advisory  groups'. 
Whilst  the  IDO  had  eight  `action  programmes',  the  WSOP  transformed  these  into 
six  'priorities',  via  which  funding  applications  would  be  assessed.  The  six 
priorities  of  the  WSOP  were  :  - 
"  The  Development  of  Productive  Activities  -  this  priority  focused  upon  the 
creation  of  industrial  sites  (23%  of  WSOP  budget). 
"  Transport  and  Communications  (20.7%  of  WSOP  budget). 
"  Environmental  Improvements  (24.9%  of  WSOP  budget). 
"  Business  Development  (14.1  %  of  WSOP  budget). 
"  Tourism  Development  (13.5%  of  WSOP  budget). 
"  Research  and  Development  /  Vocational  Training  (3.9%  of  WSOP  budget). 
Source  :-  Strathclyde  IDO,  1994,  p.  3. 
98The  WSOP  witnessed  the  creation  of  some  institutional  developments  with  regard  to  the  merger 
of  the  ERDF  and  ESF  Working  Groups  into  the  'Operational  Programme  Monitoring  Committee' 
which  then  took  on  a  more  strategic  role.  The  impact  of  these  changes  will  be  discussed  further 
with  regard  to  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership. 
136 The  first  three  of  these  priorities  can  be  viewed  as  dealing  with  primarily 
hardware  schemes.  However,  the  remaining  three  signify  the  growing  role  of 
software  schemes  within  the  partnership  with  the  last  priority  being  an  entirely 
new  function  for  the  partnership.  Clearly  this  was  in  line  with  DGXVI's  policy 
priorities,  and  they  would  have  pushed  for  such  an  outcome  in  negotiating  the 
WSOP  package.  The  second  development  within  the  WSOP  was  the  creation 
of  'advisory  groups'  which  were  intended  as  a  mechanism  to  cope  with  the 
increasing  membership  of  the  partnership.  Five  advisory  groups  were  created  to 
reflect  the  priorities  outlined  above.  These  were  :-  Tourism,  Business 
Development,  Vocational  Training  Facilities,  Research  and  Development;  and 
Physical  Infrastructure.  These  groups  would  comprise  specialists  from  the 
various  constituent  grouping  within  the  partnership,  which  had  an  interest  in  the 
priority  areas,  and  can  be  viewed  as  a  development  from  the  practice  of  ESF 
Working  Group,  once  again  emphasising  the  extent  to  which  the  partnership  was 
evolving  via  a  process  of  'trial  and  error'.  The  function  of  these  groups  was  to 
assess  applications  for  funding  and  to  make  recommendations  as  to  whether  a 
project  should  be  accepted.  SRC  had  a  representative  on  each  advisory  group. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  SRC's  representative's  upon  advisory  groups  would  not 
necessarily  be  drawn  from  the  Chief  Executive's  Department,  as  specialist 
knowledge  was  a  requirement  for  membership  of  an  advisory  group.  As  a 
consequence  a  variety  of  departments  from  SRC  were  represented  upon 
advisory  groups. 
The  advisory  groups  were  chaired  by  the  Programme  Executive  with  the  Scottish 
Office  having  a  representative  on  each  group.  In  addition,  the  procedure  to 
agreeing  to  which  institutions  should  participate  in  each  group  was  done  in 
consultation  with  all  the  partnership  members  through  the  Programme  Executive, 
although  the  Scottish  Office  had  to  agree  to  the  membership  proposed  by  the 
The  new  priority  area,  'R  and  D/  Vocational  Training'  would  also  be  to  the  benefit  of  new 
entrants  into  the  partnership,  such  as  the  LEC's  and  the  colleges  which  had  come  out  from  the 
control  of  SRC. 
137 Executive.  As  before  in  the  Scottish  Office  pursuit  of  a  `chairman's  role',  the 
Scottish  Office  was  keen  to  ensure  it  was  able  to  oversee  the  whole  process 
despite  ceding  an  element  of  control  over  the  selection  of  projects  in  order  to 
cope  with  the  administrative  problems  resulting  from  the  expansion  of  the 
partnership.  Nevertheless  the  creation  of  advisory  groups,  gave  a  considerable 
degree  of  autonomy  to  organisations  with  a  specialism  in  the  WSOP's  priority 
areas.  Despite  the  trend  away  from  infrastructure  projects,  SRC  continued  to 
obtain  a  considerable  degree  of  funding  via  the  WSOP,  although  the  Council 
obtained  no  ERDF  funding  from  the  'Tourism  Development'  and  'R  and  D/ 
Vocational  Training'  project  streams.  Nevertheless  SRC  had  a  representative  on 
each  advisory  group,  perhaps  reflecting  the  Council's  role  as  a  'lead  player'  with 
regard  to  the  Structural  Funds  amongst  organisations  at  the  local  level.  Table 
5.7  displays  SRC's  share  of  funding  across  the  priority  areas  of  the  WSOP,  with 
SRC  once  more  obtaining  the  majority  of  its  funding  from  the  infrastructure 
dominated  priorities.  Table  5.8  gives  a  breakdown  of  the  funding  received  by 
individual  departments  within  SRC,  and  illustrates  the  impact  of  the  drift  towards 
'software'  schemes  more  clearly.  Despite  the  Roads  department  obtaining  the 
largest  degree  of  finance,  SBD  and  Education  obtain  the  second  and  third 
highest  amounts  of  funding  from  the  WSOP,  with  the  majority  of  the  funding  for 
these  two  Departments  coming  from  the  ESF,  thus  reflecting  the  drift  of  funds 
away  from  large-scale  infrastructure  projects  and  correspondingly  departments 
such  as  Roads,  Sewerage,  Water  and  the  SPTE  (see  Table  5.6  for  comparison). 
138 Table  5.7  -  SRC's  ERDF  Funding  by  WSOP  priority  area,  1993. 
WSOP  PRIORITY  AREA  SRC'S  SHARE  OF  SRC'S  SHARE  OF  THE 
FUNDING  (£'S).  WSOP  PRIORITY  AREA 
BUDGET  %. 
Development  of  Productive  2,417,133  18% 
Activities. 
Transportand  5,968,925  49.3% 
Communications. 
Environmental  2,912,548  20% 
Improvements. 
Tourism  Development.  0  0% 
Business  Development.  1,919,892  23.3% 
R  and  D/  Vocational  0  0% 
Training. 
Source  :-  Strathclyde  IDO,  1994. 
Table  5.8  -  SRC  D  epartments  and  Fu  nding  from  the  WS  OP  1993. 
SRC  DEPARTMENT  ERDF  FUNDING 
OBTAINED.  (EM). 
ESF  FUNDING 
OBTAINED.  (EM). 
TOTAL  FUNDING 
OBTAINED.  (EM). 
Roads  7.1  0  7.1 
Sewerage  0.3  0  0.3 
Physical  Planning  1.4  0  1.4 
SBD  1.5  2.9  4.4 
Chief  Executive's  0.  0.1  0.1 
Education  0  4.1  4.1 
SPTE  2.6  0  2.6 
Other  2.2  0  2.2 
Total  15.1  7.1  22.2 
Source:  -  SRC,  1994,  p.  46. 
5.5  -  Strathclyde  European  Partnership  (SEP).  1994-96. 
The  creation  of  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership  (SEP)  brought 
programming  in  Western  Scotland  into  line  with  the  rest  of  Europe,  in  terms  of 
time-scale.  In  addition  to  the  establishment  of  SEP,  three  other  partnerships 
were  created  in  Scotland  during  1994  (Highlands  and  Islands  -  Obj.  1;  Eastern 
Scotland  -  Obj.  2;  Dumfries  and  Galloway  -  Obj.  5b).  The  three  'new`  partnerships 
were  organised  along  the  same  lines  as  the  SEP,  thus  providing  evidence  that 
the  European  Commission  and  the  Scottish  Office  were  satisfied  with  the 
implementation  of  the  'partnership  principle'  in  Strathclyde  and  wished  to  export 
the  model  elsewhere100.  The  SEP  consisted  of  £233.5m  of  European  funding 
10°Scottish  office  and  European  Commission  views  of  the  'partnership'  in  Strathclyde  will  be 
discussed  later  in  this  chapter. 
139 between  1994  to  1996101,  with  £174.2m  coming  from  the  ERDF  and  £49.3m 
from  the  ESF102.  As  with  previous  programmes,  the  SEP  produced  a  plan  for 
the  region  (the  Single  Programming  Document  -  SPD),  which  again  was 
considerably  more  detailed  than  previous  'plans'  in  particular,  as  the  SPD 
assessed  the  impact  of  previous  rounds  of  European  Funding  within  Strathclyde, 
information  which  would  no  doubt  be  greatly  desired  by  DG's  V  and  XVI.  The 
SPD  set  out  two'strategic  objectives'  for  the  partnership,  which  were  :  - 
"  To  enhance  the  competitiveness  of  the  Western  Scotland  economy  in  order  to 
improve  economic  growth,  job  prospects  and  the  quality  of  the  regional 
population. 
"  To  improve  economic  and  social  cohesion  within  the  region  in  order  to 
increase  economic  development  opportunities  for  individuals  and  communities 
faced  with  growing  social  and  economic  exclusion. 
Source  :-  Strathclyde  European  Partnership,  1995,  p.  21. 
These  objectives  as  with  previous  programmes,  were  then  translated  into  a 
series  of  'development  priorities'  around  which  applications  for  funding  would  be 
assessed.  The  SPD  outlined  four  priority  areas  which  again  underline  the  extent 
to  which  software  schemes  had  replaced  the  infrastructural  bias  of  previous 
programmes. 
The  four  priorities  were  :- 
9  Business  development  (33%  of  the  SEP  budget); 
"  Business  environment  (39%  of  the  SEP  budget); 
1O1Western  Scotland  was  designated  as  an  Objective  2  Region  from  1994-99,  however  unlike 
Objective  1  programmes  which  last  for  six  years,  Objective  2  can  be  renegotiated  after  three 
years.  Thus  this  chapter  will  only  deal  with  the  SEP  in  its  first  three  years,  although  the  post-1996 
SEP  will  be  considered  with  regard  to  the  re-organisation  of  local  government  in  Chapter  Eight. 
102The  IDO  had  responsibilty  for  the  management  of  two  Community  Initiatives,  between  1991  to 
1993.  In  addition  to  RECHAR,  the  SEP  was  also  responsible  for  three  other  Community 
Initiatives  :-  RESIDER  which  dealt  with  the  decline  of  communities  centred  on  the  steel  industry, 
and  was  therefore  focused  upon  the  former  Lanarkshire  steel  communities;  KONVER  which  was 
targeted  at  areas  previously  dependent  upon  the  defence  industry;  and  lastly,  URBAN,  which  was 
focused  upon  areas  with  high  unemployment  in  Paisley  and  North  Glasgow.  SRC  applied  for 
funding  under  all  of  these  Cl's. 
140 9  Tourism  (13%  of  the  budget); 
"  Economic  and  Social  Cohesion  (14%  of  the  SEP  budget). 
Source  :-  Russell,  L,  1995,  p.  5-6. 
The  SEP  also  witnessed  a  shift  away  from  purely  public  sector  schemes  being 
eligible  for  funding,  as  the  SPD  aimed  "to  maximise  private  sector  investment  in 
projects"  (SEP,  1995,  p.  23),  thus  once  more  increasing  the  competition  for  funds 
within  the  partnership.  SRC  retained  the  title  `lead  partner'  as  SRC  managed  the 
financial  arrangements  surrounding  the  staffing,  premises  and  other 
requirements  of  the  SEP.  However  from  1994,  the  SEP  was  funded  through 
what  was  termed  `technical  assistance',  whereby  the  SEP  could  spend  up  to  I% 
of  its  Structural  Fund  allocation  to  meet  the  'Programme  Executive's' 
requirements,  with  this  European  money  being  match  funded  through  a  standard 
rate  fee  being  charged  to  each  partner  and  via  0.4%  of  each  project  approved 
being  allocated  to  meet  the  Executive's  costs.  Thus  SRC  no  longer  bore  the 
burden  of  maintaining  the  partnership  as  its  share  of  funding  reduced,  reflecting 
the  declining  influence  of  SRC  within  the  partnership. 
In  addition  to  the  introduction  of  advisory  groups  within  the  WSOP,  the  1993 
programme  was  also  notable  for  institutional  changes  it  introduced  which  were 
continued  and  developed  during  the  SEP.  As  before,  the  changes  were 
introduced  in  order  to  cope  with  the  increasing  number  of  partners.  During  the 
period  1994-96,  the  SEP  consisted  of  four  main  components:  -  the  Programme 
Monitoring  Committee;  the  Programme  Management  Committee;  Advisory 
groups;  and  the  Programme  Executive. 
The  'Programme  Monitoring  Committee'  broadly  fulfilled  the  function  of  the  IDO 
'Co-ordinating  Committee'  in  that  it  was  responsible  for  ensuring  that  the 
partnership  fulfilled  the  requirements  of  the  Structural  Fund  regulations  and  the 
plan  set  out  by  the  Single  Programming  Document.  Unlike  the  IDO  'Co- 
ordinating  Committee'  which  ensured  a  seat  for  every  partner,  the  Monitoring 
Committee  contained  representatives  of  'constituencies'  of  interest  in  the  same 
141 manner  as  advisory  groups.  Thus  although  the  SEP  now  contained  more  than 
180  'partners',  the  Monitoring  Committee  consisted  of  only  20  members  "drawn 
from  appropriate  European  Commission  DG's,  The  Scottish  Office  Industry 
Department...  Local  Authorities,  Scottish  Enterprise  Network,  Voluntary 
Organisations,  Local  Economic  Initiatives  and  Higher  and  Further  Education" 
(Russell,  1995,  p.  7).  SRC  had  a  representative  upon  the  Committee  which  the 
Scottish  Office  chaired  and  under  EU  regulations  had  to  meet  at  least  twice  a 
year.  This  Committee  also  contained  a  sub-committee,  termed  the  'Joint 
Management  Board'  which  oversaw  the  work  of  the  Programme  Executive  and  in 
particular,  its  management  of  the  budget.  The  'board'  consists  of  the  Scottish 
Office  as  the  'implementing  authority';  SRC  as  the  employers  of  the  Executive 
and  representatives  from  Scottish  Enterprise  and  the  District  Councils. 
MacAleavey  (1995)  suggests  that  behind  the  creation  of  the  'Joint  Management 
Board'  "lay  the  intention  of  the  Scottish  Office  to  increase  its  own  supervisory  role 
over  the  Executive"  (MacAleavey,  1995,  p.  298).  While  this  appears  to  be  a 
reasonable  suspicion  given  the  past  history  of  the  Scottish  Office  in  terms  of 
desiring  to  maintain  a  key  position  within  the  partnership,  interview  sources  did 
not  confirm  this  perspective. 
The'Programme  Management  Committee'  represents  a  combination  of  the  IDO's 
ERDF  and  ESF  Working  Groups,  with  the  Committee  making  decisions  upon 
applications  for  funding  based  upon  initial,  but  not  binding  recommendations  from 
advisory  groups.  The  Committee  "had  up  to  30  representatives  of  the 
partnership.  The  partnership  representatives  include  at  least  one  member  from 
each  advisory  group  and  reflect  the  various  constitutencies  of  partners"  (Russell, 
L,  1995,  p.  7).  Once  again  SRC  had  one  representative  upon  this  committee, 
which  was  chaired  by  the  'independent'  Programme  Executive,  and  met  three  to 
four  times  a  year.  However  the  SEP  contained  six  advisory  groups,  as  compared 
to  five  under  the  WSOP,  with  two  new  groups  being  created  dealing  with 
'business  infrastructure'  and  'business  development'  whilst  the  'physical 
infrastructure'  group  was  scrapped  in  line  with  the  changing  emphasis  of  the 
142 programme.  Finally  the  Programme  Executive  fulfilled  broadly  the  same 
functions  as  under  the  IDO,  although  two  of  the  objectives  of  the  Programme 
Executive  which  were  written  into  the  SPD,  are  of  interest  here.  These  were  :  - 
"To  publicise  and  market  the  Programme,  Partnership,  and  use  of  the  Structural 
Funds  in  the  region.  -To  undertake  research  aimed  at  improving  the  quality  and 
impact  of  the  Programme's  policy  and  practice"  (SEP,  1995,  p.  61). 
The  need  for  information  has  already  been  noted  as  a  prime  concern  for  the 
Commission,  and  despite  the  detailed  SPD  it  probably  desired  more.  The  SEP 
did  increase  its  staffing  during  the  period  1994-96  and  post-1996,  in  order  to 
undertake  research.  Publicity  is  also  a  key  concern  of  the  Commission,  as  the 
comments  of  a  DGXVI  `desk-officer'  illustrate  :- 
"We  are  also  interested  in  promoting  these  programmes.  Maybe  this  is  one  of 
the  weak  points,  publicity.  I  am  not  so  sure  that  in  Strathclyde,  people  are  aware 
of  these  programmes.  And  each  time  we  can,  we  promote  ourselves,  with  the 
European  programmes,  with  money....  We  are  putting  the  focus  now  mainly  on 
deprived  areas  in  Strathclyde.  It  would  be  interesting  to  know  if  people  living  in 
deprived  areas...  are  aware  that  it  is  Europe  that  is  doing  this.  They  are  not.  We 
consider  it  also  part  of  our  work  to  promote  the  European  Union"  (Case  31). 
Figures  were  not  available  for  the  funding  which  SRC  obtained  from  the  SEP 
between  1994  to  1996.  However  due  to  the  developments  outlined  above  (i.  e. 
the  increasing  size  of  the  partnership  and  the  ongoing  shift  from  funding  from 
hardware  to  software  schemes),  departments  such  as  SBD  and  Education  which 
benefited  most  from  these  changing  priorities  would  continue  to  increase  their 
share  of  the  funding  that  SRC  obtained,  whilst  the  overall  level  of  European 
funding  SRC  received  would  continue  to  decline.  Certainly  this  was  the 
perception  amongst  officials  and  politicians  within  SRC  and  within  SEP,  where  a 
senior  official  commented  upon  SRC's  declining  European  funding  in  the 
following  manner:  - 
"Strathclyde  over  the  period  1989  to  1995,  which  was  it's  last  full  year,  probably 
saw  it's  share  of  the  programme  go  down  from  60-65%  to  about  15%.  Partly 
because  what  was  eligible  for  the  Structural  Funds,  was  moving  away  from  large 
infrastructure  funds  to  a  whole  range  of  other  things.  So  their  influence  in  that 
sense  as  a  beneficiary  was  decreasing"  (Case  43). 
143 The  period  from  1994  to  1996  will  also  have  seen  a  decline  in  SRC's  funding  due 
to  the  impending  reorganisation  of  local  government,  which  took  effect  from  April 
1st  1996.  For  the  final  year  of  SRC's  existence  (April  1995  to  April  1996),  SRC 
applied  for  funding  on  behalf  of  its  'successor  councils'103  in  order  to  attempt  to 
ensure  some  degree  of  coherence  in  terms  of  European  policy  during  the  period 
of  reorganisation.  However  given  the  general  disarray  within  local  government  at 
this  time,  it  is likely  that  overall  funding  for  local  government  declined.  Certainly 
SRC's  influence  had  waned  in  terms  of  the  negotiations  over  the  SPD  which 
established  the  priorities  of  the  partnership  prior  to  1994,  as  compared  to  the 
negotiations  for  the  IDO,  with  officials  and  politicians  within  SRC  well  aware  of 
the  more  active  engagement  on  the  part  of  the  Scottish  Office  with  regard  to  the 
Structural  Funds.  A  senior  official  within  the  Chief  Executive's  Department 
summed  up  the  changed  status  of  SRC  in  the  SEP  negotiations  as  follows  :  - 
"The  second  time  round,  when  we  came  to  the  SEP  document,  then  the  Scottish 
Office  got  more  heavily  involved.  And  Strathclyde  was  still  a  very  powerful  voice 
but  the  Scottish  Office  came  to  have  a  much  more  significant  role  because  they 
clearly  recognised  ...  I  mean  put  it  like  this,  when  we  negotiated  the  IDO,  I  believe 
it  is  correct  to  say  the  Scottish  Office  had  a  staff  of  six  dealing  with  European 
affairs.  So  Strathclyde  was  a  formidable  contributor,  whereas  now  they  have 
about  fifty  odd.  OK,  that  tells  you  everything.  I  mean  we  got  away  with  setting  it 
103The  12  unitary  authorities  which  succeeded  SRC,  existed  as  'shadow  councils'  for  the  period 
from  April  Ist  1995  to  April  1st  1996.  Elections  had  been  held  to  these  shadow  councils,  whilst 
bureaucratic  posts  were  being  filled  throughout  this  period.  As  a  consequence,  SRC  entered  into 
negotiations  with  all  it's  shadow  councils,  and  where  agreement  was  made  SRC  would  apply  for 
funding,  the  commitments  of  which  would  then  be  `taken  on'  by  the  unitary  authorities.  Thus 
whilst  SRC  applied  for  the  funding,  the  project  would  ultimately  not  be  responsible  to  SRC.  This 
resulted  in  situations  where  officials  were  both  responsible  for  European  funding  in  SRC  and  in  a 
successor  council  for  April  1995  to  April  1996,  and  therefore  agreement  over  such  project 
applications  were  presumably  easier  to  make  f  However,  as  Chapter  Eight  (which  deals  with  the 
impact  of  local  government  reorganisation  upon  European  policy  in  the  West  of  Scotland)  will 
show,  this  was  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule,  and  SRC  had  to  attempt  to  reach  agreement 
with  councils  which  in  some  cases  had  not  appointed  a  European  officer  or  indeed  decided 
whether  to  have  a  'European  function'  within  the  new  Council,  presumably  resulting  in  a  slippage 
of  European  funding  during  the  reorganisation.  Nevertheless  individual  departments  of  SRC  with 
a  reliance  upon  European  funding  such  as  SBD  attempted  to  ensure  some  degree  of  coherence, 
in  the  following  manner 
"Back  in  August  1995,  we  called  together  the  heads  of  economic  development  of  the  new 
authorities,  most  of  whom  had  been  appointed  by  that  time.  And  we  got  agreement  from  them  to 
submit  applications  for  them,  on  their  behalf  to  try  and  retain  that  continuity....  So  the  new 
councils,  basically  had  approvals  waiting  for  them  as  long  as  they  continued  to  carry  out  the 
projects  on  the  same  lines  as  before,  as  set  out  in  the  application  forms"  (Case  16  -  SBD  official). 
144 up,  by  being  first  and  by  being  smart,  but  they  wised  up  and  they  pushed 
resources  in  to  make  sure  that  controls  were  kept"  (Case  14). 
These  developments  all  point  to  a  reduced  role  for  SRC  within  the  partnership. 
Nevertheless,  the  Council  remained  an  important  protagonist  within  SEP, 
however  it  could  no  longer  claim  to  exert  the  influence  which  it  previously  had. 
The  principle  of  partnership  had  changed  dramatically  since  its  early  beginnings 
with  the  NPCI,  and  I  now  intend  to  address  a  number  of  issues  which  this 
progression  in  the  nature  of  partnership  culminating  in  SEP  raise.  Firstly,  why 
the  implementation  of  partnership  in  Scotland  varied  from  that  in  the  rest  of  the 
UK?  Secondly,  the  extent  to  which  the  'model'  developed  in  Scotland  enabled 
local  actors,  principally  SRC,  to  have  a  policy  input  ?  What  does  the 
implementation  of  partnership  in  the  West  of  Scotland  tells  us  about  the  model  of 
'multi-level  governance'? 
5.6  -  The  `Scottish'  Dimension  to  Partnership. 
The  early  beginning  to  partnership  in  Strathclyde  from  1985  onwards,  as 
opposed  to  the  rest  of  the  UK  where  the  process  did  not  start  until  1989/90, 
enabled  an  institutional  structure  to  develop  in  the  Region  without  any  model 
available  for  imitation.  Thus,  Scottish  practice  did  not  just  follow  the  lead  set  in 
the  rest  of  the  UK,  and  in  particular  by  the  DTI  and  DoE.  The  European 
Commission  wanted  to  ensure  'local'  involvement  in  order  to  reduce  its  reliance 
upon  member-states,  and  whilst  the  NPCI  and  IDO  were  innovative  measures 
involving  large  sums  of  money,  they  were  certainly  in  a  position  to  insist  that  both 
structures  were  not  dominated  by  central  government.  Equally  important 
however,  was  the  role  of  SRC  in  pushing  for  an  integrated  package  of  funds,  and 
correspondingly  the  extensive  role  the  Council  held  in  the  early  partnership 
arrangements  in  Strathclyde,  where  an  input  into  the  partnership's  objectives  was 
desired  in  order  to  fund  the  Council's  economic  and  social  strategies.  Thus  by 
1989,  Strathclyde  had  a  partnership  structure  in  place,  which  had  proved  largely 
satisfactory  to  the  main  participants  and  which  was  drafted  onto  the  other 
145 Scottish  partnerships  which  arose  out  of  the  1989  Reforms  of  the  Structural 
Funds. 
The  regulations  regarding  the  implementation  of  the  Structural  Funds  require 
only  that  a  'Monitoring  Committee'  is  established  to  implement  the  Single 
Programming  Documents,  and  a  permanent  programme  executive  to  administer 
the  funds.  In  England  and  Wales,  these  instructions  were  followed  to  the  letter, 
and  this  is  all  that  the  partnership  arrangements  amount  to,  with  the  programme 
executive  being  staffed  by  central  government  officials.  The  Programme 
Monitoring  Committee's  (PMC's)  established  in  England  and  Wales,  were 
criticised  for  being  too  large  or when  PMC's  were  reduced  in  size  along  the  lines 
of  the  SEP,  they  were  still  viewed  as  being  dominated  by  central  government. 
For  instance,  Garmise  (1996)  found  in  the  case  of  Wales,  "a  consistent  attempt 
by  the  Welsh  Office  to  retain  centralised  control  over  economic  development, 
actively  resisting  the  partnership  principle  inherent  in  European  programmes.  In 
fact,  the  Welsh  Office's  concern  with  control  has  led  it  to  place  the  Secretariat  in 
charge  of  Structural  Funds  in  the  Welsh  Office  itself'  (Garmise,  1996,  p.  10). 
The  experience  of  partnership  in  Strathclyde  (  and  subsequently  Scotland)  does 
not  resemble  the  scenario  sketched  out  for  England  and  Wales,  a  situation  of 
which  the  European  Commission  was  aware  of,  for  instance  a  former  European 
Commissioner  commented  :- 
"I  could  never  get  the  DTI  to  accept  it  (the  SEP  model)  in  England,  we  tried  very 
hard  to  get  them  to  accept  it  for  Merseyside,  which  they  didn't.  I  would  say  that 
from  my  point  of  view,  it  was  easier  to  deal  with  the  Scottish  Office  than  either  the 
Welsh  Office  or  the  DTI...  Merseyside  send  letters  all  the  time,  and  its  only  just 
started  and  I  believe  it  continues  now.  They  say  we  don't  know  what  is  going  on, 
there  is  a  lack  of  information,  there  is  no  accessibility  and  its  all  being  run  in  a 
bureaucratic  way"  (Case  45). 
English  and  Welsh  local  authorities  lobbied  DGXVI  on  the  possibilities  of 
obtaining  a  similar  structure  in  their  regions,  as  a  former  member  of  Bruce 
MiIlan's  'Cabinet'  noted  :- 
146 "authorities  in  England  and  Wales  lobbied  to  have  that  sort  of  operation.  There 
were  certainly  strong  efforts,  particularly  the  South  Wales  RECHAR  authorities 
with  Wyn  Davies  MEP,  arguing  that  they  should  do  the  same  in  South 
Wales....  We  felt  it  worked  well.  It  was  a  good  operation,  I  think  the  Scottish 
Office  accepted  that.  We  would  like  to  encourage  it.  It  certainly  had  a  lot  of 
resistance  when  we  worked  with  the  DTI  and  we  can't  insist  on  it,  it  has  to  be  a 
partnership"  (Case  32). 
Anderson  (1990)  states  that  "clusters  of  interorganisational  relationships  at  the 
domestic  level  reflect  the  underlying  distribution  of  resources  among  actors,  and 
endow  them  with  different  capabilities  and  vulnerabilities  as  they  seek  to  cope 
with  changes  administered  to  their  policy  environment  by  the  EC"  (Anderson, 
1990,  p.  417).  However,  Anderson  goes  on  to  depict  UK  SNAs  as  'resource 
weak'  and  thus  dominated  by  central  government  within  the  policy  arena  of  the 
Structural  Funds.  However,  the  Scottish  Office  were  dealing  with  a  sub-national 
authority  during  the  1980's  which  was  certainly  as  'resource  rich',  in  terms  of 
experience  with  dealing  with  the  Commission  regarding  ERDF  and  ESF  funding 
as  the  Scottish  Office  and  was  thus  able  to  shape  the  policy  environment  in 
terms  of  partnership,  whilst  the  Scottish  Office  fulfilled  a  'gatekeeping'  role.  As 
these  'resource  dependencies'  changed  over  time,  for  the  reasons  outlined 
above,  the  Scottish  Office  remained  committed  to  the  form  partnership  had  taken 
in  Scotland,  through  maintaining  this  'gatekeeping  role'.  Keating  and  Jones 
(1995)  viewed  the  European  policy  environment,  as  an  arena  where  In  the  past, 
the  Scottish  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  Welsh  Office  were  able  discreetly  to  bend 
UK  policy  initiatives  or  modify  their  implementation  in  areas  of  low  political 
salience"  (Keating  and  Jones,  1995,  p.  101).  The  implementation  of  partnership 
in  Scotland  can  certainly  be  viewed  as  one  such  instance  of  this  occurring. 
The  divergent  approaches  taken  to  implement  partnership  in  Scotland  and  the 
rest  of  the  UK,  was  widely  commented  upon  by  interview  respondents,  and 
frequently  used  as  an  example  of  the  close  and  co-operative  relations  which 
existed  between  local  institutions  and  the  Scottish  Office.  As  discussed  above, 
decisions  were  taken  on  the  basis  of  consensus  whilst  respondents  were  unable 
147 to  recall  any  examples  of  the  Scottish  Office  (or  the  European  Commission) 
vetoing  project  applications.  From  the  perspective  of  the  Scottish  Office,  the 
partnership  model  in  Scotland  whilst  being  participative,  inclusive  and  offloading 
the  administrative  costs  onto  an  outside  structure,  still  enabled  the  Scottish  Office 
to  oversee  the  process. 
Whilst  the  decision-making  process  within  the  partnership  was  characterised  by  a 
consensual  approach,  this  is  not  to  imply  that  there  was  not  a  hierarchy  between 
'partners'  within  the  SEP.  As  outlined  above,  the  European  Commission  was 
clearly  able  to  influence  the  development  strategy  of  the  partnership,  whilst  the 
Scottish  Office  performed  a  'gatekeeping  role'  as  it  is  the  authority  with  the  final 
legal  responsibility  for  the  management  of  the  funds  and  it  occupied  the  key 
positions  within  the  SEP  through  holding  the  chairmanship  of  the  main 
committee's  (the  Programme  Monitoring  and  Management  Committee's).  In 
addition,  SRC  held  a  key  role  through  its  designation  as  a  `lead  partner',  and  due 
to  the  extensive  role  of  the  Council  in  the  negotiations  for  the  NPCI  and  IDO,  as 
well  as  initially  being  the  main  beneficiary  from  the  funds.  With  the  entrance  of 
the  LECs  into  the  partnership  and  the  shift  away  from  infrastructure  schemes,  the 
enterprise  companies  have  become  an  increasingly  influential  set  of  partners 
within  the  SEP.  Thus  the  influence  of  an  organisation  within  the  partnership,  is 
reliant  upon  the  extent  of  engagement  with  European  funding,  the  level  of 
expertise  which  the  organisation  brings  allied  to  its  importance  within  the  local 
policy  environment.  SRC  was  particularly  important  in  the  NPCI  and  IDO,  as  it 
was  the  principal  development  actor  within  Strathclyde  which  was  represented  in 
the  partnership.  In  short,  influence  within  SEP  depends  upon  the  resources 
which  the  organisation  brings  to  the  partnership  whether  these  be  in  terms  of 
information,  expertise,  finance,  policy-making  or  legal.  An  official  from  the  Chief 
Executive's  Department  described  the  practice  of  partnership  within  the  SEP's 
committees,  in  the  following  manner:  - 
148 "Certainly  some  partners  are  more  equal  than  others.  I've  felt  that  the  Regional 
Council  is  more  equal  than  others  given  that  we've  been  one  of  the  major 
beneficiaries  of  the  programme  at  least  in  financial  terms,  we  are  also  the  agency 
that's  covering  the  whole  programme  area.  There  are  180  agencies  involved,  but 
a  lot  of  these  are  only  one  single  project  specific,  but  there  are  only  a  limited 
number  that  have  a  real  strategic  interest  in  the  economic  development  across 
the  whole  spectrum  of  activities  that  entails.  So  we  would  include  obviously,  the 
local  authorities  and  since  1992,  the  LEC's.  Only  in  one  or  two  exceptional 
circumstances,  would  you  say  that  the  Scottish  Office  were  in  any  sense  dictating 
the  operation.  -There's  obviously  one  or  two  things  which  do  happen,  for 
example,  central  government  schemes  were  able  to  short  circuit  the  normal 
appraisal  process  and  get  approved"  (Case  12). 
Once  partnership  structures  were  in  place  in  Strathclyde  prior  to  1989,  it  may 
have  been  politically  sensitive  for  the  Scottish  Office  to  attempt  to  reduce  the 
input  from  local  actors,  in  order  to  come  into  line  with  wider  UK  practice,  as  a 
senior  SEP  official  commented  :- 
"The  Scottish  Office  know  that  if  they  were  to  try  and  reverse  this  trend,  they're 
not  taking  me  on  or  us  in  here  [the  Programme  Executive],  who  they  could  sweep 
aside  quite  easily,  they're  taking  on  something  like  150  agencies  in  Strathclyde 
including  people  like  Scottish  Enterprise  and  the  LEC's,  they  would  not  like  the 
fact  that  things  were  going  back  into  central  control  or  the  local  authorities  or 
anybody  else.  So,  I  think  the  momentum  has  got  such  that  the  Scottish  Office 
would  find  it  very  difficult  to  reverse  the  trend"  (Case  43). 
However  it  seems  unlikely  that  the  Scottish  Office  would  want  to  reverse  the  form 
that  partnership  had  taken  in  Scotland.  In  part,  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
Scottish  Office  continued  to  have  a  substantial  degree  of  control  over  the  process 
through  the  positions  it  holds  within  the  SEP,  thus  ensuring  that  SEP  policy  does 
not  contradict  government  policy.  The  Scottish  Office  was  also  aware  that 
relations  between  central  and  local  government  had  been  largely  amicable,  as 
both  levels  of  government  had  a  shared  interest  in  ensuring  that  the  maximum 
amount  of  funding  came  to  Strathclyde.  Even  where  conflicts  of  interests  did 
arise,  such  as  over  additionality,  SRC  tended  to  pursue  these  in  a  non- 
confrontational  manner  relying  upon  expressing  the  Council's  view  behind  closed 
doors  rather  than  in  the  public  spotlight.  In  the  view  of  a  Scottish  Office  official, 
the  relationship  between  SRC  and  the  Scottish  Office  was  one  where  "we  knew 
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This  official  then  went  on  to  compare  the  approach  of  SRC  to  that  of  English  local 
authorities,  which  in  his  view  "were  trying  to  do  a  Strathclyde  thing,  but  without 
Strathclyde's  subtlety  or  diplomacy"  (Case  43). 
The  trust  which  developed  within  the  SEP  due  to  the  close  relations  between 
actors  within  the  Scottish  policy  community,  certainly  seems  to  have  been  an 
element  of  its  success.  In  addition,  SRC  (and  the  rest  of  Scottish  local 
government)  were  only  too  aware  of  the  situation  in  England,  and  would  not  want 
to  be  seen  to  be  endangering  the  distinctive  nature  of  the  partnership  process  in 
Scotland.  Finally,  the  Scottish  Office  had  also  been  keen  since  the  late  1980's  to 
develop  relations  with  the  Commission  and  to  distance  the  Scottish  Office  from 
the  Commission's  view  of  Whitehall,  in  order  to  develop  what  Mazey  and  Mitchell 
term  the  'Euro-profile'  of  the  Scottish  Office.  A  senior  Scottish  Office  official  took 
the  view  that  "the  Scottish  Office  get  on  better  with  the  Commission  than  any 
Whitehall  department,  because  we  in  the  Scottish  Office  have  always  been 
treated,  not  necessarily  regarded  as  such,  but  always  treated  as  an  intermediate 
arm  of  government,  and  we  are  entirely  comfortable  dealing  with  European 
Commission  officials,  because  they  are  not  significantly  different  in  terms  of  the 
power  relationship  with  a  Whitehall  department"  (Case  43).  The  stance  of  the 
Scottish  Office  cannot  be  solely  attributed  to  its  role  as  a  territorial  ministry,  as 
the  Welsh  office  acted  in  a  completely  different  manner104.  However  the  desire 
of  the  Scottish  Office  to  accentuate  the  distinct  status  of  Scotland  within  the  UK, 
appears  to  have  been  part  of  a  concerted  effort  by  the  Scottish  Office,  as  the 
aforementioned  official  went  on  to  comment:  - 
"The  one  thing  we  all  now  know,  is  that  Scotland  is  different,  that's  about  all 
we've  managed  after  six  or  seven  years  of  banging  the  drum  and  bashing  heads. 
The  problem  with  the  Commission  is,  that  they  keep  changing  desk  officers,  and 
that  makes  our  job  that  bit  harder.  But  that  said,  I  think  the  European 
Commission  collectively,  to  the  extent  that  it  thinks  collectively  has  a  fairly  good 
104Garmise  (1997),  provides  an  interesting  account  of  Welsh  Office  efforts  to  limit  the  extent  of 
local  input  into  the  Structural  Fund  partnerships  in  Wales,  where  turf  battles  and  parochial 
infighting  still  remain  a  conspicuous  feature  of  the  Welsh  landscape"  (Garmise,  1997,  p.  14). 
150 impression  of  Scotland,  and  recognises  certainly  in  terms  of  the  Structural  Funds 
that  we  are  not  different,  but  that  we  do  things  differently.  In  whatever  terms  they 
are  thinking,  they  prefer  our  approach,  to  what  they  see  south  of  the  border" 
(Case  43). 
In  this  sense,  the  Scottish  Office  approach  to  partnership  post-1989,  can  also  be 
partly  viewed  as  part  of  a  broader  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Scottish  Office  to 
appear  'Euro-friend  ly'  vis-a-vis  the  European  Commission. 
5.7  -  Conclusions. 
The  extent  to  which  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership,  provides  evidence 
supportive  to  proponents  of  multi-level  governance  is  somewhat  mixed.  The 
SEP  certainly  provides  an  example  of  an  institution  which  has  brought  together  a 
wide  range  of  actors  from  all  tiers  of  government  and  governance,  with  these 
actors  interacting  within  'complex  patterns  of  mutual  influence',  within  an 
institution  in  which  no  single  institution  is  sovereign  or  even  overly  dominant. 
The  extent  to  which  European  funding  can  be  considered  to  have  engendered  a 
process  of  'region-building'  is  rather  more  problematic,  given  the  close  knit 
horizontal  networks  which  already  exist  between  local  development  actors  in 
Strathclyde  and  the  'territorial'  basis  to,  relations  between  local  actors  and  the 
Scottish  Office.  Instead  it  would  seem  more  likely  that  the  development  of 
partnership  in  Strathclyde  is  at  least  in  part  attributable  to  the  strong  ties  which 
bound  together  institutions  within  the  region  through  a  wider  Scottish  'policy 
community'.  The  existence  of  a  central  government  department  which  was 
willing  to  identify  common  goals  with  local  actors,  and  allow  areas  of 
confrontation  to  be  by-passed  enabled  the  variety  of  institutions  within  the  SEP  to 
co-operate. 
The  development  of  partnership  in  Strathclyde  occurred  not  purely  as  a 
consequence  of  a  top-down  bargain  between  the  European  Commission  and  the 
member-state  onto  the  region,  but  also  due  to  the  activism  of  SRC  in  lobbying 
the  European  Commission  for  an  integrated  package  of  funds,  and  then  through 
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NPCI  and  IDO.  Thus  the  early  development  of  partnership  in  Strathclyde  is 
attributable  as  much  to  bottom-up  pressures  as  to  top-down  stimuli  and  therefore 
the  initial  partnerships  in  Strathclyde  cannot  be  viewed  as  analogous  to  Harding's 
'shotgun  partnership'.  Indeed,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  Reforms  of  the 
Structural  Funds  in  1989  perhaps  limited  the  scope  for  further  innovation  with 
partnership  in  Strathclyde  as  the  partnership  process  became  more  formalised 
and  widespread.  Finally,  the  view  that  partnership  can  be  viewed  as  a  process  of 
`decisional  reallocation'  upwards  to  the  Commission  and  downwards  to  the 
region  is  a  somewhat  simplistic  version  of  partnership  in  Strathclyde.  Whilst  the 
process  has  certainly  enabled  the  European  Commission  to  pursue  its  policy 
priorities  within  Strathclyde,  most  notably  the  shift  from  hardware  to  software 
projects,  and  enabled  local  actors  to  have  an  input  into  the  SPD,  the  member- 
state  remains  central  to  the  process.  In  the  SEP,  the  Scottish  Office  pursued  a 
'gatekeeping'  role,  in  terms  of  chairing  the  main  committees  of  SEP  and  on  the 
advisory  groups  which  it  did  not  chair,  through  retaining  the  right  to  veto 
membership  to  advisory  groups.  Nevertheless,  the  Partnership  was  significant  in 
that  the  Scottish  Office  did  not  use  this  formal  position  of  power  to  any  great 
extent,  instead  allowing  the  process  to  go  ahead  as  far  as  possible  via 
consensus,  whilst  SRC  certainly  relied  heavily  upon  Scottish  Office  support  for 
it's  policies  during  the  NPCI  and  IDO  negotiations. 
The  role  SRC  played  in  obtaining  the  NPCI  and  the  IDO  can  certainly  be 
regarded  as  one  of  the  most  significant  outcomes  from  SRC's  `pioneer  policies 
towards  Europe  in  the  early  to  mid-I  980's.  However,  this  role  at  the  forefront  of 
partnership  did  not  last  long  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  Firstly,  a  recognition  of  the 
growing  importance  of  European  funding  and  it's  impact  at  the  local  level  within 
the  Scottish  office  and  a  corresponding  mobilisation  in  terms  of  staff,  resources 
and  policy  on  the  part  of  the  Scottish  Office  in  response.  Secondly,  the  Reform 
of  the  Structural  Funds  in  1989  ensured  that  there  would  be  little  chance  of  an 
SNA  being  able  to  negotiate  a  deal  similar  to  the  IDO,  given  the  increasingly 
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within  Strathclyde  in  line  with  Commission  policy,  ensured  that  there  was 
increasing  competition  for  funding  and  correspondingly  SRC's  share  of  funding 
fell.  Equally,  new  actors  within  the  partnership,  in  particular  the  LECs,  were  able 
to  bring  'resources'  to  the  SEP  such  as  knowledge  of  the  economic  development 
measures  pursued  in  the  Region,  which  previously  SRC  had  dominance  over. 
Finally,  the  shift  from  hardware  to  software  projects,  reduced  SRC's  share  of 
funding  and  also  took  funding  away  from  departments  which  traditionally  had 
benefited  from  infrastructure  projects  under  the  NPCI  and  IDO  such  as  Roads,  to 
the  advantage  of  departments  such  as  Strathclyde  Business  Development. 
Once  again,  this  was  a  Commission  policy  which  reduced  the  influence  of  SRC 
within  the  partnership.  In  this  sense,  multi-level  governance  must  be  viewed  as  a 
set  of  power  relationships  which  constantly  transform  themselves,  and  in  which 
Commission  decisions  can  not  only  empower  SNAs  but  also  reduce  their 
influence. 
Nevertheless,  SRC's  success  in  obtaining  European  funding  through  the  NPCI 
and  IDO,  certainly  legitimised  the  European  policies  of  the  Council,  and  enabled 
other  initiatives  to  be  taken  which  did  not  have  quite  such  transparent  motives  as 
SRC's  interest  in  an  integrated  approach  to  European  funding.  The  most 
significant  example  of  such  a  policy  was  the  Ecos-Ouverture  programme,  which 
is  the  subject  of  Chapter  Six. 
153 Chapter  Six  -  The  Ouverture  Programme  and  Strathclyde  Regional  Council, 
1990  -  97. 
6.1  -  Introduction. 
The  Reform  of  the  Structural  Funds  in  1989  was  notable  for  the  increase  in  the 
scale  of  funding  and  the  attempt  to  co-ordinate  the  priorities  of  EC  financial 
instruments.  However,  the  1989  Reforms  had  another  major  impact  upon  the 
European  policies  of  SRC  external  to  those  involving  the  Strathclyde  European 
Partnership.  The  Reforms  also  allowed  for  10%  of  the  EC  Structural  Fund 
budget  to  be  allocated  in  the  form  of  `Community  Initiatives'  (Cis).  As  the  name 
of  these  programmes  implies,  Cis  are  EC-wide  measures  which  aim  to  tackle 
particular  issues  or  sectors.  The  setting  aside  of  10%  of  funding  in  the  form  of 
Cis  was  widely  viewed  as  a  significant  strengthening  of  the  autonomy  of  the 
Commission  within  the  sphere  of  regional  policy,  as  George  (1996)  exemplifies  :  - 
"Even  more  favourable  to  the  autonomy  of  the  Commission  were  the  Community 
Initiatives  (Cis)  to  tackle  the  problems  of  particular  industries.  Ten  per  cent  of  the 
funds  were  aside  for  Cis,  for  which  the  Commission  did  not  even  have  to  work 
with  a  Management  Committee.  The  Cis  provided  the  Commission  with  an  even 
more  powerful  tool  for  pursuing  an  independent  and  genuinely  Community 
regional  policy.  Focusing  on  particular  industries  that  were  in  decline,  such  as 
steel  or  coal  industries,  the  Ci's  were  agreed  between  consortia  of  regional  and 
local  authorities  and  the  Commission  without  necessarily  involving  national 
governments  at  all"  (George,  1996,  p.  239). 
Within  the  budget  line  for  the  Cls  however,  326m  ECU105  was  earmarked  for 
what  were  termed  `Article  10'  projects.  Schemes  developed  through  Article  10 
finance  were  required  to  be  small-scale  pilot  projects  or  studies  which  were 
innovative  in  terms  of  the  approach  taken  with  regard  to  regional  policy,  and 
through  encouraging  co-operation  between  sub-national  authorities  (SNAs).  The 
European  Commission  (or  more  accurately  DGXVI)  contended  that  :  - 
"the  innovative  nature  of  these  actions  lies  not  just  in  their  objectives  but  also  in 
the  types  of  partnerships  that  they  foster  through  bringing  together  Local  and 
Regional  Authorities  as  well  as  a  wide  variety  of  economic  and  social 
105  The  Funding  for  Article  10  projects  of  326m  ECU  was  spread  over  a  four  year  period,  from 
1989-93. 
154 actors.....  The  underlying  philosophy  of  Article  10  of  the  ERDF  Regulation  stems 
from  the  need  to  encourage  innovatory  development  based  on  the  exchange  and 
co-operation  in  the  traditional  regional  policies,  both  at  national  and  Community 
level.  This  process  shall  speed  progress  towards  economic  and  social  cohesion 
within  the  context  of  an  internationalisation  of  the  economy"  (European 
Commission,  1995,  p.  8). 
The  pilot  period  for  Article  10  from  1989  to  1993,  witnessed  projects  being 
developed  within  four  main  policy  areas:  -  spatial  planning;  cross-border  co- 
operation,  co-operation  networks  between  towns  and  regions;  and  urban 
problems.  This  chapter  deals  with  one  Article  10  project,  the  Ouverture 
programme  "which  was  the  largest  Article  10  programme  between  1989  to  1993 
in  terms  of  funding,  with  a  budget  of  £6m"  (SRC  Minutes,  September  1992). 
Ouverture106  was  an  external  regional  co-operation  measure  which  aimed  at 
encouraging  co-operation  between  regions  in  Eastern  and  Western  Europe.  The 
network  was  managed  by  SRC  with  co-operation  from  three  partner-regions  in 
Western  Europe  and  the  European  Commission  (DGXVI),  with  no  member-state 
involvement. 
The  previous  chapter  considered  the  evolution  of  partnership  in  Strathclyde 
within  a  context  which  brought  together  European,  national  and  local  interests 
together  within  varying  institutional  settings  and  evaluated  the  extent  to  which  the 
interests  of  these  actors  were  able  to  shape  the  development  of  partnership  in 
Strathclyde.  This  chapter  deals  with  the  same  questions  as  those  considered 
with  regard  to  partnership  with  the  exception  that  central  government  had  no 
formal  role  within  Ouverture.  Instead,  Ouverture  provides  an  opportunity  to 
evaluate  the  evolution  of  an  institution  which  brought  together  SNAs  and  the 
European  Commission  within  an  institutional  setting.  Therefore,  this  chapter 
focuses  upon  avenues  of  enquiry  developed  in  Chapter  Two  : 
106  The  Ouverture  programme  merged  with  a  similar  project  in  1995  named  F-COS,  thus 
becoming  the  'ECOS-Ouverture'  programme.  This  process  will  be  considered  later  in  this  chapter 
however,  the  pre-1  995  programme  shall  be  termed  Ouverture,  and  the  post-1995  programme  as 
'ECOS-Ouvefture'  in  this  chapter. 
155 9  Where  sub-national  actors  enter  into  institutional  relationships  with  outside 
actors,  how  do  relationships  between  these  actors  evolve  over  time? 
"  Which  actors  dominate  these  relationships? 
"  How  extensive  is  the  influence  of  SNAs  within  such  relationships? 
Analyses  of  multi-level  governance  tend  to  focus  upon  whether  power  has  been 
eroded  from  member-state  control,  in  either  an  upwards  direction  to  European 
Institutions  or  downwards  to  SNAs.  The  Ouverture  programme  provides  a  case- 
study  of  Commission  -  SNA  relations  over  a  seven  year  period  across  three  main 
axes  which  arise  from  the  questions  outlined  above.  Firstly,  the  manner  in  which 
the  policies  of  DGXVI  (and  the  European  Commission)  evolved  with  regard  to 
Ouverture,  Article  10  projects  and,  the  role  of  SNAs.  Secondly,  the  objectives  of 
SRC  with  regard  to  developing  'concrete'  policies  with  the  European 
Commission,  and  the  consequences  of  the  Ouverture  experience  upon  these 
priorities.  Finally,  the  Ouverture  programme  also  entailed  co-operation  between 
SNAs  and  therefore  enables  an  analysis  of  the  extent  to  which  SNAs  were  able 
to  collaborate  and  of  the  tensions  that  emerged  within  this  relationship. 
In  order  to  consider  these  issues,  this  chapter  is  split  into  three  main  sections. 
Section  6.2  deals  with  the  original  structure,  aims  and  objectives  of  the  Ouverture 
programme,  whilst  also  considering  the  motivations  behind  the  Commission's 
and  SRC's  involvement  in  the  scheme.  Section  6.3  considers  the  process  of 
continual  change  within  Ouverture  throughout  its  entire  existence,  but  particularly 
between  1990  to  1994.  In  relation  to  this  process  of  change  the  increasingly 
prominent  role  of  the  European  Commission,  in  terms  of  shaping  the  direction  in 
which  Ouverture  developed,  is  examined.  Section  6.4  deals  with  the  merger 
between  Ouverture  and  ECOS,  and  the  resultant  structure  of  the  new  project, 
whilst  also  elaborating  on  the  impact  of  these  acrimonious  negotiations  upon  the 
Commission.  Moreover,  the  impact  of  wider  developments  within  European 
Institutions  with  regard  to  Article  10  projects  upon  Ouverture  is  also  discussed. 
However  it  is  to  the  origins  of  the  initial  Ouverture  programme  and  the 
156 motivations  of  its  principal  actors  (SRC  and  the  Commission)  that  I  now  intend  to 
turn. 
In  essence,  the  development  of  the  Ouverture  programme  is  considered  from  a 
multi-level  governance  perspective  with,  in  particular  the  motivation  for  SRC's 
participation;  the  degree  of  influence  which  SNAs  (primarily  SRC)  exerted  over 
the  development  of  the  programme;  and  the  means  via  which  SRC  exerted 
influence;  with  regard  to  the  Ouverture  programme  being  the  principal  focus  of 
this  chapter. 
6.2  1-  The  Origins  and  Structure  of  Ouverture. 
The  origins  of  the  Ouverture  were  the  result  of  a  conversation  in  early  1990 
between  an  SRC  official  from  the  Chief  Executive's  department  and  a  DGXVI 
official  at  an  AER107  Conference  in  Vienna.  The  official  from  SRC  suggested 
that  the  recent  developments  in  Eastern  Europe  offered  a  potential  role  for 
RETI108,  due  to  the  network's  "experience  of  the  traditional  industrial  regions, 
which  had  been  through  a  process  of  rapid  job  loss  and  transition.  Looking  at 
industry  in  Eastern  Europe,  they're  going  to  go  through  exactly  the  same  process 
in  spades,  you've  [referring  to  DGXVI]  got  an  opportunity  here  to  get  RETI  and 
the  RETI  regions  to  help  regions  in  the  East  which  are  about  to  go  through  that 
sort  of  process"  (Case  14).  A  couple  of  months  later,  DGXVI  contacted  the  same 
official  regarding,  whether  in  place  of  RET1109,  SRC  would  be  willing  to 
"organise  a  network  of  all  the  Western  European  regions  to  link  with  the  Eastern 
European  regions"  (Case  14). 
107  AER  stands  for  the  Association  of  European  Regions.  Chapters  Four  and  Seven,  outline  the 
functions  of  this  trans-regional  network  and  the  role  of  SRC  within  it. 
i°  RETI  stands  for  the  Traditional  Industrial  Regions  of  Europe'.  Once  again,  Chapters  Four 
and  Seven  consider  the  function  of  this  network  and  the  role  of  SRC  within  it,  in  greater  detail. 
However  it  is  worth  noting,  that  SRC  may  have  been  keener  to  advance  the  interests  of  RETI 
over  those  of  AER,  due  to  the  reservations  SRC  held  regarding  AER  and  the  increasingly 
prominent  role  of  SRC  within  RETI,  in  the  run-up  to  the  renegotiation  of  the  Structural  Funds  in 
1992  (See  Chapters  Four  and  Seven  for  greater  detail). 
109  Chapter  Four  mentioned  some  of  the  concerns  DGXVI  may  have  had  with  the  effectiveness 
of  RETI  as  an  organisation,  and  this  may  have  been  partly  responsible  for  vesting  the  lead  role  in 
this  programme  to  SRC. 
157 There  appeared  to  be  a  general  consensus  amongst  SRC  officials  that  "by  1990, 
Strathclyde  had  quite  a  good  name  in  Europe,  and  one  of  the  reasons  why  we 
were  successful  in  this  programme  and  so  on,  was  that  people  had  an  ability  to 
deliver'  (Case  44).  The'good  name'  which  SRC  had  obtained,  at  least  within 
DGXVI,  can  be  attributed  to  the  success  the  Council  had  had  in  lobbying  for  and 
then  managing  (through  the  secondment  of  its  officials)  the  NPCI  and  IDO,  which 
due  to  the  scale  of  these  schemes  were  bound  to  have  made  an  impact  upon  the 
'collective  consciousness'  of  DGXVI.  In  addition,  SRC  had  become  increasingly 
active  within  a  range  of  networks,  notably  RETI,  whilst  the  appointment  of  Bruce 
Millan  as  the  Commissioner  for  Regional  Policy,  is  unlikely  to  have  done  SRC 
any  harm.  The  structure  for  the  programme  that  DGXVI  had  already  devised  for 
the  network  certainly  appeared  to  consolidate  the  view  that  the  Commission  had 
faith  in  'the  ability  of  SRC  to  deliver.  DGXVI  outlined  an  organisational  structure 
for  the  network  that  assigned  the  overall  management  of  the  programme  to  SRC, 
in  co-operation  with  a  number  of  'partner  regions',  which  SRC  was  free  to 
approach  and  select.  The  European  Commission  approved  the  Ouverture 
programme  in  December  1990,  for  a  pilot  period  running  from  July  1991  to 
December  1993,  with  an  initial  budget  of  £6m  for  this  period. 
6.2.2  -  The  Structure  of  the  Ouverture  Programme. 
The  Ouverture  programme  was  innovative  not  only  in  the  sense  that  it  brought 
together  regions  in  both  Eastern  and  Western  Europe  under  the  auspices  of  an 
EC  programme  for  the  first  time,  but  also  through  the  decentralised 
organisational  structure  of  the  network.  Upon  being  approached  by  the 
European  Commission  to  manage  the  programme,  SRC  had  contacted  three 
other  regions  as  to  their  willingness  to  become  involved  in  the  management  of 
the  programme.  DGXVI  had  commented  to  an  SRC  official  that  the  Commission 
would  prefer  if  SRC  did  not  involve  the  "mega-regions"(Case  14)  such  as 
Catalonia  and  Bavaria,  and  accordingly  SRC  approached  `lower  profile'  regions 
with  whom  the  Council  had  already  developed  links,  through  participation  within 
158 RETI.  These  regions  were  :-  Asturias  (Spain),  Piemonte  (Italy)  and,  Saarland 
(Germany). 
Ouverture  was  established  with  two  broad  objectives.  These  were  "to  encourage 
European  Integration  and  support  moves  to  democratic  government  and  a 
market  economy  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe"  (Ouverture,  1994,  p.  1).  This 
was  to  be  achieved  through  "the  creation  of  a  network  of  multi-lateral 
partnerships  between  regions  and  local  authorities  in  the  EC  and  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe"  (Ouverture,  1994,  p.  1).  More  specifically,  Ouverture  was  to 
finance  projects  that  encouraged  co-operation  between  regions  across  the 
spheres  of  regional  democracy,  regional  services,  economic  development  and, 
the  environment. 
The  Ouverture  programme  consisted  of  three  main  components,  the  'Head 
Office',  'Local  Offices'  and,  the  'Steering  Group'.  The  Ouverture  'Steering  Group' 
provided  overall  direction  for  the  network,  in  that  it  set  the  aims  and  objectives  of 
the  programme,  and  conducted  negotiations  regarding  finance  and  relations  with 
outside  organisations.  The  committee  consisted  of  representatives  of  the  four 
partner-regions  (i.  e.  SRC,  Asturias,  Piemonte  and,  Saarland)  and  an  official  from 
DGXVI,  with  SRC  holding  the  Chairmanship  of  the  Steering  Group.  The  Head 
Office  of  the  network  was  concerned  with  the  administration  of  the  programme  on 
a  day  to  day  basis,  in  terms  of  monitoring  the  progress  of  projects  and  relations 
with  'local  offices'.  The  Head  Office  was  located  in  Glasgow  and  consisted  of 
four  members  of  staff  seconded  from  SRC.  The  'Local  Offices'  managed  the 
day-to-day  organisation  of  individual  projects,  and  formed  the  main  contact  point 
for  regions  in  Eastern  and  Western  Europe  wishing  to  become  involved  in  the 
Ouverture  programme.  Each  'local  office'  was  given  a  particular  geographical 
area  to  manage  projects  within,  and  thus  would  become  the  contact  for  regions 
within  these  locations,  for  instance,  SRC  managed  projects  involving  regions 
from  the  UK,  Eire,  Czechoslovakia  and  Yugoslavia.  Figure  6.1,  depicts  the 
159 organisational  structure  of  Ouverture  and  the  geographical  competences  and 
staff  numbers  of  each  office. 
Clearly  in  terms  of  the  organisational  structure  of  the  network,  SRC  held  a  pivotal 
role  through  holding  the  Chair  of  the  Steering  Group,  provision  of  staffing  and 
facilities  for  the  Head  Office  and  through  operating  a  local  office.  Despite  the 
extensive  influence  SRC  held  within  the  programme,  DGXVI  carried  the  financial 
burden  for  Ouverture.  Each  partner  region  contributed  £131,000p.  a.  or  6.4%  of 
the  programmes  running  costs,  resulting  in  the  European  Commission  financing 
74.5%  of  Ouverture's  expenditure  (SRC  Minutes,  September  1992). 
The  European  Commission  was  willing  to  finance  Ouverture  and  endow  it  with  a 
decentralised  structure  as  the  programme  represented  not  only  an  attempt  to 
tackle  economic  and  political  change  in  Eastern  and  Central  Europe  at  the  sub- 
national  level  but  also  on  the  Commission's  side  there  was  a  desire  to  put 
subsidiarity  into  practice  by  giving  regions  a  chance  to  run  activities  themselves, 
and  to  develop  a  concrete  aspect  to  the  'Europe  of  the  Regions'  notion"  (Watkins, 
S,  1994,  p.  1).  SRC  would  also  frequently  allude  to  the  federalist  backdrop  to  the 
programme.  For  instance,  SRC  Council  Minutes  termed  Ouverture  "an 
innovative  grass  roots  approach  to  European  integration  and  regional 
development,  which  builds  on  the  idea  of  the  Europe  of  the  Regions"  (SRC 
Minutes,  September  1992). 
160 FIGURE  6.1  -  The  Institutional  Structure  of  Ouverture. 
Ouverture  Steering  Group 
Exercises  strategic  and  political  control  over  Ouverture.  Consists  of  one 
representative  from  the  four  `partner  regions  and  DGXVI.  Meets  twice  a  year. 
4 
Head  Office 
Exercises  executive  control  over  the  day-to-day  direction  of  the  programme. 
Liases  with  local  offices,  partner-regions,  DGXVI  and  other  external 
organisations.  Consists  of  four  full-time  members  of  staff,  seconded  from  SRC. 
Head  Office  located  in  Glasgow. 
4 
Local  Offices 
Exercise  control  over  the  implementation  and  monitoring  of  individual  projects. 
A)  Strathclyde  -  Responsibility  for  projects  involving  regions  from  the  UK,  Eire, 
Czechoslovakia  and  Yugoslavia.  Two  full-time  members  of  staff,  seconded  from 
SRC. 
B)  Asturias  -  Responsibility  for  projects  involving  regions  from  Spain,  Portugal 
and  Bulgaria.  Two  full-time  members  of  staff. 
C)  Piemonte  -  Responsibility  for  projects  involving  regions  from  Italy,  Greece 
and  Hungary.  Two  full-time  members  of  staff. 
D)  Saarland  -  Responsibility  for  projects  involving  regions  from  Germany, 
Belgium,  France,  Luxembourg  and  Poland.  Two  full-time  members  of  staff. 
Source  :-  SRC  Minutes,  beptemAer  1  yyz. 
161 Whilst  SRC  may  have  been  prepared  to  lend  support  to  the  prospect  of  a  'Europe 
of  the  Regions,  the  authority  had  other  more  familiar  motivations  for  involvement 
in  the  programme.  In  direct  terms,  whilst  SRC  contributed  £131,000  per  annum 
to  the  network,  the  Region  received  over  £1  m  in  spending  under  the 
management  budget  of  the  programme,  through  financing  the  head  office  and  a 
'local  office'  of  Ouverture  (SRC  Minutes,  September  1992).  Thus,  SRC  obtained 
a  direct  financial  gain.  However  the  Regional  Council  also  expected  to  obtain  a 
range  of  less  directly  quantifiable  (yet  nevertheless  significant)  benefits  through 
the  Council's  extensive  involvement  with  Ouverture.  These  potential  benefits 
ranged  from  the  potential  of  enabling  firms  within  Strathclyde  to  have  improved 
access  to  Eastern  and  Central  European  markets,  to  the  Regional  Council 
expanding  its  expertise  in  obtaining  finance  from  European  sources  through 
involvement  in  the  network.  In  terms  of  SRC's  European  policy,  managing  the 
EU's  largest  Article  10  project  would  certainly  do  nothing  to  diminish  the 
Council's  reputation  within  trans-regional  networks  such  as  AER  and  RETI,  and 
perhaps  most  importantly  within  DGXVI.  Table  6.2  outlines  the  perceived 
benefits  of  involvement  in  Ouverture,  as  outlined  in  a  paper  by  the  Chief 
Executive's  Department  and  presented  to  SRC  Councillors  at  the  second 
meeting  of  the  European  and  International  Affairs  Committee  in  September  1992. 
162 Table  6.2  -  The  Benefits  to  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  of  Involvement  in 
Ouverture. 
Strathclyde's  central  management  role  helps  to  maximise  the  benefits  which 
Ouverture  can  bring  to  the  region.  These  include  :  - 
1)  Business  Links  -  As  the  economic  centre  of  the  EC  moves  East,  Strathclyde 
is  becoming  economically  more  peripheral.  Ouverture  is  creating  a  centre  of 
knowledge  and  expertise  to  assist  Strathclyde  firms  in  making  business  links  with 
the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe....  A  European  Business  Group,  chaired  by  the 
Chair  of  the'Economic  and  Industrial  Development  Committee'  has  been  set  up 
to  develop  the  opportunities  provided  by  Ouverture,  and  help  overcome  these 
growing  locational  disadvantages.  Businesses  contacted  through  this  group 
have  accompanied  Ouverture  on  visits  to  Eastern  Europe  and  promising  contacts 
have  been  made  and  are  being  pursued. 
2)  New  Funding  Opportunities  -  The  expertise  and  links  developed  by 
Ouverture  increase  opportunities  for  access  to  many  new  funding  sources. 
These  include  the  UK  Government's  'Know  -  How  Fund',  the  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction  and  Development's  'Municipal  Fund'  and,  the  EC's  PHARE, 
TEMPUS  and  ACE  programmes. 
3)  Expertise  -  Ouverture  is  able  to  provide  advice  and  help  to  other  regional 
services  (departments  of  the  Council)  through  its  contacts,  particularly  with  the 
EC  and  the  partner  regions. 
4)  Training  -  Ouverture  provides  a  wide  range  of  opportunities  for  SRC  staff  and 
others  in  the  local  community  to  acquire  European  experience. 
5)  Profile  -  Ouverture  is  the  largest  Article  10  ERDF  project  in  Europe.  It's 
successful  development  reflects  well  on  the  Council  in  the  European  sphere  and 
beneficially  affects  the  image  of  the  authority  in  Brussels.  Piemonte  and 
Saarland  have  helped  strengthen  the  Council's  European  alliances  and 
increased  its  power  to  lobby  on  other  issues110.  Ouverture  is  also  a 
demonstration  to  the  local  community  and  to  the  UK  Government  of  what  a 
region  with  the  resources  and  expertise  of  Strathclyde  can  achieve  on  the 
international  scene  which  would  not  be  possible  for  smaller  local  government 
units. 
Source  :-  SRG  Committee  rapers,  September  1992. 
SRC  was  certainly  pro-active  in  attempting  to  realise  these  potential  benefits,  for 
instance,  Strathclyde  Business  Development  (SBD)  ran  trade  missions  to  all  of 
the  Western  European  Ouverture  partner  regions  and  to  a  number  of  regions  in 
Eastern  Europe  which  the  Council  had  contacts  with  through  Ouverture.  From 
the  perspective  of  SRC  officials  within  SBD,  the  Ouverture  programme  offered 
163 development  opportunities  as  long  as  "you  are  confident  that  you  are  doing  them 
[SME's  in  Strathclyde]  a  favour"  (Case  15).  A  concern  was  expressed  by  an 
SBD  official  that  the  department  was  rather  'bounced'  into  organising  trade 
missions  with  regions  who  had  political  relations  with  SRC,  as  "if  you  put  two 
politicians  in  a  room  from  different  parts  of  the  world-they  will  come  out 
expressing  undying  fraternity"  (Case  15).  Nevertheless,  the  interviews  amongst 
SRC  official's  external  to  Ouverture  exhibited  a  good  knowledge  of  the  network, 
and  on  a  couple  of  occasions  SRC  staff  had  obtained  practical  assistance  from 
Ouverture  officials.  For  example,  an  official  from  the  Education  Department  had 
received  advice  from  Ouverture  officials  on  obtaining  EC  finance  from  the  Lingua 
programme. 
The  initial  structure  of  the  Ouverture  programme  as  agreed  between  the 
European  Commission  and  the  `partner  regions'  was  modified  considerably 
during  the  programme's  initial  pilot  period  between  1991  and  1993/4,  as  a 
consequence  of  pressures  both  internal  and  external  to  the  network.  It  is  the 
process  of  ongoing  change  within  the  network  during  this  time  period,  that  I  now 
intend  to  turn. 
6.3.1.  -  Continuous  Change  :-  Ouverture  1991-94111. 
That  the  Ouverture  programme  should  have  experienced  considerable  change 
upon  being  implemented  is  not  in  itself  particularly  surprising,  given  that  Article 
10  projects  were  intended  to  be  experimental  in  nature.  However  what  is  of 
interest  here,  is  the  nature  of  the  process  of  change  that  took  place,  and  for  a 
programme  that  intended  to  operationalise,  to  some  extent,  the  slogan  of  a 
'Europe  of  the  Regions'  to  what  extent  Ouverture's  'partner-regions'  (and 
specifically  SRC)  were  active  or  passive  agents  in  these  processes.  Between 
1991  and  1993,  three  main  issues  significantly  altered  the  structure  of  Ouverture 
110  This  is  a  reference  to  SRC's  close  relations  within  RETI  to  the  other'partner  regions',  and  the 
prominent  role  which  SRC  took  with  regard  to  lobbying  for  the  retention  of  Objective  Two  Funding 
in  1992. 
164 as  outlined  above.  Firstly,  the  structure  and  geographical  coverage  of  the 
network  was  constantly  under  review.  Secondly,  Ouverture  began  to  obtain 
finance  from  sources  other  than  Article  10,  resulting  in  the  introduction  of  new 
interests  into  the  programme.  Finally,  the  creation  of  a  new  network  with  a 
similar  structure  and  function  as  Ouverture,  resulted  in  new  pressures  upon  the 
network. 
6.3.2.  -  The  Changing  Structure  and  Geographical  Coverage  of  Ouverture. 
The  Ouverture  programme  was  reasonably  successful  in  its  first  two  years  of 
being  operational,  in  terms  of  the  amount  of  projects  it  succeeded  in  establishing. 
By  the  end  of  1992,  Ouverture  had  approved  35  projects  involving  90  SNA's  from 
across  the  EC112.  In  addition,  the  programme  had  a  membership  of  600  local 
and  regional  authorities  of  which  350  were  located  within  the  EC,  the  remainder 
coming  from  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  However  over  100  project  applications 
had  been  made  to  Ouverture  by  the  end  of  1992,  whilst  the  programme  had 
spent  virtually  all  of  its  'project  funding'  with  a  year  of  the  programme  still  to  run, 
despite  having  transferred  some  monies  from  its  'management  budget'  to 
projects  in  1992.  As  a  consequence,  SRC  approached  the  Commission  in 
November  1992,  with  a  request  for  a  further  £1.39m  for  the  project  fund  in  1993, 
and  £2.23m  of  finance  to  enable  a  one  year  extension  of  the  programme  into 
1994  (SRC,  November  1992).  Agreement  was  subsequently  reached  along 
these  lines  with  the  European  Commission  providing  a  further  £3.7m  of  finance 
to  cover  the  approval  of  projects  in  1993,  and  an  extension  of  the  project  into 
1994.  However  linked  to  this  extension  of  the  programme  and  the  increasing 
funding  being  allocated  by  DGXVI,  was  the  proviso  that  the  programme  should 
expand  into  Albania,  Romania  and  the  Baltic  States  in  1994.  As  a  result  of  this 
agreement,  the  financial  contribution  of  each  'partner  region'  increased  to 
£186,000  (at  1993  prices)  from  the  previous  £131,000  p.  a.  (at  1991  prices). 
111  The  Ouverture  programme  was  granted  a  one  year  extension  to  its  pilot  period  in  1993,  and 
accordingly  this  section  will  deal  with  some  issues  which  occurred  in  1994. 
112  Of  these  90  SNA's,  34%  were  from  regions  designated  as  Objective  One  and  32%  from 
regions  designated  as  objective  Two  (SRC,  November  1992). 
165 However  given  the  larger  than  expected  number  of  projects  being  financed  and 
the  extension  of  the  programme,  this  contribution  amounted  to  each  `partner 
region'  contributing  4.2%  (or  cumulatively  16.8%)  of  the  programme's  costs 
(SRC,  April  1993).  As  a  result,  the  contribution  of  each  partner  region  to  the 
programme  had  fallen  by  2.2%. 
The  use  of  finance  as  a  lever  via  which  the  Commission  could  direct  the 
development  of  Ouverture  in  terms  of  both  geographical  coverage  and 
organisational  structure  would  be  a  common  motif  between  1991  and  1997.  In 
the  two  other  major  extensions  to  Ouverture's  geographical  coverage,  other 
issues  were  directly  linked  to  the  expansion  of  the  programme.  In  1994 
Ouverture  expanded  to  include  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS), 
with  the  expansion  being  linked  by  the  Commission  to  closer  consultation 
between  Ouverture  and  a  similar  Article  10  project,  ECOS.  As  a  result 
programmes  approved  for  the  CIS  were  considered  by  a  separate  'Steering 
Group'  that  consisted  of  both  Ouverture  and  ECOS  representatives.  The 
Commission  provided  a  considerable  incentive  to  agreement,  by  providing  the 
vast  majority  of  the  funding,  with  each  'partner  region'  and  ECOS  making  only  a 
'symbolic  contribution'  of  £4,000  p.  a.  (  and  the  creation  of  four  new  posts  in 
Glasgow113),  whilst  the  Commission  provided  the  remainder  of  the  £2.5m  of 
funding  (SRC,  November  1993).  Finally,  the  expansion  of  ECOS-Ouverture  to 
the  Mediterranean  'Third'  Countries114  in  1995,  was  tied  to  the  successful 
outcome  of  merger  negotiations  between  the  two  networks  (SRC,  May  1995). 
Each  extension  was  initiated  by  an  informal  approach  by  the  Commission  to  SRC 
regarding  the  possibility  of  an  extension  to  the  programme115.  Ouverture  would 
113  All  ECOS-Ouverture  projects  were  managed  by  the  Ouverture  head  office,  thus  accounting 
for  the  extra  posts  being  located  in  Glasgow. 
114  The  Mediterranean  'Third'  Countries  are  :-  Algeria,  Cyprus,  Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan,  Lebanon, 
Malta,  Morocco,  Syria,  Palestinian  Territories,  Tunisia  and  Turkey. 
115  Not  every  informal  approach  made  by  the  Commission  was  however  taken  up  by  the  'partner 
regions',  for  example  when  approached  as  to  the  possibility  of  extending  the  network  into  South- 
166 then  issue  a  formal  submission  for  extra  funding  to  cover  the  extension.  For 
instance,  with  regard  to  the  programmes  extension  into  the  CIS,  SRC  Committee 
Papers  note  :  - 
"In  October,  DGXVI  of  the  European  Commission  made  an  informal  approach  to 
the  Regional  Council  inviting  it  to  consider  an  extension  of  its  Ouverture  activities 
to  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States"  (SRC,  November  1993). 
As  an  Ouverture  official  commented  with  regard  to  these  extensions  :- 
"It's  part  of  their  political  agenda,  and  its  driven  by  DGI  really  pushing  DGXVI,  to 
look  at  the  overall  picture  of  the  external  relations  of  the  Commission.  So  that 
was  very  much  pushed  by  the  Commission"  (Case  26). 
In  addition  to  a  significant  expansion  in  the  scale  of  the  programme,  the  network 
also  underwent  a  number  of  changes  in  terms  of  its  organisational  structure 
between  1991  and  1994.  The  first  change  to  Ouverture's  institutional  structure 
occurred  in  October  1993,  with  the  accession  of  Midi-Pyrenees  to  the  Ouverture 
Steering  Group  and  the  creation  of  a  new  local  office  in  the  region  with 
responsibility  for  projects  emanating  between  France,  Romania,  Latvia  and 
Estonia116.  The  introduction  of  a  French  region  to  the  network's  management 
structure  was  intended  to  address  the  comparatively  low  number  of  French 
regions  involved  with  the  network,  and  accordingly  "improve  the  balance  of  the 
partnership  and  make  Ouverture's  operation  more  effective"  (SRC,  October 
1993).  An  'effective  operation'  in  France  would  become  increasingly  important 
as  the  Commission  increasingly  stressed  the  importance  of  co-operation  with 
ECOS117  from  1992  onwards.  At  the  end  of  1994  a  Danish  region,  West 
Zealand,  became  the  sixth  'partner-region',  on  this  occasion  to  cope  with  the 
accession  of  Sweden  and  Finland  to  the  EU.  Accordingly,  West  Zealand  dealt 
with  projects  involving  regions  from  Denmark,  Sweden  and  Finland.  Both  these 
East  Asia,  the  partner-regions  declined,  as  `our  partners  felt  that  our  interests  didn't  lie  there" 
(Case  44). 
116  Projects  involving  Lithuanian  regions  were  previously  handled  by  the'local  office'  in  Saarland, 
whilst  Projects  involving  Albanian  regions  were  managed  by  the  Piemonte  office. 
117  ECOS  was  managed  by  CEMR  which  was  closely  associated  with  French  regions  and 
municipalities.  The  headquarters  of  CEMR  are  located  in  Paris,  whilst  the  President  of  CEMR 
throughout  the  merger  negotiations  with  Ouverture  was  the  Mayor  of  Strasbourg. 
167 'partner-regions'  contributed  financially  to  Ouverture  on  the  same  basis  as  the 
original  members.  Accordingly,  the  Commission's  burden  of  the  overall  cost  of 
the  programme  had  fallen  by  the  end  of  1994  to  74.8%.  In  addition  to  the 
introduction  of  new'partner  regions',  'local  offices'  were  given  a  more  prominent 
role  in  the  administration  of  the  network,  reflected  in  an  increase  in  their  staffing 
levels  (see  Table  6.2).  Lastly,  SRC's  Finance  Department  audited  the  network  in 
1993/4  following  concerns  regarding  the  financial  propriety  of  other  Article  10 
projects. 
The  second  change  to  Ouverture's  institutional  structure  came  as  a  consequence 
of  concern  amongst  EU  member-states  over  Article  10  funding.  Concern 
amongst  member-states  centred  upon  the  fraudulent  use  of  Article  10  finance, 
whilst  the  Court  of  Auditors  began  investigating  Article  10  projects  in  1994,  in 
order  to  address  these  concerns118.  As  a  consequence,  the  Council  of 
Ministers  ruled  that  an  expert  panel  should  be  established  to  vet  the  decisions 
made  on  Ouverture  projects  by  the  network.  An  official  within  the  Chief 
Executive's  Department  who  was  closely  involved  in  the  negotiations  surrounding 
the  establishment  of  Ouverture,  described  the  conditions  which  resulted  in  this 
decision,  in  the  following  manner  :  - 
"The  member  states  were  not  happy  with  the  original  basis,  which  was  that  the 
Ouverture  partnership,  were  deciding  upon  projects,  and  they  insisted  upon  the 
Commission  setting  up  an  expert  panel  who  had  to  have  the  approval  of  the 
member  states  to  oversee  the  decisions  on  individual  projects.  Now  that  we 
could  not  object  to,  because  the  problem  was  that  we  were  simultaneously  on 
occasions  applicant  and  judge  and  jury,  and  that  was  not  a  tenable  long-term 
solution"  (Case  14). 
The  ability  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  to  influence  the  structure  of  an  Article  10 
project  clearly  signals  the  extent  to  which  the  Commission  was  concerned  with 
the  implementation  and  accountability  of  Article  10  projects.  A  further  symptom 
of  concern  on  the  part  of  the  Commission  is  evident  in  that  SRC  had  expressed 
the  desire  that  Ouverture  develop  into  a  'Community  Initiative'  thus  removing  the 
168 experimental  nature  of  the  programme,  and  had  communicated  this  view  to 
Bruce  Milian.  However  this  option  was  never  taken  up  by  DGXVI  (SRC,  October 
1993).  Of  equal  significance,  was  the  ability  of  member-states  to  exert  influence 
upon  structures  that  were  formally  outside  their  competence.  Table  6.3  outlines 
the  organisational  structure  of  the  Ouverture  programme  at  the  end  of  1994. 
Its  The  impact  of  the  Court  of  Auditors  report  into  Article  10  projects  (published  in  1996),  will  be 
discussed  later  in  this  chapter. 
169 Table  6.3  -  The  Organisational  Structure  of  the  Ouverture  Programme,  end 
of  1994. 
Ouverture  Steerin  g  Group.  ECOS  -  Ouverture  Joint  Steerin  g 
Group  for  CIS  Projects. 
Representati  ves  of  the  six  partner  Two  representatives  from  Ouverture 
regions,  DGXVI  and  DGI.  u  (both  SRC)  and  ECOS,  plus  a 
SRC  holds  the  Cha  ir.  u  DGXVI  and  DGl  official.  Chair 
u  i  i  11  rotates  every  six  months  between 
11  n  nu  ECOS  and  Ouverture.  u 
u  n  nunun  u 
u  n  nunun  u 
u  n  nunun  u 
u  11  11  u  ft  Un  u 
u  ý1  fGGGOuverture  Expert  Panel.  11  U 
u  11  Power  to  make  individual  project  approvals,  11  u 
after  selection  by  Ouverture  Head  Office  ft  u 
u  11  and  Steering  Group.  Consists  of  8  `experts',  ft  u 
u  11  including  ECOS/Ouverture  nominees.  Chaired  n  u 
11  11  by  the  European  Commission.  11  11 
u  n  unn  u  N--<-=-=G  Head  Office.  ==ýý==  ft  u 
u  Overall  responsibility  for  administration  u 
=>=>=>=:  >=>=>=>=>=:  >of  Ouverture  projects  and  CIS  projects.  GGGGGG  = 
10  members  of  staff. 
u  nt 
un 
un 
un  Local  Offices. 
Number  of  Staff.  Responsibility  for  projects  from  : 
Asturias  One.  Spain,  Portugal  and  Bulgaria. 
Midi  -  Pyrenees  Three.  France,  Estonia,  Latvia  and 
Romania. 
Piemonte  Five.  Greece,  Italy,  Albania  and  Hungary. 
Saarland  Five.  Belgium,  Germany,  Luxembourg, 
Netherlands,  Lithuania  and  Poland. 
Strathclvde  Four.  Austria,  Ireland,  UK,  Czech 
Republic,  Slovak  Republic  and 
Slovenia. 
West  Zealand  Two.  Denmark,  Sweden  and  Finland. 
Source:  -  SRC,  May  1995. 
170 6.3.3.  -  The  Impact  of  PHARE  and  TACIS  funding  upon  Ouverture. 
Whilst  the  Ouverture  programme  was  intended  to  deal  with  the  political  and 
social  transformations  taking  place  in  the  former  'Soviet  bloc',  the  finance  which  it 
received  from  the  European  Commission  could  only  be  spent  within  EU 
boundaries.  As  a  consequence  SNAs  from  non-EC  countries  were  often  unable 
to  become  involved  in  a  project  due  to  a  lack  of  finance.  This  had  been  a 
particular  problem  for  the  network,  for  instance,  SRC  'Committee  Papers'  noted 
with  regard  to  an  application  for  funding  by  Ouverture  from  TACIS,  that  :  - 
"The  lack  of  available  finance  for  Central  European  partners  has  been  a  source 
of  regret  for  them  within  the  Ouverture/ECOS  Programmes,  and  one 
which  sometimes  restricts  their  ability  to  become  involved.  The  inclusion  of 
matching  finance  for  CIS  partners  would  allow  project  proposals  to  be  properly 
balanced,  and  guarantee  full  and  effective  participation  from  the  Eastern  side" 
(SRC,  November  1993). 
Accordingly,  the  Ouverture  programme  began  to  access  finance  from  two  EU 
scheme's  (PHARE  and  TACIS)119,  which  enabled  money  to  be  allocated  outside 
EC  boundaries.  Initially,  Ouverture  entered  into  negotiations  with  the 
Commission  regarding  obtaining  PHARE  finance  upon  the  suggestion  of  Bruce 
Millan,  and  with  the  subsequent  expansion  into  the  CIS,  the  programme  took  the 
same  approach  towards  TACIS  funding. 
The  introduction  of  these  external  sources  of  financed  20  into  the  Ouverture 
programme,  resulted  in  the  introduction  of  additional  interests  into  the 
programme,  principally  in  the  form  of  DGI121  as  both  PHARE  and  TACIS  are 
119  PHARE  (Pologne-Hongrie  :  Actions  pour  la  Reconversion  Economique)  is  an  EC  programme 
established  in  1989,  which  allocates  funding  for  economic  development  or'reconversion'  and 
policies  aimed  towards  the  'democratisation'  of  Poland  and  Hungary.  'Phare'  is  also  the  French 
for  lighthouse.  TACIS  shares  the  same  objectives  as  'PHARE',  and  is  targeted  at  the  CIS. 
120  The  PHARE  programme  injected  £2.25m  of  funding  into  the  Ouverture  programme  between 
1994  and  1996,  whilst  TACIS  provided  £1.5m  of  finance  over  the  same  period.  The  European 
Commission  provided  60%  match  funding  on  the  finance  from  both  programmes  (SRC,  February 
1994). 
121  DGI  deals  with  the  external  relations  of  the  European  Commission.  It  is  split  into  two  parts. 
DGIA  deal  with  European  and  the  new  independent  states,  common  foreign  and  security  policy 
and  external  missions.  DGIB  deals  with  the  Southern  Mediterranean,  Middle  East,  Latin  America, 
South  and  South-East  Asia  and  North-South  Cooperation. 
171 managed  by  DGI  (See  Table  6.3).  As  a  consequence,  Ouverture  officials  had  to 
become  attuned  not  only  to  the  policy  priorities  of  DGXVI,  but  also  of  DGI.  The 
'pillarised'  (Bomberg,  1996)  nature  of  the  European  Commission  is  well 
documented,  for  instance  Lodge  (1993)  comments  that  "this  bureaucracy  is  sub- 
divided  into  directorates-general  (DGs  -  each  comprising  around  250  people)  that 
broadly  mirror  administrative  responsibilities  for  given  policy  areas  which  are  not 
entirely  self-encapsulated  and  so  sometimes  give  rise  to  contradictory  or  not 
quite  compatible  initiatives  from  different  DGs  working  on  aspects  of  the  same 
policy  area"  (Lodge,  1993,  p.  6).  An  Ouverture  official  outlined  the  differing  policy 
goals  and  bureaucratic  environments  of  the  two  DGs  in  the  following  manner  :- 
"DGI  is  coming  from  the  benefits  to  the  Eastern  partner  projects,  that  is  what  they 
are  interested  in.  They  also  believe  in  small-scale  activity.  Their  bureaucratic 
mode  is  one  where  they  have  a  lot  of  responsibility  resting  at  desk-officer  level. 
A  big  budget  and  a  small  staff.  Desk  officers  have  a  lot  of  devolved 
responsibility.  Whereas  within  DGXVI  the  culture  is  very  much  more  hierarchical. 
So,  at  some  times  the  two  halves  have  had  difficulty  communicating  with  each 
other,  because  they  are  operating  at  different  levels.  DGXVI,  they  are  coming 
from  Regional  Policy,  their  interest  is  to  see  benefits  principally  to  Objective  One 
areas.  That  always  takes  precedence.  And  they  have  believed  that  bigger  is 
better,  so  they  have  tried  to  increase  the  scale  of  the  projects,  way  beyond  the 
level  that  DGI  really  want,  and  really  beyond  the  level  we  would  really  like"  (Case 
44). 
The  impact  of  DGI  policy  priorities  upon  the  network  was  certainly  most  evident 
through  its  promotion  of  the  interests  of  non-EU  regions,  for  instance,  a  sizeable 
proportion  of  PHARE  finance  was  used  to  establish  Ouverture  offices  in  Poland 
and  Hungary.  In  terms  of  Ouverture,  the  introduction  of  EU  Institutional  interests 
outside  of  DGXVI,  increased  the  complexity  of  managing  the  network  and 
assessing  Commission  plans  for  its  future.  Nevertheless,  the  impact  of  EU 
Institutions  other  than  DGXVI  upon  Ouverture  would  become  an  increasingly 
prominent  theme  post-1994. 
172 6.3.4.  -  The  Emergence  of  ECOS. 
In  January  1992,  the  European  Commission  and  CEMR122  (Council  of 
European  Municipalities  and  Regions)  established  a  network  which  was  based 
upon  similar  lines  to  Ouverture,  termed  the  'European  City  Co-operation  Scheme' 
(ECOS)  (Wenzel,  1993).  The  European  Commission  provided  the  Article  10 
project  with  3.4m  ECU  of  funding  to  be  targeted  at  co-operation  between  EU  and 
Central  and  Eastern  European  cities  across  four  policy  areas  :-  local  democracy, 
urban  services,  urban  policies  and,  the  environment.  Clearly,  the  two  networks 
had  comparable  objectives,  whilst  the  distinction  between  regions  and  urban 
areas  can  often  be  rather  arbitrary. 
The  similarity  between  the  two  networks  had  certainly  not  escaped  the  attention 
of  DGXVI.  In  1992,  when  Ouverture  had  approached  DGXVI  for  extra  funding  for 
1993  and  the  extension  of  the  programme  into  1994  (See  Section  6.3.2),  DGXVI 
had  responded  by  agreeing  to  additional  funding  on  the  basis  that  there  was 
increased  co-operation  between  the  two  networks.  Equally,  the  expansion  of 
Ouverture  into  Albania,  Romania  and  the  Baltic  States  was  a  measure  that 
brought  Ouverture  into  line  with  ECOS  which  upon  establishment  had  covered 
these  countries.  The  extension  of  Ouverture  into  the  CIS  involved  the  creation  of 
'Joint  Steering  Group'  with  EGOS  whilst  expansion  into  the  'Third'  Mediterranean 
was  shadowed  by  EGOS  and  the  two  networks  also  started  to  obtain  PHARE 
and  TACIS  finance  at  around  the  same  time. 
By  1994,  there  was  a  significant  degree  of  co-operation  between  ECOS  and 
Ouverture.  For  instance,  the  two  networks  produced  joint  promotional 
documentation  and  organised  joint  conferences  for  regions  involved  with  projects 
in  either  network.  Lobbying  of  the  Commission  for  the  continuation  of  both 
programmes  was  also  conducted  jointly  during  1994  (SRC,  November  1993). 
However,  the  European  Commission  informed  both  programmes  that  finance  for 
173 the  period  1995  to  1999,  was  only  available  on  the  condition  that  the  two 
networks  merged.  As  with  the  geographical  expansion  of  the  Ouverture 
programme,  despite  the  decentralised  decision-making  structure  of  the  network, 
the  Commission's  control  over  the  'purse-strings'  ultimately  determined  the 
destiny  of  Ouverture. 
6.3.5  -  Summary. 
The  period  of  Ouverture's  existence  from  1991  to  1994,  consisted  of  a  process  of 
continuous  change,  driven  almost  entirely  by  the  European  Commission.  This 
process  of  change  consisted  of  the  expansion  of  the  networks  geographical 
coverage  and  accordingly,  financial  resources;  the  introduction  of  policy  interests 
other  than  those  of  DGXVI,  through  the  involvement  of  DGI;  and,  a  process  of 
increasing  co-operation  with  ECOS,  resulting  in  the  merger  of  the  two  networks 
in  1995.  Nevertheless,  Ouverture  was  an  extremely  successful  Article  10  project, 
having  created  118  co-operation  project  during  these  four  years.  The  success  of 
Ouverture  during  this  period  would  become  apparent  in  the  outcome  of  the 
merger  negotiations  with  ECOS,  and  in  the  fact  that  the  European  Commission 
wanted  to  continue  with  the  'pilot  project'  until  1999,  with  the  administration  of  the 
network  remaining  with  the  same  Institutions.  However  it  is  to  the  merger 
negotiations  and  the  development  of  ECOS-Ouverture  between  1995  and  1997 
that  I  now  intend  to  turn. 
6.4.1  -  The  End  of  a  'Europe  of  the  Regions'  ?  :-  ECOS  -  Ouverture,  1995 
97. 
The  merger  negotiations  between  ECOS  and  Ouverture  were  extremely 
acrimonious,  with  a  settlement  not  being  reached  until  May  1995,  five  months 
after  ECOS-Ouverture  was  due  to  become  operational.  At  the  outset,  both 
EGOS  and  Ouverture  had  broadly  set  out  to  take  overall  control  of  the  new 
structure  for  their  respective  organisations.  As  the  discussions  proceeded,  it 
122  CEMR  brings  together  all  the  national  associations  of  SNA's  within  each  member-state,  for 
instance,  in  the  case  of  the  UK,  the  LGIB  (Local  Government  International  Bureau)  would 
represent  UK  SNA's  within  CEMR. 
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EGOS  and  Ouverture.  As  a  consequence,  the  major  differences  between  the 
two  networks  centred  upon  the  location  of  the  new  networks  headquarters  and 
the  division  of  responsibilities  between  the  two  structures.  Ouverture  focused  its 
lobbying  campaign  upon  emphasising  the  successful  record  of  the  network  and 
the  fact  that  Ouverture  employed  full-time  staff  dealing  only  with  Ouverture.  In 
contrast,  ECOS  was  managed  by  CEMR,  which  was  a  political  organisation 
intended  to  operate  as  a  lobbying  organisation,  whilst  SRC  was  keen  to  point  to 
the  problems  CEMR  had  experienced  with  'financial  irregularities'  (Case  26).  An 
SRC  official  who  had  a  prominent  role  in  these  negotiations  summarised  the 
arguments  used  as  follows  :  - 
"We  had  a  much  more  developed  management  structure,  and  we  had  a 
headquarters  office  specifically  for  Ouverture.  Also  the  programme  itself  started 
off  as  a  regional  programme,  and  the  city  programme  [EGOS]  came  later.  And 
there's  a  lot  of  rhetoric  that  comes  from  the  Commission  about  democratic  input 
into  these  kinds  of  programmes,  in  other  words  regional  authorities  being  directly 
involved  in  managing  the  programmes.  To  have  placed  the  headquarters  with  a 
huge  political  organisation  like  CEMR,  would  have  taken  away  from  that.  Also,  if 
the  Commission  was  serious  about  having  the  programme  managed  from  a 
peripheral  region  of  the  Community,  then  transferring  the  headquarters  to 
Brussels  or  Paris  wasn't  going  to  achieve  that"  (Case  13). 
From  the  EGOS  /  CEMR  perspective,  the  arguments  used  by  Ouverture/SRC 
were  underhand,  and  on  occasion  false.  The  comments  of  an  EGOS  official 
employed  as  part  of  the  merged  ECOS/Ouverture,  gave  the  following  impression 
of  the  negotiations  outcome,  which  highlights  the  bitterness  between  the  two 
organisations  :  - 
"The  Commission  bought,  if  you  like  the  story  from  Glasgow,  which  was  we  are 
professional  because  we  work  full-time  on  this  and  nothing  else,  whereas  CEMR 
they  are  a  political  body  and  one  of  their  activities  is  this,  but  it  is  not  their  only 
activity,  they  are  not  fully  committed  to  this  programme.  So  they  sold  this  story  to 
the  Commission  which  was  not  the  real  one,  but  they  bought  it,  and  even  a 
further  story,  there  was  an  emotional  side  to  it,  they  argued  that  CEMR  officials 
are  getting  a  wage,  but  if  Ouverture  does  not  get  the  programme,  we  are  on  the 
street,  we're  unemployed,  because  we  are  employed  for  this  programme.  And 
this  also  had  an  impact,  because  it  was  in  the  arguments  for  many  things"  (Case 
36). 
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to  leave  ECOS  and  Ouverture  to  hammer  out  an  agreement,  "with  the 
Commission  occasionally  coming  in  to  referee  it...  to  come  down  on  one  side  or 
the  other"  (Case  44).  In  part  the  distance,  which  the  Commission  put  between 
itself  and  these  negotiations,  may  have  reflected  an  increasing  sense  of 
disillusionment  with  ECOS/Ouverture  and  Article  10  projects  more  generally. 
The  only  shared  conclusion  to  emerge  from  these  negotiations  was  that  the 
whole  experience  had  been  "a  long  and  painful  process"  (Case  44). 
Nevertheless  agreement  was  reached  resulting  in  the  new  network  named, 
ECOS-Ouverture. 
6.4.2.  -  The  Structure  and  Obiectives  of  ECOS-Ouverture. 
Prior  to  the  conclusion  of  the  merger  negotiations,  DGXVI  had  already  outlined 
its  funding  proposals  for  the  period  1995-99.  The  Article  10  budget  for  the  five- 
year  period  was  set  at  400m  ECU  (as  opposed  to  326m  ECU  between  1989-93), 
with  Article  10  finance  being  targeted  into  four  priority  areas  :-  inter-regional,  intra 
and  extra  community  co-operation  (180m  ECU);  innovation  for  local  and  regional 
development  (90m  ECU);  spatial  planning  (45m  ECU);  and,  urban  policy  (80m 
ECU)  (European  Commission,  1995,  p.  8).  Ecos-Ouverture  came  under  the 
heading  of  `inter-regional,  intra  and  extra  community  co-operation'  and  shared 
this  categorisation  and  budget  of  1  80m  ECU,  with  two  other  projects  :-  PACTE 
and  RECITE  (European  Commission,  1995,  p.  16).  Within  this  budget  stream, 
DGXVI  allocated  30m  ECU  (£23.5m)  to  finance  Ecos-Ouverture  between  1995- 
99123.  Table  6.4  outlines  the  projected  contributions  of  the  various  partners  in 
Ecos-Ouverture  between  1995  and  1999,  whilst  Table  6.5  compares  the  SRC 
and  EC  contributions  between  two  time  periods,  1991  to  1994  and  1995  to  1999. 
Table  6.4,  illustrates  that  the  success  of  the  Ouverture  programme  was  reflected 
in  the  budget  of  Ecos-Ouverture  for  the  period  1995  to  1999,  with  not  only  the 
123  Ouverture  received  a  total  of  £11  m  in  EC  finance  between  1991  and  1994  (SRC,  October 
1994). 
176 overall  level  of  Article  10  finance  increasing,  but  also  the  expected  contribution 
from  the  PHARE  and  TACIS  schemes  was  projected  to 
increase  significantly,  thus  accounting  for  the  increasing  contribution  under  the 
'others'  column.  In  addition,  Table  6.4  displays  that  whilst  'partner-region' 
contributions  increased  in  absolute  terms  between  1995-99  (as  illustrated  by  the 
example  of  SRC),  the  contribution  of  a  partner-region  as  a  proportion  of  Article 
10  finance  (i.  e.  not  including  PHARE  and  TACIS  funding)  declined  from  8.1  %  to 
5.3%.  As  a  result,  given  the  experience  of  Ouverture  between  1991-94,  it  could 
be  expected  that  the  Commission  would  continue  to  direct  Ecos-Ouverture  in  the 
policy  direction,  which  it  desired  between  1995-99,  given  that  it  continued  to 
provide  the  vast  majority  of  finance  for  the  programme. 
Table  6.4  -  Financial  Contributions  to  ECOS-Ouverture.  1995-99(£m). 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  TOTAL  /o 
(EM)  (EM)  (EM)  (£M)  (£M)  1995-  CONTRIBUTION 
99(£M)  OF  EACH 
PARTNER', 
1995-99 
E.  C.  4.705  4.705  4.705  4.705  4.705  23.5  60.2% 
Others.  2.35  2.86  2.8  3.1  3.34  14.27  36.5% 
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SRC.  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  1.25  3.2% 
TOTAL  7.305  7.635  7.755  8.055  8.295  39.045  100% 
Source:  -  SRC,  October  1994. 
124  'Others'  refers  to  the  financial  contributions  from  'partner  regions'  (including  CEMR),  and 
expected  funding  from  PHARE  and  TACIS.  The  increase  in  funding  from  'others'  over  the  five- 
year  period,  reflects  the  increase  in  funding  expected  from  PHARE  and  TACIS  over  this  period. 
'Partner  regions'  would  contribute  at  the  same  level  as  SRC,  i.  e.  £250,000  p.  a. 
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99. 
YEARS.  E.  C.  GRANT  (EP.  A.  )  SRC  SRC 
(ARTICLE  10).  CONTRIBUTION  CONTRIBUTION 
(£P.  A.  ).  AS  A%  OF  E.  C. 
GRANT  (ARTICLE 
10). 
1991-94.  2,100,000  170,000  8.1 
1995-99.  4,700,000  250,000  5.3 
Source:  -  SRC,  October  1994. 
The  outcome  of  the  merger  certainly  left  no  doubt  that  the  Ouverture  'partners' 
had  certainly  gained  the  upper-hand  in  the  negotiations,  and  correspondingly 
would  benefit  most  from  the  expansion  in  Ecos-Ouverture's  budget.  The 
headquarters  of  Ecos-Ouverture  would  remain  in  Glasgow,  whilst  three  former 
Ecos  officials  would  be  responsible  for  projects  emanating  from  the  'Third' 
Mediterranean  countries,  obtaining  finance  from  the  PHARE  initiative  and 
managing  publications  and  marketing.  Ecos-Ouverture  would  be  headed  by  a 
'Steering  Group'  which  meets  twice  a  year  (analogous  to  Ouverture's  Steering 
Group'),  which  would  consist  of  representatives  of  DGXVI,  DGI,  the  six  Ouverture 
'partner-regions'  and  six  CEMR  'city  representatives'  as  well as  a  representative 
from  AER  and  CEMR.  As  a  result  the  'Ecus-Ouverture  Steering  Group'  was 
extremely  large  and  in  reality,  amounted  to  nothing  more  than  a  "symbolic 
meeting"  (Case  26)  of  the  various  organisations  involved  with  the  programme. 
Effective  management  was  undertaken  by  the  `Ecos-Ouverture  board'  which 
consisted  of  two  political  representatives  from  Ouverture  (a  SRC  politician125 
and  a  Piemonte  politician)  and  CEMR  (the  President  and  a  Vice-President  of 
CEMR).  The  Chairmanship  of  the  `board'  would  rotate  between  the  SRC 
125  Following  the  reorganisation  of  Scottish  local  government  in  April  1996,  the  SRC 
representative  was  replaced  by  a  Glasgow  City  Council  politician,  who  acted  on  behalf  of  the 
West  of  Scotland  European  Consortium'  MOSEC).  The  impact  of  reorganisation  upon  Ecos- 
Ouverture  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  Eight. 
178 representative  and  CEMR  President  every  six  months.  The  senior  official  of 
Ecos-Ouverture  was  the  former  head  of  the  Ouverture  programme. 
Despite  the  success  of  Ouverture  and  principally  SRC  (as  it  was  the  main 
beneficiary)  in  the  merger  negotiations,  the  tensions  which  existed  carried  over 
onto  the  organisational  structure  of  Ecos-Ouverture,  for  example,  through  the 
biannual  rotation  of  the  chairmanship  of  the  Ecos-Ouverture  board.  These 
tensions  continued  when  Ecos-Ouverture  became  operational,  notably  in  terms 
of  disputes  over  the  roles  of  the  headquarters  in  Glasgow  and  the  office  in 
Brussels  (which  is  the  CEMR  office  in  Brussels),  as  a  former  Ecos-Ouverture 
official  commented  :  - 
"The  battle  is  going  on  between  the  two  headquarters,  and  CEMR  with  the  sub- 
headquarters.  The  battle  is  going  on  there,  there  is  no  doubt  about  that"  (Case 
26). 
The  dominance  of  the  European  Commission  over  the  direction  in  which  Ecos- 
Ouverture  developed,  was  again  apparent  in  the  changing  objectives  of  the 
network  post-1994.  The  objectives  of  Ecos-Ouverture  for  1995-99  are  :  - 
1)  To  reinforce  economic  and  social  cohesion  by  promoting  the  involvement  of 
regions  and  cities  from  less  favoured  areas  of  the  European  Union  in  East- 
West  and  North-South  co-operation. 
2)  To  assist  in  the  economic  and  political  transition  of  Central  and  East 
European  regions  and  cities. 
3)  To  contribute  to  regional  development  and  the  modernisation  of  local  and 
regional  authorities  in  all  the  participating  areas. 
4)  To  foster  public  I  private  partnerships. 
Source  :-  http:  //serve.  com/homepages/is_ecos_ouverture/raisonde.  html  (1997). 
The  new  aims  of  the  programme  reflected  DGXVI's  desire  to  move  away  from 
the  overtly  political  role  of  the  network  (most  notably  through  providing  a  practical 
edge  to  the  term  `a  Europe  of  the  Regions')  towards  a  greater  emphasis  on  the 
179 economic  development  role  of  the  programme  and  an  increase  in  the  role  of  the 
private  sector  within  Ecos-Ouverture.  In  part,  this  was  due  to  the  high  demand 
for  economic  development  projects  where  Ouverture  had  experienced  during  the 
period  1991-1993,  that  "one  of  the  strongest  patterns  to  emerge  is  within  the 
spheres  of  co-operation  that  have  been  chosen  by  projects.  Projects  relating  to 
economic  development  matters  have  been  by  far  the  most  common,  accounting 
for  two-thirds  of  the  total"  (Watkins,  1994,  p.  4). 
However  the  increased  prominence  of  economic  development  as  the  prime 
rationale  for  the  network,  reflected  DGXVI's  policy  priorities,  for  example,  a 
senior  DGXVI  official  at  a  conference  reviewing  the  operation  of  Ecos-Ouverture 
stated  that  "our  creed  should  be  :  local  development,  local  development  and 
more  local  development"  (Leygues,  J,  1994,  p.  100).  In  addition,  this  shift  in  the 
emphasis  of  Ecos-Ouverture  reflected  concerns  within  DGXVI  regarding  the 
conflation  of  technical  and  political  functions  within  Article  10  funding.  The  power 
struggles  amongst  regional  'barons'  from  Ouverture  and  Ecos  would  merely  have 
exacerbated  these  concerns.  In  addition,  DGXVI  was  coming  under  pressure 
from  the  Court  of  Auditors  and  DGXX  (Financial  Control)  over  the  accountability 
and  financial  procedures  of  Article  10  projects.  It  is  these  'pressures'  and  the 
impact  of  them  upon  Ecos-Ouverture  post-1995,  that  I  now  intend  to  address. 
6.4.3.  -  DGXVI  and  the  retreat  from  a  `Europe  of  the  Regions'  :-  Ecos- 
Ouverture.  1995-97. 
The  distinction  between  technical  and  political  functions  within  an  Article  10 
project  was  a  theme  which  emerged  within  the  merger  negotiations,  where 
Ouverture  highlighted  this  distinction,  arguing  that  Ecos  should  not  be  in  control 
of  an  Article  10  project  as  the  organisation  was  a  political  structure  with  no 
administrative  capacities  apart  from  the  function  of  lobbying  EU  Institutions.  An 
Ouverture  official  stated  the  position  of  Ouverture  regarding  the  involvement  of 
CEMR  within  an  Article  10  project  in  the  following  manner:  - 
180 "CEMR  should  not  be  involved  in  running  the  programme,  because  they  are  a 
lobbying  group  and  an  information  service,  and  they  should  not  be  involved  in 
technical  assistance.  I  know  a  few  national  associations,  paying  their 
subscription  to  them,  who  are  absolutely  against  CEMR  running  any  technical 
assistance  scheme"  (Case  26). 
Whilst  Ouverture's  line  of  argument  may  have  been  effective  within  the  merger 
negotiations,  it  would  also  have  served  to  highlight  the  tension  between  the 
function  of  Ouverture  as  the  implementation  of  a  technical  assistance  programme 
combined  with  the  involvement  of  SNA  politicians  with  no  direct  links  to  the 
European  arena.  Throughout  the  period  from  1995  to  1997,  Ouverture  officials 
observed  increasing  impatience  within  the  Commission  at  the  role  of  SNA 
politicians  within  what  was  officially  a  technical  operation.  This  tension  was  not 
confined  to  Ecos-Ouverture  alone,  as  DGXVI  removed  the  organisation  of 
another  Article  10  project  named  RECITE  from  the  sub-national  network 
'Eurocities'  in  1996.  The  network  was  put  up  to  tender,  with  the  contract 
ultimately  being  won  by  a  French  private  consultancy.  Ecos-Ouverture  officials 
were  certainly  aware  of  a  growing  sense  of  disillusionment  within  DGXVI, 
concerning  the  involvement  of  sub-national  politicians  and  institutions  within 
Article  10  projects.  An  Ouverture  official  summarised  the  source  of  DGXVI's 
disillusionment  with  Ecos-Ouverture  in  the  following  manner:  - 
"You  have  to  feel  the  difference  between  what  the  Commission  calls  technical 
assistance,  and  the  lobbying  /  political  side  of  things,  and  the  Commission  don't 
like  those  two,  to  be  completely  mixed.  That's  what  we  are  doing  in  Ecos- 
Ouverture.  You  influence  them  on  the  policy  side  by  lobbying  them,  by  having  a 
dialogue,  once  they  make  a  decision,  you  work  with  that  decision.  I  think  for 
small  programmes,  targeted  programmes,  like  Ecos-Ouverture,  there  is  a  need 
for  technical  assistance  to  the  regions  and  cities,  for  the  sheer  technical  side  of  it. 
The  Commission  can't  process  applications  and  monitor  the  project,  they  don't 
have  the  staff.  So  I  understand  some  of  the  Commission's  impatience  with  Ecos- 
Ouverture,  because  for  them  it  is  a  technical  assistance  office"  (Case  26). 
In  contrast  representatives  of  SNAs  within  Ecos-Ouverture,  whilst  on  occasion 
recognising  the  problems  sub-national,  political  involvement  posed  for  the 
European  Commission,  nevertheless  considered  that  SNAs  Should  have  an 
overtly  political  role  within  Ecos-Ouverture  in  line  with  the  network's  earlier 
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the  EU  policy  process.  For  instance,  a  representative  of  Saschen-Anhalt,  which 
became  a  `partner-region'  in  June  1996126,  took  the  following  view  of  the 
political  role  of  SNAs  within  Ecos-Ouverture  :  - 
"Without  a  strong  political  body,  the  programme  has  no  chance,  because  a 
political  role,  and  the  political  dimension  of  the  programme,  which  means  the 
strong  involvement  of  the  regions  in  the  programme,  is  a  key  element  of  its 
success  or  its  weight"  (Case  41). 
Whilst  the  power  struggles  amongst  the  regional  'barons'  of  Ouverture  and 
CEMR  during  the  merger  negotiations  and  the  subsequent  operation  of  Ecos- 
Ouverture  would  have  drawn  attention  to  the  tension  between  the  political  and 
technical  assistance  functions  of  the  programme,  DGXVI's  impatience  with  the 
network  was  also  a  product  of  pressures  external  to  the  workings  of  Ecos- 
Ouverture.  These  pressures  stemmed  from  an  ongoing  investigation  by  the 
'Court  of  Auditors'  into  the  financial  practices  of  Article  10  projects,  and  as  a 
consequence  DGXX  (Financial  Control)  began  to  take  an  increasing  interest  in 
the  degree  of  'transparency'  in  Article  10  funding  i.  e.  where  and  the  uses  to 
which  Article  10  finance  had  been  put  ? 
Ecos-Ouverture  officials  were  well aware  of  the  increasing  tensions  between 
DGXVI  and  DGXX,  over  the  role  of  Article  10  finance127.  The  underlying 
philosophy  behind  Article  10  projects  was  that  power  (financial  and  decision- 
making)  could  be  devolved  away  from  the  Commission,  however  DGXX  took  the 
view  that  DGXVI  had  been  "delegating  powers  to  agencies,  which  they  do  not 
126  Saschen-Anhalt  replaced  Saarland  as  the  German  'partner-region',  within  Ecos-Ouverture  in 
June  1996.  Saschen-Anhalt  as  a  Länd  within  the  former  GDR,  was  therefore  of  relevance  to  the 
programme.  Saschen-Anhalt  had  also  come  into  contact  with  SRC  through  membership  of  AER 
and  RETI.  The  reason  for  Saarland  leaving  Ecos-Ouverture,  appear  partly  to  be  due  to  a  sense 
of  disappointment  in  the  development  of  the  programme,  however  primarily  due  to  internal 
political  developments  within  Saarland,  relating  to  budget  cutbacks  and  a  change  of  leadership 
within  the  Länd.  Saschen-Anhalt  took  over  all  of  the  Saarland's  financial  and  administrative 
responsibilities  (i.  e.  opened  a  'local'  office  dealing  with  projects  emanating  from  Belgium, 
Germany,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  Lithuania  and  Poland)  with  regard  to  Ecos-Ouverture  (Case 
41). 
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182 have  the  power  to  delegate"  (Case  44).  In  addition,  DGXX  was  concerned  over 
the  lack  of  financial  controls  put  in  place  by  DGXVI  within  Article  10  projects.  In 
response,  DGXVI  began  "drawing  back  functions.  There's  a  lot  of  codification 
going  on....  there  is  far  less  subsidiarity,  it  is  far  more  about  the  administration  of 
the  programme,  rather  than  developing  the  policies  ourselves"  (Case  44). 
DGXVI  also  attempted  to  pre-empt  the  'Court  of  Auditors'  report  into  Article  10, 
by  publishing  a  'policy  protocol'128  regarding  Article  10,  which  set  out  three  'key 
concerns'  with  the  current  implementation  of  Article  10.  These  were  that  there 
was  "a  need  for  simplification;  greater  clarity  in  the  policy  followed  by  the 
Commission;  and,  more  effective  methods"  (European  Commission,  1995,  p.  20) 
in  the  implementation  of  Article  10.  The  `policy  protocol'  made  recommendations 
concerning  the  organisational  structure  of  Article  10  projects  in  the  future,  via  :  - 
"the  establishment  of  a  system  able  to  operate  in  a  subsidiary,  complementary 
and  co-ordinated  way  (that  is,  on  three  separate  levels  of  responsibility)  to 
ensure  :  - 
A)  the  growing  involvement  of  the  Member  States; 
B)  the  active  participation  of  local  government  and  those  working  in  the  economy 
in  preparing,  implementing  and  assessing  the  programme; 
C)  careful  and  rational  project  management  and  effective  monitoring  by 
professional  bodies  selected  for  their  competence,  with  each  pilot  project 
directly  managed  by  the  regional  and  local  authorities  involved  in  it". 
(Source:  -  European  Commission,  1995,  p.  25). 
The  policy  protocol  clearly  considered  Article  10  projects  as  being  a  purely 
technical  function  of  the  Commission,  and  while  the  report  emphasised  the 
principle  of  subsidiarity  inherent  within  Article  10  projects,  it  also  introduced  a  role 
for  Member  States.  The  report  from  the  Court  of  Auditors  was  published  in 
August  1996,  and  dealt  with  a  series  of  Article  10  programmes  run  by  the 
Commission  in  the  Mediterranean.  The  'Court  of  Auditors'  report  "was  a  totally 
damning  indictment  on  the  operation  of  those  programmes"  (Case  44),  and  whilst 
the  report  did  not  deal  with  any  projects  run  by  Ecos-Ouverture,  the  ramifications 
128  A  'policy  protocol'  is  not  a  legally  binding  document,  however  it  serves  the  purpose  of  setting 
out  the  European  Commission's  priorities  within  an  area  of  policy. 
183 of  the  document  were  felt  within  all  Article  10  projects.  The  Court  of  Auditors 
made  five  main  criticisms  of  the  Commission  and  the  local  management  structure 
for  the  Mediterranean  programme,  known  as  the  'Agency  for  Trans- 
Mediterranean  Networks'  (ARTM).  The  criticisms  of  the  'Court  of  Auditors'  were 
as  follows  :  - 
A)  the  powers  conferred  upon  ARTM  constitute  in  effect  a  delegation  of  the 
powers  of  the  Commission  to  a  third  party  :  apart  from  the  fact  that  it  is 
doubtful  whether  in  this  case  there  is  a  legal  basis  for  such  a  delegation,  a 
decision  in  principal  to  that  effect  is  required,  which  can  only  be  taken  by  the 
Commission  itself.  No  such  decision  exists. 
B)  excessive  recourse  was  had  to  private  treaty  contracts,  without  proper 
tendering. 
C)  the  manner  in  which  contracts  were  awarded,  the  involvement  of  the  same 
consulting  firms  in  the  conception  of  the  programmes,  in  the  preparation  of 
financing  proposals,  in  the  management  of  ARTM,  and  in  the  technical 
monitoring  of  the  programmes  led  to  a  situation  in  which  serious  confusions  of 
interest  existed,  prejudicial  to  the  proper  management  of  Community  funds. 
D)  the  resources  and  procedures  of  the  Commission  for  monitoring  the 
implementation  of  the  MED  programmes  and  for  controlling  their 
decentralised  administration  were  inadequate  :  when  the  serious  confusions 
of  interest  referred  to  above  were  identified  by  the  Commission,  it  was 
ineffective  for  a  long  time  in  bringing  them  to  an  end. 
E)  serious  shortcomings  in  the  financial  management  of  the  programmes  at  the 
level  of  the  Commission  and  the  ARTM  were  identified. 
(Source:  -  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities,  1996,  p.  5-6). 
The  criticisms  within  the  Court  of  Auditor's  report  of  the  Mediterranean 
programmes  were  "not  directed  at  the  concept  of  decentralised  co-operation" 
(Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities,  1996,  p.  5),  but  rather  at  the 
implementation  of  the  programmes.  Nevertheless  the  Report  and  the  attentions 
of  DGXX  towards  Article  10,  had  a  considerable  impact  upon  the  decentralised 
structure  of  Ecos-Ouverture.  Officials  within  Ecos-Ouverture  recognised  that 
DGXVI  was  increasingly  taking  the  view  that  the  programme  was  merely  an 
agency  of  the  Commission.  In  part  this  reflected  an  increasing  institutionalisation 
of  relationships  as  the  programme  expanded.  For  instance,  officials  from  Ecos- 
Ouverture  began  having  regular  monthly  meetings  with  DGI  and  DGXVI  officials 
in  1996.  However,  this  also  reflected  a  concern  within  DGXVI  over  the 
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Ouverture  did  not  make  decisions  but  rather  implemented  and  administered 
Article  10  funds. 
Changing  attitudes  within  DGXVI  were  not  the  only  outcome  of  criticism  of  Article 
10  projects,  as  DGXVI  began  to  'draw  back'  functions  previously  carried  out  by 
Ecos-Ouverture  to  Brussels.  An  Ecos-Ouverture  official  described  the  rationale 
for  this  process  as  being  a  result  of  DGXVI  "seeking  to  protect  itself  against 
charges  that  have  been  laid  at  its  door  by  other  parts  of  the  Commission.  So  it  is 
going  through  this  process  of  drawing  powers  back  and  creating  these  much 
more  rigid  structures"  (Case  44).  The  extent  of  DGXX's  criticism  of  DGXVI's  role 
in  the  handling  of  Article  10  projects,  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  DGXX  refused 
to  allow  any  finance  for  Ecos-Ouverture  from  January  1996,  "in  order  to  force  the 
issue"  (Case  44)  over  Article  10  projects.  As  a  consequence,  the  Steering  Group 
of  Ecos-Ouverture  did  not  meet  in  either  1996  or  1997.  The  pressures  over 
Article  10  projects,  and  the  need  to  reassert  the  control  of  the  Commission  over 
them,  resulted  in  Ecos-Ouverture  being  put  up  for'open  tender  at  the  beginning 
of  1997.  The'open  tender'  consisted  of  Ecos-Ouverture  being  split  into  three 
'lots'  :-  Article  10  finance  covering  the  programmes  whole  area  minus  the  Baltic 
States  and  the  CIS;  PHARE  finance  for  the  Baltic  States;  and  TACIS  finance  for 
the  CIS.  The  motivations  for  this  disaggregation  of  Ecos-Ouverture  lay  in  the 
aforementioned  conflict  between  DGI  and  DGXVI  (See  Section  6.3.3), 
concerning  the  manner  in  which  Ecos-Ouverture  should  develop.  An  Ecos- 
Ouverture  official  described  this  process  as  follows  :  - 
"DGI  has  made  it  clear  informally  that  they  would  prefer  the  winners  of  the  three 
Lots  to  be  different.  The  reason  for  that  is  that  there  has  been  a  lot  of  tension 
between  DGI  and  DGXVI  over  the  development  of  the  programme  to  date.  They 
are  coming  from  different  ends  of  the  spectrum,  they  have  different  ways  of 
working  as  well.  And  that  sort  of  marriage,  which  we  have  tried  to  put  together, 
has  been  a  stormy  one.  If  the  finance  for  Lots  two  and  three,  is  coming  entirely 
from  PHARE  and  TACIS,  then  their  preference  is  to  have  a  separate 
management  organisation,  as  then  there  is  no  link  back  to  DGXVI"  (Case  44). 
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Ecos-Ouverture  officials  believed  that  the  tenders  were  most  likely  to  go  to 
private  consultancies,  in  order  to  allow  the  Commission  to  view  the  project  as  a 
purely  technical  function  over  which  it  could  have  direct  control.  As  a  former 
Ecos-Ouverture  official  commented  :- 
"The  Commission  was  always  aware  that  there  was  a  political  dimension  to  our 
organisation  which  you  don't  have  with  a  consultancy.  Because  we  have  a 
Steering  Group  made  up  of  the  locally  elected  members  from  the  representative 
regions,  and  these  guys  are  politicians.  So  they  were  always  aware  that  there 
was  a  political  level  to  it.  Retrospectively,  I'm  not  sure  they  will  do  that  again 
because  of  that  political  element.  I  think  they  felt  it  was  a  bit  of  a 
constraint.....  Because  they  [the  Commission]  can  tell  a  consultancy  exactly  what 
to  do  and  when  to  do  it,  but  when  local  politicians  are  involved,  whose  regions 
are  putting  in  hard  cash,  otherwise  there  would  be  no  need  for  politicians,  which 
makes  sure  the  costs  for  the  Commission  were  reduced.  That  element  I  am  not 
sure  they  would  do  again"  (Case  26). 
6.4.4.  -  Summary. 
The  merger  between  Ecos  and  Ouverture  not  only  highlighted  the  animosity 
between  the  two  regional  networks,  as  they  attempted  to  gain  control  over  the 
Article  10  project,  but  also  the  problems  from  the  Commission's  perspective  of 
political  involvement  in  a  technical  assistance  programme  in  terms  of  establishing 
clear  lines  of  responsibility  for  decision-making  (both  administrative  and 
financial).  The  early  rhetoric  of  Ouverture  regarding  SNA  involvement 
representing  moves  towards  operationalising  the  concept  of  a  'Europe  of  the 
Regions'  were  gradually  sidelined  as  DGXVI  focused  upon  the  technical  function 
of  the  network.  Nevertheless,  DGXVI  still  appeared  keen  to  have  SNA 
involvement  in  Article  10  projects.  However  the  tensions  between  the  technical 
and  political  functions  of  Ecos-Ouverture  were  brought  to  a  head,  due  to  external 
pressures  from  DGXX  and  the  Court  of  Auditors.  Both  DGXX  and  the  Court 
desired  clear  lines  of  decision-making,  with  ultimate  authority  resting  with  the 
Commission,  and  as  a  consequence  DGXVI  started  to  codify  practices  and  draw 
back  functions  to  Brussels.  Clearly  this  left  SNAs  questioning  the  value  of 
becoming  involved  in  an  Article  10  project  whilst  DGXVI  became  'impatient'  with 
the  attitudes  of  it's  regional  partners.  These  pressures  ultimately  led  to  Ecos- 
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the  development  of  Ecos-Ouverture  resulted  in  the  network  being  split  into  three 
parts  within  the  tender  process. 
6.5.  -  Conclusions. 
At  the  outset  of  this  chapter,  I  established  three  main  axes  across  which  the  case 
study  of  (Ecos-)  Ouverture  could  be  analysed.  These  were  firstly,  to  assess  the 
evolution  of  policy  within  DGXVI  and  the  European  Commission  with  regard  to 
the  role  of  SNAs  within  Article  10  projects.  Secondly,  to  relate  the  outcomes  of 
this  case-study  to  analyses  of  `multi-level  governance'.  And  lastly,  to  assess  the 
extent  to  which  SNAs  were  able  to  co-operate  together  within  an  Article  10 
project.  I  now  intend  to  discuss  each  of  these  themes  in  turn. 
DGXVI  clearly  has  a  vested  interest  in  promoting  contact  with  and  between 
SNAs,  given  that  it  has  responsibility  for  regional  policy,  and  therefore  requires 
assistance  from  SNAs  with  the  implementation  of  its  policies.  As  a  result  DGXVI 
would  be  keen  to  promote  the  interests  of  SNAs  within  the  EU  policy  process, 
and  this  may  account  for  the  DG's  willingness  to  develop  a  programme  with 
SNAs  which  was  intended  to  give  a  'concrete  aspect'  to  the  notion  of  a  'Europe  of 
the  Regions'.  Nevertheless,  over  the  course  of  the  Ouverture  experiment, 
DGXVI  became  increasingly  disillusioned  with  the  infighting  amongst  its  SNA 
partners  and  impatient  that  the  DG's  policy  priorities  were  being  resisted  by  its 
partners  despite  DGXVI  providing  the  bulk  of  the  finance  for  the  Ecos-Ouverture 
programme. 
DGXVI  had  to  re-evaluate  the  position  of  SNAs  within  Article  10  projects,  as  a 
result  of  criticism  from  the  Court  of  Auditors  and  DGXX  (and  ultimately  the 
withholding  of  Article  10  finance).  Initially  DGXVI  attempted  to  deflect  these 
criticisms  through  a  reassertion  of  its  control  over  Article  10  projects  via  the 
publication  of  a  policy  protocol  and  the  drawing  back  of  functions  to  Brussels. 
However,  continued  criticism  upon  the  publication  of  the  Court  of  Auditor's  report, 
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leaving  the  Ouverture  partnership  conducting  a  purely  technical  operation  whilst 
the  programme's  Steering  Group  did  not  meet  for  two  years.  Finally,  DGXVI  put 
Ecos-Ouverture  up  for  tender.  Analyses  of  'multi-level  governance'  tend  to  view 
DGXVI  and  the  Commission  as  being  synonymous  (such  as  Marks,  1993), 
however  the  case-study  of  DGXVI  clearly  illustrates  that  whilst  it  was  initially  able 
to  act  unilaterally,  the  introduction  of  interests  from  other  DG's  (I  and  XX) 
resulted  in  a  retraction  of  DGXVI's  earlier  position.  Clearly  analyses  of  multi-level 
governance  fail  to  account  for  the  'pillarised'  structure  of  the  Commission's 
bureaucracy.  In  addition,  the  ruling  of  the  Court  of  Auditors  that  there  is  no  legal 
basis  for  the  Commission  to  delegate  powers  to  SNAs  when  the  Commission 
cannot  retain  ultimate  authority,  may  result  in  many  SNAs  reconsidering  the 
value  of  involvement  in  such  projects.  The  ruling  of  the  Court  of  Auditors  clearly 
puts  a  limit  on  the  extent  to  which  the  Commission  can  devolve  powers.  In 
addition,  the  dominance  of  the  Commission  within  Ecos-Ouverture,  despite  the 
network's  decentralised  decision-making  structure,  due  to  the  Commission 
providing  the  majority  of  the  programmes  finances  raise  questions  as  to  the 
extent  to  which  SNAs  can  expect  to  influence  policy  when  the  Commission  holds 
the  'purse-strings'. 
Finally,  the  acrimony  between  Ecos  and  Ouuverture  clearly  illustrates  that  whilst 
SNAs  are  able  to  unite  behind  broad  themes,  such  as  increases  in  funding,  there 
is  a  significant  degree  of  competition  between  SNAs  for  relatively  small  rewards. 
Such  'turf  wars'  between  SNAs  appear  to  reflect  the  relatively  weak  position  of 
SNAs  within  the  EU  policy  process.  As  a  result  of  the  declining  influence  of 
SNAs  within  Ecos-Ouverture,  some  SNA  representatives  are  ambivalent  over  the 
continued  value  of  SNA  participation  within  technical  assistance  programmes 
concluding  that  SNAs  should  focus  upon  lobbying  European  Institutions  in  order 
to  influence  the  EU  policy  process.  The  participation  of  SRC  within  formal  and 
informal  networks,  as  mechanisms  via  which  to  lobby  European  Institutions  is  the 
subject  of  the  next  chapter. 
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7.1  -  Introduction. 
Accounts  of  the  EU  frequently  refer  to  the  "complexity  and  fluidity"  (Mazey  and 
Richardson,  1993,  p.  38)  of  the  European  policy  process,  whilst  the  "EU's 
institutional  complexity  and  density  make  it  unique  as  a  system  of  governance" 
(Peterson,  1995,  p.  395).  The  signing  of  the  'Single  European  Act'  (1986)  greatly 
expanded  the  policy  portfolio  of  European  Institutions,  whilst  strengthening  the 
ability  of  the  European  Commission  to  initiate  policy  across  a  range  of  fields  such 
as,  environmental  policy.  As  a  consequence,  the  SEA  resulted  in  a  vast  increase 
in  the  range  and  diversity  of  organisations  lobbying  European  Institutions  (see 
Mazey  and  Ricardson,  1992).  Sub-national  authorities  (SNA's)  were  no  less 
immune  from  this  process.  John  (1994a)  sub-divides  SNA's  into  three 
categories,  according  to  the  extent  to  which  an  authority  has  responded  to 
European  policy  developments.  These  categorisations  are:  -  the  'Euro-minimal' 
SNA;  the  'EU  financially  orientated'  SNA;  and,  the  'fully  Europeanised  SNA'  (See 
Figure  7.1). 
With  reference  to  Chapter  Four,  SRC  had  clearly  met  the  requirements  of  being  a 
'fully  Europeanised'  SNA  by  1987-8,  through  attempting  to  influence  EU  policy 
via  the  Brussels  office  and  through  participation  in  trans-national  networks.  In 
addition,  the  Council  would  also  act  as  a  source  of  information  on  implementation 
issues  across  a  variety  of  policy  fields,  most  notably  in  terms  of  the 
implementation  of  the  `partnership'  principle  via  the  NPCI  /  IDO  /  SEP.  Finally, 
SRC  was  attempting  to  ensure  that  via  the  Chief  Executive's  'European  Unit',  the 
various  departments  of  the  Council  were  fully  aware  of  the  impact  of  European 
legislation  and  of  funding  opportunities.  Thus,  the  European  Unit  formed  a 
Committee  which  brought  together  departmental  heads  in  1987,  to  address  the 
impact  of  the  'Single  European  Act'  upon  SRC. 
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Forms  of  SNA  engagement  with  the  EU.  Scale  of  SNA  Europeanisation. 
Responding  to  EU  directives  and 
regulations. 
Euro-Minimal  SNA. 
Managing  EU  information.  Euro-Minimal  SNA. 
Communicating  to  the  private  sector  and 
public. 
Euro-Minimal  SNA. 
Maximising  EU  grants.  EU  Financially-orientated  SNA. 
Facilitating  economic  regeneration.  EU  Financially-orientated  SNA. 
Linking  with  other  local  organisations 
participating  in  the  EU. 
EU  Networking  SNA. 
Participating  in  EU  international  networks 
and  co-operating  in  joint  projects. 
EU  Networking  SNA. 
Advising  the  EU  on  implementation 
issues. 
Fully  Europeanised  SNA. 
Seeking  to  influence  EU  policy.  Fully  Europeanised  SNA. 
Making  the  council's  policies  more 
'European'. 
Fully  Europeanised  SNA. 
Source  :  -John  (1994a),  p.  11. 
The  emergence  of  SNAs  as  actors  attempting  to  influence  the  European  policy 
process  (primarily  post-1986),  has  been  most  apparent  in  three  main  forms 
(Marks,  1996).  Firstly,  via  the  establishment  of  SNA  offices  in  Brussels; 
secondly,  the  creation  (and  participation  of  SNAs  within)  trans-national  SNA 
networks;  and  finally,  through  the  creation  of  the  'Committee  of  the  Regions', 
which  was  at  least  partly  inspired  through  pressure  by  SNAs  within  trans-regional 
networks  such  as,  AER  and  CEMR.  Once  again,  SRC  was  active  within  all  three 
channels  (See  Chapter  Four),  through  opening  a  regional  office  in  Brussels  in 
1984,  membership  of  a  range  of  trans-regional  networks  while  two  SRC 
190 Councillors  were  members  of  the  CoR  (including  the  head  of  the  UK  delegation 
to  the  CoR)129 
This  chapter  considers  SRC's  experience  of  these  mechanisms,  as  a  platform 
from  which  to  influence  European  policy.  The  means  via  which  SRC  attempted 
to  influence  the  European  policy  process  through  formal  trans-regional  networks, 
a  European  office  and  informal  networks  provides  another  avenue  to  assess  the 
influence  of  Europeanisation  upon  SRC.  Furthermore,  this  chapter  also 
considers  the  approaches  used  to  influence  policy-making  and  how  successful 
the  various  means  of  influence  utilised  by  SRC  were  perceived  to  be?  In  Section 
7.2,  the  involvement  of  SRC  within  trans-regional  networks  is  evaluated,  with 
regard  to  the  motivations  for  SRC's  involvement;  the  extent  to  which  these 
networks  were  able  to  influence  EU  policy;  the  advantages  which  accrued  to 
SRC  through  involvement;  and  the  problems  which  SRC  experienced  within 
these  networks.  While  SRC  was  involved  in  a  range  of  networks,  I  intend  to 
focus  upon  what  Chapter  Four  termed  'generalist  networks'  or  "peak  networks" 
(Benington  and  Harvey,  1994,  p.  27),  which  tend  to  include  a  large  number  of 
SNAs  and  deal  with  the  'high  politics'  of  SNA  interest  such  as  Structural  Fund 
reform,  as  opposed  to  more  specialised  or  technical  networks.  In  particular  I 
intend  to  focus  upon  SRC's  involvement  within  the  Association  of  European 
Regions  (AER)  and  the  'Traditional  Industrial  Regions  of  Europe'  (RETI). 
Following  on  from  SRC's  involvement  within  formal,  trans-regional  networks, 
Section  7.3  considers  the  role  and  functions  of  SRC's  'Brussels'  office,  with 
particular  regard  to  the  evolution  of  the  Office  over  time  as  SRC  collaborated  with 
other  Scottish  actors,  through  moving  into  the  Scotland  Europa  offices.  The 
lobbying  techniques  pursued  by  SRC's  'European  Liaison  Officers'  will  be 
discussed,  alongside  a  consideration  of  the  importance  of  'informal'  networks  as 
129  While  two  SRC  Councillors  were  members  of  CoR,  they  did  not  represent  SRC  on  the  CoR, 
as  the  five  Scottish  members  of  the  CoR  (and  their  alternates)  represent  Scottish  local 
government  as  a  whole,  with  the  Scottish  CoR  members  being  selected  by  the  Scottish  Secretary 
(Stolz,  1994). 
191 a  means  of  influencing  European  policy.  Informal  networks  are  evaluated  further 
in  Section  7.4,  with  regard  to  the  extent  to  which  there  were  identifiable  networks 
amongst  local  actors  dealing  with  European  policy  within  Strathclyde  and 
Scotland,  and  the  extent  to  which  these  networks  were  influential130.  In 
addition,  the  informal  networks  that  SRC  developed  through  its  Brussels  office 
are  also  considered.  However,  it  is  to  SRC's  involvement  within  trans-national 
networks  that  I  now  intend  to  turn. 
7.2.1  -  The  Role  of  Trans-National  Networks. 
"In  general  terms,  co-operation  between  regions  belonging  to  different  nation- 
states  is  motivated  by  the  identification  of  common  problems  and  I  or  interests 
and  the  conviction  that  joint  action  or  at  least  a  co-ordinated  approach  whether  at 
national  or  European  level  -  is  required  to  address  these  problems  and  articulate 
the  common  interests"  (Weyand,  1996,  p.  167). 
Trans-national  networks  are  a  product  of  the  desire  on  the  part  of  the 
Commission,  to  obtain  representations  from  constituencies  which  are 
representative  of  a  large  number  of  European  interests  affected  by  a  particular 
issue.  As  a  consequence,  sub-national  lobbyists  are  well  aware  of  the  value  of 
trans-national  networks  as  a  means  of  access  into  the  Commission.  As  a  former 
SRC  European  Liaison  officer  commented  with  regard  to  the  benefit  of  network 
membership  :  "the  Commission  will  generally  listen  more  readily  to  the  voices  of 
a  number  of  regions  together,  whether  it's  in  a  geographical  interest  grouping  or 
a  priority  interest  grouping.  And  I  think  that's  the  major  benefit  you  get"  (Case 
13). 
In  addition  to  providing  access  to  the  Commission  and  greater  authority  to  SNA 
opinions,  SRC  respondents  frequently  stressed  the  opportunities  that  networks 
130  Assessments  of  the  extent  to  which  lobbying  strategies  pursued  by  SRC  were  successful,  are 
based  upon  the  perceptions  of  those  interviewed  concerning  these  strategies.  This  does  not 
necessarily  imply  that  lobbying  undertaken  by  SRC  had  a  determining  effect  upon  eventual  EU 
decisions,  due  to  the  complex  and  secretive  nature  of  EU  decision-making,  particularly  within  the 
Council  of  Ministers.  Instead,  this  chapter  intends  to  assess  the  perceptions  of  the  participants 
involved  in  such  strategies,  as  to  the  value  of  the  various  mechanisms  outlined  in  this  chapter,  in 
influencing  the  EU  policy  process  (See  Chapter  Three,  for  a  fuller  discussion  on  this  point). 
192 provided  in  terms  of  funding  opportunities  that  emerged  through  contacts  with 
other  SNAs  that  required  'partners'  for  funding  programmes131  ,  and  as  a  forum 
for  the  'exchange  of  ideas'  between  SNAs  regarding  policy. 
7.2.2  -  SRC,  RETI  and  the  `Objective  Two'  lobby. 
The  most  frequent  example  cited  by  SRC  respondents,  as  to  the  influence  which 
trans-national  networks  can  bring  to  bear  upon  the  EU  policy  process,  was  the 
case  of  the  `Objective  Two  Lobby'132  of  1991-92.  The  Review  of  the  Structural 
Fund  budget  for  the  period  1994  to  1999,  was  due  to  be  determined  in  1992,  and 
there  was  a  growing  realisation  that  the  position  of  Objective  Two  funding  would 
come  under  scrutiny  in  this  review  and  possibly  be  scrapped  for  reasons  which  a 
former  European  Commissioner  summarised  as  follows  :  - 
"Objective  One  areas  would  be  OK,  and  be  provided  for  in  the  Council 
regulations,  because  everyone  recognises  that  you  have  to  have  an  Objective 
One  status,  because  of  the  particular  problems  they  have,  and  of  course,  the 
1992  financial  settlement,  which  specifically  decided  what  money  should  be  for 
Objective  One.  The  representatives  of  what  you  might  call  the  Objective  Two 
areas,  have  always  been  a  bit  worried  that  it  would  lose  out.  Objective  One 
would  have  its  advocates,  Objective  5b  would  be  part  of  the  lobby  for  agriculture 
which  is  very  deeply  entrenched  in  the  Community  and  in  the 
Commission....  There  would  be  more  money  for  the  Social  Fund,  because  of  the 
high  unemployment,  and  Objective  Two  would  be  squeezed  a  bit"  (Case  32). 
131  SRC  could  also  find  partners  for  programmes,  for  which  the  Council  had  EU  funding.  For 
instance,  SRC  selected  its  'partner-regions'  for  Ouverture  on  the  basis  that  it  had  good  relations 
with  these  SNAs  within  RETI  (See  Chapter  Six). 
132  The  Structural  Funds  were  divided  into  five  priority  objectives  between  1994  and  1999.  These 
were  :  - 
objective  1:  promoting  the  development  and  structural  adjustment  of  regions  whose 
development  is  lagging  behind. 
-  Objective  2:  converting  the  regions  or  parts  of  regions  seriously  affected  by  industrial 
decline. 
-  Objective  3:  combating  long-term  unemployment  and  facilitating  the  integration  into  working 
life  of  young  people  and  of  persons  exposed  to  exclusion  from  the  labour  market,  promotion 
of  equal  employment  opportunities  for  men  and  women. 
-  Objective  4:  facilitating  the  adaptation  of  workers  to  industrial  changes  and  changes  in 
production  systems. 
-  Objective  5:  promoting  rural  development  by  : 
-  Objective  5a  :  speeding  up  the  adjustment  of  agricultural  structures  in  the  framework  of  the 
common  agricultural  policy  and  promoting  the  modemisation  and  structural  adjustment  of  the 
fisheries  sector. 
-  Objective  5b  :  facilitating  the  development  and  structural  adjustment  of  rural  areas. 
Source  :  European  Commission  (1996),  p.  11. 
193 DGXVI  initially  approached  RETI  regarding  the  situation  facing  Objective  Two 
funding,  at  the  forthcoming  Review  of  the  Structural  Funds,  and  expressed  its 
desire  to  organise  a  meeting  of  the  Objective  Two  regions  under  the  auspices  of 
RETI.  However,  RETI  did  not  take  up  this  approach  and  DGXVI  was  left  to 
organise  the  meeting  itself  in  July  1991.  Relations  between  RETI  and  DGXVI 
appear  to  have  been  strained  prior  to  this  point,  a  feature  which  McAleavey  and 
Mitchell  (1994)  attribute  to  the  network  not  being  "fully  representative  of  declining 
industrial  regions  in  that  it  was  numerically  dominated  by  UK  local  authorities, 
.. 
[whilst]  a  number  of  Member  States  were  not  represented  at  all"  (McAleavey 
and  Mitchell,  1994,  p.  244).  Despite  this  the  'Objective  Two  lobby',  which 
subsequently  emerged  (although  led  by  SRC),  did  include  regions  from  virtually 
every  member-state.  In  addition,  MacAleavey  and  Mitchell  claim  that  the 
perception  existed  within  DGXVI  that  "the  leadership  and  direction  of  RET1133 
were  idiosyncratic"  (McAleavey  and  Mitchell,  1994,  p.  244). 
Whatever  the  situation,  the  outcome  of  the  July  1991  meeting  was  that  a  number 
of  regions  including  SRC  agreed  to  hold  a  meeting  in  Tuscany  to  which  all 
Objective  Two  regions  would  be  invited  and  which  would  address  the  means  by 
which  Objective  Two  funding  could  be  protected.  At  the  meeting  in  Florence, 
thirty-six  of  the  sixty  regions  eligible  for  Objective  Two  funding  attended. 
However  these  regions  obtained  90%  of  the  Objective  Two  budget.  The 
Florence  meeting  proposed  that  an  'Objective  Two  lobby'  be  formed,  whilst  "a 
position  paper  was  adopted  and  a  representative  delegation134  set  up,  with  one 
representative  from  every  member-state  with  an  interest  in  Objective  Two  (eight 
member  states).  Strathclyde  was  chosen  to  lead  the  UK  delegation  and  overall 
European  delegation"  (Case  12).  The  delegation  of  eight  regions  then  conducted 
133  The  leadership  (and  headquarters)  of  RETI  were  drawn  from  Nord  Pas  de  Calais,  and  thus 
were  not  part  of  any  UK  domination  of  the  network. 
134  The  representative  delegation  comprised  :-  Strathclyde  (Overall  Lead  Region  and  UK); 
Catalonia  (Spain);  Groningen-Denthe  (Netherlands);  North  Jutland  (Denmark);  Nord  Pas-de- 
Calais  (France);  North  Rhine-Westphalia  (Germany);  Tuscany  (Italy);  and,  Wallonia  (Belgium). 
194 a  lobbying  campaign  throughout  1992,  culminating  in  a  meeting  of  the  Objective 
Two  lobby  in  Edinburgh  for  "tactical  or  symbolic  reasons"  (Case  12)  prior  to  the 
Council  of  Ministers  summit. 
Regions  from  each  member  state  pursued  lobbies  within  their  own  member- 
state.  SRC  organised  a  meeting  with  Tim  Sainsbury,  who  was  the  minister 
responsible  at  the  DTI,  whilst  the  Scottish  Office  was  well  aware  of  SRC's 
activities  within  RETI  and  was  keen  to  encourage  them  as  far  as  possible,  as  a 
Scottish  Office  official  commented  :  - 
"The  Scottish  Office  was  involved  in  that,  we  were  all  part  of  that.  But  remember 
we  can't  lobby,  we're  part  of  the  member  state,  so  it  was  important  for  us  to  know 
what  was  going  on.  We  exchanged  information,  so  we  could  know  what  they 
were  up  to,  and  we  were  paddling  the  Scottish  canoe  as  hard  as  we  could"  (Case 
42). 
Initially  the  lobbying  campaign  was  organised  from  SRC's  Brussels  office. 
However  the  RETI  Brussels  office  also  became  involved  after  the  Leader  of  SRC, 
Cllr.  Charles  Gray,  was  voted  President  of  RETI,  with  the  backing  of  the  other 
`Objective  Two'  lobby  regions.  Throughout  1992,  the  Objective  Two  lobby  was 
extremely  active  in  pursuing  their  case  with  meetings  being  held  not  only  with 
representatives  from  member-states,  but  also  European  representatives 
including  the  President  of  the  European  Commission,  Jacques  Delors,  the 
Commissioners  for  DGV  (Social  Policy)  and  DGXVI  (Regional  Policy),  a  variety 
of  MEPs  including  the  Chair  of  the  EP  'regional  policy'  committee,  and  the 
Portuguese  Minister  for  Regional  Policy  during  the  first  half  of  1992,  when 
Portugal  held  the  Chairmanship  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  and  Tim  Sainsbury 
when  the  UK  held  the  Chair  of  the  Council.  As  mentioned  above,  the  lobby 
culminated  in  a  conference  of  the  Objective  Two  'regions'  being  held  in 
Edinburgh  prior  to  the  Summit  meeting,  and  a  resolution  of  the  regions  position 
(which  was  drafted  by  an  SRC  official)  being  submitted  to  the  Council. 
The  Edinburgh  Council  Summit  in  December  1992  maintained  Objective  Two 
funding  as  a  proportion  of  the  other  objectives,  with  the  exception  of  Objective 
195 One  which  was  increased.  McAleavey  and  Mitchell  (1994)  note  with  regard  to 
this  outcome  and  the  influence  of  the  Objective  Two  lobby  upon  it,  that  "it  is  a 
feature  of  the  closed  nature  of  the  decision-making  process  at  the 
intergovernmental  apex  of  the  Community  that  the  bargaining  behind  the 
compromise  eventually  reached  at  the  Edinburgh  Summit  in  December  1992 
remains  obscured  (McAleavey  and  Mitchell,  1994,  p.  246).  Nevertheless, 
politicians  and  officials  within  SRC  were  convinced  that  the  Objective  Two  lobby 
had  a  determining  influence  upon  the  decisions  taken  at  the  Council  meeting,  as 
the  comments  of  an  SRC  official  from  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  who  was 
closely  involved  in  the  lobbying  campaign  illustrate  :  - 
"I  think  we  made  quite  a  big  impact,  I  think  it  was  seen  as  representative  by  the 
European  Commission  and  others,  it  did  involve  all  the  big  players  at  the 
European  level,  it  was  a  transnational  initiative.  In  terms  of  the  outcome,  I  think  it 
was  successful  in  that,  the  decisions  taken  at  Edinburgh  were  that  outside 
Objective  One  the  proportions  of  funding  for  the  other  Structural  Funds  should 
stay  the  same  as  in  the  previous  funding  period,  which  we  thought  was  a  fairly 
positive  result".  (Case  12). 
Part  of  the  explanation  for  the  confidence  within  SRC  that  the  Objective  Two 
lobby  had  an  impact  upon  the  eventual  decision  taken  was  that  the  lobby  was  in 
very  close  contact  with  DGXVI  throughout  the  campaign.  As  mentioned  above, 
the  origins  of  the  Objective  Two  lobby  lay  in  the  promptings  from  DGXVI,  which 
presumably  had  no  interest  in  scrapping  Objective  Two  funding,  as  it  represented 
a  key  element  of  its  policy  portfolio  both  in  terms  of  the  DG's  finance  and  profile. 
The  support  which  DGXVI  provided  to  the  Objective  Two  lobby  was  described  by 
an  SRC  official  in  the  following  terms  :  - 
"There  were  some  people  within  the  Commission,  who  were  very  sympathetic 
towards  what  we  were  doing,  although  there  are  limits  to  which  they  can  overtly 
be  seen  to  be  supporting  a  lobby.  But  yes,  there  were  important  people  within 
DGXVI,  in  this  case,  who  were  very  supportive  of  what  we  were  doing  but  also 
there  was  a  limited  extent  to  which  they  could  do  that,  apart  from  suggesting  to 
the  Commission  that  you  should  see  this  delegation".  (Case  12). 
Clearly  the  Objective  Two  lobby  was  assured  of  a  degree  of  success,  due  to  the 
degree  of  support  the  lobby  had  at  its  disposal  within  the  Commission,  up  to  the 
196 level  of  European  Commissioner.  As  Mazey  and  Richardson  (1996)  note,  "in 
classic  Downsian  fashion,  the  Commission  has  proved  adept  at  constructing 
supportive  clientele  groups"  (Mazey  and  Richardson,  1996,  p.  46).  The  Objective 
Two  lobby  can  certainly  be  construed  as  an  instance  of  DGXVI  providing  the 
impetus  behind  a  lobby  which  initially  did  not  have  an  organisational  basis  due  to 
the  reluctance  of  the  RETI  leadership  to  become  involved.  When  the  'lobby 
regions'  obtained  control  of  RETI,  this  provided  further  legitimacy  to  the  region's 
demands,  whilst  DGXVI  provided  support  in  terms  of  information  and  access  to 
the  lobby  throughout.  In  addition,  the  selection  of  SRC  as  the  lead  region  of  the 
lobby,  can  also  be  linked  to  Bruce  Millan's  being  a  former  Labour  MP  from 
Strathclyde,  who  was  well  known  to  SRC's  Labour  leadership. 
7.2.3  -  Summary. 
The  Objective  Two  lobby  provides  an  example  of  SNAs  being  able  to  influence 
the  EU  policy  process,  through  having  a  common  interest  with  a  DG  of  the 
Commission.  Given  that  SNAs  lacked  an  institutional  foothold  within  the  EU 
policy  process  (prior  to  the  creation  of  the  Committee  of  the  Regions),  the 
support  of  a  powerful  benefactor,  in  this  instance  within  the  Commission,  was  a 
pre-requisite  of  the  lobbying  campaign  success.  When  RETI  was  engaged  as  an 
active  part  of  the  campaign,  this  provided  further  weight  to  the  region's  demands. 
In  essence,  RETI  provided  legitimacy  to  the  demands  of  the  regions,  as  a 
mechanism  via  which  to  influence  EU  Institutions.  SRC  fulfilled  an  active 
leadership  role,  through  utilising  contacts  that  the  Council  had  in  the  European 
and  national  /  regional  arenas,  whilst  also  utilising  the  resources  SRC  had  in  the 
form  of  the  Brussels  office  and  the  `European  Unit'  within  the  Chief  Executive's 
department,  allied  to  the  active  promotion  of  the  case  by  the  SRC  political 
leadership. 
7.2.4  -  SRC,  AER  and  the  Federalist  agenda. 
AER  is  one  of  the  largest  EU-related  trans-national  networks  which  brings 
together  SNAs  from  the  EU  and  Eastern  Europe,  including  all  the  major  (or 
197 stronger)  European  regions.  Given  the  scale  of  AER's  membership  it  has  tended 
to  focus  upon  lobbying  for  an  entrenchment  and  expansion  of  the  role  of  SNAs 
within  the  EU  policy  process  most  notably  with  regard  to  supporting  issues  such 
as  the  establishment  of  a  'Committee  of  the  Regions',  the  implementation  of 
subsidiarity  as  a  'substantive'  principle135,  the  signing  of  the  Council  of  Europe's 
'Charter  of  Local  Self  Government'  and,  to  obtain  SNA  access  to  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  Despite  this  emphasis  upon  'institutional'  issues,  the  network  does 
cover  more  specific  policy  areas  through  a  series  of  commissions  (See  Table 
4.3),  which  are  established  underneath  the  AER  Bureau  which  determines  the 
policy  of  the  network136.  Nevertheless,  AER's  "primary  objective  has  become 
the  representation  of  regional  interests  vis-a-vis  European  institutions.  Though 
membership  goes  well  beyond  the  EU  territory,  the  recognition  of  the  'fait 
regional'  in  European  politics  in  general,  but  in  particular  in  the  institutional 
framework  of  the  EU,  has  become  the  major  political  aim  of  the  organisation" 
(Weyand,  1996,  p.  176). 
When  SRC  joined  RETI  in  1986,  the  Council  also  automatically  became  a 
member  of  AER.  Chapter  Four  (Section  4.3.4)  noted  the  disillusionment 
amongst  SRC  officials  regarding  the  lack  of  a  practical  edge  to  AER's  activities. 
However,  upon  SRC  becoming  a  member  of  AER's  ruling  'Bureau'137,  an 
awareness  developed  of  the  'long-term  political  game'  which  AER  was  pursuing 
with  regard  to  establishing  formal  access  to  the  EU  policy  process,  primarily 
through  the  creation  of  a  Committee  of  the  Regions.  SRC  was  active  in  this 
process,  and  attended  the  'Conferences  on  a  Europe  of  the  Regions'  organised 
135  Scott,  Peterson  and  Millar  (1994)  discuss  the  differences  between  the  substantive  and 
procedural  definitions  of  subsidiarity  within  the  Treaty  on  European  Union,  agreed  at  Edinburgh, 
in  December  1992.  For  more  general  discussions  of  subsidiarity,  see  Van  Kersbergen  and 
Verbeek  (1994)  and  Hoffe  (1996). 
136  Chapter  Four,  Section  4.3.4  provides  a  description  of  AER's  organisational  structure. 
137  SRC  had  two  periods  of  membership  upon  AER's  Bureau.  Or.  Charles  Gray  represented 
SRC  on  the  Bureau  from  1989  to  1992,  and  was  thus  a  member  of  the  Bureau  during  the  period 
when  the  momentum  behind  the  establishment  of  the  CoR  began  to  develop.  Cllr.  Gerald 
McGrath  represented  SRC  on  the  Bureau  from  1995  to  1996. 
198 by  the  German  Lander  in  1990,  and  to  which  only  the  `strong'  regions  within  the 
EU  were  invited  (See  Weyand,  1996138). 
In  addition  to  SRC  membership  of  the  AER  Bureau,  the  Council  also  held 
positions  within  AER's  Committee  structure,  which  dealt  with  specific  policy 
areas.  Positions  upon  these  committees  provided  access  to  Commission 
officials  with  responsibility  for  related  policy  areas,  whilst  SRC  membership 
enabled  the  promotion  of  the  Council's  policy  priorities  within  these  committees. 
SRC  was  a  member  of  Commission  One,  which  dealt  with  the  institutional  affairs 
of  the  EU  (See  Table  4.3)  which  was  perceived  within  SRC  as  a  means  of 
influencing  the  eventual  structure  of  the  CoR  (See  Chapter  Four,  Section  4.3.4). 
However  of  more  direct  relevance  to  SRC's  immediate  policy  concerns,  was  the 
Council's  membership  of  Committees  Two  and  Five.  Committee  Two  dealt  with 
co-operation  between  Eastern  and  Western  Europe,  a  subject  of  considerable 
importance  to  AER  given  that  it  had  a  significant  degree  of  membership  drawn 
from  Eastern  European  regions  out  with  the  EU.  The  Committee  acted  as  a 
platform  for  SRC  to  obtain  wider  political  support  for  the  operations  of  (Ecos) 
Ouverture,  whilst  also  enabling  access  to  Commission  officials  dealing  with  the 
programme.  Cllr.  McGrath  held  the  Presidency  of  the  East-West  Committee  from 
1994-95  and  vice-presidency  in  1996.  AER  provided  backing  to  SRC  in  the 
negotiations  with  ECOS,  concerning  the  future  structure  of  the  programme  in 
order  to  counteract  CEMR's  support  for  EGOS  (See  Chapter  Six,  Section  6.4.1). 
For  instance  at  an  AER  Bureau  meeting  in  January  1995,  at  the  height  of  the 
merger  negotiations  with  EGOS,  Cllr.  McGrath  used  his  membership  of  the 
Bureau  to  highlight  the  interests  of  Ouverture  and  urge  Bureau  members  to 
provide  'political'  support  presumably  through  lobbying  the  Commission.  SRC 
Minutes  (March  1995)  outline  Cllr.  McGrath's  contribution  in  the  following  manner 
138  Weyand  (1996)  provides  an  account  of  the  role  of  the  'Conferences  on  a  Europe  of  the 
Regions'  organised  by  the  German  Lander,  in  particular  Bavaria.  This  process  produced  the 
possibility  of  a  split  within  AER,  between  the  'strong'  and  'weak'  regions  similar  to  the  conflict  with 
the  CoR  between  'regions'  and  'municipalities'  (see  Millan,  1997). 
199 "Councillor  McGrath  outlined  to  the  Bureau  the  situation  in  terms  of  negotiations 
for  the  future  of  the  Ouverture  programme.  President  Pujol  pledged  his  personal 
support  to  the  continuation  of  the  programme  and  its  importance  to  the  regions  of 
Europe  in  general  and  asked  the  Bureau  also  to  support  fully  the  programme  on 
a  political  level.  The  members  of  the  Bureau  agreed  to  do  this"  (SRC  Minutes, 
March  1995). 
Membership  of  Commission  Two  was  used  as  part  of  a  larger  lobbying  campaign 
throughout  the  merger  negotiations  (See  Section  7.4),  whilst  membership  also 
provided  a  means  to  promote  the  work  of  Ouverture  and  attempt  to  attract  new 
'partners'  from  Eastern  and  Western  Europe  as  a  former  Ouverture  official 
commented  :  - 
"We  used  AER  as  a  marketing  mechanism  for  a  while,  because  they  have  an 
East-West  Committee,  which  meets  once  or  twice  a  year.  So  we  would  go  along 
to  that,  because  for  us,  it  was  a  very  good  way  of  making  contact  with 
representatives  of  EU  and  Central  Europe"  (Case  44). 
The  extent  of  AER's  involvement  extended  to  a  place  on  Ecos-Ouverture's 
'Steering  Group'  following  the  merger,  thus  institutionalising  the  network's 
relationship  with  Ecos-Ouverture.  Committee  Five  dealt  with  'Regional  Policy, 
Planning,  Infrastructure,  Environment  and  Tourism'.  Clearly  membership  of  this 
committee  was  of  value  to  SRC,  as  another  means  of  maintaining  contact  with 
DGXVI  officials. 
7.2.5  -  Summary. 
Both  AER  and  RETI  provided  access  to  Commission  officials  and  the  opportunity 
to  push  SRC  policy  priorities.  In  addition,  contact  with  other  SNAs  enabled  SRC 
to  make  an  input  into  debates  concerning  the  role  of  SNAs  within  the  EU  policy 
process,  whilst  also  acting  as  a  means  of  obtaining  partners  for  funding,  such  as 
Community  Initiatives.  However,  both  AER  and  RETI  are  `peak'  level  networks, 
and  engage  in  lobbying  campaigns  (such  as  lobbying  for  a'Committee  of  the 
Regions')  which  are  beyond  the  scope  of  more  limited  networks.  Yet,  SRC 
respondents  active  within  less  `glamorous'  networks,  valued  participation  within 
them  as  a  means  of  information  exchange  with  SNAs  and  Commission  officials, 
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find  evidence  within  trans-national  networks  of  "overlapping  and  interlapping 
spheres  of  state,  market  and  civil  society"  (Benington  and  Harvey,  1994,  p.  20),  at 
best  evidence  of  participation  within  networks  beyond  political  involvement  was 
limited  to  the  rather  more  technical  and  issue-specific  networks  with  which  SRC 
engaged,  such  as  'Les  Esturiales'  which  dealt  with  estuary  management. 
Participation  within  trans-national  networks  was  limited  to  a  small-elite  of 
politicians  and  officials,  with  politicians  tending  to  have  multiple  memberships  of 
networks.  This  parallels  the  findings  of  Benington  (1997)  who  comments  :- 
"it  became  clear  from  our  research  that  only  a  relatively  small  proportion  of  local 
authorities,  and  only  a  very  small  number  of  councillors  and  officers  within  those 
authorities,  are  involved  in  transnational  networking.  Active  involvement  is 
limited  to  a  small  inter-locking  'cosmopolitan  elite'  of  members  and  officers" 
(Benington,  1997,  p.  10). 
The  existence  of  this  'cosmopolitan  elite'  certainly  caused  resentment  among 
other  Labour  politicians,  with  Cllr.  Charles  Gray  being  ousted  as  Leader  of  the 
Council  in  1992,  at  least  partly  as  a  consequence  of  this  resentment  (See 
Chapter  Four,  Section  4.4).  Members  of  SRC's  European  and  International 
Affairs  Committee,  also  alleged  that  representation  upon  some  of  the  'lesser 
trans-national  networks  could  be  used  to  reward  'loyal'  Councillors.  Given  the 
subsequent  allegations  of  'trips  for  votes'  on  Glasgow  City  Council139,  such 
allegations  raise  concerns  regarding  the  limiting  of  such  activities  to  a  small  elite, 
and  the  lack  of  accountability  over  their  activities. 
As  'peak'  networks,  AER  and  RETI  provided  significant  opportunities  to  influence 
the  EU  policy  process.  However  in  both  the  case  of  the  `Objective  Two'  lobby 
and  lobbying  on  behalf  of  Ouverture,  trans-national  networks  were  only  utilised 
as  part  of  a  larger  lobbying  strategy,  with  the  network  being  used  to  add 
139  The  `trips  for  votes'  allegations  at  Glasgow  City  Council  (GCC)  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter 
Eight,  however  it  is  worth  noting  at  this  juncture,  that  the  Leader  of  GCC  who  made  the 
allegations  was  also  the  Leader  of  SRC  from  1992-96,  whilst  his  deputy  on  GCC  was  Cllr.  Gerald 
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depended  upon  the  active  co-operation  of  DGXVI  and  member-state 
bureaucracies.  Whilst  AER  and  RETI  provided  an  institutional  legitimacy  to  both 
lobbying  campaigns,  in  terms  of  approaching  the  Commission  and  member- 
states,  SRC  (and  other  SNAs)  relied  heavily  upon  informal  networks  developed 
through  the  Brussels  office  and  the  SNAs  "territorial  community"  (Rhodes,  1988, 
p.  78)  such  as  SRC's  access  to  Millan  during  the  Objective  Two  lobby.  It  is  to  the 
role  of  'informal  networks'  as  a  means  of  influencing  the  EU  policy  process,  firstly 
via  a  Brussels  office,  and  secondly  through  the  use  of  a  'territorial  community' 
that  I  now  intend  to  turn. 
7.3.1  -  SRC's  use  of  a  Brussels  office  as  a  means  of  influence. 
The  functions  of  sub-national  offices  in  Brussels  tend  to  fulfil  a  wide  range  of 
functions  that  broadly  fall  into  four  main  categories  (Jeffrey,  1996;  John;  1994; 
Marks  and  McAdam,  1996).  Firstly,  a  Brussels  office  provides  a  base  from  which 
to  monitor  EU  policy  development  and  track  the  progress  of  legislation  through 
EU  institutions.  Secondly,  sub-national  offices  enable  European  officers  to  lobby 
Commission  officials  and  MEPs,  and  more  generally  establish  long-term 
relationships  with  officials  and  MEPs  thus  ensuring  that  access  can  be  easily 
obtained  to  policy-makers  within  areas  that  are  of  relevance  to  the  SNA  office. 
Thirdly,  with  the  expansion  in  the  number  of  sub-national  offices  since  the  late 
1980s,  an  increasing  proportion  of  an  SNA's  office  workload  is  spent  cultivating 
contacts  with  other  regional  offices,  in  order  to  enhance  information  flow,  obtain 
partners  for  funding  programmes,  and  generally  establish  links  with  regions 
which  have  (or  are  perceived  to  have)  similar  interests  to  the  host  region.  In 
addition  to  informal  networking  between  SNA  representatives  maintaining 
contacts  can  also  take  on  a  more  formal  structure.  For  instance  SNA  offices 
frequently  hold  seminars  which  promote  their  region  or  deal  with  issues  of 
concern  in  order  to  assess  opinion  amongst  other  SNAs,  and  as  a  consequence 
McGrath,  who  was  also  his  deputy  on  SRC  (1992-96)  and  Chair  of  SRC's  European  and 
International  Affairs  committee. 
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Brussels  office  acts  as  a  two  way  conduit  of  information,  via  informing  the 
Council  'back  home'  of  European  policy  development  and  funding  opportunities 
whilst  also  providing  the  Commission  with  information  concerning  local  policy  and 
implementation  procedures. 
Chapter  Four  outlined  the  changing  role  of  SRC's  Brussels  office  over  time. 
Initially  the  office  was  established  primarily  to  inform  the  Council  of  funding 
opportunities  and  cultivate  relationships  with  DGV  and  DGXVI  officials  in  order  to 
improve  the  Council's  access  to  European  funds.  However,  the  creation  of  the 
IDO  (Integrated  Development  Operation)  in  1988,  substantially  reduced  this  area 
of  the  office's  work  due  to  funding  being  allocated  in  a  lump  sum  for  a  fixed  time 
period,  resulting  in  decisions  regarding  European  funding  being  taken  within  the 
IDO  /  SEP  (Strathclyde  European  Partnership).  Liaison  and  lobbying  of 
Commission  officials  with  regard  to  European  funding  became  limited  to 
obtaining  funding  from  smaller-scale  funds,  such  as  Community  Initiatives  or  to 
lobbying  when  the  Structural  Fund  budget  was  being  re-negotiated,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  Objective  Two  lobby,  where  the  Brussels  office  was  heavily  involved 
in  organising  the  lobbying  of  European  Institutions.  As  a  result,  the  function  of 
the  Brussels  office  had  shifted  by  1988,  from  being  a  mechanism  with  which  to 
improve  the  flow  of  European  finance  to  that  of  providing  an  advocacy  and  liaison 
service  via  which  SRC  could  develop  links  with  other  SNAs  and  act  as  a  base 
from  which  to  lobby  the  European  Commission,  European  Parliament  and 
latterly,  the  Committee  of  the  Regions. 
Mazey  and  Richardson  (1996)  comment  that  in  order  to  successfully  lobby  EU 
Institutions,  "the  key  resource  for  any  group  is  a  reputation  for  expertise  and 
reliability"  (p.  42).  SRC  was  the  second  SNA  to  formally  open  an  office  in 
140  When  an  SNA  office  opens  in  Brussels,  it  will  tend  to  organise  a  function  in  order  to  make 
contact  with  Commission  officials,  MEPs  and  other  SNAs,  in  order  to  put  the  SNA  'on  the  map'. 
An  example  of  this  trend  was  'Scottish  Week  at  the  European  Parliament'  which  was  organised 
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and  gain  access  to  the  Commission,  in  particular  DGV  and  DGXVI  officials,  due 
to  the  novelty  and  symbolic  nature  of  the  venture.  In  addition,  as  one  of  the  first 
SNAs  to  formally141  adopt  the  Brussels  base  approach  to  lobbying,  SRC  was 
not  trying  to'make  its  case'  amongst  a  cacophony  of  SNA'voices'  also 
attempting  to  lobby  European  Institutions.  As  a  consequence,  SRC  was  able  to 
develop  extremely  good  contacts  within  DGV  and  DGXVI,  as  other  SNA  lobbyists 
in  Brussels  who  arrived  later  were  well  aware.  For  example  a  Scottish  lobbyist 
who  was  resident  in  Brussels  during  the  1980s  in  a  different  capacity  commented 
that  SRC's  representative  in  Brussels  "patrolled  the  corridors  of  DGXVI  and 
DGV"  (Case,  24),  whilst  an  English  lobbyist  was  also  well  aware  of  the  contacts 
SRC  had  built-up  within  the  Commission  by  observing  that  The  (the  SRC  lobbyist) 
put  Strathclyde  on  the  map,  I  know  a  lot  of  Commission  officials  who  knew  about 
Strathclyde,  but  didn't  know  anything  else  about  UK  regional  activity"  (Case  40). 
Certainly  during  the  1980's  SRC  was  able  to  project  itself  as  being  generally 
representative  of  Scottish  SNA  opinion.  For  instance,  a  Welsh  lobbyist  observed 
that  "I  think  that  people  thought  that  Strathclyde  was  more  or  less  Scotland....  And 
of  course,  at  42  or  43%  of  the  Scottish  population142  it  virtually  was"  (Case  37). 
by  Scottish  Enterprise,  shortly  after  the  opening  of  the  Scotland  Europa  offices  in  1992,  in  order 
to  raise  awareness  of  the  office's  existence  and  to  establish  contacts  with  a  wide  range  of  actors. 
141  Birmingham  City  Council  opened  it's  office  a  couple  of  months  prior  to  SRC  (See  Chapter 
Four,  Jeffrey,  1996,  p.  183)  however  SRC's  European  Liaison  officer  was  already  providing 
information  on  an  informal  basis  to  the  Council  prior  to  1984  whilst  on  secondment  from  the 
Highlands  and  Islands  Development  Board  to  DGV.  Thus  SRC,  could  not  formally  open  it's  office 
until  this  period  of  secondment  ended,  and  the  official  was  free  to  join  SRC  and  lobby  openly  on 
it's  behalf. 
142  SRC  tended  to  account  for  a  slightly  higher  proportion  of  the  Scottish  population  than  42  or 
43%,  with  the  figure  generally  to  between  45-50%  between  1975  and  1996.  SRC's  population  fell 
from  2.47  million  to  2.3  million  between  1977  and  1991,  a  fall  of  6.9%  (SRC,  1995,  p.  25),  whilst 
SRC's  population  was  projected  to  increase  by  0.2%  between  1992  and  1998  (SRC,  1995,  p.  37). 
The  Scottish  population  in  1981,  was  5.18  million,  therefore  SRC  (using  the  1977  figure)would 
have  accounted  for  around  48.4  %  of  the  Scottish  population,  whilst  in  1991  the  Scottish 
population  had  declined  slightly  to  5.107  million,  thus  SRC's  population  share  had  declined  to 
45%  of  the  Scottish  population  (Scottish  Office,  1996,  p.  3).  The  Scottish  population  was 
projected  to  increase  by  0.5%  in  the  period  up  to  2001  (Scottish  Office,  1996,  p.  3),  slightly  above 
the  SRC  rate  of  0.2%. 
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within  the  Commission,  particularly  within  DGV  and  DGXVI  due  to  SRC's  policy 
priorities  (See  Chapter  Four).  However  with  the  creation  of  the  IDO  in  1988,  the 
opportunity  for  direct  contact  between  SRC's  European  Liaison  Officer  and 
Commission  officials  resulting  in  new  funding  for  the  Council  was  much 
diminished.  With  the  1988  Reform  of  the  Structural  Funds  (See  Chapter  Five), 
this  situation  was  true  for  all  SNAs  and  accordingly  the  nature  of  European  SNA 
liaison  and  of  the  Brussels  office  changed  as  SNAs  became  more  focused  upon 
"adopting  a  longer-term,  more  proactive  strategy  to  exert  influence  over  the 
manner  in  which  EU  policies  were  shaped  to  ensure  access  to  future 
programmes  attuned  to  their  particular  needs"  (Goldsmith,  1998,  p.  218). 
Accordingly,  SRC  became  increasingly  'engaged'  with  trans-regional  networks, 
developing  informal  contacts  and  networks  with  a  range  of  Institutions  beyond 
the  Commission,  including  MEPs  and  latterly  the  CoR,  as  well  as  other  SNAs. 
In  addition,  the  increasing  engagement  of  SNAs  with  the  EU  post-1986,  and  in 
particular  the  rapid  increase  in  the  number  of  SNA  representations  (Jeffrey, 
1996)  allied  to  the  scale  of  some  regional  offices,  such  as  the  German  Lander 
that  tend  "have  a  bigger  operation  which  allows  specialisation  and  depth  across  a 
range  of  policy  fields"  (Jeffrey,  1996,  p.  192)  ensured  that  SRC  faced  a  significant 
degree  of  competition  in  attempting  to  obtain  access  to  Commission  officials.  UK 
local  authorities  were  at  the  forefront  of  this  process,  as  there  are  more  UK  SNA 
representations  than  from  any  other  member  state  (John,  1994b).  The  extent  of 
this  trend  led  the  Audit  Commission  to  comment  that  "an  `embassy'  in  Brussels  is 
the  latest  thing  in  Euro-chic"  (Audit  Commission,  1991,  p.  35),  although  the  large 
number  of  UK  offices  can  largely  be  accounted  for  as  an  outcome  of  the 
extremely  fragmented  nature  of  sub-national  governance  in  the  UK. 
Due  to  the  large  number  of  SNA  representations,  a  number  of  UK  sub-national 
institutions  established  collaborative  offices  (such  as  the  Yorkshire  and 
Humberside  regional  office)  or  formed  a  company  to  represent  institutions  within 
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representations  brought  together  a  number  of  institutions  from  within  a  region, 
enabling  a  pooling  of  resources  and  a  number  of  staff  to  be  employed  focusing 
on  specific  policy  areas,  rather  than  an  individual  officer  covering  the  whole  raft 
of  policies.  In  addition,  these  offices  not  only  represented  local  government,  but 
also  a  range  of  local  institutions  such  as  Training  and  Enterprise  Councils  and 
local  development  agencies,  thus  paralleling  the  structures  of  governance  within 
UK  regions.  A  smaller  minority  would  also  incorporate  private  industry  and  would 
rent  out  office  space  to  SNAs  from  any  member-state  in  order  to  finance  the 
operation.  Scottish  sub-national  representation  followed  this  trend  of 
collaboration  between  various  actors  across  `regions'  through  the  establishment 
of  the  Scotland  Europa  centre  in  Brussels,  and  it  is  to  the  structure  of  this 
organisation  and  the  role  of  SRC  within  it,  that  I  now  intend  to  turn. 
7.3.2  -  The  establishment  and  functions  of  Scotland  Europa. 
Scotland  Europa  was  established  in  May  1992,  to  "promote  Scotland's  interests 
with  the  institutions  of  the  European  Union"  (Scotland  Europa,  1996,  p.  1). 
However  the  process  of  creating  Scotland  Europa  had  been  dogged  by 
considerable  controversy  due  to  the  leaking  of  a  Scottish  Office  memoranda 
concerning  the  composition  of  a  Scottish  'Brussels'  office,  known  as  the 
'Weeple143  papers'.  The  Weeple  papers  set  out  the  benefits  and  potential 
pitfalls  of  establishing  a  Scottish  representation  in  Brussels.  Broadly,  the 
disadvantages  of  an  office  in  Brussels  were  perceived  to  be  that  such  a 
representation  may  contradict  UK  government  policy  as  set  out  by  UKREP  in 
Brussels,  and  that  the  organisation  could  raise  opposition  within  a  number  of 
143  Weeple'  refers  to  the  Under  Secretary,  Edward  Weeple  within  the  Industry  Department  of  the 
Scottish  Office,  who  was  responsible  for  EC  affairs  within  the  Department  and  wrote  the  leaked 
memoranda.  A  Scotland  Europa  officer  dismissed  the  accuracy  of  the  Weeple  papers, 
contending  that  there  was  no  opposition  from  Whitehall,  whilst  Northern  Ireland  had  already 
opened  an  office  and  Wales  was  preparing  one.  Scotland  Europa  considered  the  Weeple 
papers,  as  the  views  of  Lord  Strathclyde  (Weeple's  boss)  alone,  and  commented  "there  was  a 
flurry  in  the  press  at  the  time.  That  was  the  only  real  evidence  of  resistance  at  the  time,  but  it 
wasn't  based  on  the  realities  of  the  situation  in  Brussels,  where  many  regional  offices  were 
opening  up,  including  other  British  offices"  (Case  24). 
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Commonwealth  Office.  However  of  more  direct  concern  to  Scottish  local 
government  was  that  Weeple  also  considered  which  Scottish  interests  / 
organisations  would  be  considered  suitable  for  the  organisation  as  "a  danger 
existed  of  allowing  interests  to  be  represented  which  would  articulate  an 
alternative  or  indeed  critical  view  of  the  Scottish  Office's  interpretation  of 
Scotland's  interests"  (Mitchell,  1994,  p.  12).  Scottish  local  government  was 
identified  as  a  potential  'trouble-maker'. 
Weeple  recommended  that  a  Scottish  representation  in  Brussels,  should  take  the 
form  of  a  private  company,  with  the  majority  shareholding  being  split  between 
Scottish  Enterprise  and  Highlands  and  Islands  Enterprise,  as  opposed  to  any 
formal  Scottish  Office  involvement  as  the  Secretary  of  State,  Ian  Lang,  was 
believed  to  favour  (Mitchell,  1994).  This  structure  would  distance  the  Scottish 
Office  from  the  project,  whilst  also  enabling  it  to  retain  a  degree  of  control  and 
limit  the  influence  of  outside  interests  within  the  structure.  Scotland  Europa  was 
ultimately  created  broadly  along  the  lines  proposed  by  Weeple,  with  the 
organisation  established  as  a  subsidiary  of  Scottish  Enterprise,  whilst  having  the 
full  support  of  the  Scottish  Office"  (Scotland  Europa,  1996,  p.  1). 
Scotland  Europa  provides  a  wide  range  of  services  to  its  subscribing  members, 
including  providing  information  and  intelligence  concerning  EU  policy 
developments  via  monthly  and  `flash'  reports  to  members;  arranging  briefings  to 
members  in  Brussels  and  Scotland  on  policy  areas;  enabling  members  to  access 
EU  funding;  and,  organising  members  lobbying  campaigns  in  Brussels  and 
"helping  members  identify  and  speak  to  the  right  people  in  Brussels  about 
specific  issues"  (Scotland  Europa,  1996,  p.  1).  In  terms  of  promoting  a  Scottish 
profile  more  generally,  Scotland  Europa  attempts  to  develop  contacts  with  other 
SNA's  in  Brussels,  provide  a  "focal  point  for  Scotland's  interests"  within  the 
Scotland  Europa  centre,  and  take  "initiatives  to  promote  Scotland  more  generally, 
[and]  bring  together  Scotland's  representative's  in  Europe"  (Scotland  Europa, 
207 1996,  p.  2).  Resident  members  (Appendix  three  provides  a  list  of  the  'resident' 
and  'subscription'  members  of  Scotland  Europa,  as  of  July  1996)  are  free  to  opt- 
in  to  these  services  according  to  their  own  priorities.  Nevertheless,  Scotland 
Europa  represents  a  minimalist  approach  to  SNA  representation  in  Brussels, 
particularly  through  its  early  attempts  to  bring  together  public,  semi-public  and 
private  sector  organisations  within  the  one  organisation.  As  a  consequence, 
Scotland  Europa  "is  not  an  aggregative  body  so  much  as  a  loose  consortium  of 
diverse  interests"  (Mitchell,  1994,  p.  20). 
Scottish  local  government  already  disenchanted  by  the  Weeple  papers,  decided 
not  to  participate  within  the  Scotland  Europa  centre  upon  its  creation,  due  to 
Scottish  Enterprise's  (and  implicitly,  the  Scottish  Office's)  dominance  over 
Scotland  Europa,  a  position  a  COSLA  official  explained  in  the  following  terms  :  - 
"The  original  concept  of  Scotland  Europa,  which  was  broadly  to  be  [an] 
organisation  owned  by  its  members,  appealed  to  COSLA.  The  Scotland  Europa 
we  got,  was  a  wholly  owned  subsidiary  of  Scottish  Enterprise,  which  was  not  the 
preferred  model  of  COSLA"  (Case  56). 
Opposition  to  participation  within  Scotland  Europa  was  strongest  amongst  the 
Regional  Councils,  with  only  Lothian  Regional  Council  in  favour  of  participation 
(three  Regional  Councils  expressed  concerns),  whilst  the  District  Council's  were 
more  evenly  split  on  the  issue  (Mitchell,  1994).  In  addition  to  concerns  over  the 
structure  of  Scotland  Europa,  the  Regional  Councils  which  dealt  with  the  majority 
of  EU  issues  which  impacted  upon  Scottish  local  government  had  already 
established  "functioning  European  teams"  (Case  56)  and  there  was  therefore  a 
concern  that  a  COSLA  office  within  Scotland  Europa  would  merely  duplicate  the 
work  of  existing  Regional  Council  offices  in  Brussels.  SRC's  European  and 
International  Affairs  Committee  certainly  took  this  view,  with  the  Committee 
reaching  the  conclusion  that  "on  balance  the  reduction  in  service  involved  in  a 
loss  of  a  dedicated  Strathclyde  EC  officer  in  Brussels  would  far  outweigh  any 
benefits  through  COSLA"  (SRC  Minutes,  September  1992),  and  accordingly  SRC 
was  not  in  favour  of  financing  a  COSLA  representation  within  Scotland  Europa. 
208 As  for  SRC  entering  into  Scotland  Europa  the  Committee  reached  the  position 
prior  to  the  establishment  of  Scotland  Europa  that  "it  is  far  from  clear  what 
Scottish  Enterprise  can  add  to  this  current  service  [SRC's  European  structure]  to 
the  Regional  Council  in  the  short  term"  (SRC  Minutes,  September  1992). 
Thus  upon  the  establishment  of  Scotland  Europa,  the  organisation  did  not 
contain  any  Scottish  local  government  'resident'  members  or  subscribers  to  the 
services  it  provided144.  The  antagonism  surrounding  the  establishment  of 
Scotland  Europa  was  reflected  in  its  initial  relations  with  other  Scottish  actors  in 
Brussels.  This  was  particularly  the  case  in  terms  of  the  relations  between 
Scotland  Europa  and  Scottish  MEPs  partly  due  to  conspiracy  theories  circulating 
amongst  Scottish  actors  in  Brussels,  regarding  the  politics  behind  the 
establishment  of  Scotland  Europa.  These  theories  tended  to  take  two  main 
forms.  Firstly,  that  Scotland  Europa  was  pushed  through  by  the  Scottish  Office, 
to  give  Ian  Lang  a  publicity  coup  in  the  run-up  to  the  1992  General  Election145. 
Alternatively,  a  number  of  Scottish  respondents  in  Brussels  took  the  view  that 
Scotland  Europa  was  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  Ian  Lang  /  Scottish  Office  civil 
servants,  to  pre-empt  Labour  party  /  Constitutional  Convention  plans  for  a 
Scottish  representation  in  Brussels  (in  the  likelihood  of  a  Labour  victory),  through 
including  the  private  sector  within  Scotland  Europa,  and  thus  establishing  an 
office  that  was  more  suited  to  Conservative  /  Scottish  Office  officials146  desires. 
Whichever  theory  is  correct  (or  neither),  the  view  that  the  Scottish  Office  was 
heavily  involved  in  quickly  establishing  Scotland  Europa  prior  to  the  1992 
144  A  resident  member  within  Scotland  Europa,  is  an  organisation  which  leases  premises  within 
the  Scotland  Europa  centre,  whilst  a  'subscriber'  is  an  organisation  which  does  not  maintain  a 
presence  in  Brussels  and  which  obtains  information  and  advice  /  contacts  on  lobbying  European 
Institutions  on  areas  of  interest  to  the  organisation  involved. 
145  Initially  Scotland  Europa  was  due  to  open  the  day  before  the  General  Election,  however 
"there  was  no  way  that  Lang  was  going  to  be  in  Brussels  on  the  day  before  a  General  Election" 
(Case  23).  As  a  result,  the  opening  of  Scotland  Europa  was  put  back  until  May  of  1992. 
However,  Scottish  Enterprise  /  Scottish  Office  clearly  could  not  have  known  the  date  of  the 
General  Election  whilst  preparing  the  opening  of  the  Centre. 
146  The  majority  of  respondents  on  this  issue  took  the  view  that  Scottish  Office  officials  were 
behind  the  rush  to  establish  Scotland  Europa,  as  this  fitted  in  with  the  likely  source  of  the  leaking 
of  the  Weeple  Papers'. 
209 Election  was  widespread  amongst  Scottish  actors  in  Brussels  (although 
explanations  of  the  motivations  behind  this  varied),  as  a  Scotland  Europa  official 
confirmed  :- 
"The  formal  basis  upon  which  we  were  set  up  was  that  we  were  going  to  be  run 
as  a  business  and  make  it  break  even  in  three  years.  If  you're  going  to  run  a 
business  and  make  it  break  even,  you  are  careful  about  the  costs,  [but]  there  was 
an  over-riding  political  consideration  again  to  get  it  set  up  quickly.  The  matter  of 
costs  went  right  out  of  the  window,  it  had  to  be  done.  The  set-up  costs  were 
pretty  significantly  over-budget....  That  was  political.  The  Scottish  Office  said  Go, 
and  it  happened"  (Case  23). 
As  a  result  of  the  events  surrounding  the  establishment  of  Scotland  Europa, 
initial  relations  between  Scottish  actors  in  Brussels  and  Scotland  Europa  were 
strained  and  in  the  case  of  Scottish  MEPs  fairly  hostile.  Evidence  of  these  initial 
strains  became  apparent  in  the  build-up  to  `Scottish  Week  at  the  European 
Parliament',  which  was  an  event  organised  by  Scottish  Enterprise,  to  raise 
awareness  of  Scotland  Europa  in  Brussels.  Figure  7.2,  provides  a  indication  of 
the  tensions  which  existed  between  Scottish  MEPs  and  Scottish  Enterprise  / 
Scotland  Europa  as  expressed  by  a  Scotland  Europa  official  which  manifested 
themselves  in  the  organisation  of  this  event. 
Table  7.2  -  Tensions  between  Scotland  Europa  and  Scottish  MEP's.  in  the 
early  days  of  Scotland  Europa. 
"When  they  [Scottish  Enterprise]  decided  to  do  Scottish  Week  at  the  European 
Parliament,  that  was  a  fiasco.  Everything  went  right  except  the  politics.  If  you  do 
something  with  Parliament,  you  get  the  politics  right-The  [Scottish  Enterprise] 
board  went  to  Strasbourg  in  March  1993....  We  had  this  meeting  between  the 
whole  of  the  Scottish  Enterprise  board  and  all  of  the  Scottish  MEPs.  It  was  an 
incredible  meeting,  it  was  like  a  lesson  in  how  not  to  do  things.  [The]  Scottish 
MEPs  all  made  little  speeches,  having  a  go  at  the  Scottish  Enterprise  board.  By 
which  time  the  Scottish  Enterprise  board  looked  pretty  bewildered.  And  then  a 
couple  of  them  [Scottish  Enterprise  board  members]  made  speeches  to  counter 
the  points  made  by  the  MEPs".  (Case  23). 
210 Nevertheless  Scotland  Europa  began  to  establish  itself  in  Brussels,  and  amongst 
the  Scottish  organisations  present  there,  to  the  extent  that  SRC  relocated  its 
office  into  the  Scotland  Europa  centre  in  April  1993.  A  number  of  factors  lay 
behind  this  decision  by  SRC.  Firstly,  Grant  Baird  [the  Chief  Executive  of 
Scotland  Europa]  had  expressed  his  "enthusiasm  for  local 
government  participation"  (SRC  Minutes,  September  1992)  within  Scotland 
Europa,  and  some  local  authorities  had  agreed  to  participate  at  some  point  in 
the  future.  Secondly,  the  decision  made  sense  to  SRC  from  an  administrative 
perspective,  as  the  lease  was  due  to  end  on  SRC's  current  office  whilst  SRC's 
European  Liaison  Officer  (since  1984)  was  due  to  retire.  Finally,  and  perhaps 
decisively,  the  inability  to  perceive  what  Scottish  Enterprise  /  Scotland  Europa 
could  add  to  SRC's  European  policy  in  the'short  term',  had  changed  as  the 
'short  term'  referred  to  the  1992  General  Election  as  the  following  extract  from 
SRC  Minutes  make  clear  :- 
"The  matter  [whether  to  enter  into  Scotland  Europa]  has  taken  some  time  to 
move  forward  for  a  number  of  reasons,  not  least  in  order  that  full  account  could 
be  taken  of  the  outcome  of  the  General  Election,  since  all  of  the  Opposition 
parties  had  indicated  a  commitment,  inter  alia,  to  establishing  a  strong  Scottish 
representative  office  in  Brussels  (which  might  or  might  not  have  built  upon  the 
Scotland  Europa  concept).  It  is  now  of  course  clear  that  there  will  be  no  early 
establishment  of  a  Scottish  Parliament  with  [a]  consequential  Scottish 
representation  in  Brussels  and  it  is  therefore  appropriate  to  return  to  detailed 
consideration  of  local  government  representation,  whether  through  Scotland 
Europa  or  in  other  ways'  (SRC  Minutes,  September  1992). 
The  decision  by  SRC  to  locate  its  representative  office  within  Scotland  Europa 
was  a  recognition  that  the  nature  of  sub-national  lobbying  had  changed 
considerably  and  that  the  `lone  ranger'  approach  to  Brussels  representation  was 
no  longer  appropriate  as  the  emphasis  of  sub-national  lobbying  shifted  from 
obtaining  EU  funding  to  the  influencing  of  legislation.  Through  entering  Scotland 
Europa,  SRC  would  be  able  to  share  information  and  contacts  with  other  Scottish 
organisations,  as  well  as  benefit  from  the  general  Scottish  persona  of  the  centre, 
as  it  became  recognised  as  the  focus  of  Scottish  activity  in  Brussels.  By  the  end 
211 of  the  1993,  there  were  four  Scottish  local  government  `resident'  members  of 
Scotland  Europa147,  and  it  is  to  the  role  of  SRC  within  Scotland  Europa  from 
1993  to  1996,  that  I  now  turn. 
7.3.3  -  SRC  and  Scotland  Europa. 
As  the  focus  of  SRC's  Brussels  office  shifted  (from  accessing  funds  to  influencing 
legislation,  participating  within  trans-regional  networks,  and  establishing  informal 
networks  with  other  SNAs),  co-operating  with  partners  within  Scotland  Europa 
and  benefiting  from  the  'Scottish  persona'  of  Scotland  Europa  also  became  an 
integral  element  of  SRC's  European  policy.  Initially  the  co-operation  between 
Scotland  Europa  and  its  resident  partners  was  limited  to  the  informal  sharing  of 
information  within  the  Centre,  however  with  a  change  of  Chief  Executive  within 
Scotland  Europa,  co-operation  began  to  become  more  formal  notably  through  the 
creation  of  `specialist  groups'  dealing  with  the  environment,  technology,  and 
education  and  training.  These  groups  would  bring  together  Scots  resident  in 
Brussels,  from  MEPs  and  Commission  officials  to  Scotland  Europa  members  to 
discuss  a  particular  policy  area.  In  addition,  the  Scotland  Europa  resident 
members  began  to  meet  fortnightly  to  outline  their  respective  work  programmes 
and  to  assess  any  areas  of  common  interest,  as  a  Scotland  Europa  official 
explained  as  follows:  - 
"Your  constituents  here  are  each  pursuing  their  own  independent  objectives,  the 
difference  is  that  here  they  are  all  under  the  same  roof,  there  is  a  commonality  in 
that  they  all  have  a  Scottish  interest.  There  is  a  lot  of  information  sharing  that 
goes  on,  for  that  which  can  be  shared,  and  [names  a  Scotland  Europa  official] 
has  done  a  lot  to  inculcate  a  team  atmosphere  amongst  the  representatives  of 
the  various  tenants  here.  And  every  two  weeks,  we  sit  round  a  table,...  and  we 
say  to  each  other,  what  we  have  done  in  the  previous  two  weeks  and  what  we 
are  going  to  be  doing  in  the  coming  two  weeks.  And  that  has  crossovers  of  all 
kinds,  sometimes  which  you  wouldn't  even  dream  of"  (Case  24). 
147  The  four  Scottish  local  government  'resident'  members  of  Scotland  Europa  at  this  time  were  : 
Strathclyde  Regional  Council;  COSLA;  East  of  Scotland  European  Consortium  (ESEC) 
comprising  central,  Fife,  Lothian  and  Tayside  Regional  Councils;  and  Highland  Regional  Council 
(the  Highland  Council  representative  also  negotiated  "representation  contracts"  (Case  23)  with 
Borders,  Dumfries  and  Galloway  and  Grampian  Regional  Councils). 
212 Scotland  Europa  certainly  seeks  to  foster  contact  between  Scottish  actors  in 
Brussels.  For  instance  the  Centre  constantly  updates  a  booklet  named  'Jock 
Tamson's  Bairns',  which  is  "a  network  listing  of  Scots  and  those  with  strong 
Scottish  connections"  (Scotland  Europa,  1996b,  p.  1)  resident  in  Brussels  and 
Luxembourg148.  This  booklet  tended  to  be  widely  used,  as  a  means  of  gaining 
information  from  an  Institution  where  no  previous  contacts  existed.  For  example 
a  Scottish  Commission  official  described  his  use  of  'Jock  Tamson's  Baims'  in  the 
following  terms  :  - 
"You're  probably  aware  of  'Jock  Tamson's  Bairns'.  We  use  that,  I  think  its  used 
quite  heavily.  Any  issue  that  somebody  is  finding  difficult  or  strained,  they  can 
resort  to  phoning  up  the  nearest  member  of  the  Scottish  Mafia  and  sorting  out  or 
at  least  getting  a  way  round  it"  (Case  33). 
Lobbyists  from  other  SNAs  would  frequently  refer  to  the  existence  of  a  Scottish 
lobby,  and  to  the  role  of  Scotland  Europa  in  providing  a  focus  to  Scottish  activity 
in  Brussels,  whilst  Commission  officials  valued  the  Centre  as  a  source  of  local 
information  (via  seminars  and  policy  papers)  and  as  a  means  of  arranging 
meetings  with  Scottish  representatives.  Whilst  representatives  from  within 
Scotland  Europa  were  aware  of  this  perception  amongst  external  actors,  they 
were  also  aware  of  the  fragmented  nature  of  Scottish  representation  in  Brussels, 
as  opposed  to  the  concerted  lobbying  campaigns  propagated  by  the  German 
Lander  or  the  'fabled'  Irish'49.  A  Scotland  Europa  official  characterised  the 
'Scottish  lobby'  in  Brussels  as  follows  :  - 
"Scotland  Europa  is  the  focal  point  of  Scottish  lobbying,  there  is  a  Scottish  lobby 
in  the  sense  that  most  of  the  Scottish  lobbying  is  conducted  out  of  the  same 
office.  The  people  on  the  receiving  end,  the  people  in  the  Commission,  think  that 
there  is  a  Scottish  lobby,  because  every  time  they  get  lobbied  by  Scotland..  it 
happens  in  the  same  place.  Scotland  Europa  does  most  of  it's  work  for  it's 
members.  The  Commission  or  EP  view  is  its  the  Scottish  lobby  again.  The 
sense  in  which  there  isn't  a  Scottish  lobby,  is  that  there  isn't  a  lobby  covering  the 
interests  of  the  whole  of  Scotland...  There  isn't  any  political  direction"  (Case  23). 
148  in  October  1996,  Jock  Tamson's  Baims  consisted  of  311  Scottish  contacts  in  Brussels  and 
Luxembourg,  with  268  resident  in  Brussels  and  43  resident  in  Luxembourg. 
149  For  a  discusssion  of  engagement  with  the  Structural  Funds  within  the  Irish  Republic  during 
the  1980's,  see  Laffan,  B  (1989). 
213 From  the  perspective  of  SRC's  European  Liaison  officer  within  Scotland  Europa, 
the  'Scottish  card'  (where  a  coalition  of  Scottish  interests  existed)  was  a  useful 
means  of  lobbying  European  Institutions,  where  there  was  a  common  interest 
amongst  Scottish  actors  within  Scotland  Europa.  More  generally,  the  SRC 
representative  would  co-operate  closely  with  the  other  Scottish  local  government 
representatives  within  Scotland  Europa,  with  the  extent  of  collaboration  ranging 
from  the  sharing  of  information  and  policy  positions  to  avoiding  a  duplication  of 
activity  (for  example,  not  attending  the  same  EP  Committee  meeting)  and 
combining  lobbying  efforts  where  mutual  interests  existed.  Such  co-operation 
made  sense,  due  to  the  proliferation  of  Scottish  SNA  representation  in  Brussels, 
whilst  Scotland  Europa  enabled  co-operation  to  take  place.  The  COSLA 
representative  in  Brussels  at  the  time,  summarised  the  position  accordingly  :  - 
"Obviously  as  the  largest  council  in  Scotland,  we  worked  closely  with  Strathclyde, 
just  as  we  worked  with  other  councils.  Size  was  not  an  issue,  but  obviously 
working  in  Brussels  with  Strathclyde  across  the  corridor,  we  could  co-ordinate 
activity  to  make  sure  that  [the  SRC  representative]  and  I  were  working 
effectively"  (Case  56). 
7.3.4  -  Summary. 
The  opening  of  an  SRC  representative  office  in  1984,  occurred  at  a  time  when 
SNA  representation  in  Brussels  was  virtually  non-existent.  This  enabled  SRC  to 
develop  a  wide  range  of  contacts  within  the  Commission  (particularly  DGV  and 
DGXVI),  in  order  to  access  European  funds.  With  the  increasing  representation 
of  SNAs  in  Brussels  following  the  introduction  of  the  `Single  European  Act'  and 
the  introduction  of  programming  and  partnership  within  Strathclyde,  the  utility  of 
the  Brussels  office  diminished  as  a  means  of  levering  European  funds.  As  a 
result,  the  remit  of  SRC's  representative  office  shifted  to  becoming  increasingly 
focused  upon  gaining  access  to  the  European  policy  process,  through 
participation  within  trans-regional  networks,  maintaining  contacts  within 
European  Institutions  and  developing  contacts  with  other  SNAs  in  Europe, 
particularly  those  with  agendas  similar  to  SRC,  such  as  regions  involved  within 
RETI  or  Ouverture. 
214 However,  SNAs  in  Brussels  not  only  attempt  to  co-operate  with  each  other,  but 
also  compete  with  each  other,  in  terms  of  gaining  access  to  decision-makers  and 
accessing  funds  that  can  still  be  lobbied  for  in  Brussels,  such  as  Community 
Initiatives.  In  many  respects,  the  mobilisation  of  SNAs  onto  the  European  policy 
process  can  be  viewed  as  a  form  of  'place  competition'  (Harvey,  1989150)  within 
the  European  political  arena.  The  eventual  participation  of  SRC  within  Scotland 
Europa  represented  a  recognition  of  the  changing  nature  of  SNA  representation 
in  Brussels  by  SRC,  and  of  the  need  for  collaboration  with  other  actors  in  order  to 
lobby  effectively.  Scotland  Europa  provided  a  'common  shop  front'  for  Scottish 
interests,  and  while  it  was  frequently  perceived  as  being  a  'Scottish'  lobby,  in 
effect  it  provided  a  means  whereby  Scottish  interests  could  collaborate  where  a 
common  interest  existed  whilst  also  respecting  the  independence  of  Centre's 
members.  This  loose  collaboration  of  Scottish  actors  in  Brussels  is  a  reflection  of 
the  constitutional  tensions  of  Scotland's  position  within  a  'union  state'  (Mitchell, 
1996),  as  the  controversies  surrounding  the  establishment  of  Scotland  Europa 
centre  clearly  illustrated. 
Nevertheless,  the  competition  between  SNAs  in  Brussels  for  access  to  European 
Institutions  ensured  that  Scottish  actors  within  Scotland  Europa  began  to 
increasingly  co-operate  through  sharing  information  and  attempting  to  lobby 
jointly  where  possible.  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  was  thus  able  to  benefit 
from  the  facilities  provided  by  Scotland  Europa,  and  liase  closely  with  other 
Scottish  local  government  representatives.  However  the  use  of  the  `Scottish' 
card  as  a  means  of  gaining  access  to  Institutions  or  lobbying  was  only  one  option 
amongst  a  range  of  alternative  methods  with  which  to  influence  the  European 
policy  process.  Where  a  common  Scottish  interest  did  exist,  SRC  would 
participate  within  these  lobbying  campaigns.  However  where  no  common 
interest  existed  or  a  particular  issue  required  a  pan-European  lobby  (such  as  the 
150  'Place  competition'  is  not  a  new  phenomenon  in  Strathclyde  (and  especially  Glasgow),  where 
the  creation  of  a  cosmopolitan  image  for  Glasgow,  was  part  of  a  strategy  to  attract  inward  global 
investment  to  Glasgow  during  the  1980's  (see,  Booth  and  Boyle,  1993,  and  Paddison,  1993  for 
an  account  of  these  processes  in  Glasgow). 
215 Objective  Two  lobby),  then  SRC  would  utilise  contacts  within  trans-regional 
networks,  and  /  or  informal  networks.  As  SRC's  European  Liaison  Officer  stated 
"as  long  as  the  Strathclyde  voice  is  heard,  I  don't  mind  if  it's  heard  through 
Scotland  Europa,  through  RETI  or  AER,  as  long  as  it's  heard.  I  think  it  doesn't 
do  you  any  discredit,  that  you're  involved  in  a  number  of  different  interests"  (Case 
13). 
This  attitude  was  no  different  to  the  approach  of  other  SNAs  in  Brussels,  and  it  is 
to  SRC's  use  of  informal  networks  as  part  of  a  lobbying  campaign  that  I  now 
intend  to  turn. 
7.4.1  -  SRC  and  informal  networks. 
The  example  of  the  Objective  Two  lobby  fronted  by  SRC,  illustrated  that  whilst 
participation  within  formal,  trans-regional  networks  are  an  important  means  of 
gaining  access  to  decision-makers  and  obtaining  legitimacy  within  the  decision- 
making  process,  the  actual  lobbying  takes  place  predominantly  through  informal 
channels.  More  generally,  the  more  mundane  day-to-day  activity  of  SNA 
representatives  requires  cultivating  informal  contacts  with  Commission  officials, 
in  order  to  gain  the  'inside  track'  on  policy  developments  within  the  Commission. 
Numerous  analyses  of  effective  Commission  lobbying  stress  the  importance  of 
'advance  intelligence'  and  consequently  of  maintaining  good  links  with 
Commission  officials151.  For  instance,  Mazey  and  Richardson  (1996)  comment 
that 
.  - 
"there  is  no  substitute  for'advance  intelligence'  to  detect  the  very  earliest  stages 
of  a  change  in  policy  -  the  beginnings  of  a  change  in  `policy  fashion'.  It  is  at  the 
151  One  method  pursued  by  SNA's  and  national  governments  in  order  to  ascertain  policy 
developments  within  the  Commission  at  an  early  stage,  and  in  some  cases  to  plant  them,  was  to 
pursue  a  policy  of  seconding  officials  to  the  European  Commission.  This  was  a  policy  which  SRC 
followed,  with  the  Council  regularly  having  at  least  one  official  within  either  DGV  or  DGXVI  at  any 
one  time.  Thus  secondees  can  provide  an  important  means  of  access  into  the  Commission 
bureaucracy  at  the  early  stages  of  policy  formulation,  as  the  following  comments  from  a  Scotland 
Europa  official  illustrate 
"We  had  the  good  fortune  to  have  one  of  our  secondees,  who  actually  drafted  one  of  the 
important  articles  on  the  ESF.  You  treat  that  carefully,  because  they're  working  for  the 
Commission,  but  we're  still  paying  their  wages  at  the  end  of  the  month.  We  knew  exactly  what 
was  happening  with  Article  6  of  the  ESF  formulations"  (Case  24). 
216 problem  identification  and  options-search  stage  of  the  policy  process  that 
lobbying  has  always  been  most  effective  -  and  this  is  also  true  for  the  EU" 
(Mazey  and  Richardson,  1996,  p.  208). 
However,  once  a  policy  moves  beyond  these  early  stages,  SNA  lobbyists  will 
also  utilise  contacts  within  the  European  Parliament  and  latterly,  the  Committee 
of  the  Regions.  In  addition,  SNAs  will  also  attempt  to  lobby  their  own  domestic 
governments  upon  a  particular  issue,  when  it  reaches  the  Council  of  Ministers. 
Accordingly,  it  is  possible  to  denote  a  hierarchy  of  informal  networks,  which 
operate  at  a  variety  of  geographical  scales,  and  which  would  become  operational 
depending  upon  the  type  of  issue  involved.  In  the  case  of  SRC,  the  Council  was 
involved  within  three  main  types  of  informal  networks,  which  can  be  categorised 
as  :-  Brussels  networks;  Scottish  networks;  and,  Strathclyde  wide  networks. 
7.4.2  -  Informal  'Brussels'  Networks. 
As  has  been  stated  above,  the  'early'  establishment  of  a  Brussels  office,  enabled 
SRC  to  get  a  'headstart'  in  terms  of  establishing  contacts  within  the  Commission, 
primarily  DGV  and  DGXVI,  as  the  primary  motivation  for  the  office  prior  to  1988 
was  to  obtain  European  finance.  Thus,  SRC  was  well  recognised  amongst  other 
SNA  lobbyists  and  Commission  officials  to  have  strong  connections  within  both 
Directorates-General,  whilst  the  appointment  of  Bruce  Millan  only  served  to 
further  the  perceived  entrenchment  of  SRC  interests  within  DGXVI,  as  the 
comments  of  a  Scotland  Europa  official  illustrate  :  - 
"Strathclyde  had  somebody  here  since  the  early  1980s,  the  name  of  Strathclyde 
was  and  is  well-known  in  DGXVI,  DGV  and  elsewhere.  The  political  and 
economic  strength  of  Strathclyde  Regional  Council,  was  known,  recognised, 
acknowledged.  -To  many  people  in  the  Commission,  Strathclyde  Regional 
Council  was  Scotland...  Strathclyde  was  powerful  in  their  own  right,  it  also  had  at 
the  time,  a  straight  track  to  the  Commissioner  for  Regional  Policy,  which  was  not 
to  be  ignored.  And  when  you  had  that,  then  all  your  foot  soldiers  throughout 
DGXVI  recognised  that,  and  without  saying  that  they  bent  over  backwards  to 
accommodate  Strathclyde  which  was  not  the  case,  they  recognised  and 
acknowledged  that  they  were  dealing  with  a  Region  in  which  their  Commissioner 
previously  had  a  constituency"  (Case  24). 
217 As  the  nature  of  SRC's  office  in  Brussels  changed,  so  the  focus  of  lobbying 
expanded  to  include  other  DGs,  such  as  Environment.  However,  SRC's  most 
extensive  contacts  continued  to  be  located  in  DGV  and  DGXVI.  In  addition,  SRC 
sought  to  extend  its  contacts  with  other  SNAs,  particularly  SNAs  which  SRC  had 
come  into  contact  with  through  trans-regional  networks.  Through  collaboration 
with  other  SNAs,  each  'region'  could  benefit  by  jointly  lobbying  their  own 
respective  contacts  within  the  Commission,  European  Parliament  and  national 
governments  upon  a  particular  issue,  with  the  Objective  Two  lobby  being  a  prime 
example  of  such  an  initiative.  Whilst  a  primary  motivation  for  contact  with 
Commission  officials  would  be  to  obtain  information,  the  European  Liaison  officer 
would  also  attempt  to  promote  existing  practice  and  policy  within  SRC,  provide 
information  for  Commission  officials  relating  to  Strathclyde  and  attempt  to  obtain 
extra  funding  for  SRC  projects.  SRC's  European  Liaison  Officer  described  this 
activity  in  the  following  manner:  - 
"The  Brussels  office  would  be  used  to  promote  a  project,  or  to  make  sure  the 
project  was  getting  to  the  right  people  in  the  Commission,  if  it  was  that  kind  of 
project  for  a  specific  budget  -  vandalism,  anti-racism,  a  culture  project  or 
whatever"  (Case  13). 
In  terms  of  contacts  with  the  European  Parliament  and  latterly  the  Committee  of 
the  Regions,  SRC  would  tend  to  approach  representatives  within  the  Strathclyde 
area,  i.  e.  MEPs  with  a  constituency  within  SRC's  boundaries  or  CoR 
representatives  who  were  also  Councillors  within  SRC1  52.  All  of  the  Labour 
MEPs  (and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  SNP  MEP)  would  be  in  regular  contact  with  the 
SRC  European  Liaison  Officer  and  senior  SRC  Councillors  regarding  SRC 
policies,  whilst  both  of  SRC's  representatives  on  the  Committee  of  the  Regions 
were  members  of  the  Council's  'European  and  International  Affairs  Committee'. 
152  The  constituencies  of  five  of  Scotland's  eight  MEP's  lay  either  wholly  or  partly  within  SRC's 
boundaries.  These  were  Glasgow,  Highlands  and  Islands,  South  of  Scotland,  Strathclyde  East 
and,  Strathclyde  West.  For  the  majority  of  the  period  considered  here  (1984-96),  four  of  these 
MEP's  were  Labour,  whilst  the  Highlands  and  Islands  was  held  by  the  SNP  (See  Lynch  (1994) 
and  Denver  (1994)  for  a  discussion  of  the  Scottish  outcomes  of  EP  elections  from  1979  to  1994, 
and  in  particular  for  the  two  elections  of  most  relevance  here,  1989  and  1994, 
218 The  close  contact  between  SRC  and  Strathclyde  based  MEPs  was  summed  up 
by  SRC's  European  Liaison  Officer  in  the  following  manner  :- 
"Basically,  we  just  keep  in  touch  on  a  weekly  basis.  And  if  there  were  any  big 
issues  I  wanted  them  to  raise,  I  would  go  and  see  them  about  it,  or  if  there  was 
anything  they  felt  the  local  authority  should  know  about,  that  had  come  up  in  their 
daily  work,  they  would  let  me  know"  (Case  13). 
Thus,  MEPs  could  fullfill  a  number  of  functions  for  SRC,  such  as  obtaining 
information  regarding  Commission  policies  and  providing  intelligence  of  possible 
changes  in  Commission  policy.  Additionally,  MEPs  could  raise  the  profile  or 
politicise  an  issue  on  SRC's  behalf,  in  order  to  put  pressure  upon  the 
Commission  or  Council  of  Ministers.  Despite  having  two  CoR  members  within 
SRC,  contact  between  these  members  and  SRC  was  rather  more  limited.  In  part 
this  was  due  to  the  CoR  being  a  new  institution  which  was  still  unproven  in  terms 
of  the  extent  of  its  influence153.  However,  whilst  SRC's  European  Liaison 
Officer  did  have  contact  with  the  Leader  of  the  UK  delegation  (an  SRC  Councillor 
and  former  Leader  of  SRC),  this  was  limited  due  to  internal  political  tensions 
within  SRC1  54,  teilst  the  other  member  had  a  less  prominent  role  within  CoR. 
The  closeness  of  relations  between  SRC  and  Strathclyde  MEPs  was  clearly 
exemplified  in  SRC's  attempts  to  obtain  a  'derogation'  from  a  directive  dealing 
with  'Urban  Waste  Water.  SRC  had  attempted  to  lobby  through  its  contacts  with 
DGXI  at  an  earlier  stage,  however,  the  issue  had  advanced  through  the  policy 
process  to  reach  the  European  Parliament.  SRC  had  not  been  able  to  build  any 
alliances  with  other  SNAs  whilst  DGXI  did  not  wish  to  allow  a  'get-out  clause'  for 
SRC  within  the  legislation.  As  a  consequence,  SRC  made  representations  to  all 
of  the  Strathclyde  based  MEPs,  and  in  particular  to  the  MEP  for  Strathclyde  East 
153  The  role  of  the  CoR  as  a  means  of  influencing  the  European  policy  process  will  be 
considered  in  Chapter  Eight,  as  the  CoR  came  more  to  prominence  following  the  reorganisation 
of  local  government  in  1996. 
154  These  'internal  political  tensions'  within  the  Labour  group  on  SRC,  were  fairly  apparent  as  ClIr 
Charles  Gray  (then  Leader  of  the  UK  Delegation  to  the  CoR)  had  been  ousted  as  Leader  by  the 
subsequent  Leader  of  SRC. 
219 who  was  the  Chair  of  the  EP's  Environment  Committee,  which  would  deal  with 
the  legislation.  Unfortunately  for  SRC,  the  MEP  took  the  view  that  :- 
"nobody  was  going  to  give  a  regional  authority  a  derogation  from  such  an 
important  directive.  Beside  which,  all  the  scientific  evidence  which  was  available 
to  me,  ran  counter  to  the  idea  that  you  could  still  dump  sewage  in  the  sea"  (Case 
18). 
Despite  this,  SRC  continued  to  pursue  their  case,  by  hiring  a  consultant  to 
investigate  the  effects  of  the  legislation,  whilst  the  Leader  of  SRC  "actually 
convened  a  meeting  in  Strathclyde  House  so  that  I  could  come  and  explain  what 
was  going  on"  (Case  18).  Whilst  the  case  of  the  Urban  Waste  Water  Directive 
exemplified  the  lengths  which  SRC  was  prepared  to  go  in  order  to  influence  EU 
policy  and  of  the  importance  of  `informal  networks',  this  instance  also  highlights 
the  necessity  for  support  from  other  SNAs,  and  especially  from  central 
government  and  /  or  the  Commission,  when  attempting  to  influence  the  EU  policy 
process. 
The  `informal  networks'  which  SRC  built  up  in  Brussels  would  address  two  main 
types  of  lobbying.  Firstly,  the  Brussels  office  would  co-ordinate  the  lobbying  of 
Commission  officials  when  dealing  with  the  day-to-day  operation  of  European 
policies  and  programmes.  Secondly,  the  Brussels  office  and  senior  SRC 
politicians  and  officials  would  engage  in  a  concerted  lobbying  campaign  involving 
the  lobbying  of  Commission  officials,  Commissioners,  MEPs,  CoR 
representatives,  national  government  (primarily  the  Scottish  Office),  alongside  a 
similar  strategy  by  other  SNAs  involved  with  the  same  issue  through  their 
contacts.  Examples  of  lobbies  of  this  kind  undertaken  by  SRC  include  the 
Objective  Two  lobby  and  the  campaign  to  retain  control  over  Ecos-Ouverture 
during  the  merger  negotiations  (See  Chapter  Six,  Section  4.1). 
7.4.3  -  Informal  'Scottish'  networks. 
A  'Scottish'  network  or  lobby  involving  SRC  with  regard  to  European  issues 
would  comprise  a  wide  variety  of  institutions,  such  as  COSLA,  Scottish  MEPs, 
220 the  Scottish  Office  (at  official  and  political  level),  Scottish  (and  Highlands  and 
Islands)  Enterprise,  Scotland  Europa  (and  the  partners  within  Scotland  Europa) 
and  a  wide  range  of  organisations  involved  within  the  Structural  Fund 
partnerships  in  Scotland.  Whilst  conducting  field-work  within  the  European  policy 
sphere  in  Scotland,  there  was  a  constant  awareness  of  the  close  links  between 
officials  and  politicians  within  organisations  dealing  with  European  policy. 
Respondents  themselves  frequently  drew  attention  to  this  feature  of  the  policy 
environment  in  Scotland,  as  the  following  quotes  from  a  range  of  respondents 
illustrate  :  - 
"Even  at  times  when  the  relationship  generally  has  been  at  rock  bottom,  I  think 
on  some  of  the  practical  things,  it's  been  possible  at  official  level,  and  indeed  at  a 
political  level  as  well,  to  get  a  reasonable  degree  of  co-operation"  (Former 
European  Commissioner,  Case  45). 
"There  is  a  different  Scottish  culture,  there  is  a  different  way  of  doing  things  in 
Scotland.  It  is  partly  because  Scotland  is  much  smaller,  you  will  always  find  that 
you  meet  the  same  people,  and  you  build  up  a  working  relationship.  In  Scotland, 
it's  a  small,  I  dread  to  call  it  elite,  but  the  decision-makers  in  Scotland  are  much 
smaller,  therefore  you  have  to  work  more  closely"  (COSLA  official,  Case  56). 
"If  you  want  me  to  summarise  in  a  sentence,  what  is  the  difference  between 
Scotland  and  England,  it  is  that  Scotland  is  a  giant  village"  (Scottish  Office 
official,  Case  42). 
MacLeod  (1996)  contends  that  the  "economic  development  community  within 
Scotland  operates  like  a  village....  And  as  with  most  villages,  this  is  characterised 
by  a  certain  degree  of  informality,  reciprocity  of  information,  relative  temporal 
stability  and  community  of  association  which  serves  to  reinforce  the  distinctive 
politico-institutional  arrangements'  (MacLeod,  1996,  p.  17).  It  is  certainly  possible 
to  discern  similar  trends  within  the  European  policy  community  in  Scotland155, 
for  instance,  frequent  contact  between  European  policy-makers  across  tiers  of 
government  and  governance;  regular  exchange  of  information  regarding  policy 
(for  example,  SRC  -  Scottish  Office  exchange  of  information  during  the  Objective 
221 Two  lobby);  a  small  policy-elite  in  key  positions  over  a  long  period  of  time, 
particularly  at  official  level;  and  finally,  distinctive  institutional  outcomes,  such  as, 
the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership.  In  terms  of  European  policy,  an  issue 
which  would  consistently  mobilise  the  Scottish  network  was  when  allocations 
were  being  negotiated  for  Scotland's  eligibility  and  share  of  the  Structural  Funds, 
given  that  Scottish  actors  would  be  keen  to  see  as  large  a  financial  contribution 
coming  to  Scotland  as  possible.  A  senior  official  within  the  Strathclyde  European 
Partnership  summed  up  the  consensus  across  all  tiers  of  Scottish  government 
and  governance  when  it  comes  to  lobbying  for  Scotland's  share  of  the  Structural 
Funds  in  the  following  manner  :  - 
"What  you  find  on  the  Structural  Funds,  is  that  the  people  across  Scotland  are 
speaking  more  or  less  with  the  same  voice,  so  there  isn't  really  any  disagreement 
between  the  STUC  or  the  CBI,  or  the  local  authorities  or  the  Scottish  Office,  or 
Scottish  Enterprise  on  the  Structural  Funds.  There  will  be  debates  and  tensions 
about  how  it  should  be  used  in  terms  of  individual  projects,  but  in  terms  of  the 
bigger  argument,  people  are  really  speaking  with  one  voice"  (Case  43). 
An  example  of  SRC  acting  in  concert  with  the  'Scottish  network'  both  within 
Scotland  and  in  Brussels,  was  the  lobbying  campaign  to  obtain  an  Objective  One 
designation  for  Argyll  and  Bute.  The  Highlands  and  Islands  had  obtained  the 
designation  of  an  Objective  One  region  for  the  period  1994  to  1999.  However, 
the  European  Commission's  designation  of  the  Highlands  and  Islands  was  based 
upon  the  NUTS  II  categorisation156  of  the  Highlands  and  Islands,  however  this 
classification  excluded  Argyll  and  Bute,  Arran  and  Cumbrae  from  Objective  One 
status,  as  these  areas  came  under  the  Strathclyde  /  Dumfries  and  Galloway 
NUTS  II  region.  The  excluded  areas  came  within  the  boundaries  of  Strathclyde 
Regional  Council  and  accordingly  SRC  became  the  prime  mover  behind  a  lobby 
iss  Midwinter  et.  al.  (1991)  also  comment  on  the  stable,  restricted  elite  membership  of  "functional 
policy  communities  which  are  territorially  differentiated  or  organised  separately  in  Scotland"  being 
symptomatic  of  the  'Scottish  style"  of  governance  (Midwinter  et.  al.,  1991,  p.  202). 
156  NUTS  stands  for  the  'Nomenclature  of  territorial  units  for  statistics',  which  designates  three 
categories  of  territorial  division  :-  NUTS  1,2  and  3.  The  European  Commission  relies  upon 
member-state  statistics  in  order  to  create  this  categorisation,  and  accordingly  there  is  no  uniform 
system  of  classification  across  the  EU.  In  the  case  of  the  UK,  NUTS  I  regions  are  based  upon 
the  UK  government's  `standard  planning  regions',  NUTS  2  upon  groupings  of  counties  and  local 
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three  main  premises.  Firstly,  that  Argyll,  Bute,  Arran  and  the  Cumbraes  fell 
within  the  Highlands  and  Enterprise  area.  Secondly,  that  the  area  shared  a 
number  of  common  characteristics  with  the  designated  Highlands  and  Islands 
area  such  as,  peripherality,  low  population  density  and  declining  industries 
(agriculture,  fisheries  etc.  ).  Thirdly,  SRC  produced  a  statistical  report  which 
concluded  that  the  excluded  areas  were  actually  poorer  than  the  designated 
Objective  One  area,  with  the  GDP  per  capita  calculated  for  Argyll  and  Bute  only 
67.2%  of  the  European  average  and  87.4%  of  the  Highlands  and  Islands  (NUTS 
2)  figure"  (SRC  Minutes,  July  1993). 
This  statistical  report  formed  a  key  part  of  SRC's  lobbying  campaigns,  as  the 
Leader  of  the  Council  made  a  representation  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
Scotland,  whilst  the  statistical  report  was  sent  to  the  Prime  Minister,  Foreign 
Secretary,  and  President  of  Board  of  Trade.  SRC's  Leader  also  met  Bruce 
Milian,  the  Senior  Official  within  UKREP,  John  Kerr  (also  a  Scot),  and  a  number 
of  senior  Commission  officials  (SRC  Minutes,  July  1993).  Finally,  the  SNP  MEP 
for  the  Highlands  and  Islands,  Winnie  Ewing,  tabled  an  amendment  within  the 
European  Parliament  "which  proposed  the  extension  of  the  Highlands  and 
Islands  area  to  be  covered  by  Objective  One  to  cover  the  whole  Highlands  and 
Islands  Enterprise  area'  (SRC  Minutes,  July  1993).  The  EP  passed  the 
amendment  by  227  to  27  votes  despite  Commission  opposition,  with  all  the 
Scottish  MEPs  voting  for  the  amendment.  The  lobby  also  had  the  support  of 
COSLA,  Highlands  and  Islands  Enterprise,  CBI,  STUC,  Grampian  Regional 
Council  and  a  number  of  district  councils  affected  by  the  issue.  The  Council  of 
Ministers  accepted  the  inclusion  of  Argyll  and  Bute,  Arran  and  the  Cumbraes 
within  the  Highlands  and  Islands  Objective  One  area  in  July  1993. 
authorities,  whilst  NUTS  3  represent  individual  counties  or  local  authorities.  For  a  discussion  of 
the  NUTS  classification  scheme,  see  Eurostat,  1989,  and  European  Commission,  1991. 
223 As  has  been  noted  above  with  regard  to  the  Objective  Two  lobby,  it  is  not 
possible  to  assess  the  influence  of  the  lobby  given  the  closed  nature  of  decision- 
making  within  the  Council  of  Ministers.  Nevertheless,  the  lobby  appeared  to 
have  the  support  of  the  UK  government  on  this  issue,  for  instance  the  Scottish 
Secretary  wrote  to  the  Leader  of  SRC  stating  that  :  - 
"I  have  consistently  acknowledged  the  desirability  of  extending  Objective  One 
status  beyond  the  statistically  defined  NUTS  2  boundaries  proposed  by  the 
Commission"  (SRC  Minutes,  July  1993). 
The  Scottish  territorial  network  in  Scotland  and  Brussels  appeared  to  be  able  to 
influence  EU  decision-making  in  this  instance.  However,  it  is  important  not  to 
over-estimate  the  value  of  this  territorial  network.  Scottish  actors  are  only  able  to 
come  together  and  co-operate  in  a  lobbying  campaign  when  a  wide  number  of 
varied  institutional  interests  are  able  to  find  a  common  interest  or  policy  position. 
In  addition,  the  Scottish  network  was  severely  constrained  through  the  inability  of 
the  Scottish  Office  to  directly  lobby  on  behalf  of  Scottish  interests,  as  a  result  of 
being  a  Department  within  the  UK  government.  As  a  consequence,  other 
Scottish  institutions  such  as  regional  councils  conducted  publicity  and  lobbying 
campaigns,  whilst  the  Scottish  Office  provided  informal  lobbying,  information  and 
tacit  support.  The  Scottish  territorial  network  also  provides  a  constant  flow  of 
information  between  institutions  involved  in  European  policy.  As  a  result, 
participation  within  the  Scottish  network  also  acted  as  a  'brake'  on  independent 
lobbying  campaigns,  in  order  to  avoid  the  alienation  of  other  interests,  in 
particular,  Scottish  Office  interests.  McAteer  and  Mitchell's  (1996)  comment  that 
"a  situation  developed  whereby  independent  action  was  carried  out  but  within 
limits  that  were  appreciated  and  accepted  by  the  Scottish  Office"  (McAteer  and 
Mitchell,  1996,  p.  24)  describes  the  relationship  between  the  Scottish  network  and 
the  Scottish  office  particularly  well.  Similarly  Martin  and  Pearce  (1999)  comment 
that  in  contrast  to  England: 
"structural  fund  programmes  in  Scotland  are  managed  by  'independent 
secretariats'  which  are  seen  as  having  helped  minimise  conflict  between  local 
and  central  government.  These  factors  have  combined  to  create  relatively  'thick' 
policy  networks  in  Wales  and  Scotland  which  are  serviced  by  well  resourced  and 
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links  with  EU  institutions  and  regions  in  other  member  states".  (Martin  and 
Pearce,  1999,  p.  46). 
Once  again,  it  is  worth  emphasising  the  importance  of  Commission  or  national 
government  support  for  any  attempt  to  influence  EU  policy-making.  Without  such 
support  SNA  lobbying  is  unlikely  to  be  successful  once  a  policy  moves  beyond 
the  early  stage  of  development  amongst  Commission  officials,  unless  SNAs  such 
as  the  German  Lander  have  access  to  the  Council  of  Ministers.  In  contrast, 
Bomberg  (1994)  considered  the  Scottish  network  in  terms  of  Environmental 
policy  to  be  relatively  ineffective  due  to  'structural  and  constitutional'  constraints, 
whilst  the  "personal  links  among  Scots  are  erratic  and  unpredictable;  they  can 
not  substitute  for  the  institutionalised  representation  on  the  Council  of  Ministers. 
Moreover,  the  importance  of  `personal  connections'  on  policy  formulations  is 
probably  overstated  by  network  participants"  (Bomberg,  1994,  p.  55).  In  general, 
Bomberg  considers  the  Scottish  network  as  being  'peripheral'  both  to  UK  and  EU 
policy  networks. 
This  is  a  rather  harsh  assessment  of  the  value  of  the  Scottish  network.  Whilst 
lack  of  access  to  the  Council  of  Ministers  (not  many  SNAs  enjoy  access  to  the 
Council  of  Ministers)  and  the  position  of  the  Scottish  Office  as  a  relatively  minor 
department  within  UK  government,  may  be  considered  as  detrimental  to  Scottish 
SNA  lobbies,  the  close  relations  between  SRC  and  the  Scottish  Office  provided  a 
significant  means  of  access  to  information  for  SRC  representatives.  Equally,  it  is 
unlikely  that  SNAs  in  the  rest  of  the  UK  experienced  as  close  relations  with  a 
central  government  department  as  the  mutually  beneficial  relationship  that 
Scottish  SNAs  developed  with  the  Scottish  Office,  within  the  sphere  of  European 
policy  (see  McAteer  and  Mitchell,  1996).  In  relation  to  this  point,  where  Scottish 
interests  do  coalesce  as  in  the  case  of  the  Argyll  and  Bute  lobby,  the  Scottish 
network  can  provide  an  extremely  useful  means  of  access  to  the  EU  policy 
process.  Finally,  in  conducting  fieldwork  amongst  Scottish  actors  involved  in 
European  policy,  the  contacts  between  individuals  located  within  a  variety  of 
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and  unpredictable'.  Instead,  frequent  contact  amongst  a  wide  range  of  officials 
and  politicians  cutting  across  a  range  of  policy  areas  was  apparent  throughout 
the  process  of  conducting  interviews157" 
To  summarise,  the  Scottish  network  provided  a  valuable  means  of  access  to 
information  for  SRC.  In  addition,  Scottish  actors  involved  in  European  policy 
became  increasingly  inter-connected  over  time,  due  to  the  necessity  of  co- 
operation  in  influencing  the  EU  policy  process,  most  notably  within  Scotland 
Europa.  However,  for  SRC  and  the  Scottish  network  to  engage  in  lobbying 
campaigns  required  a  common  interest  to  exist,  i.  e.  that  a  common  interest 
existed  between  SRC  and  the  Scottish  Office.  Where  such  a  situation  did  not 
arise,  then  co-operation  would  continue  through  contact  between  a  range  of 
institutions  outlining  their  policy  positions  and  the  sharing  of  information.  Thus 
for  SRC  the  Scottish  network  was  only  one  network  amongst  a  range  of  options 
to  be  utilised  when  attempting  to  influence  EU  policy.  However,  the  importance 
of  the  Scottish  territorial  community  as  a  means  of  articulating  a  policy  position 
(i.  e.  representing  a  policy  position  as  the  'Scottish'  policy  position)  and  of  access 
to  European  Institutions,  intensified  over  time  particularly  through  the 
establishment  of  Scotland  Europa  and  as  a  result  of  the  need  to  compete  with 
the  increasing  number  of  SNAs  represented  in  Brussels. 
7.4.4  -  Strathclvde-Wide  networks. 
In  addition  to  a  Scottish  network,  SRC  was  also  a  focal  point  for  information  and 
advice  with  regard  to  European  policy  within  Strathclyde.  The  Strathclyde 
network  would  involve  a  wide  range  of  actors  at  the  local  levell58  with  an 
interest  in  European  policy,  such  as  local  authorities,  Scottish  Enterprise  /  LEC's, 
157  On  an  anecdotal  level,  on  a  number  of  occasions  when  conducting  interviews,  respondents 
were  aware  of  interviews  I  had  conducted  previously  within  other  institutions,  including  the 
Scottish  Office. 
158  For  a  wide  ranging  discussion  of  Strathclyde  elites,  and  the  concordance  in  attitudes  amongst 
these  elites  and  co-operation  between  institutions  at  the  local  level  in  Strathclyde,  see 
Christopoulos  (1996). 
226 voluntary  sector  organisations,  chambers  of  commerce,  STUC  and  Strathclyde- 
based  MEP's159.  Contact  between  institutions  at  this  scale  would  frequently 
relate  to  advice  on  accessing  European  funding,  information  on  European  policy 
developments  and  the  policy  of  institutions  on  particular  issues.  Initially,  SRC 
was  the  main  source  of  advice  for  information  on  obtaining  European  funds. 
However,  with  the  establishment  of  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership  (SEP), 
the  partnership  became  the  main  contact  for  such  advice.  An  SRC  official 
summarised  the  role  of  the  SRC  within  the  Strathclyde  network  as  follows  :  - 
"Right  through  the  1980s,  local  authorities  were  seen  as  a  source  of  knowledge 
and  intelligence  on  European  issues,  and  that  remained  the  case  right  to  the  end. 
But  increasingly  when  it  came  to  the  funding,  with  the  creation  of  the  SEP,  the 
role  of  giving  general  advice  about  how  to  get  European  money  really  belonged 
to  that  unit"  (Case  12). 
The  Strathclyde  network  enabled  participants  to  develop  joint  positions  regarding 
particular  issues  prior  to  the  Scottish  level,  and  to  a  limited  extent  to  co-operate 
to  further  their  own  interests.  For  instance,  the  European  Parliament's  'Regional 
Policy  Committee'  had  never  had  a  Scottish  representative  upon  it,  in  contrast  to 
the  Welsh  position  where  Wyn  David's  (MEP)  membership  (and  Vice- 
Chairmanship)  of  this  committee  had  "been  extremely  useful  for  South  Wales" 
(McAteer  and  Mitchell,  1996,  p.  21).  Part  of  the  explanation  for  the  lack  of 
Scottish  representation  on  this  committee  may  have  been  due  to  having  "had 
Bruce  Milian  as  Commissioner,  and  they  [Strathclyde]  had  good  regional 
representation"  (Case  17),  resulting  in  no  Scottish  MEP  feeling  that  there  was  a 
direct  need  to  be  on  the  Regional  Policy  Committee.  However,  places  on  the 
Committee  were  due  to  become  vacant  in  December  1996,  and  it  became  clear 
whilst  interviewing  that  representatives  from  institutions  around  Strathclyde,  such 
as  SEP,  Ecos-Ouverture  and  a  number  of  the  'nev'  unitary  authorities  were  keen 
to  place  a  particular  Strathclyde-based  MEP  on  this  committee.  Thus,  a  number 
of  respondents  had  made  representations  to  this  MEP  who  "took  a  bit  of 
159  For  instance,  Strathclyde-based  MEPs  would  frequently  attend  the  meetings  of  SRC's 
'European  and  International  Affairs  Committee',  and  the  European  committees  of  district  councils, 
where  they  would  ask  questions  of  the  Council's  policy,  despite  not  being  Councillors. 
227 persuasion"  (Case  43)  despite  other  Scottish  MEPs  expressing  an  interest  in 
joining  the  Committee.  Accordingly,  the  `chosen'  MEP  became  a  member  of  the 
Committee  at  the  beginning  of  1997.  A  senior  official  described  the  need  to 
persuade  this  particular  MEP  to  join  the  committee  in  the  following  terms  :- 
"We've  now  got  [names  a  Strathclyde  MEP]  onto  the  EP's  Regional  Policy 
Committee.  Now  we've  never  previously  had  a  Scottish  member  on  that 
Committee,  which  is  crazy,  as  that  is  a  very  important  committee  for 
us...  Basically  a  number  of  people  said  to  him,  somebody  has  got  to  do  it,  and  you 
are  the  one  that  knows  most  about  it.  We  saw  that  committee  as  a  gap  in  our 
ability  to  influence.  So,  we've  got  an  MEP  now  who  is  on  the  right  committee, 
and  who  is  building  up  more  of  a  knowledge  of  this  area.  And  he  will  work  much 
better  with  WoSEC1  60,  COS  LA  and  the  others"  (Case  43). 
Thus  a  network  of  actors  at  the  local  level  in  Strathclyde  with  an  involvement  in 
European  policy,  would  interact  frequently  not  only  in  terms  of  providing 
information  and  advice,  but  also  in  order  to  protect  the  influence  of  Strathclyde  as 
a  'region'  and  as  a  corollary  Scottish  interests,  in  order  to  maintain  their  access 
into  the  European  policy  process. 
7.5  -  Conclusions. 
Analyses  of  multi-level  governance  have  tended  to  focus  upon  institutional 
outcomes  as  a  result  of  sub-national  mobilisation  with  regard  to  European 
policies,  most  notably,  with  regard  to  the  implementation  of  partnership  within  the 
Structural  Fund  regulations.  However,  it  became  evident  when  attempting  to 
analyse  SRC's  attempts  to  influence  the  EU  policy  process  that  informal 
networks  were  at  least  of  equal  importance  in  understanding  the  mechanisms  via 
which  SRC  attempted  to  influence  EU  decision-making.  This  is  not  to  decry  the 
value  of  SRC  participation  within  institutional  structures.  For  instance, 
membership  of  trans-national  networks  provided  SRC  with  a  range  of  benefits, 
such  as  access  to  Commission  officials;  a  means  of  developing  contacts  with 
other  SNAs  and  obtaining  'partners'  for  EU  funding;  legitimisation  for  lobbying 
16°  WOSEC  refers  to  the  West  of  Scotland  European  Consortium'  which  represented  the 
European  interests  of  West  of  Scotland  local  authorities  following  local  government 
reorganisation  in  1996. 
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members;  and,  as  a  vehicle  for  the  promotion  and  protection  of  SRC  policies 
(such  as  Ecos-Ouverture)  vis-ä-vis  outside  interests.  However,  trans-national 
networks  can  at  times  resemble  little  more  than  talking-shops,  particularly  to 
SNAs  that  are  not  close  to  the  central  decision-making  centres  within  such 
networks. 
The  ability  of  SNAs  to  obtain  access  to  the  decision-making  heart  of  networks  is 
likely  to  be  a  product  of  the  resources  they  bring  in,  such  as  reputation  as  a  key 
SNA  actor  within  Europe,  informational  resources,  size  and  political  profile  of  the 
SNA  etc.  Asa  consequence,  'peak  level'  networks  which  attempt  to  influence 
EU  policy  on  a  regular  basis,  tend  to  be  dominated  by  the  most  prominent  SNAs 
within  Europe,  such  as  the  German  Lander  and  the  Spanish  Autonomous 
Communities.  The  ability  of  SRC  to  gain  access  to  the  decision-making  centres 
of  trans-national  networks  such  as  AER,  was  due  to  the  reputation  which  SRC 
had  cultivated  amongst  SNAs  in  Brussels  over  a  period  of  time,  allied  to  the 
perceived  influence  of  SRC  within  DG's  V  and  XVI,  which  are  typically  of  most 
interest  to  SNAs. 
The  explosion  of  regional  representation  in  Brussels  since  the  late  1980s 
(Jeffrey,  1996),  is  also  symptomatic  of  the  importance  which  SNAs  place  on 
developing  informal  contacts  with  a  wide  range  of  actors  involved  in  European 
policy-making.  The  early  establishment  of  SRC's  Brussels  office  gave  the 
Council  a  considerable  advantage  over  SNAs  that  arrived  later,  particularly  in 
terms  of  the  establishment  of  considerable  contacts  within  the  Commission, 
accessing  European  funds  and  developing  a  profile  for  the  region  in  Brussels. 
However,  the  shift  in  emphasis  of  sub-national  representations  in  Brussels  post- 
1988,  away  from  European  funding  and  the  increased  competition  (as  well  as 
collaboration)  between  SNAs  in  Brussels,  was  reflected  in  SRC's  decision  to  re- 
locate  within  the  Scotland  Europa  centre. 
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increased  over  time.  Whilst  SRC  was  largely  able  to  engage  in  bi-lateral 
negotiations  with  the  Commission  in  the  early  1980s  for  funding  packages,  as  the 
extent  of  the  involvement  increased  and  structures  became  more  systematic  (for 
example,  the  IDO),  co-operation  with  Scottish  partners  and  in  particular  the 
Scottish  Office  became  increasingly  important.  SRC  engaged  in  a  largely  co- 
operative  relationship  with  the  Scottish  Office  (despite  political  tensions)  with  a 
significant  degree  of  information  sharing  and  Scottish  Office  support  for  SRC 
policies  (such  as,  the  Objective  Two  lobby),  despite  the  Scottish  Office  being 
apparently  constrained  by  its  constitutional  position.  This  is  not  to  deny  that 
tensions  did  exist.  The  Scottish  'territorial  network'  could  only  be  effective  when 
interests  between  a  range  of  European  policy  'stakeholders'  coalesced.  The 
controversies  surrounding  the  establishment  of  the  Scotland  Europa  centre 
provide  an  indication  of  the  tensions  which  did  exist.  Nevertheless,  SRC's 
eventual  participation  within  the  Scotland  Europa  centre  enabled  the  Council  to 
benefit  from  a  Scottish  profile  where  interests  merged  to  present  a  policy  position 
as  the  'Scottish'  position.  Despite  initial  tensions,  the  Scotland  Europa  centre 
enabled  increased  co-operation  to  occur  between  Scottish  representatives  in 
Brussels  (especially  local  government  representatives),  whilst  also  adding  a 
cohesiveness  to  the  'Scottish  lobby'  in  Brussels. 
However  the  reliance  of  SRC  (and  SNAs  more  generally)  upon  informal 
networks,  trans-regional  networks  and  sub-national  representations  highlights  the 
relatively  weak  position  of  such  actors  within  the  European  policy  process,  with 
the  exception  of  SNAs  which  are  able  to  influence  European  policy  through 
constitutional  measures  entrenched  at  the  domestic  level  (  See  Chapter  Two). 
SNAs  rely  upon  early  intelligence  and  contacts  with  Commission  officials,  in 
order  to  influence  policy  prior  to  the  formal  policy-making  process,  due  to  the 
weakness  of  SNAs  at  that  stage.  Beyond  this,  for  an  SNA  to  be  successful 
usually  requires  the  support  (tacit  or  otherwise)  of  national  governments  or  the 
Commission,  whilst  SNAs  may  be  viewed  as  being  left  as  proxy  campaigners  for 
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campaigns  (for  example,  the  Objective  Two  lobby).  Where  SNAs  act 
independently  or  without  Commission  /  national  government  support,  then  such 
campaigns  are  unlikely  to  be  successful  in  the  short  term,  thus  perhaps 
explaining  the  role  of  networks  such  as  AER  in  pursuing  a  long-term  political 
strategy  with  regard  to  issues  such  as  the  establishment  of  the  CoR.  However, 
SNAs  do  not  engage  in  mobilising  at  the  European  level,  in  order  to  influence  the 
European  policy  process  alone.  A  substantial  part  of  any  SNAs  activity  in 
Brussels  (including  SRC),  relates  to  promoting  the  SNA  /  region  itself  and  to 
protect  current  gains. 
Significant  opportunities  exist  for  SNAs  to  influence  the  European  policy  process, 
however  the  ability  to  do  so  varies  depending  upon  the  type  of  issue  involved,  the 
stage  the  issue  has  reached  in  the  policy  process,  and  the  support  which  exists 
for  the  SNA  policy  position.  Of  particular  importance  is  whether  or  not  an  SNA 
(or  more  likely  a  network  /  group  of  SNAs)  can  rely  upon  the  support  of  DGs 
within  the  Commission  or  a  member-state(s)  and  act  in  alliance  with  such  parties. 
As  a  result,  SNAs  can  be  perceived  as  inhabiting  a  "complex,  multi-layered, 
decision-making  process'  (Marks,  1992,  p.  221),  where  SNAs  can  influence 
policy.  However,  the  member-states  and  the  Commission  remain  the  key 
gatekeepers  in  the  process,  with  SNAs  able  to  exert  influence  or  pressure 
through  the  "multiple  cracks  or  points  of  access"  (Marks  et.  al,  1996,  p.  61)  within 
the  process,  in  particular  when  SNAs  demands  combine  with  national  or 
Commission  interests. 
231 Chapter  Eight  -  Local  Government  Reorganisation  and  European  Policy  in 
the  West  of  Scotland,  1996-97. 
8.1.1  -  Introduction. 
"Local  government's  relations  with  the  European  Community  are  generally  of  two 
types  -  councils  both  implement  Community  policies  and  have  a  voice  in  their 
development.  It  is  likely  that  all  of  the  new  councils  will  be  involved  to  a  greater 
or  lesser  extent  in  both  roles.  It  will  be  their  responsibility  to  determine  how  this 
should  be  managed.  It  is  likely  however  that  there  will  be  a  need,  particularly 
when  local  authorities  are  seeking  to  provide  input  into  the  development  of 
European  policy,  for  them  to  group  together  (as  some  do  at  present)  to  equip 
themselves  with  as  strong  a  voice  as  possible.  These  groupings  may  need  to  be 
pursued  at  an  all-Scotland  level  through  the  Convention  of  Scottish  Local 
Authorities  or  on  an  area  basis,  whether  in  formal  or  informal  groupings"  (Scottish 
Office,  1993,  p.  11). 
On  the  1st  April  1996,  the  two-tier  regional  and  district  council  structure  of 
Scottish  local  government  was  replaced,  with  a  single  tier,  all  purpose,  32  unit 
structure.  This  chapter  intends  to  address  the  ability  of  the  twelve  successor 
unitary  authorities  to  SRC,  to  conduct  a  European  policy  in  the  West  of  Scotland. 
Whilst  this  chapter  considers  the  ability  of  the  twelve  successor  authorities  to 
SRC,  to  maintain  a  European  policy  along  the  lines  developed  by  the  Regional 
Council  between  1975  to  1996,  the  analysis  focuses  in  particular  upon  the 
experience  of  four  unitary  authorities.  These  are  :-  Glasgow  City,  North 
Lanarkshire,  Renfrewshire  and  South  Lanarkshire161.  Glasgow  City  was 
selected  as  it  forms  the  largest,  in  terms  of  population,  successor  authority  to 
SRC  which  is  located  in  the  metropolitan  centre  of  the  region.  North  and  South 
Lanarkshire  are  both  authorities  located  next  to  each  other  and  within  the 
hinterland  of  Glasgow  which  were  both  undergoing  a  process  of  recovering  from 
de-industrialisation.  Thus,  these  two  authorities  were  comparable  due  to  their 
proximity  and  the  similar  policy  issues  each  would  have  to  address  as  unitary 
161  In  addition,  one  interview  was  conducted  with  an  official  from  Argyll  and  Bute  Council,  as  this 
authority  was  distinctive  due  to  its  primarily  rural  location  and  uniqueness  with  regard  to  the 
Structural  Funds,  in  terms  of  its  membership  of  both  the  Objective  One  Highland  and  Islands 
European  Partnership  and  Objective  Two  Strathclyde  European  Partnership.  Thus,  in  terms  of 
232 authorities.  Due  to  their  location  within  an  area  of  significant  de-industrialisation 
both  authorities  would  be  likely  to  receive  a  considerable  amount  of  Objective  2 
funding  and  this  would  therfore  offer  an  opportunity  to  analyse  the  extent  to 
which  each  authority  engaged  with  European  issues  and  accordingly,  assess  the 
structures  which  these  councils  put  in  place  to  deal  with  the  European  function. 
Lastly,  Renfrewshire  Council  was  also  located  within  an  area  of  de- 
industrialisation  and  again  could  be  expected  to  engage  with  the  Structural 
Funds  however  the  smaller  size  of  the  authority,  in  comparison  to  the  other  three 
councils  selected,  would  enable  an  assessment  to  be  made  of  the  extent  to 
which  the  authority  was  able  to  put  in  place  a  European  structure.  The  selection 
of  these  four  authorities  is  discussed  fully  in  Chapter  Three,  however  the 
emphasis  upon  these  authorities  was  based  upon  the  rationale  that  they  would 
provide  a  representative  sample  of  the  experiences  of  all  twelve  unitary 
authorities.  However,  the  operation  of  European  policy  within  all  twelve 
authorities  was  also  assessed  via  a  postal  questionnaire,  upon  which  many  of 
the  results  of  this  chapter  are  also  drawn  (See  Chapter  Three). 
The  analysis  of  the  European  policies  of  SRC's  twelve  successor  authorities  will 
occur  across  four  axes.  Firstly,  the  approach  taken  towards  the  European 
function  within  SRC's  twelve  successor  authorities  will  be  assessed  in  terms  of:  - 
the  location  of  the  function  within  the  Council  structure;  the  priorities  of  the 
Council  with  regard  to  European  policy;  and  the  committee  structures  and 
staffing  levels  established  to  deal  with  European  affairs  within  the  unitary 
authorities.  Secondly,  the  extent  to  which  the  new  unitary  authorities  have  been 
able  to  access  funding  from  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership  (SEP)  and  the 
impact  of  reorganisation  upon  the  influence  of  local  government  as  a  constituent 
interest  within  SEP  and  the  impact  of  local  government  reform  upon  SEP  as  an 
institution  more  generally  will  be  discussed.  Thirdly,  the  impact  of  the  change  in 
local  government  structure  upon  the  operation  of  the  Ecos-Ouverture  programme 
European  policy,  Argyll  and  Bute  Council,  was  something  of  an  anomaly  as  compared  to  SRC's 
eleven  other  successor  authorities. 
233 and  the  West  of  Scotland's  role  within  it  will  be  considered.  Finally,  the  ability  of 
local  government  in  the  West  of  Scotland  to  articulate  interests  vis-a-vis 
European  Institutions  will  be  analysed  at  the  various  levels  at  which  this  occurs:  - 
individual  authority  level;  West  of  Scotland  lobbying  structures;  and,  Scottish 
local  government  structures;  participation  within  trans-national  networks.  In 
addition,  the  informal  networks  utilised  by  local  government  in  the  West  of 
Scotland,  with  particular  regard  to  contacts  with  the  Scottish  Office,  MEPs,  CoR 
representatives,  and  Commission  officials  will  be  discussed. 
The  experience  of  local  government  reorganisation  in  England  and  Wales  and 
the  abolition  of  the  metropolitan  counties  appeared  to  have  significantly  reduced 
the  ability  of  SNAs  to  articulate  interests  vis  a  vis  European  Institutions.  For 
instance  Roberts  (1997)  comments  that  :- 
"Reorganisation  of  local  government  in  the  English  and  Welsh  shires  and  the 
abolition  of  the  regional  councils  in  Scotland  was  likely  to  put  back  the  regional 
representation  of  sub-national  government  in  the  UK  by  some  20  years;  this 
threatened  to  leave  a  yawning  chasm  due  to  the  absence  of  an  accountable  body 
that  could  initiate  and  regulate  strategic  thinking  and  action"  (Roberts,  1997, 
p.  269). 
Three  main  disadvantages  were  highlighted  by  Roberts  for  UK  SNAs  as  a 
consequence  of  reorganisation,  in  terms  of  competing  for  influence  with  other 
European  SNAs  within  the  EU.  Firstly,  the  fragmentation  of  local  government 
within  the  EU  ran  counter  to  trends  towards  establishing  and  entrenching  the 
powers  of  regional  representative  structures  across  the  EU  member  states.  As  a 
consequence,  UK  SNAs  would  have  a  diminshed  influence  over  EU  regional  and 
spatial  policy.  Secondly,  due  to  tensions  within  the  'Committee  of  the  Regions' 
(CoR)  between  'regional'  and  'local'  representatives  this  would  result  in  a 
diminished  status  of  UK  CoR  members  as  regional  representatives.  Finally  UK 
SNA  representation  within  EU  sub-national  representative  structures  would 
diminish.  Roberts  highlighted  the  example  of  the  'Assembly  of  European 
Regions'  as  providing  evidence  of  the  reduced  influence  of  UK  SNAs  within  such 
structures  by  stating  that  :- 
234 uThere  was  a  significant  UK  presence  in  the  AER  and  a  number  of  UK  members 
played  an  active  role  in  developing  the  work  of  the  main  assembly  and  its 
committees.  However,  following  the  abolition  of  the  metropolitan  counties  and 
the  progressive  weakening  of  the  shires  in  England  and  the  abolition  of  the 
Scottish  regional  authorities,  the  ability  of  British  members  to  speak  and  act  with 
an  authoritative  voice  at  the  regional  level  was  somewhat  diminished"  (Roberts, 
1997,  p.  267). 
This  chapter  assesses  whether,  and  if  so,  to  what  extent  the  involvement  and 
influence  of  local  authorities  in  Western  Scotland  diminished  from  the  previous 
practice  of  SRC  in  terms  of  European  policy.  However  this  thesis  only  considers 
the  practice  of  European  policy  within  the  reorganised  councils  until  May  1997. 
Due  to  this  limited  time-span,  when  the  new  unitary  authorities  were  still  `bedding 
down',  it  is  important  to  recognise  that  the  conclusions  reached  in  this  chapter 
are  based  upon  the  initial,  early  experiences  of  the  reorganised  councils  with 
regard  to  European  policy.  It  is  to  the  debates  surrounding  the  reorganisation 
process,  and  in  particular  concerns  regarding  the  viability  of  the  European 
function  within  a  unitary  structure,  that  I  now  intend  to  turn. 
8.1.2  -  The  Background  to  Reorganisation. 
Local  government  reorganisation  in  Scotland  came  into  effect  on  April  1st  1996, 
with  a  change  in  structure  from  the  two-tier  system  of  regional  and  district 
councils  to  a  single  tier  of  local  authorities.  The  Scottish  Secretary,  Ian  Lang, 
contended  that  Wheatley's  two-tier  structure  required  reform  as  the  "present  two- 
tier  system  now  presents  real  obstacles  to  local  government  in  meeting  the 
challenge  of  change  successfully  and  acts  as  a  brake  on  desirable  and 
necessary  initiatives"  (Scottish  Office,  1991,  p.  9).  More  specifically,  the  Scottish 
Office  consultation  paper  on  local  government  reform  (Scottish  Office,  1991) 
made  a  number  of  criticisms  of  the  Wheatley  structure.  Firstly,  that  the  two  tier 
structure  of  regions  and  districts  was  not  understood  by  the  general  public  thus 
causing  confusion  and  as  a  consequence,  a  lack  of  local  accountability.  In 
addition,  due  to  the  large  size  of  some  regional  councils,  such  as  Strathclyde, 
this  also  resulted  in  a  lack  of  accountability,  as  regional  councils  were  remote 
235 from  local  communities.  Secondly,  there  was  a  duplication  of  functions  between 
regions  and  districts,  both  in  terms  of  policy  roles  (such  as  urban  renewal)  and  in 
administrative  services  (such  as  personnel).  Finally,  the  role  of  local  government 
had  changed  significantly  since  the  Wheatley  reforms;  for  instance,  economic 
planning  at  a  regional  scale  had  significantly  diminished  in  importance. 
Accordingly,  the  government  viewed  local  government  as  moving  away  from 
being  a  provider  of  services  to  becoming  an  'enabling'  authority,  as  was  evident 
from  the  thrust  of  government  policy  towards  local  government  across  a  wide 
range  of  issues  (such  as  compulsory  competitive  tendering,  consumer  choice 
and  increasing  the  involvement  of  the  private  sector). 
The  Scottish  Office  consultation  paper  (1991)  proposed  that  single  tier  authorities 
would  provide  a  remedy  to  the  problems  of  the  two-tier  structure  as  "the 
arguments  in  favour  of  the  single  tier  are,  in  the  main,  the  mirror  image  of  the 
criticisms  of  the  present  two-tier  system"  (Scottish  Office,  1991,  p.  9).  A  single 
tier  structure,  the  Scottish  Office  argued,  would  improve  public  accountability 
through  being  closely  related  to  local  identities  and  communities,  remove 
duplication  and  tensions  between  regions  and  districts,  and  provide  a  structure 
more  suited  to  the  role  of  local  government  as  an  `enabler.  After  a  period  of 
consultation  and  the  presentation  of  a  range  of  single  tier  authority  structures, 
from  a  fifteen  to  a  fifty-one  single  tier  structure  (Scottish  Office,  1992),  the 
Scottish  Office  finally  settled  on  a  structure  of  29  unitary  authorities,  plus  the 
continuation  of  the  three  unitary  all-purpose  island  authorities  which  previously 
existed  under  the  Wheatley  structure.  Figure  8.1  depicts  the  two-tier  structure  of 
local  government  pre-1996,  and  Figure  8.2,  its  successor  single  tier  structure 
post-1996. 
The  case  for  local  government  reorganisation  was  widely  criticised  by  a  wide 
range  of  actors  from  opposition  politicians  to  local  government  practitioners  and 
academics.  In  particular,  the  criticisms  made  by  the  Government  of  the  two-tier 
structure  were  widely  disputed,  as  were  government  claims  as  to  the  benefits  of 
236 a  single-tier  structure  (for  example  Midwinter,  1995).  In  addition,  the  32  unit 
structure  was  viewed  in  some  instances  as  little  more  than  attempt  to  improve 
Conservative  fortunes  within  Scottish  local  government,  given  that  the 
Conservative  party  did  not  control  any  regions  or  districts  under  the  two-tier 
system,  with  the  boundaries  of  some  councils  appearing  to  be  an  outcome  of 
"political  and  administrative  expediency"  (Paddison,  1997,  p.  107).  Alongside 
accusations  of  gerrymandering,  reorganisation  was  considered  by  some 
observers  to  be  a  result  of  : - 
"a  continuing  resentment  at  its  [the  Scottish  Office]  failure  to  control  the  two 
largest  regions  Strathclyde  and  Lothian,  which  had  been  powerful  enough  to 
challenge  the  government's  policies  on  public 
expenditure,  local  government  finance  and  central  -  local  relations"  (Alexander, 
1992,  p.  59;  See  also  McAteer  et  al,  1996)162. 
162  This  view  was  certainly  prominent  amongst  Labour  SRC  Councillors  interviewed,  who 
attributed  blame  more  directly  at  resentment  on  the  part  of  the  Conservative  party  than  the 
Scottish  office,  and  who  frequently  pointed  to  John  Major's  description  of  SRC  as  "a  monstrosity". 
This  view  was  formally  expressed  in  SRC's  response  to  the  Government's  proposals,  where  the 
document  submitted  to  the  Scottish  Office,  concluded  as  follows 
'The  overall  impression  given  by  the  consultative  paper  is  that  it  is  politically  motivated,  its 
primary  objective  being  to  continue  the  process  of  reducing  the  role  and  influence  of  local 
government  which  the  Government  has  been  pursuing  progressively  since  the  1980's....  The 
process  by  which  the  decision  is  arrived  at  should  however  be  as  much  divorced  from  party 
political  prejudice  as  is  possible.  An  independent  commission  would  secure  that.  The  present 
review  does  not"  (SRC,  1991,  p.  22). 
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rationale  underlying  reorganisation,  in  particular  by  emphasising  that  no  evidence 
had  been  provided  to  support  government  criticism  of  the  two  tier  structure,  whilst 
the  evidence  which  did  exist  tended  to  dispute  the  government  position.  SRC 
contended  that  a  single  tier  structure  would  weaken  local  democracy,  whilst 
regional  councils  provided  a  cost-effective  service  and  that  the  process  of  local 
government  reorganisation  itself  would  be  expensive  both  financially  and  in  terms 
of  disruption  to  service  delivery.  Accordingly,  SRC  concluded  in  its  response  to 
the  Government's  consultation  exercise  that  "any  move  to  smaller  single  tier 
authorities  in  Strathclyde  would  result  in  increased  costs,  reduce  efficiency  and 
reductions  in  service  quality"  (SRC,  1991,  p.  22). 
8.1.3  -  The  European  Dimension  to  Reorganisation. 
During  the  consultation  period,  both  the  Scottish  Office  and  Strathclyde  Regional 
Council  commented  on  the  ability  of  Scottish  local  government  to  develop 
European  policy  post-reorganisation.  SRC  argued  that  it  had  been  extremely 
successful  in  developing  European  policies,  this  ability  was  attributed  on  its  part, 
to  the  Council  using  Its  political  standing,  size  and  research  resources  to 
become  the  UKs  lead  region  in  European  Community  affairs"  (SRC,  1993,  p.  23). 
To  be  able  to  operate  successfully  at  a  European  level,  SRC  contended  that  sub- 
national  authorities  (SNAs)  with  the  scale  and  strategic  functions  of  SRC  could 
have  "influence  in  European  affairs  and  in  securing  substantial  amounts  of 
funding  for  the  region"  (SRC,  1993,  p.  24),  in  order  to  compete  with  SNA's  from 
other  EU  member-states.  Accordingly  SRC  considered  that  reorganisation  of 
local  government,  along  the  lines  proposed  by  the  Government,  would  have  a 
detrimental  effect  upon  the  representation  of  Strathclyde's  European  interests  as 
the  unitary  authorities  would  be  unable  to  provide  the  resources  or  strategic 
functions  necessary  to  be  effective  whilst  the  ability  of  unitary  authorities  to 
provide  co-finance  for  EU  funds  was  also  questioned.  The  impact  of 
reorganisation  upon  the  European  policies  of  Scotland's  local  authorities  was 
also  a  prominent  area  of  concern  within  the  Scottish  media,  for  instance,  a 
240 Scottish  newspaper  summarised  the  potential  implications  of  reorganisation  with 
regard  to  Europe  in  the  following  manner:  - 
"Reform  could  threaten  local  authorities'  chances  of  securing  EC  funds  which 
boost  development  spending...  One  of  the  concerns  raised  by  the  prospect  of 
abolition  of  the  regions  is  whether  smaller  councils  will  be  sufficiently  strategically 
significant  to  be  visible  in  EC  bureaucratic  terms"  (Scotland  on  Sunday,  22/11/92, 
p.  14). 
Whilst  the  Scottish  Office  did  not  appear  to  accept  that  reorganisation  would 
result  in  reduced  local  government  access  to  European  funding,  the  impact  of 
reform  upon  the  advocacy  and  lobbying  functions  of  Scottish  local  government 
(and  in  particular  of  local  government  in  the  West  of  Scotland)  was  recognised  as 
a  legitimate  concern,  as  in  1992  the  Scottish  Office  stated  :  - 
"Scottish  local  authorities  are  competing  with  a  range  of  other  bodies  within  the 
[European]  Community  to  make  their  voice  heard.  It  seems  clear  that,  the  larger 
the  population  and  area  represented,  the  greater  the  weight  which  will  be  given 
to  views  put  forward.  The  structure  of  Scottish  local  government  hitherto  has 
enabled  Strathclyde  Region  to  acquire  particular  authority  in  handling  European 
issues  and  representing  its  views  at  Community  level  either  alone  or  in 
conjunction  with  other  regions  within  the  Community"  (Scottish  Office,  1992, 
p.  64). 
The  32  unit  structure  established  by  the  Government  under  the  terms  of  the 
Local  Government  (Scotland)  Act,  in  1994,  would  clearly  result  in  smaller 
authorities  in  terms  of  the  geographic  size  and  level  of  resources  available  to  the 
new  single  tier  authorities  in  the  West  of  Scotland  as  compared  to  SRC  (See 
Figures  8.1  and  8.2).  Accordingly,  the  Scottish  Office  recommended  that  in  terms 
of  European  policy,  local  government  should  either  operate  under  the  auspices  of 
COSLA  or  through  voluntarily  agreeing  to  work  with  other  local  authorities  within 
sub-Scottish  level  regional  groupings.  Figure  One  depicts  the  two-tier  structure 
of  local  government  pre-1996,  and  Figure  Two,  its  successor  single  tier  structure 
post-1996. 
Strathclyde  Regional  Council  was  replaced  in  April  1996  by  twelve  unitary 
authorities,  Table  8.3  details  the  population  and  party  political  composition  of 
241 each  of  these  12  authorities.  Table  8.3  clearly  illustrates  the  wide  variations  in 
scale  between  the  twelve  successor  authorities  (as  measured  by  population) 
replacing  SRC,  from  Glasgow  City  (the  largest  local  authority  in  Scotland)  with  a 
population  of  623,850  to  East  Renfrewshire  with  a  population  of  86,780,  although 
clearly  all  the  unitary  authorities  represent  a  significant  reduction  in  scale 
compared  to  SRC's  population  of  2.3  million  in  1991164.  However  in  terms  of 
political  representation,  the  successor  authorities  were  all,  except  for  Argyll  and 
Bute  and  East  Renfrewshire,  controlled  by  the  Labour  party  thus  raising  the 
possibility  of  successful  co-operation  between  the  councils  as  a  result  of  Labour 
dominance  of  local  government  in  the  West  of  Scotland.  The  single  tier 
authorities  would  fulfill  the  same  functions165  as  performed  by  the  previous  two- 
tier  structure,  however  given  the  smaller  scale  of  the  new  councils,  the  Secretary 
of  State  placed  a  statutory  obligation  on  the  authorities  to  enter  into  joint 
arrangements,  in  order  to  provide  services  which  could  not  be  managed  by  the 
Council  alone  such  as,  planning,  police  and  fire  services.  However,  as  has  been 
outlined  above,  in  the  case  of  European  affairs  no  statutory  obligation  was  placed 
upon  local  authorities  to  enter  into  'joint  arrangements',  although  the  councils 
were  free  to  collaborate  at  a  Scottish  or  sub-Scottish  level  with  regard  to 
European  issues. 
164  See  Chapter  Seven,  Section  3.1,  for  further  details  on  SRC's  population  change  between 
1975  and  1996. 
165  Broadly  the  responsibilities  of  the  unitary  authorities  cover  the  functions  of:  -  Education, 
Social  Work,  Police  and  Fire,  Emergency  Planning  and  Civil  Defence,  Roads,  Transport, 
Planning,  Water  and  Sewerage,  Housing,  Urban  Regeneration,  Cultural  Activities  and  Library 
Services,  Relations  with  the  European  Community,  Tourism,  Trading  Standards  and 
Environmental  Health,  Valuation  of  Property  for  the  Council  Tax  and  Non-Domestic  Rates,  District 
Courts,  Registration  of  Births,  Deaths  and  Marriages,  and,  Archives. 
242 Table  8.3  -  Profile  of  SRC's  Twelve  Successor  Authorities. 
UNITARY  AUTHORITY.  POPULATION.  PARTY  POLITICAL  COMPOSITION.  166 
Argyll  and  Bute  90,550  Independent  Control. 
IND  21;  SNP  4;  LD  3,  CON  3,  LAB  2. 
Dumbarton  and  Clydebank  97,790  Labour  Control. 
LAB  14,  SNP  7,  IND  1. 
East  Ayrshire  123,820  Labour  Control. 
LAB  22,  SNP  8. 
East  Dunbartonshire  110,220  Labour  Control. 
LAB  15,  LD  9,  CON  2. 
East  Renfrewshire  86,780  No  Overall  Control. 
CON  9,  LAB  8,  LD  2, 
IND  1. 
Glasgow  City  623,850  Labour  Control. 
LAB  77,  CON  3,  LD  1, 
SNP  1,  IND  1. 
Inverclyde  89,990  Labour  Control. 
LAB  14,  LD  5,  CON  1. 
North  Ayrshire  139,020  Labour  Control. 
LAB  27,  CON  1,  SNP  1, 
IND  1. 
North  Lanarkshire  326,750  Labour  Control. 
LAB  60,  SNP  7,  IND  2. 
Renfrewshire  176,970  Labour  Control. 
LAB  20,  SNP  13,  LD  3, 
CON  2,  IND  2. 
South  Ayrshire  113,960  Labour  Control. 
LAB  21,  CON  4. 
South  Lanarkshire  307,100  Labour  Control. 
LAB  62,  SNP  8,  LD  2, 
CON  2. 
Source:  -  SLGIU  (1yyo)  pvi-io 
166  The  'party  political  composition'  of  SRC's  twelve  successor  authorities  represent  the  outcome 
of  the  local  government  elections  held  in  April  1995,  as  the  unitary  authorities  took  shape  during  a 
shadow  year  (April  1995  to  April  1996),  prior  to  formally  replacing  SRC  in  April  1996.  The 
abbreviations  used  to  label  parties  are  as  follows:  -  CON  -  Conservative;  IND  -  Independent;  LAB 
-  Labour,  LD  -  Liberal  Democrat;  SNP  -  Scottish  National  Party. 
243 8.2.1  -  The  Intemalisation  of  the  European  Function  within  Local 
Government  in  the  West  of  Scotland. 
"The  first  point  to  make  in  looking  at  the  role  of  European  policy  in  the  new 
councils  is  that  there  is  no  `blueprint'  for  organising  European  activity.  The  role 
that  European  policy  plays  in  a  council  will  depend  on  many  factors  -  including  its 
size,  its  status  in  terms  of  the  structural  funds,  the  activities  of  the  predecessor 
authorities,  the  structure  of  the  new  council  and  the  resources  that  it  can  put  into 
the  activity.  While  there  is  no  'blueprint',  it  is  clear  that  Europe  is  a  key  issue  for 
the  new  councils.  It  will  be  interesting  to  look  at  the  way  in  which  they  tackle  this 
complex  issue,  and  many  of  the  regional  councils  have  an  excellent  track  record 
in  Europe.  This  record  has  been  achieved  because  they  have  not  only  had  the 
financial  resources  and  staff  to  devote  to  European  policy  but  because  they  have 
been  able  to  recruit  capable  and  experienced  staff.  It  is  important  that  this 
experience  is  not  lost  in  the  re-organisation"  (Jordan,  J,  167  1996,  p.  116). 
The  debates  surrounding  the  reorganisation  of  Scottish  local  government,  prior  to 
April  1996,  raised  a  number  of  concerns  with  regard  to  the  impact  of  restructuring 
upon  the  ability  of  Scottish  local  authorities  to  conduct  European  policy.  Broadly 
these  concerns  fell  into  four  main  categories.  Firstly,  that  the  new  councils  would 
lack  the  financial  resources  to  provide  co-finance  for  European  funding  at  the 
same  level  as  had  been  previously  committed,  in  particular  by  the  regional 
councils.  Secondly,  that  the  unitary  authorities  would  be  less  effective  in  terms  of 
interest  representation  at  the  EU  level.  Thirdly,  that  the  loss  of  experience  in 
European  affairs,  in  terms  of  staff  turnover  as  a  consequence  of  reorganisation, 
would  result  in  a  less  effective  European  policy  on  the  part  of  Scottish  local 
government.  Finally,  that  the  unitary  authorities  would  face  financial  difficulties 
(See  McAteer  et  al,  1996,  on  this  issue),  and  would  accordingly  fail  to  make 
adequate  provision  for  the  European  function  within  councils,  as  it  was  not  a 
statutory  responsibility. 
Although  the  research  from  which  this  chapter  is  derived  concluded  in  April  1997, 
and  therefore  the  new  councils  had  only  been  in  place  for  a  year,  the  initial 
dislocation  caused  by  reorganisation  had  begun  to  diminish  and  it  was  possible 
to  assess  the  effects  of  restructuring  upon  the  operation  of  European  policy 
244 amongst  the  successor  authorities  to  SRC.  Accordingly  in  this  section,  I  intend  to 
discuss  the  structure  put  in  place  by  the  new  councils  with  regard  to  some  of  the 
issues  raised  above.  Table  8.4  provides  a  summary  of  the  structures  put  in  place 
by  SRC's  twelve  successors  in  terms  of  the  number  of  staff  employed  to  deal 
with  European  policy,  the  location  of  the  European  function  within  the  councils, 
whether  a  European  committee  had  been  established  and  places  each  council 
within  the  'continuum'  of  SNA  involvement  devised  by  John  (1  994a)168.  Given 
that  the  new  unitary  authorities  had  only  been  operational  for  a  year  when  the 
research  was  conducted,  the  structures  which  had  been  put  in  place  can  be 
viewed  as  providing  a  sign  of  intent  with  regard  to  the  extent  to  which  the  council 
was  preparing  to  engage  with  European  policy  developments. 
Table  8.4  clearly  illustrates  that  a  wide  variety  of  European  structures  had  been 
put  in  place  by  the  new  unitary  authorities,  with  four  main  approaches  being 
identifiable  along  a  continuum  from  an  extensive  engagement  with  European 
affairs  to  a  minimal  (perhaps  non-existent)  engagement.  The  most  extensive 
arrangements  made  by  a  unitary  authority  to  deal  with  the  European  function, 
was  via  the  creation  of  a  separate  European  and  International  Unit  staffed  with 
seven  officers  in  both  cases  alongside  a  designated  political  committee  dealing 
solely  with  European  issues.  Two  councils  adopted  this  approach  to  the 
European  function:  -  Glasgow  City  and  South  Lanarkshire.  This  approach  clearly 
represents  a  significant  engagement  due  to  the  degree  of  resources  required  to 
maintain  these  structures.  In  both  instances,  officials  and  politicians  contended 
that  these  structures  were  symptomatic  of  the  importance  of  European  affairs  to 
these  councils.  The  establishment  of  a  separate  European  and  International  Unit 
certainly  represents  a  high  degree  of  'Europeanisation',  for  instance  in  South 
Lanarkshire  the  structure  of  the  Council's  European  Unit  took  the  following  form:  - 
167  Jordan  is  a  COSLA  European  Officer. 
168  See  Table  7.1  for  a  summary  of  the  John  (1994a)  typology  against  which  to  assess  the 
extent  to  which  a  SNA  has  responded  to  European  policy  developments. 
245 "the  remit  of  the  unit  is  threefold,  firstly  looking  at  policy  development,  secondly 
funding  and  thirdly,  looking  at  information.  What  we  do  is  that  we  operate  almost 
as  a  consultancy  within  the  Chief  Executive's  service.  It  is  very  much  a  corporate 
function,  we  act  and  service  the  clients,  and  the  clients  are  seen  as  the  15 
service  departments,  which  make  up  South  Lanarkshire  Council.  And  all  15 
departments  have  some  form  of  European  contact"  (Case  52). 
246 Table  8.4  -  The  European  Function  within  West  of  Scotland  Councils. 
NAME  OF  LOCATION  OF  SPECIFIC  NUMBER  SCALE  OF  SNA 
COUNCIL  THE  EUROPEAN  OF  EUROPEANISATION 
EUROPEAN  COMMITTEE  EUROPEAN 
FUNCTION  WITHIN  THE  STAFF 
COUNCIL  EMPLOYED 
Argyll  and  Bute  Planning  No  1  EU  Financially- 
Development  orientated  SNA 
and  Tourism 
Dumbarton  and  None  None  0  Euro-Minimal  SNA 
Clydebank 
East  Ayrshire  Development  No  2  EU  Networking  SNA 
Services 
(Corporate 
department) 
East  Economic  and  No  I  EU  Networking  SNA 
Dunbartonshire  Social  Strategy 
Unit  (Mthin 
Chief 
Executive's 
Department) 
East  Economic  No  1  EU  Financially- 
Renfrewshire  Development  orientated  SNA 
and 
Environment 
Glasgow  City  European  and  Yes  7169  Fully  Europeanised 
International  SNA 
Unit 
Inverclyde  Economic  No  1  EU  Financially- 
Development  orientated  SNA 
North  Ayrshire  Planning  Roads  No  2  EU  Financially- 
and  orientated  SNA 
Environment 
169  At  the  time  of  conducting  research,  although  Glasgow  City  Council  had  seven  European 
'posts',  only  three  were  actually  in  position  during  the  research  period. 
247 North  Chief  Yes  2  Fully  Europeanised 
Lanarkshire  Executive's  SNA 
Department 
Renfrewshire  Economic  No  3  EU  Financially- 
Development  orientated  SNA 
Unit  (Within 
Planning  and 
Transportation 
dept) 
South  Ayrshire  Economic  No  1  EU  Financially- 
Development  orientated  SNA 
South  European  and  Yes  7  Fully  Europeanised 
Lanarkshire  International  SNA 
Unit 
Source:  -  Questionnaire  results;  COSLA  (1996) 
Thus,  in  addition  to  seven  officers  within  the  European  Unit,  each  department  of 
the  Council  also  had  at  least  one  officer  dealing  with  European  issues.  The 
creation  of  a  European  Unit  had  differing  motives  however,  in  Glasgow  City  the 
structures  appeared  to  have  been  put  in  place  in  order  to  mimic  the  structure  of 
SRC,  as  the  initial  motivation  of  Glasgow  City's  European  policy  "was  to  make 
sure  that  existing  programmes  and  projects  were  protected,  and  that  was  our 
number  one  priority"  (Case  55).  In  contrast  the  role  which  South  Lanarkshire 
Council  (SLC)  envisaged  for  European  affairs  was,  in  part,  borne  out  of  criticism 
of  the  manner  in  which  SRC  dealt  with  the  function,  which  was  viewed  within 
SLC  as  being  too  concerned  with  "high  level  policy"(Case  52)  to  the  neglect  of 
integrating  the  European  function  through  the  work  of  the  whole  council  via  a 
bottom-up  as  opposed  to  SRC's  top-down  approach  170.  Divisions  between 
councils,  particularly  those  which  are  most  active  in  terms  of  European  policy, 
which  favoured  the  'SRC  approach'  to  European  policy  and  councils  favouring 
170  To  a  certain  extent,  criticism  of  SRC  may  in  part  be  a  result  of  tensions  between  SRC  and 
the  district  councils  of  which  there  was  substantial  evidence  (See  Stodart,  1981).  For  instance, 
the  politician  and  official  interviewed  at  SLC,  were  both  previously  members  of  a  district  council. 
248 alternative  approaches  would  prove  to  be  a  hindrance  to  co-operation  between 
West  of  Scotland  authorities  within  the  sphere  of  European  policy. 
The  second  form  of  structure,  which  appears  to  indicate  a  high  recognition  of  the 
importance  of  the  European  function,  adopted  by  a  number  of  the  new  councils 
was  to  place  the  European  function  within  a  corporate  department  (usually  the 
Chief  Executive's  department).  Placing  European  policy  within  a  corporate 
department  clearly  indicates  a  recognition  on  the  part  of  these  councils  to 
integrate  the  European  function  into  the  operation  of  all  the  council  departments 
and  was  adopted  by  three  councils  (East  Ayrshire,  East  Dunbartonshire  and 
North  Lanarkshire).  The  third  and  most  prominent  approach  taken  by  SRC's 
successor  authorities,  was  to  place  the  European  function  within  a  non-corporate 
department  of  the  council,  this  department  usually  being  concerned  with 
economic  development.  Six  councils  followed  this  approach  (Argyll  and  Bute, 
East  Renfrewshire,  Inverclyde,  North  Ayrshire,  Renfrewshire  and  South 
Ayrshire).  The  adoption  of  this  structure  may  tend  to  represent  that  the  council 
views  European  policy  purely  in  terms  of  accessing  the  Structural  Funds,  and 
correspondingly  has  a  minimal  desire  to  engage  with  policy  issues  arising  from 
the  European  function.  A  COSLA  official  commented  on  the  importance  of  the 
location  of  the  European  function,  in  terms  of  assessing  a  Councils  stance  with 
regard  to  Europeanisation,  in  the  following  manner:  - 
"Originally,  many  authorities  located  responsibility  for  European  policy  in  their 
economic  development  section  or  related  departments,  and  this  reflected  the 
importance  of  the  structural  funds.  However,  a  growing  trend,  accelerated  by 
both  the  implementation  of  the  Single  European  Act  and  the  Maastricht  Treaty, 
has  been  to  view  European  policy  as  a  corporate  activity  and  to  locate  the 
European  function  in  a  corporate  department  or  service"  (Jordan,  1996,  p.  117). 
Finally,  only  one  council,  Dumbarton  and  Clydebank,  did  not  create  a  European 
structure  in  place  or  appointed  staff  to  deal  with  the  European  function.  Overall, 
councils  which  either  established  a  European  Unit  or  located  the  function  within  a 
corporate  department,  can  be  considered  as  'fully  Europeanised'  (See  Table 
7.1),  given  that  this  indicates  a  desire  to  engage  with  European  policy  in  all  its 
249 forms,  from  funding  to  legislative  issues.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  three 
authorities  (Glasgow  City,  North  Lanarkshire  and  South  Lanarkshire)  with  the 
largest  population  base  of  SRC's  successors,  can  all  be  considered  'fully 
Europeanised'  (See  Table  8.3)171.  However,  given  that  half  of  SRC's  successor 
authorities  appear  to  view  the  European  function  as  primarily  a  funding  issue,  this 
highlights  the  variety  of  responses  to  European  policy  being  adopted  post- 
reorganisation.  In  addition,  this  finding  also  lends  weight  to  the  pre-reform 
concern  that  disaggregation  would  result  in  a  reduced  effectiveness  on  the  part 
of  local  government  in  the  West  of  Scotland  to  represent  its  interests  to  European 
institutions.  The  perception  that  the  role  of  local  government  with  regard  to 
European  policy  is  limited  to  securing  structural  fund  finance  is  understandable 
given  the  financial  difficulties  facing  local  government  in  Scotland  post-1996. 
Given  the  corporate  nature  of  European  policy,  the  extent  to  which  Council 
European  officers  believed  that  there  was  a  co-operative  relationship  with  other 
council  departments,  in  terms  of  integrating  European  policy  into  the  work  of  the 
council,  would  provide  an  indication  of  the  extent  to  which  European  policy  had 
been  integrated  into  the  policy  profile  of  the  councils.  87.5%  of  questionnaire 
respondents  claimed  to  have  either  very  co-operative  or  co-operative  relations 
with  external  departments  (Question  3).  However,  one  respondent  (6.3%)  was 
experiencing  an  unco-operative  relationship  with  external  departments,  whilst 
another  (6.3%)  was  obtaining  no  co-operation  whatsoever.  Neither  of  these 
respondents  was  employed  within  a  council  categorised  above  as  being  fully 
Europeanised.  Another  indicator  of  the  extent  of  integration  of  the  European 
function  within  the  new  councils,  would  be  the  number  of  departments  with  which 
European  officers  would  be  in  regular  contact  (Question  8).  Respondents 
identified  a  wide  range  of  departments,  again  indicating  a  fairly  high  degree  of 
integration,  with  which  they  were  in  regular  contact  with  over  European  issues, 
171  While  North  Lanarkshire  did  not  put  inplace  a  European  Unit  along  the  lines  of  Glasgow  City 
and  South  Lanarkshire,  the  Council  has  demonstrated  a  considerable  commitment  to  engaging 
with  European  policy  issues,  within  its  first  year  of  operation,  through  hosting  the  WOSEC 
Secretariat  whilst  the  Leader  of  North  Lanarkshire  Council  was  also  the  Leader  of  WOSEC. 
250 the  most  prominent  being  Planning  and  Development,  Economic  Development, 
Education,  Chief  Executive's  and  Social  Work. 
Prior  to  reorganisation,  the  issue  of  restructuring  resulting  in  loss  of  staff  with 
experience  of  European  policy  being  an  unintended  outcome  of  the  disruption 
caused  by  the  shift  to  a  single-tier  structure  was  frequently  expressed. 
Questionnaire  results  confirmed  the  relevance  of  this  concern  as  50%  of  officials 
employed  in  European  officer  posts  had  not  previously  held  a  position  dealing 
with  European  policy172.  The  majority  of  officials  interviewed  (as  opposed  to 
being  contacted  by  questionnaire)  had  previous  experience  of  European  policy, 
however  an  official  from  Argyll  and  Bute  reflected  that  following  reorganisation 
there  had  been  a  `local  hiatus  of  being  unable  to  tap  into  a  pool  of  information,  of 
experienced  people  who  dealt  with  these  issues  for  a  long  time"  (Case  57).  A 
further  tension  referred  to  by  some  interviewees  was  that  some  of  the  new 
councils  were  discriminating  against  former  SRC  employees,  due  to  resentment 
of  SRC  amongst  the  former  district  councils.  Questionnaire  results  provide  a 
rather  unclear  answer  to  this  point,  although  a  number  of  respondents  did  refer  to 
this  practice  taking  place  (See  Table  8.5).  Of  those  employed  in  European  posts 
in  the  West  of  Scotland,  52.9%  had  previously  been  employed  by  SRC  with 
41.2%  being  drawn  from  the  district  councils,  the  remaining  5.9%  having  being 
employed  by  other  regional  councils  (Question  19). 
Prior  to  re-organisation  it  was  posited  that  a  unitary  authority  structure  would 
result  in  a  reduced  ability  on  the  part  of  the  new  councils  to  access  the  structural 
funds,  due  to  the  financial  obstacles  in  providing  co-finance.  At  the  time  of 
conducting  research,  it  was  rather  early  to  obtain  a  conclusive  answer  on  this 
point,  as  the  majority  of  councils  were  mainly  dealing  with  funding  projects  which 
had  been  put  in  place  by  SRC,  and  thus  the  new  councils  had  no  option  but  to 
commit  funds  to  these  schemes.  However,  amongst  practitioners  dealing  with 
251 European  funding,  there  was  an  expectation  that  the  number  of  applications  from 
local  authorities  in  the  West  of  Scotland  would  decline  post-1997,  this  in  part 
being  due  to  the  financial  pressures  which  the  single-tier  authorities  were  subject 
to.  Table  8.5,  illustrates  the  opinions  of  an  official  outside  local  government,  with 
regard  to  local  authorities  accessing  the  Structural  Funds  and  of  the  resentment 
which,  on  occasion,  existed  towards  former  SRC  officials  and  politicians. 
172  Anecdotal  evidence  from  officials  employed  within  SRC  confirmed  this  trend,  as  a  number  of 
European  policy  officers  took  up  post  in  the  new  councils,  that  were  not  dealing  with  European 
policy. 
252 Table  8.5  -  An  Outsiders'  View  of  Reorganisation,  in  terms  of  the  Structural 
Funds  and  West  of  Scotland  Rivalries. 
What  we  do  know  is  that  there  is  going  to  be  more  problems  with  local 
government  finding  co-finance,  match  funding  for  European  projects  because  of 
the  cuts  they  are  facing  in  capital  budgets.  But  again,  that  has  been  happening 
over  the  last  few  years,  but  most  of  the  Councils  are  probably  finalising  their 
budgets,  so  are  the  LECs.  So  we  really  don't  know  what  they  are  going  to  have 
available  to  fund  economic  development  projects  or  to  look  for  European  funds. 
But  again,  the  trend  has  been  that  local  authorities  had  to  look  for  smarter  ways 
of  putting  projects  together,  finding  ways  of  getting  private  finance  in,  finding 
ways  of  getting  lottery  money  in,  so  the  amount  they  put  into  a  project  goes  down 
all  the  time. 
There  has  always  been  a  resentment,  even  when  the  Region  was  around,  about 
how  much  Glasgow  got  versus  the  rest  of  the  Region...  The  main  resistance  has 
come  from  Ayrshire,  Ayrshire  is  the  one  area  that  you  see  becoming  increasingly 
independent,  and  the  three  Ayrshire  councils  are  working  together  on  a  whole 
number  of  joint  schemes,  and  really  they  see  themselves  as  a  different  area. 
We've  now  got  two  structure  plans  for  the  old  Strathclyde,  and  one  is  basically 
Clyde  Valley,  and  the  other  is  Ayrshire.  So  again  the  system  is  dividing  off 
Ayrshire,  and  politically  the  most  hostile  people  to  the  Region  were  probably 
North  Ayrshire  and  they're  still  very  hostile.  You  can  see  that  in  the  way  various 
councils  have  made  appointments....  So  there  are  a  lot  of  these  battles  going  on. 
And  that's  happened  in  a  number  of  councils,  and  at  a  political  level,  ex-regional 
councillors  are  getting  nowhere,  and  at  an  official  level,  ex-regional  officials  are 
getting  nowhere.  It's  not  true  everywhere.  So,  it's  different  in  various  parts  of  the 
region,  everything  is  a  bit  delicate  at  the  moment.  The  Councils  have  spent  their 
first  year  trying  to  cope,  and  deal  with  these  huge  budget  cuts. 
From  an  overall  perspective,  the  vast  majority  of  respondents  considered  that 
reorganisation  had  diminished  the  effectiveness  of  European  policy  from  a  West 
of  Scotland  perspective,  as  58.8%  of  respondents  considered  reorganisation  to 
have  had  a  negative  impact,  and  in  a  further  11.8%  of  cases  an  extremely 
negative  impact,  in  terms  of  the  ability  of  the  West  of  Scotland  to  represent  its 
interests  vis-a-vis  the  EU.  A  wide  variety  of  negative  outcomes  were  attributed  to 
having  diminished  the  functioning  of  European  policy  in  the  West  of  Scotland, 
with  the  most  prominent  issue  raised  by  52.9%  of  respondents  being  that  the 
West  of  Scotland  now  lacked  a  strategic  focus  in  approaching  European  policy 
and  setting  its  priorities.  Other  negative  impacts  were  judged  to  have  been:  -a 
loss  of  experienced  European  policy  officers;  less  resources  being  available  for 
253 European  policy;  a  lack  of  interest  in  the  new  councils  regarding  European  policy; 
and  finally,  that  the  West  of  Scotland  had  experienced  a  reduction  in  status  vis-a- 
vis  other  EU  regions.  However,  a  minority  of  respondents  did  consider 
reorganisation  to  have  been  generally  positive  in  terms  of  European  policy,  for 
instance  a  European  officer  based  in  a  rural  authority,  commented  that  "the 
perception  now,  with  the  function  being  based  in  a  smaller  Council,  appears  to  be 
that  there  is beginning  to  be  a  greater  feeling  of  ownership  and  awareness  within 
the  Council  of  the  potential  of  European  funding  possibilities  and  lobbying 
powers"  (Case  57).  Other  respondents  also  drew  attention  to  a  greater  sense  of 
`ownership'  over  European  policy  as  opposed  to  the  function  being  centralised 
within  SRC,  as  well  as  increased  awareness  of  the  European  function  and  of  EU 
funding  applications  being  more  closely  tailored  to  local  needs.  It  was  notable 
however,  that  respondents  who  made  these  positive  comments  with  regard  to 
reorganisation  tended  to  have  previously  been  located  within  district  councils  and 
post  reorganisation,  were  located  within  authorities  that  tended  to  be  COSLA- 
orientated  (the  split  between  COSLA-orientated  and  WOSEC  orientated  councils 
is  discussed  in  Section  8.5.2). 
8.2.2  -  Summary. 
During  the  consultation  period  preceding  reorganisation,  a  number  of  actors 
raised  issues  which  broadly  claimed  that  Scottish  local  government's  ability  to 
conduct  European  policy  would  be  diminished  as  an  unintended  consequence  of 
the  change  to  a  single-tier  structure.  The  issues  raised  were  fourfold  :-  that  the 
new  councils  would  lack  the  finance  necessary  to  co-finance  EU  funding;  that  the 
councils  would  be  less  effective  in  terms  of  representing  interests  vis-a-vis  EU 
Institutions;  reorganisation  would  result  in  a  loss  of  experienced  European 
officers,  as  a  result  of  staff  turnover;  and  finally,  the  new  councils  would  fail  to 
make  adequate  provision  for  the  European  function,  due  to  the  financial 
pressures  the  new  councils  would  be  under. 
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successor  authorities  to  SRC  in  dealing  with  the  European  function  points  to  the 
conclusion  that  whilst  reorganisation  may  not  have  been  beneficial  to  the 
operation  of  European  policy  in  Western  Scotland,  the  consequences  may  not 
have  been  as  detrimental  as  those  outlined  during  the  consultation  process. 
There  had  clearly  been  a  loss  of  experienced  European  personnel  post- 
reorganisation,  as  50%  of  those  employed  in  European  positions  post- 
reorganisation  had  no  previous  European  policy  experience.  However,  the 
effects  of  this  turnover  in  personnel  (and  the  disruption  caused  by  reorganisation) 
should  be  expected  to  diminish  over  time.  Local  government  in  the  West  of 
Scotland  appears  to  have  a  well  developed  grasp  of  the  importance  of  the  EU  to 
local  government,  as  all  except  one  local  authority  had  European  policy  officers 
in  position.  The  main  impact  of  reorganisation  may  have  been  for  the  new 
councils  to  view'Europeanisation'  as  a  purely  funding  related  issue,  with  this 
development  being  particularly  pronounced  amongst  the  smaller  local  authorities. 
However,  five  councils  had  clearly  recognised  the  European  function  as  having 
policy  as  well  as  funding  implications,  through  locating  the  policy  field  within 
either  a  corporate  department  or  through  establishing  a  separate  European  unit. 
However,  the  focus  on  funding  issues  alone,  within  half  of  SRC's  successors, 
may  result  in  a  diminished  ability,  on  the  part  of  West  Central  Scotland  local 
government  as  a  collective,  to  represent  interests  vis-a-vis  the  EU  (the  issue  of 
interest  representation  will  be  discussed  further  in  Section  8.5).  Equally  the 
majority  of  respondents  (both  via  questionnaires  and  interviews)  considered  that 
reorganisation  had  had  a  detrimental  impact  upon  the  operation  of  European 
policy  in  the  West  of  Scotland,  with  particular  regard  to  the  loss  of  a  West  of 
Scotland  strategic  view.  Whilst  it  is  not  possible  to  accurately  ascertain  the 
impact  of  reorganisation  upon  the  ability  of  the  new  councils  to  co-finance  EU 
funding,  a  number  of  respondents  referred  to  a  lack  of  resources  post- 
reorganisation,  whilst  practitioners  outwith  local  government  expected  a  decline 
in  local  government  applications,  although  the  source  of  this  decline  is 
255 attributable  to  a  variety  of  factors.  It  is  to  the  impact  of  local  government 
reorganisation,  and  of  developments  within  SEP  more  generally,  that  I  now  turn 
8.3  1-  Reorganisation  and  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership  (SEP), 
1996-7. 
Chapter  Five  documented  the  development  of  'partnership'  within  Strathclyde 
Region  between  1988  and  1996.  Across  this  period  of  time  the  influence  of  SRC 
within  the  SEP  diminished  due  to  a  variety  of  reasons.  Firstly,  the  Scottish  Office 
recognised  the  importance  of  EU  funding  as  an  economic  development  tool,  and 
mobilised  in  terms  of  staff,  resources  and  policy  accordingly.  Secondly,  the 
institutionalisation  of  partnership  arrangements,  following  the  Reform  of  the 
Structural  Funds  in  1989,  ensured  that  SRC  would  be  unlikely  to  negotiate  a  deal 
as  favourable  as  the  'Integrated  Development  Operation'  (1988-92)  package  had 
been  in  terms  of  funding  and  SRC's  policy  priorities.  Thirdly,  the  expansion  in 
the  number  of  'partners'  eligible  for  Structural  Funds  support,  notably  through  the 
introduction  of  the  LEC's,  reduced  the  salience  of  SRC  as  a'resource-provider 
of  local  economic  development  knowledge  and  expertise  as  well  as  increasing 
the  competition  for  funding.  Finally,  the  Commission's  policy  of  shifting  the 
emphasis  of  European  regional  aid  away  from  hardware  (e.  g.  infrastructure 
projects)  towards  software  (e.  g.  business  development)  projects,  reduced  the 
proportion  of  funding  which  SRC  received  as  it  was  the  main  provider  of 
infrastructure  within  the  region. 
Thus  the  influence  of  local  government  (SRC  was  the  main  local  government  unit 
to  engage  with  the  Structural  Funds  in  Strathclyde)  within  the  SEP  was  already 
waning,  prior  to  re-organisation.  However  the  financial  pressures  which  single 
tier  authorities  are  subject  to  may  exacerbate  the  trend  of  declining  local  authority 
funding  applications,  and  correspondingly  of  local  government  influence  within 
the  SEP,  although  at  this  stage  the  figures  are  not  available  to  conclusively  prove 
this  to  be  the  case.  In  addition  during  1996,  the  projects  for  which  the  new 
councils  would  be  responsible,  would  have  been  projects  bequeathed  to  them  by 
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the  consent  of  the  shadow  authorities  during  1995,  in  order  to  limit  any  losses  of 
funding  caused  as  a  result  of  reorganisation  (See  footnote  103,  Section  5.5  on 
this  issue). 
SRC's  twelve  successor  authorities  also  attempted  to  minimise  the  disruption 
caused  by  reorganisation,  in  terms  of  their  influence  as  a  constituency  within  the 
SEP,  by  maintaining  the  position  of  individuals  on  SEP  Committees,  who  had  sat 
on  SEP  committees  prior  to  reorganisation,  where  this  was  possible.  However 
due  to  the  turnover  of  staff,  new  representatives  did  take  up  positions  on  SEP 
Committees,  with  the  West  of  Scotland  European  Consortium'  (WOSEC)173 
"co-ordinating  who  should  do  what"  (Case  52)  and  ensuring  that  as  many  of 
SRC's  successor  authorities  were  represented  as  possible.  Of  the  single-tier 
authorities  where  interviews  were  conducted,  all  had  at  least  one  representative 
on  an  advisory  group,  whilst  South  Lanarkshire  had  a  representative  on  the 
`Programme  Management  Committee'  and  North  Lanarkshire  on  the  board  of 
SEP. 
Nevertheless,  European  officers  within  the  unitary  authorities  were  aware  of  the 
reduced  influence  of  local  authorities  within  the  SEP,  for  instance,  a  European 
officer  within  South  Lanarkshire  Council  commented:  - 
"there  has  definitely  been  a  shift  of  power...  we've  had  regional  dominance  or 
SRC  dominance  to  then  criticism,  for  instance  of  business  development,  in  terms 
of  the  over  emphasis  of  the  LECs  involvement  in  it  [within  SEP]"(Case  52). 
The  reorganisation  of  local  government  in  1996  also  had  considerable 
ramifications  for  SEP  as  SRC  fulfilled  the  role  of  `lead  partner'174  with  regard  to 
the  partnership.  Clearly  SRC  could  no  longer  fulfill  this  role  post-1996  and  the 
SEP  would  have  to  find  a  new  `sponsor'  or  structure  following  reorganisation. 
173  The  role  of  the  West  of  Scotland  European  Consortium  (WOSEC)  will  be  discussed  fully  in 
Section  8.5. 
174  The  designation  'lead  partner  refers  to  the  authority  responsible  for  the  premises,  staffing  and 
administrative  requirements  of  SEP  (See  Chapter  Five,  Section  Five). 
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limited  by  guarantee',  thus  removing  any  sense  of  ownership  which  local 
authorities  may  have  perceived  with  regard  to  the  partnership  when  SRC  was  the 
'lead  partner.  This  change  in  the  status  of  SEP,  was  perceived  by  a  variety  of 
European  officers  as  diminishing  the  influence  of  local  authorities  within  the  SEP, 
whilst  the  other  partnerships  in  Scotland  remained  linked  to  local  institutions 
through  'lead  partner  arrangements.  For  instance,  one  official  commented  on 
the  shift  in  SEP's  status  as  follows:  - 
"The  establishment  of  the  SEP  as  a  company  limited  by  guarantee  is  an  absolute 
disgrace,  as  it  has  enabled  or  facilitated  a  reduction  in  the  democratic 
accountability  of  SEP  to  local  politicians  and  created  a  much  more  free  rein  for 
SEP  Limited.  On  reflection  I  think  it  would  be  much  better  to  go  for  the  lead 
authority  model,  in  order  to  control  it,  to  provide  much  clearer  political 
accountability"'  75  (Case  48). 
The  second  major  change  to  the  operation  of  SEP  during  this  period  was  the 
renegotiation  of  the  partnership's  'Single  Programming  Document'  (SPD),  for  the 
period  1997-99.  The  six-year  programme  agreed  for  1994  to  1999  was  intended 
to  be  assessed  at  the  end  of  1996  but  not  to  be  subject  to  major  changes  for  the 
period  1997  to  1999.  However  upon  the  commencement  of  negotiations  during 
1996,  SEP  officials  realised  that  the  Commission  desired  significant  changes  to 
the  programme  for  the  period  1997  to  1999.  The  extent  of  the  Commission's 
success  in  obtaining  changes  to  the  SEP's  priorities  becomes  immediately 
apparent  when  comparing  the  objectives  of  the  1994-96  and  1997-99 
programmes.  The  priorities  for  the  SEP  between  1994  to  1996  were:  -  business 
development;  business  environment;  tourism;  and,  economic  and  social 
cohesion176"  The  SPD  for  1997  to  1999  sets  out  five  priorities  for  the 
programme:  - 
175  For  the  new  round  of  Structural  Fund  programmes,  2000-06,  only  the  Highlands  and  Islands 
had  not  become  a  company  limited  by  guarantee  whilst  the  Highlands  and  Islands  partnership 
was  actively  considering  becoming  such  a  company  in  the  course  of  the  new  programme. 
176  See  Chapter  Five,  Section  Five,  discusses  the  1994  to  1996  SPD  in  detail. 
258 1)  Small  and  Medium-sized  Enterprises  (SMEs)  and  Local  Services  (49.724m 
ECU); 
2)  Applied  Research,  Technological  Development  and  Innovation  (13.516m 
ECU); 
3)  Strategic  Spatial  Development  (33.801  m  ECU); 
4)  Tourism  and  Cultural  Industries  (21.804m  ECU); 
5)  Community  Economic  Development  (23.284m  ECU). 
Source:  -  SEP  (1997). 
These  priorities  closely  matched  Commission  guidelines  issued  to  Member 
States  in  April  1996  (SEP,  1997,  p.  51).  The  shift  from  hardware  to  software 
schemes  in  line  with  Commission  policy  (See  Chapter  Five),  continued  in  the 
new  SPD.  The  1997-99  SPD  also  asserted  the  importance  of  private  finance  as 
a  means  of  levering  finance  for  European  funding  and  increasing  the  likelihood 
that  the  partnership  would  expand  in  size.  Equal  opportunities  and  the 
environmental  impacts  of  EU  funding  were  also  emphasised  as  central  to  SEP 
operations. 
The  final  and  most  controversial  change  to  the  1997-99  SPD  from  the  previous 
programme  was  that  EU  funding  would  "concentrate  resources  on  the  areas  of 
greatest  need  and  locations  offering  the  maximum  opportunities  for  employment 
creation"  (SEP,  1997,  p.  55).  The  Commission  initially  wanted  funding  focussed 
on  the  most  deprived  areas  within  Strathclyde  which  was  accepted  by  SEP 
partners,  however  the  Commission  also  proposed  focussing  funding  upon 
'strategic  sites',  along  lines  similar  to  a  growth  pole  strategy.  This  caused 
considerable  concern  amongst  SEP  partners  and  was  ultimately  dropped  during 
the  negotiations  due  to  a  coalition  of  opposition  ranging  from  the  Scottish  Office, 
LEC's,  local  authorities  and  SEP  Executive.  An  SEP  official  (Case  43)  viewed 
the  strategic  site  proposal,  as  an  attempt  to  reduce  Objective  Two  geographical 
coverage  with  a  view  to  EU  enlargement.  Generally  the  attitude  of  Commission 
officials  during  the  SPD  negotiations  was  viewed  by  a  number  of  actors  as 
representing  an  increasingly  hands-on  approach  by  the  Commission  with  regard 
to  the  workings  of  SEP.  The  1997-99  SPD  as  a  document  provides  considerable 
259 evidence  of  the  extensive  information,  which  the  Commission  expected  from 
partnerships  when  compared  to  previous  SPDs.  For  instance,  the  1994-96  SPD 
consists  of  88  pages  compared  to  124  pages  for  1997-99.  An  SEP  official 
commented  on  these  increasing  demands  as  follows:  - 
"We've  had  to  add  in  a  huge  amount  of  extra  information.  The  content  of  it,  are 
really  only  the  thirty  or  forty  pages  of  strategy  and  what  we  are  going  to  do  with 
the  funds.  The  rest  is  a  revised  environmental  profile  and  much  more  information 
on  the  socio-economic  characteristics  of  the  region.  Now  we  produced  that  three 
years  ago  and  they  have  actually  asked  us  for  more"  (Case  43). 
Thus  the  1997-99  programme  contained  some  considerable  changes  from  1994- 
96,  due  to  the  prompting  of  the  Commission,  resulting  in  considerable 
consternation  over  the  apparent  centralising  tendencies  of  the  Commission, 
within  SEP.  An  SEP  official  remarked,  with  regard  to  the  increasing  influence  of 
the  Commission  that  "there  is  meant  to  be  continuity,  this  is  the  second  half  of  a 
six-year  planning  period,  and  they  [the  Commission]  ignored  the  plan  for  the  six 
years,  and  treated  it  as  two  separate  three  year  programmes"  (Case  43).  The 
increasing  interventionism  of  the  Commission  within  the  SEP  was  also  causing 
considerable  resentment  amongst  local  authority  European  officers.  Whilst  the 
Commission  was  viewed  as  having  become  increasingly  interested  in  the  fine 
detail  of  the  partnership  arrangements  over  a  number  of  years,  the  extent  of 
Commission  involvement  during  the  1997-99  SPD  negotiations  reached  new 
levels.  The  comments  of  two  European  officers  below  reflect  the  resentment  of 
local  government  actors  at  Commission  interventionism. 
"They  should  basically  put  their  money  where  their  mouth  is,  in  terms  of 
subsidiarity,  and  let  us  tell  them  what  is  best  in  terms  of  our  area"  (Case  47). 
"What  we  have  increasingly  moved  towards,  and  a  bit  of  self  criticism,  what  we 
have  allowed  the  Commission  to  do,  is  move  towards  dictating  how  we  should 
run  our  economy  and  how  we  should  set  our  own  socio-economic  priorities,  and  I 
think  that  is  fundamentally  wrong  ...  I  think  now  the  local  authorities,  and  all  the 
partners  in  the  West  of  Scotland,  are  beginning  to  say  we  just  can't  work  within 
these  parameters,  the  Commission  have  overstepped  the  mark,  they  have  just 
taken  it  a  step  too  far"  (Case  52). 
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It  is  still  too  early  to  judge  the  impact  of  local  government  reorganisation  upon  the 
ability  of  the  new  councils  to  obtain  European  funding.  However,  the  initial 
indicators  tend  to  point  to  a  reduced  role  for  local  government  with  regard  to  the 
Structural  Funds,  although  EU  funding  will  remain  a  major  source  of  finance  for 
local  government.  However,  local  government's  role  within  the  partnerships 
would  have  diminished  even  if  restructuring  had  not  taken  place,  given  the 
direction  of  Commission  policy  towards  expanded  partnerships,  an  increased  role 
for  private  finance  and  the  move  towards  software  schemes.  Nevertheless,  the 
tight  budgetary  constraints  on  local  government  post-1996  may  limit  the  uptake 
of  EU  funding  by  the  unitary  authorities.  Certainly  the  diminished  influence  of 
local  government  within  Scotland  post-reorganisation  has  been  recognised  by 
COSLA,  which  in  its  European  workplan  for  1996-97,  commented:  - 
"In  the  current  Structural  Fund  programmes  there  is  concern  at  the  matching 
funding  difficulties  faced  by  local  councils,  and  the  reduced  role  of  local  councils 
in  structural  fund  partnerships"  (COSLA,  1996b,  p.  3). 
In  broader  terms,  partnership  continued  to  develop  and  evolve  during  1996  and 
1997,  firstly  through  the  establishment  of  SEP  as  a  company  limited  by 
guarantee,  and  secondly  through  the  agreement  of  the  1997-99  SPD  which 
featured  some  significant  changes  from  the  1994-96  SPD,  of  which  it  was 
intended  to  be  a  continuation.  Most  dramatically,  the  Commission  appears  to  be 
adopting  an  increasingly  interventionist  stance,  with  regard  to  the  policies 
pursued  within  partnerships,  in  part  due  to  the  pressures  to  prepare  for  EU 
enlargement.  Nevertheless,  this  approach  is  resulting  in  an  increased  scepticism 
amongst  local  government  actors  with  regard  to  the  role  of  the  European 
Commission  as  an  active  participant  in  economic  development  policy  at  the 
regional  scale.  More  importantly,  developments  within  SEP  during  1996  and 
1997  highlight  the  fluid  power  relations  between  actors  within  multi-level 
governance  institutions,  and  in  particular  the  extent  to  which  SNAs  are  ultimately 
reliant  upon  the  European  Commission  and  /  or  central  government  when 
attempting  to  direct  policy.  Where  no  such  support  exists,  it  rapidly  becomes 
261 apparent  that  SNAs  are  unlikely  to  shape  the  decisions  which  are  made  within 
such  institutions,  due  to  their  reliance  upon  the  resources  (in  the  case  of  the 
Commission,  the  finance)  which  these  actors  bring  to  institutions  such  as  the 
SEP.  It  is  to  the  experience  of  the  new  unitary  authorities  within  another  multi- 
level  institution,  the  Ecos-Ouverture  programme  that  I  now  intend  to  turn. 
8.4  1-  Reorcianisation  and  Ecos-Ouverture. 
Prior  to  reorganisation  the  Ecos-Ouverture  programme  had  been  subject  to 
considerable  scrutiny,  as  a  result  of  two  principal  factors.  Firstly,  Article  10 
projects  in  general  had  attracted  considerable  criticism  from  DGXX  (Financial 
Control)  of  the  European  Commission  and  from  a  Court  of  Auditors  report  dealing 
with  Article  10  projects  operational  in  the  Mediterranean.  As  a  consequence, 
DGXVI  attempted  to  centralise  financial  and  administrative  procedures  across  all 
Article  10  projects  including  Ecos-Ouverture,  thus  diluting  the  initial  vision  of 
subsidiarity  underlying  the  programme.  Secondly,  antagonism  aroused  during 
the  merger  process  between  Ecos  and  Ouverture  continued  post-merger, 
resulting  in  DGXVI  becoming  disillusioned  with  the  organisation  of  the 
programme.  The  pressures  upon  DGXVI  with  regard  to  Article  10  projects  in 
general,  and  discontent  with  the  structure  of  Ecos-Ouverture,  resulted  in  DGXVI 
announcing  during  1997  that  Ecos-Ouverture  would  be  put  out  to  `open  tender' 
with  the  successful  bidder  obtaining  control  of  the  programme  in  January  2000. 
This  section  intends  to  address  the  role  of  SRC's  successor  authorities  within 
Ecos-Ouverture,  as  Chapter  Six  dealt  with  the  impact  of  the  above  issues  during 
1996  and  1997  on  Ecos-Ouverture. 
Prior  to  reorganisation,  SRC  had  provided  finance  to  cover  the  operational  costs 
of  maintaining  Ecos-Ouverture  for  the  first  year  of  the  programme  following 
reform,  thus  ensuring  the  continuation  of  funding  until  April  1997.  SRC's 
responsibility  as  the  regional  authority  responsible  for  the  headquarters  and  a 
local  office  of  Ecos-Ouverture  was  transferred  to  Glasgow  City  Council  in  April 
1996,  as  the  offices  of  the  programme  were  located  within  this  authority's 
262 boundaries.  However,  prior  to  reorganisation  SRC  had  instigated  negotiations 
between  its  twelve  successor  authorities  regarding  the  establishment  of  a  West 
of  Scotland  European  Consortium'  (WOSEC),  which  would  assume  control  of  the 
programme  from  Glasgow  City  Council  upon  its  establishment.  WOSEC  was  not 
formally  established  until  October  1996,  whilst  the  negotiations  to  transfer  control 
to  WOSEC  were  not  formally  agreed  until  April  1997.  Accordingly  at  a  time  when 
Ecos-Ouverture  was  under  considerable  pressure  as  the  tender  process  began, 
the  programme  was  lacking  a  significant  presence  from  the  region,  which  held 
the  headquarters  of  the  programme.  An  Ecos-Ouverture  official  commented  that 
the  principal  impact  of  reorganisation  had  "over  time  weakened  politically  the 
Glasgow  base  of  the  structure,  and  the  fact  it  has  taken  WOSEC  a  long  time  to 
come  into  being177..  has  created  a  political  vacuum  over  the  last  year"  (Case  44). 
This  political  vacuum  was  a  cause  of  concern  amongst  the  SNA  partners  within 
the  programme,  as  the  lack  of  direction  from  the  West  of  Scotland  weakened 
Ecos-Ouverture  as  a  whole.  For  instance,  a  Council  of  European  Municipalities 
and  Regions  (CEMR)  official  commented  on  the  vacuum  which  SRC's  demise 
had  left  within  the  programme,  in  the  following  terms:  - 
"There  has  been  an  absence  from  the  Ouverture  side.  The  City  of  Glasgow, 
which  was  supposed  to  have  taken  over,  we  have  not  really  seen  them 
anywhere.  The  only  person  we  have  seen  at  a  political  level  has  been  ClIr. 
McGrath176,  but  I  am  not  exactly  sure  what  he  is  doing  or  what  his  job  is  with 
Glasgow  City.  Whereas  before  we  knew  the  people  with  whom  we  negotiated 
and  their  system  and  their  role,  now  these  people  don't  seem  to  be  in  the  same 
places,  and  we  haven't  seen  the  new  ones,  so  there  is  an  absence"  (Case  36). 
Discontent  amongst  the  Ecos-Ouverture  partners  at  the  lack  of  an  active 
involvement  on  the  part  of  the  unitary  authorities  in  the  West  of  Scotland  became 
evident  in  January  1997,  as  agreement  was  reached  to  transfer  WOSEC's 
representation  on  the  programme's  'Steering  Committee'  to  the  'Assembly  of 
European  Regions'  (AER).  The  impact  of  this  change  in  representation  was  to 
177  The  role  of  WOSEC  and  the  reasons  for  the  delay  in  its  establishment  will  be  discussed  in 
Section  8.5. 
178  Cllr.  McGrath  was  Chair  of  Glasgow  City  Council's  European  and  International  Affairs  sub- 
committee. 
263 clearly  signal  the  diminution  of  the  West  of  Scotland's  influence  within  the 
programme.  An  Ecos-Ouverture  official  based  in  Glasgow  commented  upon  the 
significance  of  this  change  in  the  following  terms:  - 
"That  political  vacuum  has  effectively  been  filled  by  AER,  largely  because  the 
other  partners  in  the  Ouverture  consortium  were  a  bit  worried  about  this  lack  of 
political  clout,  and  they  effectively  invited  AER  to  take  the  lead  in  the  regional 
partnership.  So  where  in  the  past  Strathclyde  led  the  regional  partnership,  it  is 
now  AER  itself  in  the  shape  of  its  Secretary  General,  who  is  the  senior  AER 
officer  in  Strasbourg  and  the  President  of  AER  who  is  the  President  of  the 
Flemish  region  in  Belgium.  For  instance,  I  am  sitting  on  a  technical  working 
group,  which  is  preparing  the  proposal  for  the  tender.  That  working  group  reports 
to  the  Secretary-General  of  CEMR  and  of  AER.  That  is  a  big  change"  (Case  44). 
While  SRC  provided  finance  to  the  12  successor  authorities  for  the  period  1996 
to  1997,  at  the  beginning  of  1997  agreement  had  to  be  reached  between  the 
WOSEC  authorities  over  providing  finance  to  the  programme  for  the  following 
year.  The  requirements  of  obtaining  the  agreement  of  twelve  authorities  to 
finance  Ecos-Ouverture  was  a  long  drawn-out  process,  given  the  financial 
pressures  the  unitary  authorities  were  subject  to.  An  Ecos-Ouverture  official 
commented  on  this  process  in  the  following  terms:  - 
"It  has  been  a  long  job  to  talk  to  and  convince  all  of  the  authorities.  It  is  very 
different  from  that  point  of  view,  whereas  in  the  past  you  would  go  to  the 
European  Affairs  committee  of  the  Region  [SRC],  and  they  would  say  Yes  or  No, 
now  effectively  we  are  doing  that  twelve  times  over"  (Case  44). 
The  difficulties  that  Ecos-Ouverture  experienced  in  attempting  to  obtain  funding 
from  the  unitary  authorities  were  symptomatic  of  changing  attitudes  within  the 
new  councils  towards  the  organisation  from  those  of  SRC  officials  and  politicians. 
Whilst  SRC  representatives  would  frequently  claim  that  involvement  within  Ecos- 
Ouverture  brought  significant  benefits  to  the  Regional  Council,  such  as  status 
within  the  EU  and  access  to  Commission  officials,  respondents  from  the  unitary 
authorities  referred  on  a  number  of  occasions  to  the  need  for  Ecos-Ouverture  "to 
sell  themselves  to  us  and  give  us  some  results,  otherwise  we  will  have  some 
problems  providing  finance  next  year"  (Case  57),  whilst  one  Council  Leader 
stated:  - 
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programme  in  Glasgow,  I  am  unsure  about  what  they  are"  (Case  53). 
The  stark  choices  facing  the  reorganised  councils  with  regard  to  European  policy 
where  finance  was  involved,  were  made  abundantly  clear  by  a  European  officer 
within  South  Lanarkshire  council,  which  has  one  of  the  most  developed 
European  functions  in  the  West  of  Scotland  (See  Table  8.4):  - 
"What  you  will  find  is,  and  I  am  as  guilty  as  anyone,  I  have  a  LIFE  tender  in  and  if 
that  comes  off,  it  will  create  four  jobs  and  I  cannot  support  the  Ecos-Ouverture 
tender  and  run  a  LIFE  project,  because  the  money  runs  out.  And  at  that  point, 
well  there  are  so  many  unforeseen  possibilities,  and  we  don't  know  if  the  tender 
[for  Ecos-Ouverture]  is  going  to  be  successful  yet.  And  I  think  most  authorities 
are  in  that  position"  (Case  52). 
The  increasingly  constrained  financial  environment  within  which  the  authorities 
were  operating  and  the  change  in  attitudes  towards  Ecos-Ouverture,  marked  a 
significant  change  from  the  pre-reform  situation.  The  lack  of  finance,  and  from 
some  councils,  the  lack  of  a  political  will  to  retain  the  management  of  the 
programme  raised  doubts  as  to  the  ability  of  WOSEC  to  win  the  tender  process 
or  lobby  as  effectively  as  SRC  had  done  during  the  merger  negotiation  with 
ECOS.  These  considerations  may  have  been  apparent  to  the  personnel  within 
ECOS-Ouverture,  which  lost  a  number  of  employees  post-reorganisation,  most 
notably  in  the  case  of  the  Director  of  the  organisation  who  left  ECOS-Ouverture 
to  join  a  private  consultancy  which  was  a  rival  bidder  in  the  tender  process. 
8.4.2  -  Summary. 
The  reorganisation  of  local  government  in  Scotland  occurred  during  a  critical 
period  for  Ecos-Ouverture,  as  the  organisation  as  a  whole  came  under 
considerable  scrutiny  from  the  European  Commission  and  the  Court  of  Auditors. 
Strathclyde  Regional  Council  went  to  considerable  lengths  to  cushion  the  impact 
of  reorganisation  upon  Ecos-Ouverture  via  firstly,  the  provision  of  a  'dowry'  to 
finance  the  West  of  Scotland's  contribution  to  the  programme  from  April  1996  to 
April  1997.  Secondly,  SRC  had  entered  into  negotiations  with  the  then  'shadovJ 
councils  over  the  establishment  of  a  'West  of  Scotland  European  Consortium', 
265 which  would  act  as  the  political  representative  of  the  programme  in  Western 
Scotland.  Despite  the  substantial  encouragement  provided  by  SRC  to  the  new 
councils  to  maintain  their  involvement  within  Ecos-Ouverture,  the  political  status 
of  the  West  of  Scotland  within  the  programme  was  considerably  diminished  as 
AER  replaced  the  West  of  Scotland  within  the  programme's  'Steering 
Committee'. 
The  delay  in  WOSEC's  establishment  and  subsequent  negotiations  between 
WOSEC  and  Ecos-Ouverture  resulted  in  Glasgow  City  Council  being  the  political 
representative  of  the  programme  until  April  1997.  This  situation  aroused 
considerable  concern  amongst  Ecos-Ouverture  'partners'  at  the  lack  of  profile 
and  direction  amongst  the  West  of  Scotland  authorities  during  a  period  when  a 
tender  bid  would  have  to  be  prepared  for  the  programme  post-1999. 
Accordingly,  AER  assumed  Glasgows  representative  responsibilities  within  the 
programme.  The  lack  of  commitment  amongst  the  WOSEC  authorities  to  ECOS- 
Ouverture  became  apparent  during  1997,  when  the  unitary  authorities  were 
expected  to  contribute  financially  to  the  programme.  Whilst  agreement  was 
reached,  the  financial  negotiations  raised  questions  over  the  ability  of  the  unitary 
authorities  to  be  involved  in  Ecos-Ouverture  post-1999,  should  the  tender  bid  be 
successful.  In  addition,  individual  authorities  within  WOSEC  were  beginning  to 
openly  articulate  doubts  over  the  benefits  of  involvement  within  Ecos-Ouverture 
and  of  their  ability  or  willingness  to  finance  the  programme  post-1999.  In  short, 
the  reorganisation  of  local  government  had  a  detrimental  effect  upon  the  ability  of 
West  of  Scotland  local  government  to  participate  within  (in  SNA  terms)  a  high 
profile  EU  initiative.  In  part,  this  outcome  was  due  to  the  lack  of  finance  available 
to  the  unitary  authorities,  however,  the  lack  of  political  will  to  support  the 
programme  also  reflected  divisions  with  WOSEC  regarding  the  appropriate 
direction  which  Scottish  local  government  should  adopt  with  regard  to  European 
policy.  The  role  of  WOSEC  and  the  wider  Scottish  dimension  to  European 
interest  representation  post-reorganisation  are  addressed  next. 
266 8.5  1-  Reorganisation  and  EU  Interest  Representation. 
There  are  a  wide  variety  of  approaches  which  SNAs  may  take  in  order  to  attempt 
to  influence  EU  decision-making,  ranging  from  formal  participation  within  trans- 
regional  networks  to  the  informal  lobbying  of  Commission  officials  (See  Chapter 
Seven).  Section  8.5  deals  with  the  approaches  taken  by  SRC's  successor 
authorities  between  April  1996  and  May  1997  with  regard  to  EU  interest 
representation.  Whilst  this  is  a  relatively  short  time-period  with  which  to  assess 
the  policies  put  in  place  by  the  unitary  authorities,  it  was  possible  to  draw 
conclusions  regarding  the  difficulties  the  new  councils  were  experiencing  and  the 
likely  direction  which  Scottish  local  government  interest  representation  was  likely 
to  take  in  the  future.  In  terms  of  the  local  government  in  the  West  of  Scotland, 
EU  interest  representation  developed  across  two  main  strands,  post  April  1996. 
Firstly,  informal  alliances  were  developed  amongst  European  policy  practitioners 
within  Scotland  and  to  a  much  lesser  extent,  informal  alliances  were  developed 
with  representatives  at  the  European  level.  Secondly,  the  unitary  authorities 
became  engaged  within  formal  structures  of  interest  representation,  notably 
within  trans-regional  networks  (such  as  AER)  and  regional  consortia  concerned 
with  EU  interest  representation  at  the  Western  Scotland  (WOSEC)  and  Scottish 
levels  (COSLA).  Given  the  relatively  limited  profile  of  the  new  councils,  as 
compared  to  SRC,  in  terms  of  population  or  finance,  and  the  need  to  build 
alliances  in  order  to  influence  within  the  EU,  it  is  not  surprising  that  some  degree 
of  co-operation  with  regard  to  European  policy,  should  take  place  between  the 
unitary  authorities  in  order  to  lobby  as  effectively  as  possible  within  the  EU. 
8.5.2  -  Regional  Consortias  :-  WOSEC  and  COSLA. 
Prior  to  reorganisation,  SRC  had  approached  the  shadow  councils  with  regard  to 
the  possibility  of  establishing  co-operation  between  the  new  councils  in  the  West 
of  Scotland  with  regard  to  European  issues.  By  January  1996,  a  Working  Group 
had  been  established,  comprising  representatives  from  all  the  shadow  authorities 
and  SRC  to  discuss  "the  general  principles  of  inter-authority  co-operation  on 
European  issues..  [and  the]  details  of  organisational  and  staffing  costs  of 
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Brussels  level"  (North  Lanarkshire  Council,  1996).  North  Lanarkshire  Council 
was  nominated  as  the  Chair  of  the  Working  Group,  whilst  Dumfries  and 
Galloway179  Council  was  to  be  approached  and  offered  a  place  within  the 
Working  Group.  The  "formal  proposals"  (North  Lanarkshire,  1996)  of  the 
Working  Group  were  to  be  submitted  by  March  1996,  in  order  to  allow  the  unitary 
authorities  to  sign  up  to  a  structure  prior  to  reorganisation  coming  into  effect. 
Ultimately,  WOSEC  was  not  formally  established  until  October  1996,  whilst  the 
European  Liaison  post  of  WOSEC  was  not  occupied  until  January  1997.  This 
delay  can,  in  part,  be  attributed  to  the  relatively  low  priority  of  European  affairs  as 
opposed  to  other  local  authority  functions,  at  a  time  of  great  upheaval  within 
Scottish  local  government,  however,  the  delay  was  also  a  result  of  "disagreement 
within  WOSEC°  (Case  46).  In  particular,  Glasgow  City  representatives  desired  a 
more  prominent  position  within  WOSEC  (particularly  as  the  council  was  the 
largest  financial  contributor  to  the  Consortium,  See  Table  8.6),  whilst  a  number  of 
other  local  authorities  were  keen  to  resist  this.  The  imprint  of  the  earlier  Working 
Group  on  the  structure  of  WOSEC,  was  apparent  on  the  establishment  of  the 
Consortium  in  October  1996,  as  North  Lanarkshire  acted  as  the  lead  authority  for 
WOSEC,  providing  the  Chair  secretariat  and  financial  support  services  to  the 
member  councils  of  WOSEC.  WOSEC  consisted  of  SRC's  twelve  successor 
authorities  and  Dumfries  and  Galloway.  The  objectives  of  the  Consortium  were 
fivefold:  - 
179  The  motivation  for  Dumfries  and  Galloway  Council's  membership  of  WOSEC  is  rather 
unclear  (apart  from  wishing  to  be  part  of  a  regional  consortia  to  improve  its  influence  in  European 
terms),  as  the  authority  did  not  obtain  Objective  Two  funding  and  was  unlikely  to  share  the 
interests  of  many  Western  Scotland  authorities  with  regard  to  urban  and  industrial  issues. 
Instead  the  Council  was  heavily  engaged  in  rural  issues  with  regard  to  Europe,  exemplified  by  the 
Council  providing  the  secretariat  for  the  UK  Objective  5b  partnership,  which  is  a  political  lobby 
representing  5b  'rural  and  deprived  areas'  (Dumfries  and  Galloway,  1996)  with  regard  to 
European  issues.  This  lack  of  common  interests  with  the  other  WOSEC  members  presumably 
accounts  for  the  Council's  withdrawal  from  WOSEC  in  April  1997. 
268 1)  To  seek  to  influence  the  development  and  implementation  of  European 
policies,  programmes,  directives,  regulations,  legislation  etc,  in  the  interests 
of  the  communities  of  the  West  of  Scotland. 
2)  To  disseminate  information  about  European  policies,  programmes,  legislation 
etc.,  and  promote  amongst  Member  Authorities  the  adoption  of  a  European 
dimension  to  relevant  policies  and  plans. 
3)  To  maximise  the  benefits  of  European  Union  financial  assistance  to  the  West 
of  Scotland  and  encourage  the  development  of  appropriate  proposals, 
projects  and  programmes  amongst  Member  Authorities,  individually  and 
jointly. 
4)  To  represent  the  interests  of  the  West  of  Scotland  through  membership  of 
appropriate  European  networks  and  other  appropriate  associations. 
5)  To  facilitate  co-operation  amongst  Member  Authorities  on  European  issues 
and  take  such  initiatives  as  may  be  agreed  to  serve  the  common  aims  of  the 
Member  Authorities. 
Source:  -  WOSEC  (1997),  p.  2. 
The  creation  of  WOSEC  was  an  attempt,  more  specifically,  to  maintain  "the 
profile  and  the  reputation  of  the  West  of  Scotland,  and  the  positive  image  that 
Strathclyde  had,  and  retain  that  for  the  new  local  authority  set-up  in  the  West  of 
Scotland"  (Case  49).  In  order  to  achieve  these  objectives,  the  Consortium 
appointed  a  European  Liaison  Officer  located  within  North  Lanarkshire  Council, 
but  based  also  within  the  Scotland  Europa  offices  in  Brussels  for  one  week  a 
month.  The  Consortium  would  meet  at  least  twice  a  year  to  determine  policy, 
with  decisions  being  taken  by  majority  vote.  The  budget  of  WOSEC  initially  was 
£134,546  p.  a.  (WOSEC,  1996  p.  2),  with  each  council  contributing  according  to  its 
population  share  (see  Table  Four). 
In  addition  to  the  twelve  successor  authorities  to  SRC  being  members  of 
WOSEC,  all  twelve  authorities  were  also  members  of  COSLA  and  as  a 
consequence  obtained  access  to  the  services  of  COSLA's  European  policy 
services.  The  existence  of  a  European  section  within  COSLA  preceded 
reorganisation,  as  COSLA  had  established  a  European  team  and  opened  an 
office  within  Scotland  Europa  in  October  1993.  Prior  to  reorganisation,  the 
COSLA  European  team  had  consisted  of  a  European  Liaison  officer  (plus  a 
secretary)  based  in  Brussels.  However  in  the  period  leading  up  to 
269 reorganisation,  COSLA  reviewed  its  entire  operations  with  regard  to  the  form 
COSLA  should  take  post-reorganisation.  As  a  result  of  this  assessment,  COSLA 
decided  to  significantly  enhance  its  European  function  in  order  to  provide  an 
improved  service  for  its  member  council's  post-April  1996.  European  policy  was 
believed  to  be  an  area  where  the  new  councils  would  require  assistance  for 
reasons  a  COSLA  official  outlined  as  follows:  - 
"The  nature  of  the  councils  we  were  dealing  with  changed.  You  didn't  have  the 
large  regions.  The  largest  council  in  the  old  structure  was  2.2m,  in  the  new 
structure  it  is  650,000,  whilst  the  smallest  mainland  council  is  44,000.  In  the  old 
system  a  small  council  could  gauge  a  relationship  with  its  Regional  Council,  to 
ensure  that  it  had  advice  on  Europe,  while  protecting  its  ability  to  generate 
individual  projects.  That  relationship  has  now  gone,  the  size  means  that  only  the 
largest  can  afford  large  European  teams,  so  the  whole  nature  and  aspect  of 
European  liaison  in  Scotland  changed  with  the  reorganisation.  We  had  to 
respond  to  the  new  structure  and  we  did"  (Case  56). 
270 Table  8.6  -  Unitary  Authority  Financial  Contributions  to  WOSEC  (excluding 
Dumfries  and  Galloway  Council).  180 
AUTHORITY  POPULATION  (%).  BUDGET  CONTRIBUTION  (£). 
Argyll  and  Bute  3.9  4,945.63 
East  Ayrshire  5.4  6,847.79 
North  Ayrshire  6.1  7,735.47 
South  Ayrshire  5.0  6,340.55 
East  Dunbartonshire  4.3  5,452.87 
West  Dunbartonshire  4.8  6,086.93 
Glasgow  City  27.4  34,746.21 
Inverclyde  4.0  5,072.44 
North  Lanarkshire  14.3  18,133.97 
South  Lanarkshire  13.4  16,992.67 
East  Renfrewshire  3.8  4,818.82 
Renfrewshire  7.6  9,637.64 
TOTAL  100.0  126,810.99 
Source:  -  WOSEC  (1996),  p.  5. 
COSLA's  response  to  reorganisation  was  twofold.  Firstly,  to  increase  COSLA's 
European  staff  from  one  to  five  and  increase  the  resources  dealing  with 
European  policy  accordingly.  Secondly,  European  policy  was  recognised  as 
being  central  to  COSLA  and  the  European  function  was  located  at  the  centre  of 
the  reformed  COSLA  decision-making  structure,  within  the  Strategy  team  of  the 
COSLA  Secretariat.  Accordingly,  COSLA  set  out  four  principal  aims  of  the 
European  team  within  COSLA  in  terms  of  European  policy,  these  viere:  - 
1)  To  contribute  to  the  development  and  implementation  of  EU  policies  and  EU 
funding  programmes  to  the  benefit  of  Scottish  local  government. 
2)  To  secure  the  influence  and  raise  awareness  of  Scottish  local  government  in 
European  and  international  organisations  and  networks. 
3)  To  ensure  that  Europe  is  fully  taken  into  account  across  all  the  activities  of 
COSLA  and  its  member  councils. 
180  Dumfries  and  Galloway  contributed  £7,735.01  p.  a.  to  WOSEC. 
271 4)  To  provide  advice,  information  and  training  support  to  member  councils  to 
enable  them  to  benefit  from  and  respond  to  developments  in  European  policy 
and  programmes. 
Source  :-  COSLA  (1996c)  p.  2. 
Clearly  there  are  a  number  of  shared  objectives  between  COSLA  and  WOSEC 
which  raised  questions  as  to  whether  it  was  necessary  to  have  regional 
consortia's  representing  parts  of  Scottish  local  government  and  COSLA 
representing  Scottish  local  government  as  a  whole  vis-6-vis  the  EU.  In  theory, 
both  COSLA  and  WOSEC  representatives  claimed  that  both  organisations  would 
have  a  role  to  fulfill  with  regard  to  European  policy,  for  instance  a  COSLA  official 
commented:  - 
"The  regional  consortia  are  part  of  COSLA,  and  they  are  a  regional  dimension  of 
the  national,  but  they  are  not  the  only  grouping  within  COSLA.  There  will 
continue  to  be  interplay  between  COSLA's  agenda,  the  regional  agendas,  and 
the  individual  member  council  agendas.  You  use  the  different  levels  to  give 
different  emphases'  (Case  56). 
In  practice,  the  distinction  between  the  roles  of  COSLA  and  WOSEC  were 
perhaps  less  clear  to  SRC's  successor  authorities,  whilst  the  impact  which 
COSLA  made  upon  individual  European  officers  following  reorganisation,  via  the 
holding  of  seminars,  producing  information  booklets  and  issue  papers  on  areas 
of  policy  contrasted  with  the  apparent  inactivity  of  WOSEC.  In  addition,  COSLA 
maintained  a  full-time  representative  in  Brussels,  whilst  the  WOSEC 
representative  was  only  present  in  Brussels  for  a  week  a  month.  This  overlap  in 
functions  between  the  two  organisations  was  apparent  in  the  close  contact 
between  European  officers  in  the  West  of  Scotland  with  both  COSLA  and 
WOSEC  (See  Table  8.7). 
272 Table  8.7  -  Contact  between  Unitary  Authority  European  Officers  and 
COSLA  and  WOSEC. 
Frequency  of  contact.  %/  (number)  of  respondents 
in  contact  with  COSLA. 
%/  (number)  of  respondents 
in  contact  with  WOSEC181. 
Every  day  0%  (0)  12.5%  (2) 
Every  two  or  three  days  29.4%  (5)  6.3%  (1) 
Weekly  5.9%  (1)  18.8%  (3) 
Fortnightly  23.5%  (4)  12.5%  (2) 
Monthly  23.5%  (4)  18.8%  (3) 
Less  frequently  than  Monthly  17.6%  (3)  31.3%  (5) 
TOTAL  100%  (17)  100%  (16) 
Source:  -  Reorganisation  Questionnaire,  Questions  9  and  10. 
The  overlap  in  functions  between  WOSEC  and  COSLA  was  evident  to  a  number 
of  European  officers,  whilst  some  European  officers  noted  that  whilst  COSLA  had 
reorganised  its  European  function  prior  to  reorganisation,  WOSEC  was  still  trying 
to  find  a  role  for  itself,  for  instance  one  European  officer  commented:  - 
I  think  COSLA  plays  an  important  function  now,  I  don't  know  about  the  role  of 
WOSEC,  it  is  in  such  a  unique  situation  with  the  Clyde  Valley  councils  all  pulling 
in  so  many  different  directions,  with  their  own  identities,  desperate  to  maximise 
the  little  funding  that  they  have  got  and  basically  everyone  is  throwing  the 
strategic  priorities  out  of  the  window"  (Case  57). 
The  overlap  between  the  roles  of  WOSEC  and  COSLA  in  terms  of  European 
policy,  began  to  have  practical  implications  during  1997  as  the  unitary  authorities 
in  Western  Scotland  began  to  devise  their  lobbying  strategies  for  the  debates 
which  were  beginning  regarding  the  renegotiation  of  the  Structural  Funds  post- 
1999.  COS  LA  had  established  a  `working  group'  to  consider  the  position  of 
Scotland  with  regard  to  the  Structural  Fund  debates,  however  WOSEC  perceived 
that  a  separate  Western  Scotland  interest  existed,  given  the  urban  and  post- 
industrial  nature  of  the  region,  and  that  a  case  could  be  made  along  the  lines  of 
181  Note  that  there  is  one  less  respondent  to  the  '%  of  respondents  in  contact  with  WOSEC' 
question.  This  is  because  one  of  the  respondents  to  the  questionnaire  was  a  WOSEC  official  and 
therefore  his  answer  to  this  question  was  not  relevant. 
273 SRC's  lobby  to  maintain  Objective  Two  funding  in  1992.  An  official  within  North 
Lanarkshire  Council  described  the  need  for  a  variation  in  approach  between 
WOSEC  and  COSLA  in  the  following  terms:  - 
"There  certainly  is  a  distinction  with  regard  to  the  interests  of  the  West  of 
Scotland  versus  COSLA.  Ours  is  primarily  urban  industrial  and  I  would  say  that 
COSLA  is  displaying  a  heavy  rural,  agricultural  orientation.  There  is  a  distinction 
there  in  the  interests  of  the  two.  There  is  also  a  difference  with  regard  to  the 
Structural  Funds  issue,  in  the  way  that  we  think  we  ought  to  be  going  about 
things.  COSLA  is  very  much  more  locked  into  playing  a  Scottish  game  and  sees 
everything  as  being  lobbying  on  a  Scottish  basis,  whereas  while  we  see  the 
value  of  that,  we  also  feel  we  share  a  lot  with  other  UK  and  European  regions" 
(Case  48). 
WOSEC  on  its  establishment  had  taken  over  SRC's  membership  of  AER  and 
RETI.  RETI  which  had  been  a  major  player  in  the  Objective  Two  lobby  (See 
Chapter  Seven),  was  once  again  organising  a  study  into  the  'impact  of  economic 
and  monetary  union  (EMU)  and  enlargement  on  industrial  regions'  with  regard  to 
the  forthcoming  renegotiation  of  the  Structural  Funds.  WOSEC  had  agreed  to 
co-finance  this  study,  however  this  decision  had  led  to  "a  running  battle,  with  let's 
say  the  members  of  the  Consortium  who  are  more  COSLA-led  than  Consortium 
led"  (Case  48).  Such  disputes  were  a  result  of  divergent  approaches  to  EU 
interest  representation  and  whether  lobbying  was  most  effectively  organised  at  a 
Scottish  or  Western  Scotland  level.  Equally,  the  lack  of  a  consensus  as  to  the 
role  of  WOSEC  in  terms  of  European  policy  vis-ä-vis  COSLA  from  the 
establishment  of  the  Consortium  and  tensions  between  authorities  in  Western 
Scotland  which  were  determined  to  establish  their  own  identity  as  councils, 
ensured  that  developing  common  strategies  within  WOSEC  was  bound  to  be  a 
fraught  process,  thus  raising  questions  about  the  organisations  effectiveness. 
Certainly  a  number  of  local  authority  European  officers  believed  that  their 
authority  had  fallen  into  WOSEC,  without  any  clear  view  of  its  function,  simply 
because  their  authority  did  not  want  to  be  left  out  of  any  emerging  structures 
post-reorganisation.  However,  the  resignation  of  Dumfries  and  Galloway  from 
WOSEC  in  1997  was  a  clear  signal  of  the  problems  which  the  Consortium  was 
experiencing  attempting  to  develop  a  role  for  itself.  These  problems  combined 
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and  the  distinctively  Scottish  approach  it  was  adopting,  for  instance  through 
withdrawal  from  the  LGIB182,  established  COSLA  as  the  main  Scottish  actor 
with  regard  to  EU  interest  representation. 
8.5.3  -  Formal  and  Informal  Interest  Representation. 
Given  the  short  existence  of  WOSEC,  little  evidence  existed  of  active  efforts  to 
develop  contacts  within  the  European  Commission  or  participate  in  sub-national 
lobbying  efforts.  For  instance,  COSLA  had  taken  the  lead  from  a  Scottish 
perspective  in  terms  of  trying  to  influence  the  outcome  of  the  1997  'Inter- 
governmental  Conference'  (IGC)  in  Amsterdam  (McAteer  et.  al.,  1998).  Equally, 
efforts  to  establish  collaborative  links  with  other  SNAs  were  also  at  a  fairly  early 
stage.  As  mentioned  above,  upon  establishment  WOSEC  became  a  member  of 
AER  and  RETI.  However,  while  WOSEC  held  positions  on  these  trans-regional 
networks  as  a  carry-over  from  SRC,  a  number  of  respondents  questioned  the 
benefit  and  cost  involved  of  participation  within  these  trans-regional  networks.  A 
common  consensus  amongst  respondents  was  that  AER  membership  would  only 
be  of  value  whilst  WOSEC  retained  an  involvement  within  Ecos-Ouverture.  The 
financial  costs  of  trans-national  network  participation  was  also  proving  to  be  a 
burden  for  a  number  of  councils,  for  instance,  with  regard  to  RETI  membership. 
One  European  officer  observed  that  her  council  would  "have  real  problems 
contributing  to  RETI  next  year"  (Case  57)  whilst  an  official  from  North 
Lanarkshire  Council  noted  that:  - 
"There  are  real  problems  with  these  organisations,  in  terms  of  the  amount  of  time 
and  the  cost  involved..  . 
lt  starts  to  get  absolutely  daft,  in  cost  terms,  it  costs  £400 
just  to  fly  to  Brussels,  and  when  you  add  in  the  hotel,  you  are  talking  about  £600 
per  person,  per  visit.  And  if  you  really  want  to  get  involved,  that's  a  real  expense" 
(Case  48). 
182  The  LGIB  refers  to  the  'Local  Government  International  Bureau',  which  represented  all  UK 
local  government  associations  within  the  EU  and  internationally.  For  instance  prior  to  1997,  the 
LGIB  provided  the  Secretariat  for  all  UK  Committee  of  the  Regions  members.  However,  COSLA 
withdrew  from  the  LGIB  at  the  start  of  1997,  resulting  in  a  situation  where  Scottish  CoR  members 
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Chapter  Seven),  the  extent  of  WOSEC's  participation  looked  likely  to  be  far  less 
extensive  as  a  result  of  the  financial  commitments  involved  and  the  relative 
difficulty  to  reach  a  consensus  amongst  the  Consortium  member  councils, 
regarding  the  benefits  of  involvement.  Equally,  WOSEC's  involvement  with 
actors  at  a  Brussels  level  was  also  significantly  reduced,  this  in  part  being  due  to 
the  absence  of  a  presence  in  Brussels  for  three  weeks  out  of  every  month  and 
the  lack  of  any  coherent  strategy  existing  as  to  the  type  of  SNAs  with  which 
WOSEC  would  wish  to  co-operate,  although  some  effort  was  being  made  to 
improve  contacts  with  Scandinavian  SNAs  (Case  49).  However,  at  the  Scottish 
level  regular  contacts  between  actors  engaged  with  European  policy  were 
commonplace.  Individual  councils  at  an  officer  and  political  level  would  be  in 
contact  with  Scottish  MEPs  and  CoR  members  on  a  fairly  regular  basis  (at  least 
once  a  month  -  Questions  11  and  13),  whilst  relations  with  the  Scottish  Office 
were  considered  to  be  'co-operative'  in  76.5%  of  cases  (Question  15). 
8.5.4  -  Summary. 
The  reorganisation  of  Scottish  local  government  had  a  significant  impact  upon 
the  structure  and  form  of  Scottish  local  government  interest  representation  vis-ä- 
vis  the  EU.  Whereas  prior  to  reorganisation  large  regional  councils  (notably, 
Strathclyde,  Highlands  and  Lothian)  tended  to  dominate  Scottish  local 
government  interest  representation  in  Europe,  the  focus  shifted  to  COSLA  as  the 
primary  actor  engaged  in  this  activity  post-April  1996.  This  shift  took  place 
despite  the  creation  of  regional  consortia  at  the  sub-Scottish  level  to  represent 
coalitions  of  unitary  authorities.  In  Western  Scotland,  the  establishment  of 
WOSEC  as  an  attempt  to  maintain  the  profile  of  the  region  following  the 
fragmentation  of  SRC,  failed  to  operate  effectively  due  to  a  number  of  difficulties. 
received  their  briefings  from  COSLA,  thus  establishing  a  virtual  Scottish  delegation  to  the  CoR. 
See  Christopoulos  and  Herbert  (1997)  for  a  more  detailed  discussion  on  this  point. 
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which  diminished  their  ability  to  co-operate,  whilst  the  process  of  obtaining 
agreement  amongst  all  thirteen  authorities  to  a  common  policy  weakened  the 
ability  of  the  West  of  Scotland  to  "come  up  with  influential  clear  cut  policies" 
(Case  48)  and  portray  the  organisation  as  an  active  SNA.  Secondly,  the  financial 
strictures  facing  the  new  councils  significantly  diminished  their  ability  to  finance 
European  policies  and  maintain  the  level  of  engagement  with  European  policies, 
programmes  and  networks  sustained  by  SRC.  As  a  consequence,  WOSEC's 
involvement  within  organisations  such  as  Ecos-Ouverture,  AER  and  RETI, 
looked  set  to  decline  in  the  forseeable  future.  Finally,  the  restructuring  of 
COSLA's  operations  and  the  extensive  resources  applied  to  the  European 
function  following  reorganisation,  ensured  that  WOSEC  was  experiencing  a 
significant  degree  of  'competition'  from  a  structure  with  a  similar  function  to 
WOSEC.  As  a  consequence,  a  number  of  authorities  in  Western  Scotland  began 
to  orientate  their  European  policy  towards  COSLA  initiatives,  as  the  organisation 
appeared  to  be  providing  a  more  effective  service  than  that  offered  by  WOSEC. 
Whilst  the  ability  of  local  government  in  Western  Scotland  to  act  as  a  significant 
actor  at  the  European  level  in  terms  of  interest  representation  virtually 
disappeared  following  reorganisation,  there  did  remain  a  close  network  of  actors 
involved  in  European  policy  at  both  the  Western  Scotland  and  Scotland-wide 
levels,  with  this  network  involving  frequent  contact  and  information  sharing 
between  local  authorities,  Strathclyde  European  Partnership,  Scottish  Office, 
MEPs  and  CoR  members.  The  shift  in  focus  of  Scottish  local  government  EU- 
interest  representation  from  the  sub-Scottish  regional  scale  to  the  Scottish  scale, 
need  not  necessarily  be  a  disadvantage  given  the  likelihood  of  EU  enlargement 
and  the  imminent  prospect  of  a  Scottish  Parliament.  Indeed  such  an 
arrangement  could  enable  Scottish  local  government  to  be  more  recognisable 
and  as  a  consequence,  more  effective  in  terms  of  interest  representation  vis-h- 
vis  the  EU. 
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Prior  to  reorganisation  a  number  of  concerns  had  been  voiced  regarding  the 
ability  of  the  unitary  authorities  to  conduct  an  effective  European  policy.  Four 
main  problems  were  identified  by  a  variety  of  actors  as  potential  problems  for  the 
operation  of  European  policy  as  a  result  of  restructuring.  These  were  firstly,  that 
the  new  councils  would  lack  the  financial  resources  to  provide  the  same  level  of 
co-finance  as  previously  provided  by  the  regional  councils.  Secondly,  that  local 
government  would  be  less  effective  at  articulating  their  interests  vis-ä-vis  the  EU. 
Thirdly,  the  disruption  caused  by  reorganisation  would  result  in  a  significant  loss 
of  personnel  experienced  in  dealing  with  the  European  function.  Finally,  that  the 
unitary  authorities  would  fail  to  make  adequate  provision  for  the  European 
function,  as  it  is  not  a  statutory  responsibility,  and  would  therefore  be  an  easy 
target  for  cutbacks  in  terms  of  the  provision  made  to  deal  with  European  policy 
by  the  new  councils.  This  chapter  assessed  the  impact  of  reorganisation  upon 
the  twelve  successor  authorities  to  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  in  terms  of 
European  policy  between  1996  to  1997,  with  regard  to  these  issues. 
In  terms  of  the  provision  made  by  SRC's  successors  to  deal  with  the  European 
function,  a  wide  variety  of  structures  were  found,  to  have  been  established  by  the 
unitary  authorities,  with  only  one  authority  having  put  no  structures  in  place  to 
deal  with  European  policy.  Broadly  two  main  approaches  were  adopted  by  the 
unitary  authorities.  Firstly  the  larger  authorities  were  found  to  have  dedicated  the 
greatest  resources  to  deal  with  European  policy,  with  the  function  either  being 
located  within  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  or  through  a  separate  European 
Unit  being  established  to  deal  with  the  function.  Such  an  approach  reflected  a 
recognition  on  the  part  of  these  councils  that  European  issues  had  policy  as  well 
as  financial  implications  for  these  authorities.  Alternatively,  the  remainder  of 
authorities  tended  to  place  the  European  function  within  an  economic 
development  or  planning  department,  reflecting  an  overriding  preoccupation  with 
obtaining  European  funding.  Overall,  the  reorganised  councils  have  attempted  to 
maintain  a  European  policy,  although  clearly  this  has  been  more  problematic  for 
278 smaller  authorities  with  less  resources  to  deal  with  strategic  issues  such  as  the 
European  function. 
The  process  of  reorganisation  certainly  caused  widespread  disruption  across 
local  government  during  the  transition  process,  and  European  policy  was  not 
immune  from  this  trend.  Whilst  there  was  a  considerable  turnover  of  staff  during 
this  period,  the  effects  of  this  disruption  were  short-term.  In  terms  of  the  ability  of 
local  government  to  provide  co-finance  for  European  funded  projects,  there  was 
considerable  evidence  that  local  authorities  were  experiencing  difficulties 
providing  co-finance  at  the  same  levels  sustained  by  local  government  pre- 
reorganisation.  In  terms  of  the  Structural  Funds,  local  authority  applications  had 
already  been  declining  prior  to  reorganisation  and  changes  to  EU  funding 
regulations  continued  to  intensify  this  trend  post-1996.  Officials  dealing  with  EU 
funding  considered  that  reorganisation  would  intensify  the  difficulties  local 
authorities  were  experiencing  to  provide  co-finance.  The  influence  of  local 
government  within  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership  (SEP)  continued  to 
diminish  post-1996,  as  other  institutions  such  as  the  LECs  increased  their  levels 
of  project  funding.  However  the  local  partners  and  the  Scottish  Office  were  able 
to  act  in  concert  to  limit  Commission  attempts  to  change  the  geographical 
coverage  of  the  SEP.  A  notable  trend  was  an  increasing  sense  of  disillusionment 
amongst  the  local  partners  with  regard  to  what  was  perceived  as  the  excessive 
demands  of  the  European  Commission  within  the  SEP.  In  broader  terms,  lack  of 
finance  was  inhibiting  the  effectiveness  of  local  authorities  with  regard  to 
European  policy.  Local  authorities  were  reluctant  to  provide  extra  finance  for 
programmes  such  as  Ecos-Ouverture  or  for  participation  within  trans-regional 
networks,  thus  reducing  the  profile  of  Western  Scotland  authorities  within 
European  structures. 
Finally,  in  terms  of  interest  representation  vis-ä-vis  the  EU,  reorganisation  had  a 
fundamental  impact  upon  the  form  this  took  in  Scotland.  Attempts  to  maintain 
SRC's  profile  via  the  establishment  of  WOSEC  were  largely  unsuccessful.  In 
279 part  this  was  due  to  a  reluctance  on  the  part  of  SRC's  successors  to  commit 
funds  to  European  policy.  However  of  equal  importance  were  tensions  between 
the  WOSEC  authorities  as  to  the  direction  in  which  European  policy  should 
develop  as  some  authorities  were  keen  to  develop  their  own  identity. 
Reorganisation  enabled  resentment  between  localities  in  the  West  of  Scotland  to 
come  to  the  surface,  and  certainly  within  WOSEC  there  was  a  desire  to  minimise 
the  influence  of  Glasgow  City  Council.  As  Sutcliffe  (1997)  notes  ;  - 
"In  Strathclyde..  a  frequent  point  of  contention  was  the  extent  to  which  Glasgow's 
interests  dominated  over  those  of  outlying  areas.  Reorganisation,  however, 
institutionalises  such  conflicts  of  interest"  (Sutcliffe,  1997,  p.  59). 
Certainly  the  need  to  reach  agreement  between  thirteen  authorities  within 
WOSEC  reduced  the  effectiveness  of  Western  Scotland  interest  representation 
vis-ä-vis  the  EU.  Additionally,  the  significant  enhancement  of  COSLA's 
European  function  shortly  prior  to  reorganisation,  provided  a  competitor  to 
WOSEC  in  terms  of  articulating  Scottish  local  government  interests  to  the  EU, 
and  certainly  a  number  of  Western  Scotland  authorities  considered  COSLA  to  be 
more  effective  and  relevant  to  their  interests  than  WOSEC.  Whether  COSLA  will 
be  able  to  overcome  the  differences  of  interest  between  Scottish  local  authorities 
in  terms  of  European  policy,  such  as  between  rural  and  industrial  authorities, 
remains  to  be  seen  but  certainly  by  1997  COSLA  had  become  the  principal 
vehicle  for  articulating  Scottish  local  government  (including  Western  Scotland 
authorities)  interests  vis-ä-vis  the  EU. 
A  number  of  respondents  noted  that  reorganisation  had  resulted  in  some  positive 
benefits,  notably  through  broadening  the  base  of  knowledge,  in  terms  of  the 
number  of  individuals  dealing  with  European  policy,  and  enabling  European 
policy  and  in  particular,  funding  applications  to  be  brought  closer  to  the  needs  of 
local  communities.  Alternatively,  the  ability  for  strategic  decision-making  to  take 
place  in  the  West  of  Scotland,  and  for  concerted  campaigns  of  interest 
representation  vis-ä-vis  the  EU  to  be  conducted,  was  considerably  diminished. 
280 The  new  unitary  authorities  have  attempted  to  develop  European  policies,  insofar 
as  their  financial  resources  and  strategic  size  will  allow.  It  is  difficult  to  envisage 
the  new  authorities  being  more  effective  in  terms  of  European  interest 
representation  than  their  predecessors,  whilst  the  early  indications  are  that  the 
new  councils  are  experiencing  difficulty  providing  co-finance  at  the  levels 
sustained  pre-reform.  However,  reorganisation  had  an  unintended  consequence 
in  reinforcing  the  Scottish  level  of  interest  representation  vis-ä-vis  the  EU, 
although  the  extent  to  which  COSLA  will  be  able  to  present  a  coherent  lobbying 
strategy  to  European  Institutions,  in  the  manner  which  SRC  achieved,  remains  a 
moot  point.  Therefore,  the  overall  impact  of  reorganisation  has  been  to  diminish 
the  effectiveness  of  Western  Scotland  local  authorities  (and  Scottish  local 
authorities  more  generally)  to  operate  within  multi-level  governance  institutions 
and  structures.  However,  one  option  for  Scottish  local  government,  and  more 
specifically  COSLA,  maybe  to  ride  on  the  profile  and  'coat-tails'  of  a  Scottish 
Parliament,  through  its  proposed  European  structures,  in  order  to  engage  more 
fully  with  the  EU.  However,  this  is  an  issue  that  is  considered  more  fully  in 
Chapter  Nine. 
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9.1  -  Introduction. 
As  stated  at  the  outset,  the  research  has  had  two  inter-related  objectives.  These 
were  firstly,  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  local  government  in  the  West  of 
Scotland  has  undergone  a  process  of  Europeanisation,  post-1975.  Secondly, 
where  local  government  in  Strathclyde  entered  into  institutional  arrangements 
with  European  Institutions,  these  were  analysed  through  the  lens  of  'multi-level 
governance'  (Marks,  1993).  In  contrast  to  many  studies  in  this  area,  the  research 
adopted  a  longitudinal  approach  to  these  processes,  in  order  to  ascertain 
whether,  and  if  so  in  what  manner,  the  twin  processes  of  Europeanisation  and 
multi-level  governance  had  changed  over  time  and  the  impact  of  these  changes 
upon  the  role  of  European  policy  within  local  government  in  the  West  of  Scotland. 
In  order  to  achieve  these  objectives,  the  research  relied  not  only  upon 
institutional  evidence  of  these  processes,  such  as  the  creation  of  new  institutions 
or  structures,  but  also  upon  the  perceptions  of  the  actors  involved  as  to  changes 
which  were  occurring  and  the  reasons  for  these.  This  is  not  to  imply,  that  the 
perceptions  of  respondents  were  an  accurate  reflection  of  'reality',  merely  that 
the  responses  they  provided  enabled  a  picture  to  emerge  as  to  the  form 
Europeanisation  and  multi-level  governance  were  taking  in  Western  Scotland,  as 
perceived  by  these  individuals.  To  some  extent,  these  perceptions  may  result  in 
policy  outcomes,  although  institutional  evidence  of  such  a  process  was  always 
sought  where  possible1  83.  In  relation  to  this  point,  the  study  also  adopted  an 
explicitly  'bottom-up'  approach  to  the  analysis  of  these  two  processes,  through 
focusing  upon  the  impact  of  European  policy  upon  local  government  in  the  West 
of  Scotland.  It  could  be  legitimately  argued  that  a  `top-down  approach',  such  as 
focusing  upon  policy  development  within  the  European  Commission,  could 
provide  an  alternative  depiction  of  events.  However,  the  pre-occupation  of  the 
study  has  been  with  institutional  developments  and  the  perceptions  of  actors 
183  See  Chapter  Three,  for  a  fuller  discussion  on  this  point. 
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approach  would  clearly  not  be  able  to  engage  with  these  issues  and  actors  to  the 
same  extent  as  the  bottom-up  approach  which  has  been  adopted  within  this 
thesis. 
Whilst  the  framework  of  analysis  for  the  research  was  provided  by  the  models  of 
Europeanisation  and  multi-level  governance,  more  specific  terms  of  reference 
were  established  in  Chapter  Three.  These  were  that  the  study  would  have  four 
main  lines  of  inquiry. 
"  Firstly,  to  analyse  the  impact  of  Europeanisation  upon  local  government  in 
West  Central  Scotland,  in  terms  of  the  response  of  Strathclyde  Regional 
Council  to  European  policy  initiatives,  and  the  rationale  underlying  the 
evolution  of  SRC's  policies.  To  relate  the  development  of  SRC's  European 
policy  to  the  wider  literature  upon  Europeanisation  and  local  government,  as 
outlined  in  Chapter  Two.  Following  reorganisation  of  local  government  in 
1996,  the  extent  of  Europeanisation  would  be  evaluated  through  analysis  of 
the  policies  put  in  place  by  SRC's  twelve  successor  authorities. 
9  Secondly,  where  institutional  developments  occurred  in  Western  Scotland  as 
a  response  to  European  policy  developments,  these  institutions  would  be 
evaluated  utilising  the  model  of  multi-level  governance. 
"  Thirdly,  whether  the  institutions  developed  in  Western  Scotland  differed  from 
either  those  in  the  rest  of  Scotland  or  the  UK. 
"  Lastly,  the  experience  of  SRC  (and  its  successor  authorities)  in  terms  of 
mobilisation  into  European  policy-making  arenas  would  be  assessed  through 
attempting  to  ascertain  the  extent  to  which  SRC  engaged  with  formal 
networks  such  as,  trans-national  networks,  and  developed  informal  networks 
(for  instance,  through  a  Brussels  office  or  territorial  networks)  as  means  with 
which  to  influence  EU  Institutions  and  accordingly  policy-making. 
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The  early  recognition  by  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  of  a  European  dimension 
to  its  activities,  sets  the  authority  apart  from  the  vast  majority  of  UK  local 
government  (with  the  exception  of  Birmingham  City  Council),  and  had  a 
significant  influence  upon  the  policy  environment  which  developed  in  Scotland 
with  regard  to  European  issues  as  compared  to  the  rest  of  the  UK.  Whilst  UK 
local  government  (and  European  SNA's  in  general)  did  not  attempt  to  obtain 
direct  channels  of  communication  with  European  Institutions  until  after  the 
signing  of  the  Single  European  Act  (1986),  SRC  was  distinct  for  having 
successfully  engaged  in  direct  negotiations  with  the  European  Commission  prior 
to  this  period.  The  emergence  of  a  European  policy  from  SRC  became  evident 
through  the  establishment  of  a  representative  office  in  Brussels  in  1984  and  the 
negotiation  of  the  `National  Programme  of  Community  Interest'  in  1985  between 
the  European  Commission,  Scottish  Office  and  SRC,  in  which  the  authority  had  a 
prominent  role.  The  impetus  behind  the  Europeanisation  of  SRC  lay  in  the  need 
to  obtain  finance  with  which  to  fund  the  Council's  'economic  and  social  strategies' 
at  a  time  when  central  government  had  rejected  the  interventionist  philosophy 
underpinning  these  documents  and  furthermore  was  attempting  to  reduce  local 
government  expenditure. 
The  identification  of  EEC  finance  as  a  means  of  disengaging  the  council  from  the 
ideologically  and  fiscally  hostile  policy  environment  of  UK  central  government 
became  apparent  as  early  as  1980,  through  the  creation  of  a  European  Unit 
centrally  located  within  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  of  SRC.  This  unit 
provided  a  co-ordinating  point  for  all  SRC  funding  applications  and  a  centre  for 
information  on  European  policy  developments.  The  European  Unit  was  thus  able 
to  participate  fully  during  the  negotiations  surrounding  the  NPCI  to  the  extent  that 
SRC  was  at  the  very  least  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  Scottish  Office  during  this 
process,  and  more  generally,  across  a  wide  range  of  European  issues  during  the 
early  1980's.  The  establishment  of  a  representative  office  in  Brussels  was  in  part 
symbolic  as  it  provided  recognition  of  the  importance  of  European  policy  to  SRC, 
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within  the  European  Commission.  The  practical  role  of  the  office  was  to 
maximise  SRC's  access  to  European  funding  through  improving  information 
flows  back  to  Glasgow  of  funding  possibilities,  whilst  also  enabling  day-to-day 
contact  between  SRC's  representative  and  Commission  officials.  In  addition,  the 
European  officer  was  also  able  to  pursue  SRC's  case  for  an  integrated  ERDF 
and  ESF  funding  package,  which  ultimately  resulted  in  NPCI. 
The  strategy  of  accessing  European  funds  in  order  to,  at  least  in  part,  finance 
SRC's  economic  and  social  strategies  achieved  notable  successes  such  as  the 
'Employment  Grant  Scheme'  in  the  early  1980s.  As  a  consequence,  SRC 
pursued  the  objective  of  an  integrated  European  funding  package  for  Western 
Scotland.  The  central  role  of  SRC  within  the  negotiations  for  the  NPCI  and 
subsequent  partnership  arrangements  in  Strathclyde  had  a  determining  effect 
upon  the  structure  of  `partnership'  in  Scotland  (See  Section  9.3).  Prior  to  1986, 
the  motivation  for  SRC's  engagement  with  European  issues  was  primarily 
financial.  However  the  experience  SRC  developed  within  this  policy  field  and 
correspondingly,  the  contacts  established  and  profile  of  SRC  within  the 
Commission  enabled  SRC  to  become  a  significant  sub-national  actor  amongst 
European  SNAs  post-1986.  SRC  benefited  from  the  lack  of  competition  from 
other  SNAs  in  Brussels  and  the  relative  novelty  of  SNA  mobilisation  enabled 
SRC  to  have  extensive  access  to  the  traditionally  'open'  Commission 
bureaucracy. 
The  structure  which  SRC  adopted  to  deal  with  European  policy  remained  largely 
unchanged  post-1986.  However  as  the  objectives  of  SRC's  policy  expanded  to 
include  an  increasing  lobbying  and  advocacy  role  for  the  council  (for  example 
through  participation  within  trans-regional  networks)  so  the  workload  of  the 
European  Unit  and  Brussels  office  shifted  accordingly.  The  change  in  emphasis 
of  SRC's  European  policy  towards  a  broader  spectrum  of  policy  issues  reflected 
the  increasing  policy  impact  of  European  legislation  and  the  corresponding 
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removal  of  the  vast  majority  of  EU  funding  as  a  Brussels-based  policy  issue, 
following  the  creation  of  the  'Integrated  Development  Operation'  in  1988,  further 
reduced  the  need  for  SRC  to  engage  in  regular  contact  with  the  European 
Commission  in  relation  to  funding. 
Whilst  the  European  Unit  within  the  Chief  Executive's  Department  remained  the 
co-ordinating  point  for  all  the  Regional  Council's  applications  for  funding, 
advocacy  functions  and  generally  as  a  source  of  information  on  European  policy, 
the  impact  of  Single  European  Market  (SEM)  legislation  did  serve  to  widen  the 
scope  of  Europeanisation  within  SRC  as  the  majority  of  the  councils  departments 
were,  to  varying  degrees,  affected  by  SEM  legislation.  Post-1992,  a  number  of 
SRC  departments  became  involved  within  trans-regional  networks  which  dealt 
with  policy  areas  of  direct  relevance  to  individual  departments. 
The  rapid  mobilisation  of  SNAs  onto  the  supra-national  arena,  notably  through 
the  establishment  of  representative  offices,  in  order  to  attempt  to  gain  access  to 
the  European  decision-making  process  also  impacted  upon  the  form  of  SRC's 
Brussels-based  operation  and  the  supporting  role  fulfilled  by  the  European  Unit  in 
Glasgow.  Direct  contact  between  SRC  representatives  and  Commission  officials 
became  increasingly  difficult  given  the  number  of  SNAs  desiring  access,  resulting 
in  increased  SRC  participation  with  trans-regional  networks,  with  the  authority 
taking  a  particularly  prominent  role  within  'peak'  or'generalist'  networks  such  as 
AER  and  RETI.  In  addition,  the  Brussels  representative  increasingly  had  to  liaise 
with  MEPs  as  the  European  Parliament  increased  in  importance,  and  latterly  with 
the  CoR  within  which  two  SRC  Councillors  were  members.  The  increasing  need 
to  form  alliances  and  build  coalitions  in  order  to  have  any  chance  of  successfully 
influencing  EU  policy  was  recognised  by  SRC,  not  only  through  trans-regional 
network  participation,  but  also  through  joining  the  Scotland  Europa  centre  in 
1993/4,  in  order  to  lend  a  Scottish  dimension  to  the  council's  activities.  This 
marked  a  significant  shift  in  policy,  as  SRC  had  previously  had  little  involvement 
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portray  itself  as  the  SNA  which  represented  the  majority  of  Scotland  and 
therefore,  by  extension,  was  Scotland.  Increasing  competition  from  other  SNAs 
and  the  changing  environment  of  SNA  lobbying  in  Brussels  required  that  SRC 
not  only  co-operate  with  other  European  SNAs  but  also  organise  territorially  in 
order  to  conduct  an  effective  European  policy. 
Strathclyde  Regional  Council  as  one  of  the  largest  SNAs  in  Europe,  and  for  most 
of  the  period  of  this  study,  the  largest  SNA  in  the  UK  (following  the  abolition  of 
the  Greater  London  Council),  could  be  expected  to  have  experienced  a 
significant  degree  of  Europeanisation  given  the  range  of  functions  under  the 
authorities  control  which  would  be  subject  to  European  legislation.  However  the 
early  engagement  of  SRC  in  terms  of  European  policy,  and  the  subsequent 
extensive  involvement  of  the  authority  within  European  structures  and  policy 
initiatives  was  not  merely  a  direct  consequence  of  the  size,  extent  of  policy 
competences  and  accordingly  budget  of  the  authority.  The  early  engagement  of 
SRC  with  European  Institutions  was  as  much  a  result  of  policy  decision  by  a  'joint 
elite'  of  senior  councillors  and  officials  to  initially,  attempt  to  obtain  European 
funding  in  order  to  finance  the  Council's  'economic  and  social  strategies'  and 
subsequently,  expand  this  involvement  as  SRC  obtained  benefits  from  the  initial 
approaches.  This  'joint  elite'  remained  fairly  constant  in  terms  of  its  membership 
as  SRC's  policy  developed,  although  it  did  expand  latterly  to  include  officials  from 
Strathclyde  European  Partnership,  Ecos-Ouverture  and  West  of  Scotland  MEP's. 
The  existence  of  this  'joint  elite'  did  arouse  jealousies  within  SRC  notably  leading 
to  significant  power  struggles  within  the  ruling  Labour  administration. 
Nevertheless  the  cohesive  nature  of  this  joint-elite  enabled  SRC  to  develop 
distinctive  European  policies  and  to  lobby  effectively  for  the  perceived  `regional 
interest'  when  the  situation  arose. 
The  ability  to  co-ordinate  a  European  policy  between  the  twelve  successor 
authorities  to  SRC  proved  problematic  following  reorganisation.  The 
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umbrella  organisation  intended  to  maintain  the  West  of  Scotland's  profile  within 
the  EU  experienced  a  number  of  difficulties  which  SRC  was  not  subject  to. 
Firstly,  the  creation  of  twelve  authorities  in  the  West  of  Scotland  opened 
institutional  jealousies  between  councils  as  some  councils  were  keen  to  develop 
their  own  version  of  European  policy,  whilst  all  intended  to  avoid  Glasgow  City 
Council  dominating  the  Consortium.  Secondly,  the  tight  fiscal  regime  facing 
many  councils  following  reorganisation  ensured  that  many  councils  were  not 
keen  to  expand  their  commitments  in  terms  of  European  policy,  whilst  a 
reappraisal  of  the  benefits  of  existing  approaches  was  underway.  Finally,  the 
emergence  of  COSLA  as  the  main  Scottish  local  government  actor  in  terms  of 
European  policy,  led  to  a  split  between  the  WOSEC  authorities  as  to  whether  a 
separate  West  of  Scotland  approach  to  European  Institutions  was  necessary. 
The  reorganisation  of  local  government  in  April  1996,  enabled  an  assessment  to 
be  made  of  the  extent  to  which  Europeanisation  had  occurred  within  Scottish 
local  government.  The  successor  authorities  to  SRC  adopted  a  wide  range  of 
institutional  structures  with  which  to  address  the  European  function.  In  broad 
terms,  the  new  councils  could  be  divided  into  two  categories.  Firstly,  councils 
that  viewed  the  EU  as  having  a  role  purely  in  terms  of  funding  and  secondly, 
authorities  which  in  addition  to  funding  were  putting  in  place  processes  with 
which  to  keep  abreast  of  EU  policy  developments  either  through  WOSEC  and  / 
or  COSLA.  A  number  of  authorities,  in  response  to  previous  practice  within  SRC, 
were  keen  to  integrate  European  policy  across  the  policy  portfolio  of  a  council  in 
order  to  deepen  experience  of  European  policy,  and  avoid  a  centralisation  of 
policy  as  occurred  within  SRC.  Whilst  the  most  active  unitary  authorities  tended 
to  be  the  largest,  the  importance  of  European  finance  was  central  to  all 
authorities,  whilst  mechanisms  with  which  to  stay  aware  of  EU  policy 
developments  were  co-ordinated  through  WOSEC  and  COSLA184.  Clearly,  the 
184  The  ability  of  Western  Scotland  local  government  to  articulate  a  response  to  EU  policy 
developments  or  to  pre-empt  them,  will  be  discussed  later  in  this  chapter. 
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dependent  upon  the  financial  resources  and  strategic  size  of  the  authorities. 
However,  the  relatively  `small'  size  of  all  Scottish  councils  following 
disaggregation  tends  to  suggest  that  Scottish  local  government  had  experienced 
a  significant  degree  of  Europeanisation  which  was  being  maintained,  as  far  as 
possible  after  reorganisation,  with  co-operation  between  authorities  on  a  pan- 
Scottish  basis  likely  to  offer  the  most  effective  approach  in  terms  of  both  policy 
and  finance  within  the  new  structure  of  local  government.  The  ability  of  Scottish 
local  government  to  cope  with  reorganisation  into  significantly  smaller  units  and 
still  maintain  the  European  function,  albeit  in  a  reduced  form,  clearly  indicates 
that  Europeanisation  had  become  embedded  within  the  policy  portfolio  of  the 
Scottish  local  government. 
9.3.1  Multi-Level  Governance  in  Western  Scotland. 
Multi-level  governance  refers  to  a  "system  of  continuous  negotiation  among 
nested  governments  at  several  territorial  tiers  -  supranational,  national,  regional, 
and  local  -  as  the  result  of  a  broad  process  of  institutional  creation  and  decisional 
reallocation  that  has  pulled  some  previously  centralised  functions  of  the  state  up 
to  the  supra-national  level  and  some  down  to  the  local  I  regional  level"  (Marks, 
1993,  p.  392).  Western  Scotland  provided  two  examples  of  'decisional 
reallocation'  and  'institutional  creation'  within  the  framework  of  multi-level 
governance.  These  were  the  Strathclyde  European  Partnership  (SEP)185  and 
(Ecos-)Ouverture.  Both  institutions  were  a  product  of  SRC's  extensive 
involvement  with  European  policy,  in  the  case  of  SEP  through  SRC's  extensive 
lobbying  for  a  region-wide  partnership  from  the  early  1980's,  whilst  Ecos- 
Ouverture  developed  from  SRC  contacts  within  DGXVI  and  the  prominent  role  of 
SRC  within  AER.  The  Strathclyde  European  Partnership  was  established  to 
administer  the  distribution  of  European  funding  within  Western  Scotland,  with  the 
principal  partners  within  the  SEP  being  the  European  Commission,  Scottish 
185  The  term  'Strathclyde  European  Partnership'  will  be  used  in  this  chapter  to  refer  to  all  the 
'partnership'  arrangements  which  existed  within  Western  Scotland  between  1985  and  1997. 
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the  LEC  network  became  prominent  actors  within  the  partnership.  Ecos- 
Ouverture  was  an  Article  10  project  involving  collaboration  between  a  range  of 
SNA's  from  across  the  EU  along  with  the  European  Commission.  The 
programme  represents  an  interesting  example  of  multi-level  governance  as  there 
was  no  member-state  involvement  within  the  programme.  It  is  to  the  form  that 
multi-level  governance  took  within  these  two  institutions  and  in  particular,  the 
changing  nature  of  multi-level  governance  over  time  within  these  institutions  that 
I  now  intend  to  turn. 
9.3.2  -  Multi-Level  Governance  and  Partnership  in  Western  Scotland. 
Partnership  in  Western  Scotland  originated  in  1985  through  the  designation  of  a 
`National  Programme  of  Community  Interest'  (NPCI)  for  the  City  of  Glasgow,  far 
in  advance  of  most  European  regions  where  partnership  typically  began  in 
1989/90  following  the  Reform  of  the  Structural  Funds  in  December  1988. 
Accordingly  Western  Scotland  offers  a  considerable  amount  of  evidence  with 
which  to  assess  the  development  of  multi-level  governance  and  of  the  nature  of 
the  partnership  process  with  regard  to  the  Structural  Funds.  The  early 
development  of  partnership  in  Western  Scotland  occurred  as  a  result  of 
persistent  lobbying  by  SRC  of  the  European  Commission,  with  regard  to  the 
need  for  an  integrated  approach  to  the  implementation  of  European  funding.  The 
NPCI  provided  a  fixed  amount  of  ERDF  finance  over  a  three  year  period,  with  the 
initiative  being  expanded  in  1988  (into  the  `Integrated  Development  Operation')  to 
include  the  vast  majority  of  SRC's  territory  and  combine  ERDF  and  ESF  funding. 
These  early  attempts  at  partnership  were  notable  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  the 
extent  to  which  all  the  organisations  involved  (principally,  SRC,  the  Scottish 
Office  and,  the  European  Commission)  were  engaged  in  a  process  of  policy 
learning,  and  secondly  the  extensive  involvement  of  SRC  in  establishing  the 
structures  and  functions  of  these  early  partnerships,  in  contrast  to  the  top-down 
bargain  between  member-state  and  European  Commission  envisaged  by  Marks 
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IDO,  as  an  equal  partner  alongside  the  European  Commission  and  Scottish 
Office,  was  in  part  due  to  SRC's  early  development  of  a  European  policy  whilst 
the  Scottish  Office  was  relatively  late  in  recognising  the  potential  of  European 
funding.  Accordingly,  SRC  was  able  to  benefit  from  this  involvement  through 
shaping  the  structure  of  the  partnership  and  ensuring  that  SRC  would  benefit 
considerably  in  terms  of  the  funding  objectives  of  the  partnership.  Nevertheless, 
even  at  this  early  stage  in  the  development  of  partnership  in  Western  Scotland, 
the  Scottish  Office  ensured  that  it  would  chair  all  the  committees  within  the  NPCI 
and  IDO  in  a  manner  which  closely  resembles  Anderson's  depiction  of  the  role  of 
central  government  as  a  'gatekeeper'  which  "mediate(s)  between  their  respective 
domestic  political  systems  and  EC  institutions"  (Anderson,  1990,  p.  417). 
However  SRC's  influence  within  the  partnerships  arrangements  in  Western 
Scotland  began  to  diminish  post  1988,  a  process  which  became  apparent  in  the 
West  of  Scotland  Operational  Programme  (1993)  and  the  Strathclyde  European 
Partnership  (1994-96).  This  decline  in  influence  was  a  consequence  of  a  number 
of  factors.  Firstly,  the  formalisation  of  programming  and  partnership 
arrangements  through  the  Reform  of  the  Structural  Funds  in  1988  ensured  that 
SRC  would  be  unable  to  negotiate  a  funding  package  as  lucrative  as  the  IDO, 
given  the  competition  for  funding  between  EU  regions.  Secondly,  the  Scottish 
Office  became  a  more  dominant  actor  within  funding  negotiations  through 
significantly  increasing  the  staffing  and  resources  to  deal  with  the  Structural 
Funds.  In  addition,  the  1988  Reform  of  the  Structural  Funds  resulted  in  the 
Scottish  Office  being  legally  designated  as  the  'implementing  authority'  for  the 
programme,  responsible  for  monitoring  the  finances  of  the  SEP.  In  this  sense, 
the  increasing  formalisation  of  Structural  Fund  regulations  diminished  the  ability 
of  SRC  to  innovate  with  partnership  arrangements,  given  that  the  initial  model 
developed  in  Strathclyde  became  commonplace  within  Scotland,  and  across  the 
EU  in  various  guises,  resulting  in  less  scope  for  policy  innovation.  Thirdly  the 
increase  in  the  number  of  partners  within  SEP,  in  line  with  Commission  policy, 
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of  overall  funding  fell.  Fourthly,  the  shift  in  Commission  policy  away  from 
'hardware'  infrastructure  schemes,  from  which  SRC  traditionally  benefited  as  the 
principal  provider  of  infrastructure  within  the  Region,  towards  'software'  schemes 
resulted  again  in  SRC's  share  of  funding  diminishing.  Finally  the  inclusion  of  new 
local  actors  within  the  SEP,  in  particular  the  LECs,  reduced  SRC's  claim  to  be 
the  principal  source  of  local  knowledge  with  regard  to  economic  development  in 
Strathclyde  thus  reducing  SRC  role  in  the  negotiations  of  the  Single 
Programming  Document  (SPD)  in  1993  and  1994.  These  trends  continued 
following  reorganisation,  thus  reducing  the  share  of  funding  liable  to  be  available 
to  local  government,  whilst  the  tight  fiscal  environment  which  local  government 
operated  within  the  period  after  reorganisation,  appears  to  have  reduced  the 
ability  of  the  unitary  authorities  to  provide  match  funding  for  the  Structural  Funds. 
The  experience  of  partnership  in  Western  Scotland  is  unusual  insofar  as  the 
region  provided  a  test-bed  for  early  formulations  of  the  concept  prior  to  its  formal 
introduction  in  the  1988  Reforms.  As  a  result,  Western  Scotland  provides  a 
longer  time-period  with  which  to  assess  multi-level  governance  as  experienced 
within  the  Structural  Funds.  Marks  (1993)  cites  the  example  of  partnership  as 
one  of  the  principal  examples  of  what  he  terms  multi-level  governance,  which  he 
envisages  as  a  new  political  space  incorporating  tiers  of  government  and 
governance  within  new  institutional  arrangements,  as  the  boundaries  of  the 
nation-state  are  eroded  from  above  and  below.  The  practice  of  partnership  in 
Western  Scotland  provides  evidence  which  both  supports  and  refutes  this 
proposition. 
The  origins  of  partnership  in  the  region  were  twofold,  firstly  the  paradiplomatic 
activities  of  SRC  in  the  early  1980s,  through  lobbying  the  Commission,  for  an 
integrated  package  of  funding  over  an  agreed  time-scale  allied  to  secondly, 
Commission  desires  to  experiment  with  funding  arrangements  resulted  in  the 
NPCI  and  IDO.  The  complex  procedures  developed  to  implement  the  Structural 
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within  the  decision  making  structure  of  the  programme,  for  example  through 
establishing  the  objectives  of  the  programme.  However,  central  government  was 
not  passive  throughout  this  process,  instead  adopting  a  'gatekeeping  role'  which 
enabled  it  to  monitor  developments  within  the  SEP  and  potentially  veto  policy 
developments  contrary  to  Scottish  Office  interests.  To  imply  that  partnership 
represents  an  erosion  of  central  government  powers  is  to  overstate  the  case, 
rather  the  form  that  partnership  takes  within  a  region  depends  greatly  upon  the 
extent  to  which  central  government  is  prepared  to  cede  powers  to  the  partnership 
and  by  extension,  local  actors. 
The  development  of  partnership  in  Western  Scotland  derives  firstly  from  the 
proactive  stance  of  SRC  upon  the  issue,  but  once  established  the  Scottish  Office 
was  prepared  to  advance  the  policy  both  within  Strathclyde  and  across  Scotland, 
as  long  as  the  department  remained  in  a  central  position  to  oversee  the  process 
within  the  partnership  committee  structure'86.  In  addition,  the  partnership  model 
is  not  fixed  once  it  has  been  established,  rather  the  whole  partnership  process  is 
fluid  with  relations  between  institutions  changing  over  time.  The  extent  of  this 
fluidity  was  apparent  in  the  constant  institutional  adjustments  to  SEP  and  the 
reduction  in  influence  of  SRC  within  SEP  as  the  partnership  evolved,  often  as  a 
direct  result  of  Commission  policy  priorities.  Therefore  multi-level  governance  as 
experienced  through  partnership  in  Western  Scotland  is  not  merely  an  example 
of  a  policy  arena  where  power  has  eroded  away  from  the  nation-state  to  the 
European  Commission  and  sub-national  institutions.  Instead,  partnership 
arrangements  in  Strathclyde  illustrate  that  the  nation-state  remains  central  to  the 
process,  in  terms  of  determining  the  degree  of  autonomy  delegated  to  the  sub- 
national  level.  Similarly  Commission  policy  decisions  do  not  necessarily 
empower  SNAs  within  this  process.  The  influence  of  SNAs  within  partnership 
arrangements  is  dependent  upon  the  resources  that  they  can  bring  to  the 
186  The  distinctive  Scottish  dimension  to  the  implementation  of  partnership  will  be  discussed  in 
Section  9.4. 
293 process,  in  terms  of  their  policy  competences  and  as  a  source  of  information  with 
regard  to  the  sub-national  socio-economic  policy  environment.  Nevertheless  the 
partnership  process  developed  in  Western  Scotland  confirms  Marks  central 
proposition,  that  such  institutions  represent  a  new  institutional  'space'  where 
institutions  from  across  a  range  of  tiers  of  governance  compete  and  collaborate 
within  a  policy  field  thus  bringing  European  Institutions  into  contact  with  a  range 
of  actors  not  present  within  neofunctionalist  and  intergovernmentalist 
conceptions  of  EU  policy  making  and  implementation. 
9.3.3  -  Multi-Level  Governance  and  Ecos-Ouverture. 
Ecos-Ouverture  represents  an  unusual  example  of  multi-level  governance  as 
there  was  no  member-state  involvement  within  the  programme  as  a 
consequence  of  the  programme  being  an  Article  10  funded  project.  The 
programme  developed  out  of  initial  discussions  between  SRC  and  DGXVI 
officials  at  an  AER  conference  in  1990,  over  the  need  to  foster  inter-regional 
cooperation  between  EU  and  Eastern  European  SNA's.  In  contrast  to  SEP, 
Ecos-Ouverture  did  represent  a  top-down  process  of  multi-level  governance  as 
Commission  officials  had  a  clear  vision  of  the  role  of  Ecos-Ouverture  (as  it  would 
become)  when  approaching  SRC  officials  with  the  proposal.  In  this  sense  SRC 
was  approached  as  representing  a  suitable  vehicle  for  the  delivery  of  the 
programme.  However,  whilst  the  Commission  had  a  clear  view  of  the  role  of 
Ecos-Ouverture,  the  actual  format  of  the  programme's  implementation  was 
initially  devolved  down  to  SRC,  which  developed  the  organisational  structure  of 
the  project  and  selected  partner  regions  within  this  framework.  The  extent  of 
control  decentralised  to  SRC,  which  operated  the  headquarters  for  the 
programme,  was  reflected  in  early  Ouverture  publications  which  claimed  that  the 
project  was  not  just  about  inter-regional  cooperation  but  also  an  attempt  to 
operationalise  the  `concept'  of  a  Europe  of  the  Regions. 
Despite  the  visions  surrounding  the  early  development  of  the  programme 
between  1990  and  1994,  the  direction  that  Ecos-Ouverture  took  during  this 
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reinforcing  the  importance  of  the  resources  which  institutions  bring  to  multi-level 
governance  scenarios.  Thus  the  expansion  of  the  programme  into  Albania, 
Romania,  the  Baltic  States,  and  the  CIS  during  these  four  years  were  all 
instigated  by  the  Commission  which  increasingly  bore  a  larger  proportion  of 
Ouverture's  overall  budget.  The  extent  to  which  DGXVI  was  directing  the 
development  of  Ouverture  became  apparent  during  1994,  when  DGXVI  informed 
Ouverture  that  a  renewal  of  the  Article  10  contract  for  the  period  1995  to  1999, 
was  conditional  upon  Ouverture  merging  with  a  similar  Article  10  scheme,  ECOS, 
which  dealt  with  co-operation  at  the  urban  scale  between  EU  and  Eastern 
European  municipalities. 
Merger  negotiations  proved  to  be  a  lengthy  and  acrimonious  process,  as  both 
organisations  attempted  to  win  overall  control  of  the  new  programme,  via 
lobbying  through  institutional  contacts  and  the  trans-national  networks  associated 
with  the  two  sides,  AER  and  CEMR187.  The  distrust  between  these  two 
organisations  ultimately  led  to  DGXVI  disillusionment  with  the  management  of 
the  negotiated  Ecos-Ouverture  outcome  by  the  SNAs  involved.  Multi-level 
governance  tends  to  assume  a  consensual  approach  to  policy  and  politics  with 
conflict  where  present  tending  to  be  most  common  between  tiers  of  governance. 
However  the  conflict  between  Ecos-Ouverture  clearly  illustrated  the  potential  for 
conflict  between  SNAs  and  the  potential  this  has  to  destabilise  multi-level 
governance  institutions.  In  addition  to  SNA  conflict  within  Ecos-Ouverture, 
DGXVI  was  also  coming  under  pressure  from  other  European  Institutions  to 
reform  the  operation  of  Article  10  programmes. 
Between  1994  and  1996,  DGXVI  had  received  serious  criticism  from  firstly  DGXX 
(Financial  Control)  with  regard  to  the  potential  for  financial  abuse  within  Article  10 
projects,  whilst  the  Court  of  Auditors  produced  a  report  making  similar  claims 
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Ouverture  was  not  a  part).  In  addition  the  Court  of  Auditors  had  questioned  the 
legality  of  the  process  in  which  powers  had  been  delegated  to  Article  10  projects. 
As  a  consequence,  DGXVI  had  begun  to  centralise  functions  with  regard  to  what 
were  now  termed  'technical  assistance  operations'.  Finally,  as  Ecos-Ouverture 
had  expanded  financially  and  geographically,  DGI  (External  Affairs)  had  become 
an  increasingly  significant  provider  of  finance  through  the  PHARE  and  TACIS'88 
programme,  and  accordingly  desired  a  greater  input  into  the  objectives  of  Ecos- 
Ouverture.  In  particular  DGI  was  keen  to  promote  a  shift  away  from  larger  scale 
projects,  as  favoured  by  DGXVI,  to  a  smaller  focus  for  Ecos-Ouverture.  The 
combination  of  these  pressures  upon  DGXVI  resulted  in  Ecos-Ouverture  being 
put  out  to  tender  in  1997,  with  the  programme  being  split  up  into  three 
components.  Accounts  of  multi-level  governance  tended  to  focus  upon  DGXVI 
as  the  principal  provider  of  the  Structural  Funds,  however  the  development  of 
Ecos-Ouverture  clearly  signals  the  importance  of  considering  not  only  the 
potential  for  policy  shifts  as  a  result  of  the  Commission's  pillarised  bureaucracy, 
but  also  of  the  influence  of  other  EU  Institutions  such  as,  the  European 
Parliament  and  Court  of  Auditors. 
Following  Scottish  local  government  reorganisation,  the  continued  involvement  of 
SRC's  successor  authorities  under  the  umbrella  of  the  West  of  Scotland 
European  Consortium  (WOSEC),  regardless  of  the  tender  outcome,  also  became 
questionable  as  a  result  of  the  new  institutional  structure.  As  part  of  the  general 
reassessment  of  European  policy  which  occurred  post-April  1996,  a  number  of 
councils  were  unclear  as  to  the  benefits  which  WOSEC  authorities  received  from 
involvement  in  the  programme.  In  addition,  some  unitary  authorities  were 
experiencing  difficulty  providing  the  limited  finance  to  sustain  Ecos-Ouverture. 
Clearly  the  restructuring  of  local  government  in  Scotland  had  reduced  the  extent 
187  AER  stands  for  the  Association  of  European  Regions  and  CEMR  for  the  Council  of  European 
Municipalities  and  Regions.  See  Chapter  Six  for  a  discussion  of  the  role  of  these  networks  in  the 
merger  negotiations  and  Chapter  Seven  for  a  broader  exploration  of  their  functions. 
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institutions,  given  the  reduced  resources  which  they  could  now  bring  to  the 
process. 
9.3.4  -  Concluding  Comments  on  Multi-Level  Governance. 
The  experience  of  partnership  in  Western  Scotland  within  both  the  Strathclyde 
European  Partnership  and  the  Ecos-Ouverture  programme  signify  the  extent  to 
which  all  the  actors  involved,  including  the  European  Commission  and  central 
government,  were  involved  in  a  process  of  policy  learning  within  these  multi-level 
governance  institutions.  Both  institutions  experienced  a  substantial  change, 
within  a  relatively  short  period  of  time,  as  the  partners  involved  attempted  to 
shape  the  institutions  involved  to  meet  their  own  policy  priorities.  Within  these 
institutions  SNAs  tended  to  be  relatively  resource-weak  actors  and  thus  over  time 
less  likely  to  be  able  to  influence  the  direction  of  policy.  Nevertheless  where 
interests  coincided  between  SNA's  and  either  the  European  Commission  and  /  or 
central  government  then  SNA  interests  could  be  pursued.  Despite  the  existence 
of  multi-level  governance  and  the  interpretation  that  such  institutions  represent 
an  erosion  of  central  state  powers,  experience  in  Western  Scotland  illustrated 
that  such  institutions  existed  with  the  co-operation  of  central  government  which 
maintained  a  gatekeeping  role,  enabling  central  government  to  direct  policy 
within  the  SEP.  Multi-level  governance  in  Western  Scotland  certainly 
represented  a  condition  of  continuous  renegotiation  as  the  influence  of  various 
partners  within  these  organisations  fluctuated  over  time,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Scottish  Office  and  the  European  Commission  which  remained  central  to  the 
process  throughout  as  a  result  of  the  financial  resources  and  legal  legitimacy  of 
these  actors  within  these  institutions.  In  contrast  SNA's  relied  upon  their 
experience  of  the  local  /  regional  scale  and  the  legitimacy  they  provided  to  these 
institutions  as  a  lever  to  influence  policy.  The  extent  to  which  SRC  was  able  to 
influence  the  initial  form  these  institutions  (in  particular  the  SEP)  took,  illustrated 
188  PHARE  stands  for'Poland  and  Hungary  Action  for  Economic  Reconstruction'  and  TACIS  for 
Technical  Assistance  for  the  CIS  and  Georgia'. 
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governance  scenarios.  As  Jeffrey  comments,  "while  all  SNA's  lack  a  strong 
constitutional  base,  those  which  approach  European  policy  entrepreneurially 
..  are  better  placed  to  `muscle  in'  for  a  share  of  European  decision-making 
alongside  the  central  state"  (Jeffrey,  1997,  p.  22-3).  SRC  certainly  acted 
entrepreneurially,  however  part  of  the  explanation  for  SRC's  extensive  European 
engagement  lies  in  the  specifically  Scottish  dimension  within  which  the  authority 
operated. 
9.4  -  The  Scottish  Dimension  to  European  Policy. 
The  form  in  which  partnership  was  implemented  in  Western  Scotland,  and  latterly 
Scotland,  is  a  prominent  example  of  the  Scottish  dimension  to  European  policy. 
Partnership  in  Scotland  contrasted  with  that  in  England  and  Wales,  where 
greater  control  was  exercised  by  central  government  through  partnership 
executives  being  staffed  by  central  government  civil  servants  resulting  in  criticism 
from  local  and  regional  agencies  concerning  a  lack  of  access  and  information 
within  the  decision-making  process  in  Structural  Fund  partnerships.  The  early 
experiments  with  partnership  in  Scotland,  and  the  active  role  of  SRC  within  this 
process,  enabled  an  alternative  model  of  partnership  to  exist  in  Scotland  prior  to 
the  Structural  Fund  reforms  of  1989.  Accordingly,  the  other  two  regional 
partnerships  in  Scotland  (East  of  Scotland  -  Objective  Two;  Highlands  and 
Islands  -  Objective  One)  both  followed  the  model  developed  in  Strathclyde 
through  the  creation  of  an  independent  programme  executive. 
The  partnership  structure  reflected  a  constant  finding  throughout  the  research 
process  of  a  distinct  Scottish  policy  community  which  dealt  with  European  policy 
and  in  particular  with  the  Structural  Funds.  This  'policy  community'  straddled  a 
wide  range  of  actors  from  a  number  of  institutional  backgrounds,  prominently 
including  the  Scottish  Office,  local  government,  Scottish  Enterprise  and  MEP's. 
The  Scottish  approach  to  partnership  was  able  to  evolve  due  to  the  frequent 
interaction  of  these  actors  and  the  corresponding  `trust'  which  developed 
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Scottish  `policy  community',  in  contrast  with  England,  and  the  corresponding 
potential  for  cooperation  between  institutions  which  developed  as  a  result.  Such 
opinions  were  frequently  expressed  by  officials,  who  whilst  recognising  the 
political  tensions  which  existed  (primarily  between  central  and  local  government), 
also  pointed  to  the  close  cooperation  on  a  day-to-day  basis  between  policy- 
makers.  In  essence,  policy-makers  were  keen  to  co-operate  in  areas  of  common 
interest  whilst  avoiding  areas  of  confrontation.  Notable  examples  of  the  Scottish 
`policy  community'  co-operating  in  order  to  achieve  common  aims,  included  the 
high-profile  campaigns  to  retain  Objective  Two  funding,  obtain  Objective  One 
funding  for  the  Highlands  and  Islands  and  subsequently,  extend  the  Objective 
One  funding  to  Argyll  and  Bute.  The  development  of  partnership  in  Scotland  and 
the  co-operation  between  Scottish  institutions  based  in  Brussels  within  Scotland 
Europa  both  provide  examples  of  the  operation  of  a  Scottish  policy  community 
within  the  context  of  European  policy. 
In  addition  to  a  Scottish  policy  community,  the  early  development  of  European 
policy  within  SRC  was  reflected  in  the  creation  of  a  European  policy-community 
within  Western  Scotland  as  expertise  in  this  field  developed  due  to  SRC's 
engagement  with  the  EU.  The  network  centred  around  SRC  politicians,  officials 
from  the  Chief  Executive's  Department,  SEP  officials  and  Strathclyde  MEP's. 
This  network  gained  prominence  during  the  mid  to  late  1980s  in  part,  due  to  the 
activism  of  SRC  within  trans-national  networks  and  through  the  access  these 
actors  could  obtain  within  DGXVI,  in  particular  to  the  Commissioner,  Bruce  Millan 
and  his  senior  officials.  However,  this  network  gradually  became  part  of  a  wider 
Scottish  policy  community  during  the  early  1990s  as  Scottish  institutions 
mobilised  more  generally  onto  the  European  policy  arena,  notably  through  the 
establishment  of  Scotland  Europa.  Nevertheless,  a  number  of  respondents  from 
unitary  authorities  post-reorganisation  were  still  aware  of  a  distinct  close  knit 
policy  community  in  Western  Scotland  which  centred  upon  SEP,  and  was  a 
legacy  of  SRCs  European  policy.  Local  government  reorganisation  encouraged 
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distinguish  itself  from  the  rest  of  the  UK,  notably  through  withdrawal  from  the 
Local  Government  International  Bureau  (LGIB). 
As  Marks  postulates  (1  996c)  the  existence  of  a  regional  identity  /  sense  of 
regional  distinctiveness,  or  in  the  case  of  Scotland,  the  role  of  distinctly  'Scottish' 
institutions  which  shared  a  perception  of  a  common  interest,  which  could  be 
divergent  from  wider  UK  interests,  certainly  aided  the  development  of  multi-level 
governance  within  both  Western  Scotland  and  Scotland.  In  addition  such  factors 
also  facilitated  cooperation  between  institutions,  particularly  following  the  rapid 
mobilisation  of  other  European  SNA's  to  Brussels. 
9.5  -  Formal  and  Informal  Channels  of  SNA  influence. 
'Multi-level  governance'  tends  to  emphasise  the  importance  of  institutional 
outcomes  as  indicators  of  SNA  mobilisation  onto  the  European  policy  arena.  In 
terms  of  the  'stronger'  European  SNA's  such  as  the  German  Lander,  such  an 
approach  clearly  carries  weight  given  the  entrenched  constitutional  position  of 
the  SNA's  within  their  member-states.  Nevertheless  proponents  of  'multi-level 
governance'  do  also  point  to  more  informal  procedures  via  which  SNAs  can 
influence  the  European  policy-making  process  (McAteer  and  Mitchell,  1996). 
The  early  origins  of  SRC's  European  policy  developed  out  of  informal  contacts 
between  SRC  officials  and  Commission  officials.  Such  developments  led  to  the 
early  establishment  of  an  SRC  representative  office  in  Brussels,  again  to  foster 
informal  contacts  between  SRC  and  the  European  Commission.  Participation 
within  formal  trans-regional  networks  came  later,  following  the  mobilisation  of 
European  SNAs  with  regard  to  European  policy  and  the  correspondent  increase 
in  competition  between  SNAs  for  the  attention  of  Commission  officials.  Formal 
networks  such  as  AER  and  RETI  provided  a  number  of  benefits  to  SNAs  such  as 
SRC,  including  access  to  Commission  officials  as  trans-regional  networks 
represented  a  large  number  of  SNAs,  whilst  the  support  of  a  network  also 
300 provided  legitimacy  to  SNA  opinions.  In  addition  trans-national  networks  can 
also  provide  legitimacy  to  a  Directorate-General  within  the  Commission,  such  as 
the  legitimacy  provided  to  DGXVI's  policy  position  through  RETI's  role  in  lobbying 
for  the  retention  of  Objective  Two  funding  in  1992.  In  addition,  trans-national 
networks  also  provide  a  forum  for  contact  with  other  SNAs  wherein  support  can 
be  garnered  for  individual  SNA  policies,  such  as  SRC  promotion  and  protection 
of  Ecos-Ouverture  under  the  auspices  of  AER,  whilst  also  providing  a  'meeting 
point'  for  SNAs  to  obtain  partners  for  EU  funding  programmes. 
However,  a  frequent  complaint  from  respondents,  particularly  officials,  was  that 
the  formal  trans-regional  networks  amounted  to  little  more  than  grandiose 
'talking-shops',  with  the  actual  politics  occurring  within  the  informal  networks 
which  developed  around  the  executives  of  organisations  such  as  RETI  and  AER 
and  the  European  Commission.  In  the  case  of  SRC,  the  prominent  role  which 
the  authority  developed  within  AER  and  RETI  was  a  product  of  the  extensive 
informal  contacts  which  SRC  held  within  the  Commission,  thus  for  instance 
enabling  SRC  to  hold  the  Presidency  of  RETI  and  take  the  lead  in  the  lobby  for 
the  retention  of  Objective  Two  in  1992.  Significantly  following  reorganisation,  the 
new  unitary  authorities  began  to  question  the  value  of  continued  involvement 
within  trans-national  networks  such  AER  and  RETI,  as  these  authorities  were  not 
prominent  within  these  networks  and  correspondingly  had  little  influence  in  terms 
of  their  decision-making  structures. 
Clearly,  the  reliance  of  many  SNAs  upon  informal  channels  of  influence  within 
the  European  decision-making  process  reflects  the  relatively  weak  position  of 
these  actors  within  EU  structures.  Attempts  to  influence  EU  decisions  were 
certainly  more  likely  to  be  successful  when  SNAs  had  the  support,  whether  tacit 
or  explicit,  of  the  Commission  or  a  member-state.  Whilst  SNAs  with  entrenched 
institutional  procedures  for  dealing  with  European  policy,  which  Jeffrey  (1997) 
terms  `European  Domestic  Policy',  may  rely  upon  formal  procedures,  SRC  and 
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further  their  interests  with  regard  to  European  policy. 
The  principal  mechanism  developed  by  SNAs  to  further  informal  contacts 
between  an  SNA  and  European  Institutions  (and  indeed,  other  SNAs)  has  been 
through  the  establishment  of  a  representative  office  in  Brussels.  SRC  was  a 
pioneer  in  this  area  of  European  policy,  with  the  initial  establishment  of  a 
representative  office  designed  to  aid  closer  contact  with  Commission  officials  and 
correspondingly  increase  European  funding  to  the  Council.  However,  the  Reform 
of  the  Structural  Funds  in  1989  significantly  reduced  the  potential  for  a  Brussels 
office  to  increase  funding  flows  to  the  'home'  region  through  the  partnership 
procedures  outlined  above,  although  this  had  been  the  case  in  Strathclyde  since 
1988  following  the  designation  of  the  vast  majority  of  the  region  within  the 
boundaries  of  the  IDO.  Accordingly  the  role  of  SRC's  office  shifted  to  focus  upon 
tracking  EU  legislation  with  regard  to  the  Council's  policy  competences 
(particularly  with  regard  to  lobbying  Commission  officials  early  in  the  policy 
formulation  process),  establishing  links  with  other  SNAs,  and  identifying  the 
remaining  funding  opportunities  which  existed,  primarily  Community  Initiatives. 
The  rapid  expansion  of  SNA  representation  in  Brussels  also  led  to  increased 
competition,  as  well  as  cooperation  between  SNAs,  whilst  the  corresponding 
mobilisation  of  Scottish  institutions  within  Brussels  principally  through  the 
establishment  of  Scotland  Europa,  ensured  that  SRC's  activities  became 
increasingly  coordinated  with  those  of  other  Scottish  institutions  following  SRC's 
entrance  into  Scotland  Europa,  in  order  to  compete  with  SNA  mobilisation  from 
across  the  EU.  Again,  the  impact  of  reorganisation  served  to  weaken  the  ability 
of  the  West  of  Scotland  authorities  to  mobilise  effectively  through  WOSEC  due  to 
the  costs  involved,  resulting  in  West  of  Scotland  local  government  interest 
representation  becoming  increasingly  channelled  through  COSLA  on  a  pan- 
Scottish  basis. 
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The  experience  of  SRC  and  its  successor  authorities  between  1975  and  1997 
with  regard  to  the  evolution  of  multi-level  governance  relationships,  clearly 
illustrates  the  extent  to  which  such  a  process  consists  of  continual  change  and 
complex,  shifting  alliances  of  interest  between  institutions  at  a  variety  of 
governmental  tiers.  The  policy  environment  post-1997  continues  to  exhibit  the 
same  features,  which  offer  both  opportunities  and  pitfalls  for  Scottish  local 
government  with  regard  to  the  extent  to  which  it  will  continue  to  Europeanise  and 
engage  in  multi-level  governance  relationships  in  order  to  influence  EU  decision- 
making.  The  post-1997  policy  environment  consists  of  two  key  institutional 
events  which  will  have  a  fundamental  impact  upon  the  relations  between  Scottish 
local  government  and  the  European  Union.  These  are  the  implications  of  EU 
enlargement  through  the  Agenda  2000189  programme  and  the  impact  of 
devolution  upon  Scottish  local  government's  relations  vis-a-vis  the  EU.  Although 
the  research  upon  which  this  thesis  rests  considers  the  period  between  1975  and 
1997,  I  intend  to  briefly  discuss  these  two  events  with  regard  to  Scottish  local 
government  European  policy. 
The  impact  of  Agenda  2000  upon  local  government  in  Scotland  is  likely  to  be 
most  noticeable  in  terms  of  a  reduction  in  the  amount  of  finance  available  via  the 
Structural  Funds.  The  Structural  Funds  have  been  reduced  from  five  objectives 
(if  Objective  5a  and  5b  are  counted  as  one  objective)  to  three  objectives'90.  The 
West  of  Scotland  remains  an  Objective  Two  area  with  a  budget  of  £272m  for  the 
period  2000-06  (Scottish  Executive,  22/12/99).  However,  the  SEP  area  has  been 
divided  into  fully  eligible  areas  and  transition  areas.  The  majority  of  Objective  2 
funding  will  be  concentrated  into  the  fully  eligible  areas.  Transition  areas 
189  For  a  discussion  of  the  impact  of  Agenda  2000  upon  the  Structural  Funds,  see  House  of 
Commons  Library,  1998a.  For  a  more  general  introduction  to  the  potential  political  and  financial 
implications  of  EU  Enlargement,  see  House  of  Commons  Library,  1998b  and  1998c. 
190  Objective  one  remains  as  constituted  during  1994-99  while  Objective  Three  and  Four  have 
been  merged  into  a  single  objective  Three  and  Objective  Two  activity  has  been  merged  with 
Objective  5b  functions.  In  addition,  the  number  of  Community  Initiatives  has  been  reduced  from 
thirteen  to  four. 
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2005  after  which  these  areas  will  lose  Objective  Two  status.  As  a  result,  local 
government  in  the  West  of  Scotland  (and  indeed  Scotland  more  generally)  can 
expect  to  face  significant  cuts  in  finance  from  European  sources.  Consequently, 
Scottish  local  government  is  likely  to  find  that  the  primary  impact  of 
Europeanisation  in  the  new  Millennium  will  be  in  terms  of  EU  legislation.  Clearly 
the  role  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  with  regard  to  European  policy  will  significantly 
structure  the  extent  to  which  Scottish  local  government  can  influence  EU  policy- 
making. 
The  Devolution  White  Paper  'Scotland's  Parliament'  (Scottish  Office,  1997)  set 
out  the  framework  for  the  Scottish  Parliament's  European  policy,  which  would 
include  the  Parliament  having  powers  of  scrutiny  and  implementation  over  EU 
legislation  as  it  affected  its  policy  competences,  whilst  the  Scottish  Executive  is 
to  have  full  access  to  UK  government  policy  discussions  on  the  member  state 
position  and  access  to  Council  of  Ministers  negotiations.  A  European  policy 
concordat  has  been  drawn  up  to  structure  Scottish  Executive  relations  with 
Whitehall  in  this  policy  area.  The  Devolution  White  Paper  stated  that  'the  guiding 
principle  which  the  UK  Government  sets  out  to  establish  in  the  relationship  with 
the  Scottish  Executive  on  EU  matters  is  that  there  should  be  the  closest  possible 
working  relationships  and  involvement'  (Scottish  Office,  1997,  p.  18).  In  addition, 
the  Scottish  Executive  will  continue  to  have  representation  within  the  UK 
Permanent  Representation  in  Brussels,  whilst  the  Scottish  Executive  opened  a 
European  office  in  July  1999,  in  offices  located  in  the  same  building  as  Scotland 
Europa  and  therefore  alongside  Scottish  local  government  representation.  The 
functions  of  this  office,  which  are  similar  to  those  of  Scottish  local  government 
representative  offices,  are  :  - 
"The  office  will  assist  the  Executive  in  supporting  the  European  responsibilities  of 
the  Scottish  Parliament.  It  will  provide  information  to  facilitate  scrutiny  of 
European  legislation;  it  will  assist  visits  to  Brussels  by  Parliamentary 
Committees.  It  will  help  raise  awareness  among  Scottish  European  decision- 
makers  of  Scottish  issues  and  perspectives;  it  will  ensure  that  the  Scottish 
dimension  is  fed  in  early  as  European  proposals  are  being  formulated.  It  will 
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States"  (Scottish  Office,  1999,  p.  1). 
In  addition  a  dose  relationship  between  the  Scottish  Executive  and  Scotland 
Europa  is  envisaged,  for  example  the  Scottish  Secretary,  Donald  Dewar,  stated:  - 
"We  need  to  project  a  strong,  unified  presence.  We  can  best  do  this  by  working 
together  with  Scotland  Europa"  (Scottish  Office,  1999,  p.  1). 
Clearly  the  devolution  settlement  holds  significant  potential  for  Scottish  local 
government  in  terms  of  European  policy,  particularly  through  improved 
information  flows  between  the  Scottish  Executive  and  Scottish  local  government. 
A  particular  role  may  exist  for  COSLA,  which  has  frequently  been  pointed  to  as 
an  intermediary  between  Scottish  local  government  and  the  Scottish 
Executive'91,  and  post-reorganisation  was  becoming  the  principal  Scottish  local 
government  actor  with  regard  to  European  policy.  Given  that  tracking  EU 
legislation  and  building  alliances  with  other  European  SNAs  will  become  the 
principal  task  of  Scottish  local  government  in  the  coming  years,  the 
establishment  of  a  Scottish  Parliament  and  Executive  will  offer  a  considerable 
resource  to  local  government.  Access  to  information  remains  the  key  asset  for 
SNAs,  and  the  role  of  the  Parliament  as  a  recepticle  and  gatherer  of  information 
regarding  policy  developments  will  offer  a  considerable  resource  for  Scottish 
local  government.  The  opportunity  to  collaborate  with  the  Scottish  Parliament 
could  enable  local  government  to  be  considerably  less  'resource-weak'  when 
lobbying  European  Institutions.  In  essence,  European  policy  may  move  closer  to 
Jeffries  model  of  'European  Domestic  Policy'  in  Scotland,  through  the  powers 
devolved  to  the  Scottish  Parliament. 
191  For  example,  the  McIntosh  'Commission  on  Local  Govemment  and  the  Scottish  Parliament' 
in  it's  second  consultation  paper  which  intended  to  indicate  the  direction  it  was  taking  , 
commented  :  -'Each  council  has  a  proper  concern  for  the  special  interests  of  its  own  area;  and 
these  concerns  need  to  be  heard  by  government.  Nevertheless,  it  seems  to  us  obvious  that  it  is 
essential  for  the  health  of  local  government  that  it  should  be  able  to  speak  also  with  a  single 
voice,  where  that  is  appropriate,  especially  in  dealing  with  government.  If  COSLA  did  not  exist,  it 
would  have  to  be  invented  for  this  purpose.  it  is  therefore  important  that  COSLA  should  develop 
305 Whether  Scottish  local  government  grasps  this  opportunity  remains  to  be  seen. 
Local  government  in  Western  Scotland  was  certainly  experiencing  difficulties  in 
conducting  a  European  policy  post  local  government  reorganisation.  However, 
this  did  result  in  a  strengthened  role  for  local  government  at  the  Scottish  level 
through  COSLA  at  the  same  time.  The  European  Union,  will  certainly  provide 
less  opportunities  financially  in  the  future.  However,  local  government  in 
Western  Scotland  experienced  a  significant  degree  of  Europeanisation  between 
1975-97,  developing  a  considerable  amount  of  experience  in  European  policy- 
making  and  the  role  of  SNA's  in  this  process.  Whilst  SRC  was  initially  a  pioneer 
with  regard  to  European  policy,  Scottish  local  government  more  generally  also 
developed  European  policies  and  structures  of  interest  articulation  in  later  years. 
As  a  result,  European  policy  has  become  an  integral  part  of  Scottish  local 
government's  policy  portfolio.  The  experience  gained  from  this  process  of 
Europeanisation  and  the  potential  to  'ride  on  the  coat-tails'  of  the  Scottish 
Parliament  with  regard  to  European  policy  ensures  that,  despite  the  loss  of  a 
financial  incentive,  Scottish  local  government  will  continue  to  contribute  to  EU 
policy-making  through  evolving  multi-level  governance  relationships. 
its  role  and  capacity  to  represent  local  government  as  a  whole  to  the  new  institutions'  (Scottish 
office,  1998,  p.  10). 
306 Appendix  One  -  List  of  Interviewees. 
Case  Number  Position  of  the  Respondent  Date  of 
Interview 
Case  One  Senior  Labour  Councillor  within  SRC.  Janus  1996. 
Case  Two  Labour  Councillor  within  SRC.  January  1996. 
Case  Three  Senior  Labour  Councillor  within  SRC  January  1996. 
(and  CoR  representative). 
Reinterviewed  in  third  series. 
Case  Four  Liberal  Democrat  Councillor  within  January  1996. 
SRC. 
Case  Five  Conservative  Councillor  within  SRC.  January  1996. 
Case  Six  Scottish  National  Party  Councillor  April  1996. 
within  SRC  and  CoR  representative). 
Case  Seven  Liberal  Democrat  Councillor  within  January  1996. 
SRC. 
Case  Eight  Former  Labour  Party  Secretary  within  February  1997. 
SRC. 
Case  Nine  Official  from  the  Department  of  February  1996. 
Physical  Planning. 
Case  Ten  Official  from  the  Roads  Department.  February  1996. 
Case  Eleven  Official  from  the  Education  February  1996. 
Department.  Interviewed  on  three 
occasions. 
Case  Twelve  Official  from  the  Chief  Executive's  March  1996. 
Department.  Interviewed  on  three 
occasions  (once  as  a  Third  Series 
respondent). 
Case  Thirteen  Official  from  the  Chief  Executive's  April  1996. 
Department. 
Case  Fourteen  Senior  Official  from  the  Chief  April  1996. 
Executive's  Department. 
Case  Fifteen  Senior  Official  from  Strathclyde  March  1996. 
Business  Development. 
Case  Sixteen  Official  from  Strathclyde  Business  April  1996. 
Development. 
Case  Assistant  to  West  of  Scotland  Labour  October  1996. 
Seventeen  MEP. 
Case  Ei  hteen  West  of  Scotland  Labour  MEP.  October  1996. 
Case  Nineteen  Scottish  National  PartMEP.  October  1996. 
Case  Twent  West  of  Scotland  Labour  MEP.  October  1996. 
Case  Twenty  West  of  Scotland  Labour  MEP.  October  1996. 
One 
307 Case  Twenty  West  of  Scotland  Labour  MEP.  October  1996. 
TWO 
Case  Twenty  Scotland  Europa  Official.  October  1996. 
Three 
Case  Twenty  Scotland  Europa  Official.  October  1996. 
Four 
Case  Twenty  Scottish  Local  Government  lobbyist.  October  1996. 
Five 
Case  Twenty  Scottish  Local  Government  lobbyist  October  1996. 
Six  and  former  Ecos-Ouverture 
official.  192 
Case  Twenty  Senior  Scotland  Europa  official.  October  1996. 
Seven 
Case  Twenty  Scottish  Journalist.  October  1996. 
Eight 
Case  Twenty  Scottish  Journalist.  October  1996. 
Nine 
Case  Thirty  Scottish  Journalist.  October  1996. 
Case  Thirty  DGXVI  official  October  1996. 
One 
Case  Thirty  Commission  official  and  formerly  a  October  1996. 
Two  member  of  Millan's  'Cabinet'. 
Case  Thirty  DGXI  official.  October  1996. 
Three 
Case  Thirty  DGV  official.  October  1996. 
Four 
Case  Thirty  DGXVI  official.  October  1996. 
Five 
Case  Thirty  CEMR  official.  October  1996. 
Six 
Case  Thirty  Wales  European  Centre  lobbyist.  October  1996. 
Seven 
Case  Thirty  LGIB  lobbyist.  October  1996. 
Eight 
Case  Thirty  Merseyside  partners  lobbyist.  October  1996. 
Nine 
Case  Forty  Lancashire  Enterprises  lobbyist.  October  1996. 
Case  Forty  Saschen-Anhalt  lobbyist.  Partner  October  1996. 
One  re  ion  in  E_cos  Ouverture. 
192  This  respondent  was  interviewed  twice.  The  first  interview  concerned  her  role  as  a  lobbyist 
for  a  Scottish  local  government  organisation,  whilst  the  second  dealt  with  her  previous 
employment  with  Ecos-Ouverture. 
308 Case  Forty  Senior  Official,  Industry  Department,  January  1997. 
Two  Scottish  Office. 
Case  Forty  Senior  Official,  Strathclyde  European  July  1996. 
Three  Partnership.  193 
Case  Forty  Senior  Official,  Ecos-Ouverture.  194  February  1996. 
Four 
Case  Forty  Former  European  Commissioner  and  July  1996. 
Five  Scottish  Labour  politician. 
Case  Forty  Six  Labour  Councillor  (and  CoR  January  1997. 
member),  North  Lanarkshire  Council. 
Also  interviewed  in  First  series. 
Case  Forty  European  Officer,  North  Lanarkshire  February  1997. 
Seven  Council. 
Case  Forty  Senior  Officer,  North  Lanarkshire  May  1997. 
Eight  Council. 
Case  Forty  European  Officer,  WOSEC.  Also  February  1997. 
Nine  interviewed  in  First  series. 
Case  Fifty  European  Officer,  Renfrewshire  May  1997. 
Council. 
Case  Fifty  Labour  Councillor  (Chair  of  COSLA's  May  1997. 
One  European  Committee),  Renfrewshire 
Council.. 
Case  Fifty  European  Officer,  South  Lanarkshire  March  1997. 
Two  Council. 
Case  Fifty  Labour  Councillor,  South  Lanarkshire  May  1997. 
Three  Council. 
Case  Fifty  Labour  Councillor,  Glasgow  City  February  1997. 
Four  Council. 
Case  Fifty  European  Officers,  Glasgow  City  March  1997. 
Five  Council. 
Case  Fifty  Six  European  Officers,  COSLA.  March  1997. 
Case  Fifty  European  Officer,  Argyll  and  Bute  March  1997. 
Seven  Council. 
193  This  respondent  was  re  interviewed  in  April  1997,  in  order  to  stay  aware  of  developments 
following  the  first  interview. 
194  This  respondent  was  re  interviewed  in  March  1997,  in  order  to  obtain  information  on 
developments  within  Ouverture  post-February  1996. 
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This  is  a  short  questionnaire  concerning  the  impact  of  local  government 
reorganisation  upon  the  operation  of  European  policy  and  interest  representation 
at  the  sub-national  level.  The  data  derived  from  this  questionnaire  will  be  used 
for  the  purposes  of  research,  in  order  to  obtain  a  PhD.  The  responses  from  this 
survey  are  confidential,  however  if  you  do  have  any  concerns  or  questions, 
regarding  the  questionnaire,  please  do  not  hesitate  to  contact  me  at  the  address 
at  the  end  of  the  below.  The  estimated  completion  time  of  the  questionnaire  is 
10-15  minutes. 
Section  A  :-  The  European  Affairs  of  your  council. 
Q1)  Does  your  council  have  a  Committee  which  deals  specifically  with  European 
Affairs?  (Please  name  the  Chair  of  this  Committee). 
Yes.  No. 
Q1  b)  If  you  answered  No,  to  Q1,  which  Committee  does  deal  with  European 
Affairs?  (Please  name  the  Chair  of  this  Committee). 
Q2)  Does  your  council  have  a  department  which  deals  specifically  with 
European  affairs? 
Yes.  No. 
Q2b)  If  you  answered  Yes  to  Q2,  how  many  officials  are  employed  within  this 
department? 
.  (Continue  to  Q3). 
Q2c)  If  you  answered  No,  to  Q2,  which  department  of  your  council,  does  deal 
with  European  affairs?  (Continue  to  Q2d) 
310 Q2d)  How  many  officials  within  this  department,  are  employed  to  deal  with 
European  affairs? 
Q3)  How  would  you  term  the  extent  of  co-operation  between  your  European 
team  and  other  departments,  affected  by  European  issues  within  your  council? 
Very 
Co-operative 
Co-operative  Not  co- 
operative 
No 
co-operation 
Don't  Know 
1  2  3  4  5 
Q4)  Which  departments  are  you  in  most  frequent  contact  with  regarding  the 
impact  of  European  affairs  upon  their  department  ?[  Please  list  the  three  most 
contacted  departments,  in  order  of  frequency  ]. 
1. 
2.  -  ----------. 
3.  ----------. 
Q5)  What  are  the  three  priorities  areas  in  terms  of  your  council's  European 
policy,  over  the  next  two  years? 
1.  -----------  ------------  . 
2. 
, 
3.  ------ýý_, 
311 Q6)  Is  your  council  a  member  of  any  European  networks,  e.  g.  AER,  RETI, 
CEMR  etc. 
Yes.  No. 
Q6b)  If  you  answered  Yes,  to  Q6),  please  name  these  networks. 
Q7)  Has  your  council  applied  for,  or  have  any  plans  to  apply  for  Community 
Initiatives  ? 
Yes.  No. 
Q7b)  If  you  answered  Yes,  to  Q7),  please  state  which  Community  Initiatives, 
these  are  :- 
Q8)  Which  three  areas  of  European  legislation,  is  your  European  department, 
most  concerned  with? 
1.  ------------------  . 
2.  -____  . 
3. 
312 Section  B:  -  The  External  Relations  of  your  Council. 
Q9)  How  frequently  are  you  in  contact  with  the  West  of  Scotland  European 
Consortium? 
Every  Day  Every  two  Weekly  Fortnightly  Monthly  Less  Don't 
to  three  frequently  Know 
days  than 
Monthly 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Q10)  How  frequently  are  you  in  contact  with  the  COS  LA  European  team? 
Every  Day  Every  two  Weekly  Fortnightly  Monthly  Less  Don't 
to  three  frequently  Know 
days  than 
Monthly 
2  3  4  5  6  7 
313 Q11)  How  frequently  are  you  in  contact  with  a  Strathclyde  based  MEP? 
Every  Day  Every  two  Weekly  Fortnightly  Monthly  Less  Don't 
to  three  frequently  Know 
days  than 
Monthly 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Q  12)  How  frequently  are  you  in  contact  with  a  non-Strathclyde-based,  Scottish 
MEP? 
Every  Day  Every  two  Weekly  Fortnightly  Monthly  Less  Don't 
to  three  frequently  Know 
days  than 
Monthly 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Q13)  How  frequently  are  you  in  contact  with  a  Scottish,  Committee  of  the 
Regions  member? 
Every  Day  Every  two  Weekly  Fortnightly  Monthly  Less  Don't 
to  three  frequently  Know 
days  than 
Monthly 
2  3  4  5  6  7 
314 Q14)  How  frequently  are  you  in  contact  with  Scottish  Office  officials,  who  deal 
with  European  issues? 
Every  Day  Every  two  Weekly  Fortnightly  Monthly  Less  Don't 
to  three  frequently  Know 
days  than 
Monthly 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Q15)  How  would  you  term  the  relations  between  your  department,  and  Scottish 
Office  officials,  dealing  with  European  affairs? 
Very 
Co-operative 
Co-operative  Not  co- 
operative 
No 
co-operation 
Don't  Know 
1  2  3  4  5 
Section  C:  -  Re-organisation. 
Q16)  How  would  you  term  the  impact  of  the  reorganisation  of  local  government, 
upon  the  representation  of  Strathclyde's  interests  vis-6-vis  the  EU? 
Extremely 
positive 
Positive  No  change  Negative  Extremely 
negative 
Don't 
Know 
ý,  2.  3.  4.  5.  6. 
315 Q17)  Dependent  upon  your  answer  to  Q17,  what  have  been  the  three  main 
advantages  /  disadvantages,  upon  the  representation  of  Strathclyde's  interests 
vis-ä-vis  the  EU,  since  re-organisation  ? 
1. 
2. 
3.  ----______--.  _-----------------------  . 
018)  Prior  to  re-organisation,  were  you  employed  in  a  position,  which  dealt  with 
European  affairs? 
Yes.  No. 
Q19)  What  was  the  name  of  the  local  authority  you  were  employed  by  prior  to 
re-organisation? 
Thank  you  for  completing  this  questionnaire.  Once  again,  if  you  have 
any  comments  or  concerns  regarding  this  questionnaire,  please  outline  these  in 
the  space  below,  or  contact  me  at:  - 
Mr  Stephen  Herbert, 
Department  of  Politics, 
Adam  Smith  Building, 
Glasgow  University, 
Glasgow, 
G12  BRT. 
Tel:  -  0141-339-8855.  Ext.  2500. 
316 Appendix  Three  -'Resident'  and  'Subscription'  members  of  Scotland 
Europa.  July  1996. 
Residents. 
COSLA 
East  of  Scotland  European  Consortium  (ESEC). 
Highlands  and  Islands  EU  Office. 
Scottish  Enterprise. 
Maclay  Murray  and  Spens. 
West  of  Scotland  European  Consortium  (WoSEC)  (formerly  SRC). 
Subscribers. 
British  Energy. 
British  Telecom. 
Caledonian  Publishing  Ltd. 
Clydeport  plc. 
Committee  of  Scottish  Clearing  Banks. 
Committee  of  Scottish  Higher  Education  Principals. 
East  of  Scotland  Water  Authority. 
Telford  College  (Edinburgh). 
Euro-Info  Centre. 
Europa  Institute. 
General  Accident. 
Glasgow  Caledonian  University. 
North  of  Scotland  Water  Authority. 
Scottish  Whisky  Association. 
Scottish  Chambers  of  Commerce. 
Scottish  Council  (Development  and  Industry). 
Scottish  Council  for  Educational  Technology. 
Scottish  Council  for  Voluntary  Organisations. 
Scottish  Design. 
317 Scottish  Environmental  Protection  Agency. 
Scottish  Environmental  Industries  Association. 
Scottish  Financial  Enterprise. 
Scottish  Further  Education  Unit. 
Scottish  Homes. 
Scottish  Hydro-Electric. 
Scottish  Natural  Heritage. 
Scottish  Power. 
Scottish  Tourist  Board. 
Scottish  Vocational  Education  Council. 
Scottish  Water  and  Sewerage  Customers  Council. 
Sea  Fish  Industry  Authority. 
St  George's  School. 
Stevenson  College. 
STUC. 
Robert  Gordon  University. 
University  of  Edinburgh. 
University  of  Glasgow. 
University  of  Paisley. 
West  of  Scotland  Colleges'  European  Partnership. 
West  of  Scotland  Water  Authority. 
Source  :-  Scotland  Europa,  1996,  p.  3. 
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